Reyes-Medrano v. Garza et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
DAYID ABISAI
REYES-MEDRA 	0 ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUAN MANUEL GARZA,
JOSE ANDRADE, LAURA
RENTERIA, SELENA
HINOJOSA, JAMES LUGO,
MIRABELLE GARZA,
ISRAEL DE LA ROSA,
TORIBIO PALA CI OS,
IMELDA PEREZ, CITY OF
PHARR, RICARDO P. RODRIGUEZ,
JR. , DANIEL RODRIGUEZ,
JUAN ALVAREZ, OFFICER FLORES
Defendants.
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§ 	CIV. NO. 7:25-cv-00362
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MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, David Abisai Reyes-Medrano, proceeding prose , initiated this action by filing a
Complaint on July 21, 2025, against Defendants Juan Manuel Garza, Jose Andrade, Laura
Renteria, Selena Hinojosa, James Lugo, Mirabelle Garza, Israel De La Rosa, Toribio Palacios,
Imelda Perez, City of Pharr, Ricardo P. Rodriguez, Jr. , Daniel Rodriguez, Officer Flores, and Juan
Alvarez (collectively, "Defendants" ). 	(See Dkt. No. 2). 	Therein, Plaintiff alleges various
infractions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and Texas state law. 	(See generally id. at 4). 	This case was
subsequently referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for memorandum and recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and LR 72. (See Dkt. No. 16).
1
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 03, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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After careful review of the record and relevant law, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's
Complaint be DISMISSED as outlined within this Memorandum.
It is further recommended that the Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 4), Motion to
Strike or Withdraw Prior Filing Due to Clerical Error (Dkt. No. 15) , Emergency Motion in Brevis
for Criminal Referral, ADA Enforcement, and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. No. 18), Motion for Writ of
Habeas Corpus & Request for Criminal Investigation (Dkt. No. 19), Motion for Leave to File
Electronically as a Pro Se Litigant (Dkt. No. 22), and Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases
Pursuant to Rule 42(a) (Dkt. No. 32) aII be DENIED as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff's Original Complaint
Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Federal Civil Rights Complaint on July 21, 2025. 1 (Se e Dkt. No.
2). Therein, Plaintiff alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and "State -l evel abuse of
office and municipal negligence." (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff, a disabled and legally blind citizen, "has
been subjected to ongoing civil rights violations, abuse, retaliation, and denial of equal access to
public services" by employees and officials of the City of Pharr, Texas, allegedly acting under
color of state law. 	(Id. at 3). Specifically, Plaintiff enumerates various documented acts: use of
excessive force by Defendant Garza; neglect and manipulation of dispatch services by Hinojosa;
suppression and denial of police records by Mirabelle Garza and Imelda Perez; interference with
1 Petitioner 's pro se petition is entitled to a more liberal construction than those drafted by practicing
attorneys. See Hain es v. Ke rn er, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.Jd 420,
426-27 (5th Cir. 2011) ("It is the substance of the relief sought by a pros e pleading, not the label that the
petitioner has attached to it , that determines the true nature and operative effect of a [filing]." ). Thus, while
Plaintiff's allegations materialize as a somewhat discombobulated plight, the Court reviews Plaintiff's
filings in a more forgiving light.
2
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due process and mail delivery by City Liaison Lugo; retaliatory obstruction of legal filings
involving Palacios and Rodriguez; and refusal to investigate or prosecute a felony assault involving
an inmate, "which was downgraded inappropriately and denied justice to Plaintiff1.]" (Id.).
Plaintiff claims that in 2016, Plaintiff was involved in an assault with a TDCJ inmate,
during the time Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. was serving as District Attorney. (Dkt. No. 2 at 7). Plaintiff
alleges this was a hate-based assault, aided by Samantha De La Rosa and her family, and that
Rodriguez Jr. failed to prosecute the offense as a felony, "despite clear evidence of tampering with
the crime scene and physical relocation of Plaintiff's body." (Id.). Then, Rodriguez Jr. transitioned
to the role of City Attorney for the City of Pharr, Texas, while Plaintiff continued to seek access to
case records "and justice." 	(Id.) . 	Rodriguez Jr. failed to act, respond, or intervene to protect
Plaintiff's civil rights. 	(Id.) . This continued silence, Plaintiff states, in collaboration with City
Liaison James Lugo and District Attorney ("DA") Toribio "Terry" Palacios, constitutes active
retaliation, conflict of interest, and white-collar suppression of evidence. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that DA Palacios "has wrongfully accessed, withheld, and blocked
legal records without due process." (Dkt. No. 2 at 7). Plaintiff claims Palacios is a known relative
and/or associate of Rodriguez Jr. and continued said actions after Plaintiff submitted lawful
complaints and public records requests. 	(Id.). 	Thus, Plaintiff claims both Rodriguez Jr. and
Palacios used their positions "to protect city liability and shield others from accountability." (Id.).
Ultimately, Plaintiff claims all eleven named defendants contributed to, enabled, or covered
up systemic deprivation of Plaintiff's emergency protection, disability accommodations, access to
police records and legal records, and access to justice as a documented disabled crime victim.
(Dkt. No. 2 at 7). These failures have caused Plaintiff emotional distress and trauma, financial
hardship, continued disability-related harm, delays in civil and criminal accountability, and
3
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violation of constitutional rights under the 1st, 4th, and 14th amendments. 	(Id.) . Accordingly,
Plaintiff seeks 	compensatory 	and 	punitive 	damages 	totaling 	$211 ,000,000.00, 	permanent
injunctive 	relief barring 	retaliation, appointment 	of counsel 	under 	28 	U.S.C. § 	1915(e),
disqualification of Toribio Palacios from accessing Plaintiff's records, disqualification of Ricardo
Rodriguez Jr. 	from 	serving as City Attorney, preservation of evidence across 	all 	named
departments, and all other relief the Court deems just and proper. (Id. at 7-8).
B. 	Attachments
1. 	Addendum as to Mirabelle Garza and Imelda Perez
Both within the Original Complaint and as a separate filing, Plaintiff attaches an addendum
regarding Mirabelle Garza and Imelda Perez on July 21 , 2025 .2 	(S ee Dkt. Nos. 2, 9) . Plaintiff
alleges that between April 26, 2025 , and June 3, 2025, Mirabelle Garza "denied Plaintiff access to
public records including copies of police reports, phone call logs, and supporting documentation."
(Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16 ; Dkt. No. 9 at 16). In doing so, Plaintiff suggests Mirabelle Garza refused to
acknowledge existing case files , and subsequently withheld documentation critical to an ongoing
federal complaint. (Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16 ; Dkt. No. 9 at 16). Mirabelle Garza responded by "claiming
they would likely not receive any documents, even before processing the request." (Dkt. No. 2-3
at 	16 ; Dkt. 	No. 9 at 	16). 	This, Plaintiff argues, constitutes obstruction, retaliation, and
discrimination, because Plaintiff is a disabled and Latino resident. (Dkt. No . 2-3 at 16 ; Dkt. No. 9
at 16) . 	Plaintiff claims this violates the ADA, the equal protection clauses, and Texas Public
Information Act. (Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16 ; Dkt. No . 9 at 16).
2 While Plaintiff attaches addend urns regarding Mirabelle Garza and Imelda Perez in separate filings , they
appear to be duplicative in nature. (S ee Dkt. Nos. 2, 9).
4
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Plaintiff claims Imelda Perez used her official city email to refer to Plaintiff as "Disabled
David Reyes," which constitutes an act of cyberbullying and discrimination. (Dkt. No. 2 -3 at 16 ;
Dkt. No. 9 at 16). Plaintiff suggests this comment was made in response to an active public records
request and "constituted unprofessional conduct, violation of the ADA, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress." 	(Dkt. 	o. 2-3 at 16 ; Dkt. 	o. 9 at 16). 	Further, Plaintiff contends these
remarks demonstrate the "hostile and retaliatory environment maintained by the City of Pharr
against disabled residents. " (Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16 ; Dkt. No. 9 at 16).
2. 	Addendum as to Jose Andrade
Plaintiff filed an addendum regarding Defendant Jose Andrade on July 21, 2025. (See Dkt.
No. 6). 	Plaintiff claims he "has suffered over a decade of documented mistreatment, abuse, and
discrimination at the hands of Trooper Jose Andrade." 	(Id. at 2). 	These acts include excessive
force, including beating Plaintiff with a baton, racial profiling and disability-based harassment,
false arrest and involuntary hospitalization of Plaintiff, lying on official reports, withholding
exculpatory information, abusing his authority and ignoring civil protections, and failing to follow
due process on multiple incidents. (Id.) .
3. 	Addendum as to City of Pharr, Texas
Plaintiff filed an addendum with regard to the City of Pharr, Texas on July 21 , 2025. (S ee
Dkt. 	o. 7). Plaintiff claims he has been "systematically targeted, neglected, and retaliated against
by multiple defendants and representatives of the City of Pharr, Texas." 	(Id. at 2). 	Specifically,
Plaintiff has experienced neglect of more than twenty (20) criminal complaints filed between 2020
and 2025, downgrading of felony offenses and refusal to act on active warrants, excessive force
resulting in permanent vision damage, involuntary hospitalization by unqualified officers, denial
of access to public records in violation of the Texas Public Information Act, cyberbullying by
5
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referring to Plaintiff as "Disabled David Reyes" by city email, and repeated acts of retaliation and
public humiliation for asserting his disability rights. (Id.) .
4. 	Addendum as to Juan Manuel Garza
Plaintiff filed an addendum with regard to Juan Manuel Garza on July 21, 2025. (See Dkt.
No. 8). Therein, Plaintiff alleges Juan Manuel Garza failed to investigate over twenty (20) separate
criminal complaints filed by Plaintiff since 2020, failed to act on valid warrants or protect
Plaintiff's rights as a disabled crime victim, failed to uphold his duties as a senior investigator and
supervisor in preventing misconduct, downgrading felonies, and obstructing due process. (Id. at
2). This has caused Plaintiff worsening of his medical condition and vision, emotional distress,
trauma, fear for safety, denial of access to justice under federal protections, and public humiliation.
(Id.).
5. 	Attached Exhibits
Along with the addendums, Plaintiff attaches various exhibits both within his Original
Complaint as well as in separate filings. Plaintiff provides the Court with a series of police reports 3
from the Pharr Police Department, including accounts of indecent assault, aggravated assault,
harassment, theft/larceny, possession of marijuana, prohibited sexual conduct, and disorderly
conduct. 4 	(See generally Dkt. No. 2-2 at 33 -178 ; Dkt. No. 13 at 1-172). 	Plaintiff also filed a
document labeled Exhibit G, which appears to be a screenshot of an internet article discussing
3 All of these reports reference some iteration of Plaintiff's name (i.e. David Reyes, David Abisai Reyes).
(See generally Dkt. No. 2). The Court interprets these to be one and the same as Plaintiff, David Abisai
Reyes-Medrano.
4 While Plaintiff files these exhibits in separate filings, both filings , with the exception of some reports, are
largely duplicative. (Compare Dkt. No. 2, with Dkt. No. 13).
6
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Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. being appointed to the position of Deputy City Attorney and Prosecutor, as
well as an image titled "Texas Syndicate" with the description "Long-time supporters of Terry
Palacios." 	(Dkt. No. 2-2 at 176, 178). 	On August 18 , 2025 , Plaintiff filed a demand letter with
the Court, demanding payment in the sum of $325 ,000,000.00 representing compensatory and
punitive damages. 	(S ee Dkt. No. 21 ). Additionally, Plaintiff filed a collection of phone records,
the purpose of which appears to be seeking various case numbers, meetings, and charges filed,
images of injuries and scars on Plaintiff's head, arm, and knee, screenshots correspondence
through the City of Pharr records portal, as well as a record of Plaintiff's many public information
requests. 5
C. 	Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, titled "Updated Civil Rights Complaint" on August
18 , 2025. 6 (S ee Dkt. No. 20). 	There, Plaintiff adds Detective Juan Alvarez, Officer Flores, and
Officer Daniel Rodriguez as defendants and no longer lists Imelda Perez, Sergeant Israel De La
Rosa as defendants. 	(Id. at 1) . Here, Plaintiff maintains his allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the ADA, Section 504 of the RA, and adds a claim under the Bivens doctrine. (Id). 	Specifically,
Plaintiff "alleges that these parties, through coordinated or compounding misconduct, violated his
rights as a legally blind and disabled citizen." (Id). Said violations include excessive force, failure
5 These exhibits were filed with the District Clerk's office, and the Court has reviewed them in conjunction
with the rest of Plaintiff's filings and attached exhibits. (S ee Dkt. Entry, Dated August 8, 2025).
6 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is the current live pleading and does not incorporate by reference any
of the prior filings . (Dkt. No. 20); see King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) ("An amended
complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint
specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.") (citing Boe/ens v.
Redman Hom es, In c., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985)). As such, the Original Complaint (Dkt. No. 2) and
subsequently filed attachments (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 13) are of no legal effect. However, in an abundance
of caution, and affording Plaintiff the benefit of liberal construction, the Court has reviewed the legitimacy
of all pleadings filed by Plaintiff. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520; see also Hernandez, 630 F.3d at 426-27.
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to investigate, denial of access to public services discrimination, retaliation, and deliberate
indifference. (Id. at 1-2).
D. 	Hearing
The Court held a status conference on September 26, 2025, for the purpose of discussing
the status of the case and allowing Plaintiff time to amend his complaint. (See Dkt. Entry, Dated
September 26, 2025). 	Plaintiff was given a deadline of October 27, 2025, to file said amended
complaint. 	(See Dkt. No. 30). 	Plaintiff never filed an amended complaint as ordered. 	On
December 5, 2025 , the Court held a second status conference, providing Plaintiff with a final
extension to file the amended complaint by December 12 , 2025. (See Dkt. Entry, Dated December
5, 2025). However, Plaintiff, again, failed to submit an amended complaint. Thus, review is based
on the current filings.
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW/ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standard
1. 	28U.S.C.§1915
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l), the Court must screen any complaint proceeding in
forma pauperis seeking relief against "a government entity, officer, or employee and dismiss the
complaint if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted." Pacheco-Morales v. Belt, SA-23-CV-00417-JKP, 2023 WL 9105552, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 3, 2023); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring dismissal of a case filed IFP
where it is determined the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.).
An action is considered frivolous where "there is no arguable legal or factual basis for the
claim." Id. (citing Ne itzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). "A complaint lacks an arguable
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basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges
the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716,
718 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003 , 1005 (5th Cir. 1998)). An action may
be considered factually frivolous "where the facts alleged are 'fantastic or delusional scenarios' or
the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is 'i ndisputably meritless. "' 	Eason v. Thaler, 14
F.3d 8, 9 n .5 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Neitzk e, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
Analysis of claims under § l 9 l 5A(b )(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) directs the court to apply the
standards governing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Pacheco-Morales, 2023 WL 9105552, at *3
(citing DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145 , 152 (5th Cir. 2011)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule
12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S . 662, 677-78 (2009). 	"T hus, claims may be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) ' on the basis of a dispositive issue oflaw[,] "' and also " if the complaint does
not contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 's tate a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face."' 	Inclusive Cmtys. Project, In c. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Ne itzke, 490 U.S . at 326; Iqbal, 556 U.S . at 678). 	This plausibility standard does not
require detailed factual allegations. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 	However, a party 's "obligation to provide the 'g rounds ' of his
'e ntitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a
cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original). A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court, drawing upon its "judicial
experience and common sense[,]" to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S . at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), 679. 	"But where the well-
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pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged- 	but it has not ' show[ n]' -' that the pleader is entitled to relief. "' Id. at 679
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (alteration in original)).
2. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 creates a private right of action for the deprivation of certain rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 . To state a cause of action under§ 1983, Plaintiff must (1) allege the Defendants violated
"a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" and (2) show "a person acting
under color of state law" committed the violation. Perdomo v. City of League City, 765 F.Supp.3d
613 , 620 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Petersen v. Johnson , 57 F.4th 225,231 (5th Cir. 2023)).
However, in the context of§ 1915A(b)(l) and§ 1915(e)(2)(B), and, thus, Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court must determine whether the facts, taken as true, would overcome the defense of qualified
immunity. Id. (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645 , 648 (5th Cir. 2012)). Qualified immunity
"shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. ( quoting
City a/Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021)). Thus, to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiff
must show (1) whether the facts alleged, taken as true, show a constitutional violation; and (2)
whether the right was clearly established in light of existing precedent. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S .
7, 11 - 12 (2015).
For a law to be clearly established, Plaintiff "must be able to point to controlling
authority-or a robust consensus of persuasive authority-that defines the contours of the right in
question with a high degree of particularity." Perdomo, 765 F.Supp.3d at 620 (quoting Hogan v.
Cunningham , 722 F.3d 725 , 735 (5th Cir. 2013)). Simply put, qualified immunity protects "all but
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the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting City of Tahlequah,
595 U.S. at 12).
3. 	Monell Municipal Liability
First, a municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of
respondeat superior. 	Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). 	Rather,
municipalities may be held liable "w hen execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
capacity, inflicts the injury ... " 	Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)). 	For Plaintiff to prove the municipality should be liable, he must show: (1) an official
policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive
knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose "moving force" is that policy (or custom). Id.
(citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Such an official policy may be "(1) a policy statement, ordinance, or regulation, or (2) ' a
persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy. "' Holley v. Blomberg, 142 F.Supp.3d 517,523 (S .D . Tex.
2015) (citing Piotrowski, 23 7 F.3d at 579). 	"The description of a policy or custom and its
relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must
contain specific facts." 	Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep 't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.
1997).
4. 	Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
To make out a valid claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must show (1) he is a
qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he was excluded from
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participation or denied meaningful access to services, programs, and activities, or that he was
otherwise discriminated against by Defendants; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination is by reason of his disability. 	Lathan v. Stevens, No. 2:16-cv-147, 2017 WL
7037704, at *3 (S .D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2017) (citing Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421 ,
428 (5th Cir. 1997)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 497125 (S.D. Tex . Jan. 19 ,
2018).
For a failure-to-accommodate claim specifically, Plaintiff must show "(1) he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the
covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations." 	K.R. 	ex rel.
Shannon v. Ce dar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., No . 3:25-cv-489-BN, 2025 WL 3265486, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 22, 2025) (citing Smith v. Harris County, 956 F.3d 311 , 317 (5th Cir. 2020)).
To show that the denial of services was '" by reason of ' Plaintiff's disability, Plaintiff must
show that the denial was intentional." E.M ex rel. Guerra v. San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dis t. ,
374 F.Supp.3d 616, 624 (S .D. Tex. 2019) (citing Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567,
574 (5th Cir. 2002)). While the Fifth Circuit has not yet defined the intentionality requirement,
the cases that have touched on the issue have required something more than deliberate indifference.
J W v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449-50 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Cadena v. El Paso County, 946 F.3d 717,
724 (5th Cir. 2020)). For a failure-to-accommodate claim, "intentional discrimination requires at
least actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary." Paley, 81 F.4th at 450 (citing Smith,
956 F.3d at 319). A plaintiff may "ordinarily satisfy the knowledge element by showing that they
identified their disabilities as well as the resulting limitations to a public entity or its employees
and requested an accommodation in direct and specific terms. " 	K.R. ex rel. Shannon, 2025 WL
3265486, at *5 (citing Smith, 956 F.3d at 317) (cleaned up). And, if Plaintiff "fail[ ed] to request
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an accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing that the disability, resulting
limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent to the
entity's relevant agents." Id. (cleaned up).
5. 	Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States .. . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ... [.]
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Analysis under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act follows that of Title II of the ADA
above. "The RA is operationally identical to the ADA in that both statutes prohibit discrimination
against disabled persons; however, the ADA applies only to public entities while the RA applies to
any federally funded programs or activities, whether public or private." 	Lathan, 2017 WL
7037704, at *3 (citing Borum v. Swisher County, No. 2:14-CV-127-J, 2015 WL 327508, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015)). As such, " [c]ourts utilize the same standards in analyzing claims under
both the ADA and RA." Id. (citing Frame v. City ofArlington, 657 F.3d 215 , 223 (5th Cir. 2011)).
The main difference between Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA is the causation
requirement. 	"Section 504 requires that the plaintiff's disability be the ' sole reason' for the
exclusion or denial of benefits, but the ADA's standard is less stringent." Paley, 81 F.4th at 449
(citing Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005)).
6. 	State Law Claims
Plaintiff alleges a surface-level, scattershot collection of state law violations, "involving
obstruction, retaliation, and abuse of authority." 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 10). 	Similarly, throughout his
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filings, Plaintiff appears to refer to various state law violations. (See Dkt. No. 2 at 4 ("State-level
abuse of office and municipal negligence"); Dkt. No. 2-3 at 10 (Intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16 (Texas Public Information Act)).
When a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the district court may also
extend supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so related such that "they form part
of the same case or controversy." Shields Doe v. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:24-CV-171 ,
2025 WL 2625566, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10 , 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). 	However, the
district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction. 	Id. 	(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). 	" So although
supplemental jurisdiction persists, the district court need not exercise it: Instead, the court may
(and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the case to state court." Id. (quoting Royal Canin U S.A ., Inc.
v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025)). As such, "the general rule [is] that ' a court should decline
to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial. "' Id. (quoting Heggemeier v. Caldwell County, 826 F.3d 861 , 872-73 (5th Cir. 2016))
(alteration in original).
Accordingly, because this Court concludes that a ll of Plaintiff's federal claims should be
dismissed, the District Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims, regardless of whether Plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. 	See Shields Doe,
2025 WL 2625566, at* 11 (declining supplemental jurisdiction on state law claims where the court
dismissed § 1983 and ADA claims under Rule l 2(b )( 6) ).
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B. 	Plaintiff's Claims
1. 	Juan Manuel Garza
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges excessive force by Juan Manuel Garza. 	(Dkt.
No. 2 at 3 ). However, Plaintiff identifies much more in the Addendum. There, Plaintiff claims he
has been "subjected to prolonged and repeated denial of justice, protection, and dignity by the
Defendant and the Pharr Police Department under his direction." (Dkt. No. 8 at 1-2). Specifically,
Defendant Juan Manuel Garza failed to investigate over twenty separate criminal complaints filed
by Plaintiff since 2020, failed to act on valid warrants to protect Plaintiff's rights as a disabled
crime victim, and failed to uphold his duties as a senior investigator and supervisor in preventing
misconduct, downgrading felonies, and obstructing due process. (Id. at 2). This, Plaintiff claims,
constitutes gross negligence, intentional disregard, and institutional retaliation. (Id.).
The Fifth Circuit has found that "the use of excessive force to apprehend a subject
implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee 	against unreasonable 	seizures." 	Colston v.
Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96 , 99 (5th Cir. 1997). To make out a claim of excessive force, Plaintiff must
show: " (l) [an] injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly
excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable." 	Walcotte v. Wicks , No.
C-08-323 , 2009 WL 1373601 , at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 15 , 2009) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d
404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007)). In considering whether an officer used excessive force , the court should
pay "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case[.]" Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Factors to be considered include "the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. " 	Id. ( citing Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). Further, the reasonableness of the force "must be judged from
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the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."
Id. ( citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S . 1, 20-22 (1968)).
While Plaintiff appears to allege excessive force as one of the claims against Defendant
Juan Manuel Garza, Plaintiff provides no accompanying facts in support thereof. (See 0kt. No. 2
at 3). 	That Plaintiff utilized the term "excessive force," without more, is insufficient to state a
claim. See Chhim v. Univ. of Tex . at Aus., 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (" We take the well-
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, but we do not credit conclusory allegations or
allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim." ). 	Moreover, Plaintiff filed images
dated May 19 , 2023, of injuries to his head, arm, and knee with the Clerk's office. 7 	Even if
Plaintiff's pleadings were accompanied by sufficient factual support to enforce his claim for
excessive force, which they are not, this claim would fall outside of the statute of limitations for a
§ 1983 claim in Texas. 8 See Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting the applicable
statute oflimitations for a § 1983 claim in Texas is two years).
Similarly, while Plaintiff claims that Defendant Juan Manuel Garza failed to investigate
many criminal complaints and act on valid warrants over a span of several years, such a claim is
not cognizable under § 1983 because there is no constitutional right to have another person
investigated or criminally prosecuted. See Morrison v. Dall. Cn ty. Sex Trafficking Task Force, No.
3:23-CV-2046-N-BH, 2023 WL 9231399, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2023) ("Any claims for criminal
investigation and prosecution should be dismissed for failure to state a claim."), report and
7 This attachment includes ten ( I 0) images depicting injuries to the head, hands, arm, and knee of Plaintiff,
dated May 19 , 2023 . These im ages are stored on a disk titled "PX-5." (See Dkt. No. 17 at 2).
8 Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on July 21 , 2025. 	(See Dkt. No. 2). 	However, Plaintiff filed his
original request to proceed in forma pauper is as of June 24, 2025 , and the request was granted on July 21 ,
2025. (See Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Case No. 7:25-mc-001 35; see also Dkt. No. 1). In
any event, a § 1983 claim with an offense date of May 19 , 2023 , wou ld fall just outside of the two-year
limitations period and be time-barred under either filing date.
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recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 150506 (N.D. Tex . Jan. 12, 2024); Lefebure v. D 'Aquilla, 15
F.4th 650, 657 (5th Cir. 2021) (" [V]ictims of crime do not have a cognizable interest in the
investigation or prosecution of others.").
Finally, Plaintiff's remaining claims that Defendant Juan Manuel Garza failed to " [u]phold
his duties as a senior investigator and supervisor in preventing misconduct, downgrading felonies,
and obstructing due process[,]" and, more broadly speaking, that he "subjected [Plaintiff] to
prolonged and repeated denial of justice, protection, and dignity[]" are completely devoid of
factual support and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2) ; see Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (noting that the Rule 8 pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."); Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469.
Claims brought against Defendant Juan Manuel Garza under § 1983 should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim, and, insofar as Plaintiff intended to bring claims under Title II of the
ADA or Section 504 of the RA against Defendant Juan Manuel Garza, such claims must be
dismissed because those provisions do not provide for individual liability. See Keith v. Tex. Tech
Med. Ctr., 2:24-CV-00010-Z-BR, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2024) (collecting
cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5113192 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13 , 2024).
Accordingly, claims against Juan Manuel Garza should be dismissed.
2. 	Jose Andrade
Plaintiff alleges that he "has suffered over a decade of documented mistreatment, abuse,
and discrimination at the hands of Trooper Jose Andrade." 	(Dkt. No. 6 at 1-2). 	Plaintiff claims
that, between 2011 and 2025, Defendant Andrade used excessive force, including beating Plaintiff
with a baton, engaged in racial profiling and disability based harassment, falsely arrested and
involuntarily hospitalized Plaintiff without just cause, lied on official reports, withheld exculpatory
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information, consistently abused his authority, and ignored civil protections and failed to follow
due process in multiple case incidents. (Id. at 2) .
Plaintiff's frustration 	with "over a decade of documented mistreatment, abuse, and
discrimination[,]" is too vague and conclusory to survive dismissal. (Dkt. No. 6 at 1-2); see Griffin
v. CPS/OCR Office, No. 5:20-CV-219-H-BQ, 2021 WL 1520010, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18 , 2021)
(" [Plaintiff' s] claims, liberally construed, are nonetheless vague and non-specific accusations of
wrongdoing and fail to support an actionable § 1983 claim.") (citations omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1516387 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2021). 	Plaintiff's supposed
excessive force allegation against Defendant Jose Andrade suffers from the same insufficiency as
the claims against Defendant Juan Mane! Garza. 	(See supra Section II(B)(l)). 	Similarly,
Plaintiff's 	assortment 	of accusations, 	including 	racial 	profiling, 	false 	arrest, 	involuntary
hospitalization, lying on official reports, withholding exculpatory evidence, and abuse of authority,
are presented with no factual support or specificity. This is insufficient to survive dismissal. Se e
Griffin, 2021 WL 1520010, at *3; Chhim , 836 F.3d at 469; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. And, as with
Defendant Juan Manuel Garza, if Plaintiff sought to bring claims against Defendant Jose Andrade
under the ADA or RA, such claims are not cognizable and should be dismissed. See Keith, 2024
WL 5112762, at *5.
Accordingly, claims against Defendant Jose Andrade should be dismissed.
3. 	Laura Renteria
Plaintiff lists Defendant Laura Renteria as "Internal Affairs, Pharr PD" in the Original
Complaint (see Dkt. No. 2 at 2) and retains her as a defendant in the Amended Complaint (see Dkt.
No. 20 at 1). Plaintiff generally claims " [a]ll 11 named Defendants either contributed to, enabled,
or 	covered 	up 	the 	systemic 	deprivation 	of Plaintiff's" 	emergency 	protection, 	disability
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accommodations, access to police and legal records, and access to justice as a documented disabled
crime victim. 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 7) . However, the record is barren of factual support with regard to
Defendant Renteria. Indeed, it appears Defendant Renteria is not specifically mentioned anywhere
else in the filings. And, listing a person as a defendant without any factual allegations against them
is insufficient to state a claim. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) ("This standard
requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a
constitutional violation."); Nicolais v. Cheramie, No. 23 -7 094, 2024 WL 4113752, at *2 (E.D. La.
Aug. 12 , 2024) (collecting cases finding that simply listing a defendant in the complaint with no
accompanying factual allegations does not satisfy the pleading standards and fails to state a claim),
report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4107704 (E.D La. Sept. 6, 2024 ); Raphiel v. Booth,
No. 24-1348, 2025 WL 2046538, at *2 (W.D. La. July 21, 2025) (dismissing claims after reviewing
the complaint and accompanying attachments and determining "[n]one of these materials contain
any factual allegations which would explain the Defendants' conduct that Plaintiff believes give
rise to his claims.").
Accordingly, the claims against Laura Renteria should be dismissed.
4. 	Selena Hinojosa
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff claims "[n]eglect and manipulation of dispatch services
by Hinojosa." 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 3). 	Similar to Defendant Renteria, Plaintiff identifies Defendant
Hinojosa as a dispatcher with Pharr PD. (Id. at 2). Defendant Hinojosa is retained as a Defendant
in the Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 20). However, Plaintiff fails to elaborate on her role in
the alleged offense, nor does Plaintiff make any factual assertions with regard to Defendant
Hinojosa throughout Plaintiff's various filings. 	This is insufficient to state a claim. 	See Oliver,
276 F.3d at 741; Nicolais, 2024 WL 4113752, at *2; Raphiel, 2025 WL 2046538, at *2.
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Accordingly, any claims against Selena Hinojosa should be dismissed.
5. 	James Lugo
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges " [i]nterference with due process and mail
delivery by City Liaison Lugo." (Dkt. No. 2 at 3). Plaintiff claims the collaboration with Ricardo
Rodriguez Jr. constitutes "active retaliation, conflict of interest, and white -c ollar suppression of
evidence." (Id. at 7 ).
Here, Plaintiff fails to include any facts that support his assertion that Defendant James
Lugo interfered with due process and mail delivery. 	Similarly, while Plaintiff takes issue with
Defendant James Lugo 's "collaboration," Plaintiff does not explain, at all, what said collaboration
entailed, when it happened, or how Plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated, and simply
regurgitating commonly used legal terms like "active retaliation, conflict of interest, and white-
collar suppression of evidence[,]" does not set a foundation to bring a claim under § 1983. 	S ee
Griffin, 2021 WL 1520010, at *3 ; Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469; Ashcroft, 556 U.S . at 678.
Moreover, insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant James Lugo 's alleged role in the
failure to prosecute or investigate, as noted, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to such and
therefore fails to state a claim. S ee Morrison, 2023 WL 9231399, at * 5; Lefebur e, 15 F.4th at 657.
And any claim against Defendant Lugo, individually, under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of
the RA should be dismissed. S ee Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5.
Accordingly, claims against Defendant James Lugo should be dismissed.
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6. 	Mirabelle Garza
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff claims suppression and denial of police records by
Mirabelle Garza. 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 3). 	Defendant Mirabelle Garza "mocked, stalled, and retaliated
against Plaintiff after he identified himself as disabled, and Plaintiff alleges that from April 26,
2025 , to June 3, 2025, Defendant Mirabelle Garza actively denied public service access, obstructed
record requests, and retaliated against Plaintiff, "a known legally blind, disabled resident." (Dkt.
No. 2-3 at 10). 	Plaintiff says he submitted multiple public information requests, but Defendant
Mirabelle Garza refused to provide case numbers, ignored calls, and withheld records essential to
Plaintiff's pursuit of justice in a prior felony assault complaint. (Id.) . This apparently caused the
case to be classified as a Class C misdemeanor in civil court. 	(Id.). 	Further, Plaintiff claims
Mirabelle Garza "implied that Plaintiff 'would likely not receive anything,' even before reading
the request in full. " (Id. at 12) . This, Plaintiff argues, is consistent with disability-based and racial
discrimination, as demonstrated by her tone, dismissive language, and persistent stonewalling. (Id.
at 13).
At the outset, it appears Plaintiff's issues with Defendant Mirabelle Garza are based on
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. However, as mentioned, such claims
are not available against an individual. 	See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5 . 	The actions of
Defendant Mirabelle Garza are therefore analyzed with the claims against the City of Pharr. (See
infra Section II(B)(l 0)).
Similarl y, insofar as Plaintiff complains that he was unable to obtain records as the result
of a public information request, this claim is not cognizable under § 1983 because Plaintiff alleges
no constitutional violation. 	Se e Plustache v. Harrison , No. 22-30110, 2023 WL 3197043 , at *2
(5th Cir. May 2, 2023) (" [T]here is no generalized constitutional or federal right to access
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documents under the control of state agencies or their political subdivisions." ); Trevino-Garcia v.
Univ. of Tex . Health Sci. Ctr.-Sc h. of Med. , No. SA -0 9-CA-0572-XR, 2009 WL 5195962, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 21 , 2009) ("The Court will not usurp the Attorney General's role in addressing
complaints under the [Texas Public Information] Act[.]"); Hund.all v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso , EP-
13-CV-00365-DCG, 2014 WL 12496895, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 21 , 2014); St Clair v. City ofPlano ,
No. 3:06-cv -1 485-R, 2007 WL 1297168, at *2 n.l (N .D. Tex. May 3, 2007) ("Even if the Court
construed the Complaint as seeking relief under the Texas Public Information Act, such violation
would not give rise to federal question jurisdiction.").
Accordingly, claims against Defendant Mirabelle Garza should be dismissed.
7. 	Israel De La Rosa
Plaintiff lists Israel De La Rosa in the Original Complaint as a Defendant titled "Patrol
Division, Pharr PD." (Dkt. No. 2 at 2). However, Defendant De La Rosa is no longer listed as a
Defendant in the Amended Complaint. 	(See Dkt. No. 20). In the event that this omission is in
error, and affording Plaintiff the benefit of liberal construction, the Court has reviewed all of
Plaintiff's filings to identify a claim against Defendant De La Rosa. 	Nevertheless, the Court is
unable to discover any factual assertions or allegations against Defendant De La Rosa. 	Thus,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant De La Rosa. See Oliver, 276 F.3d at 741; Nicolais,
2024 WL 4113752, at *2; Raphiel, 2025 WL 2046538, at *2 .
Accordingly, the claims against Israel De La Rosa should be dismissed.
8. 	Toribio Palacios
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges retaliatory obstruction of legal filings involving
Palacios. (Dkt. No. 2 at 3). Plaintiff further claims Defendant Palacios collaborated with Ricardo
Rodriguez Jr. , constituting "active retaliation, conflict of interest, and white-collar suppression of
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evidence." (Id. at 7). Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Palacios has wrongfully accessed, withheld,
and blocked legal records without due process. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff claims Defendant Palacios is a
known relative or associate of Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. , and continued these actions after Plaintiff
submitted lawful complaints and public records requests. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff argues Defendant
Palacios used his position to protect city liability and shield others from accountability. (Id.).
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Palacios is factually insufficient. 	Plaintiff does not
describe what the alleged collaboration with Defendant Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. entailed, nor how it
amounted to a constitutional violation of any sort. As mentioned, use of legal terms like "active
retaliation, conflict of interest, and white-collar suppression of evidence[,]" standing alone, will
not pass muster under § 1983. 	See Griffin, 2021 WL 1520010, at *3; Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469;
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
Similarly, any allegation that Defendant Palacios inhibited Plaintiff's public records
requests is not cognizable under§ 1983. See Plustache , 2023 WL 3197043 , at *2 ; Trevino-Garcia,
2009 WL 5195962, at *5 ; Hundall, 2014 WL 12496895, at *4; St Clair, 2007 WL 1297168, at *2
n.1.
Accordingly, claims against Defendant Toribio Palacios should be dismissed.
9. 	Imelda Perez
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff claims suppression and denial of police records by
Imelda Perez. 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 3). 	Plaintiff claims Defendant Imelda Perez "used her official city
email to refer to the Plaintiff by the derogatory label 	' Disabled David Reyes,' an act of
cyberbullying and discrimination." 9 (Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16). Plaintiff claims this comment was made
9 Plaintiff submitted a screenshot of the referenced email comment with the Clerk 's Office, along with
various other exhibits and attachments.
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in relation to an active public records request and constitutes unprofessional conduct, a violation
of the ADA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 	(Id. ). 	Further, Plaintiff claims that
these acts demonstrate the hostile and retaliatory environment maintained by the City of Pharr
against disabled residents. (Id.).
It appears that Plaintiff's grievances with Defendant Imelda Perez revolve around Title II
of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 	However, as noted, such claims are not
actionable against an individual defendant. 	See Keith, 2024 WL 5112762, at *5. The actions of
Defendant Imelda Perez are therefore analyzed with the claims against the City of Pharr. 	(See
infra Section Il(B)(l 0)).
Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant Imelda Perez with regard to an
active information request, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because Plaintiff has
alleged no constitutional violation. See Plustach e, 2023 WL 3197043 , at *2 ; Trevino-Garcia, 2009
WL 5195962, at * 5; Hundall, 2014 WL 12496895, at *4; St Clair, 2007 WL 1297168, at *2 n.1.
Accordingly, claims against Defendant Imelda Perez should be dismissed.
City of Pharr
Plaintiff alleges he has been "systematically targeted, neglected, and retaliated against by
multiple departments and representatives of the City of Pharr, Texas." 	(Dkt. No. 7 at 2).
Specifically, Plaintiff claims neglect of more than twenty (20) criminal complaints filed between
2020 and 2025, downgrading of felony offenses and refusal to act on active warrants, use of
excessive force, resulting in permanent vision damage, involuntary hospitalization by unqualified
officers, denial of access to public records, in violation of the Texas Public Information Act,
cyberbullying via city email by referring to Plaintiff as "Disabled David Reyes," and repeated acts
of retaliation and public humiliation for asserting his disability rights. 	(Id.). 	Further, Plaintiff
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claims the City of Pharr is responsible for the acts of Juan Manuel Garza (criminal negligence,
failure to investigate, suppression of felony offenses), Laura Renteria (Internal Affairs cover-up,
refusal to respond to complaints or provide updates), Mirabelle Garza (denial of records, threats
of unlawful fees, retaliation based on disability), Imelda Perez (use of official email to mock and
bully Plaintiff publicly), Jose Andrade (excessive force, unlawful detention, mental health abuse),
and the Pharr Records & Patrol Departments (coordinated retaliation, refusal to provide service,
and defamation). (Id.).
At the outset, Plaintiff fails to identify a custom or policy that could trigger liability under
Monell against the City of Pharr, nor does he make any attempt to do so . 	In fact, Plaintiff's
complaints as to the City of Pharr appear to exclusively encompass the individual alleged acts of
the City's employees, and Plaintiff may not hold the City of Pharr vicariously liable based on the
theory of respondeat superior under Monell. 	See Shumpert v. City of Tupelo , 905 F.3d 310, 316
(5th Cir. 2018) ("A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior."); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Monell.
On the other hand, Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do provide
for vicarious liability. See Paley, 81 F.4th at 449 ("[A] plaintiff need not identify an official policy
to sustain a claim against a public entity as it may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its
employees under either [the ADA or RA]."). Thus, Plaintiff could plausibly hold the City of Pharr
liable under these provisions for the acts of the City's employees. Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim under either provision.
Plaintiff first claims Defendant Mirabelle Garza mocked , stalled, and retaliated against
Plaintiff after he identified himself as disabled, and that from April 26, 2025, to June 3, 2025 ,
Defendant Mirabelle Garza actively denied public service access, obstructed record requests, and
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retaliated against Plaintiff, "a known legally blind, disabled resident. " 	(Dkt. No. 2-3 at 10).
Plaintiff says he submitted multiple public information requests, but Defendant Mirabelle Garza
refused to provide case numbers, ignored calls, and withheld records which apparently caused the
case to be improperly classified in civil court. 	(Id.). 	Further, Plaintiff claims Mirabelle Garza
"implied that Plaintiff 'would likely not receive anything,' even before reading the request in full."
(Id.).
Next, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Imelda Perez "used her official city ema il to refer to the
Plaintiff by 	the 	derogatory 	label 	' Disabled 	David 	Reyes,' 	an 	act 	of cyberbullying 	and
discrimination." 	(Dkt. No. 2-3 at 16). 	Plaintiff claims this comment was made in relation to an
active public records request and constitutes unprofessional conduct, a violation of the ADA, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and, further, that these acts demonstrate the hostile and
retaliatory environment maintained by the City of Pharr against disabled residents. (Id.).
Even liberally construed, Plaintiff fails to allege that he was "excluded from participation
or denied meaningful access to services, programs, or activities," as Plaintiff repeatedly references
only the various public records requests, which remain the purview of the Office of the Attorney
General. 	Lathan, 2017 WL 7037704, at *3 ; see Trevino-Garcia, 2009 WL 5195962, at *5;
Hundall, 2014 WL 12496895, at *4 ; St Clair, 2007 WL 1297168, at *2 n.l. 	In fact, within the
exhibits and attachments Plaintiff filed are several images that indicate some information requests
were granted and the invoices for said requests were subsequently provided, contradicting the
position that Plaintiff was denied access to services. 10 	Thus, Plaintiff's claims may fail on this
ground alone.
10 Plaintiff filed various exhibits with the District Clerk's Office. One such exhibit is an attachment titled
PX-6, which contains countless screenshot images of public information requests, some of which indicate
that no such information exists, and others that indicate the information exi sts and the invoice must be paid.
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However, even if the Court found that Plaintiff was denied access to services, Plaintiff still
fails to state a claim because he is unable to show that he was denied such access to services
because of his di sability. S ee Delano-Py le , 302 F.3d at 574 ("A plaintiff asserting a private cause
of action for violations of the ADA or the RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a
showing of intentional discrimination." ). Plaintiff makes no assertion that his disability was taken
into consideration in any way during the processing of the public records requests, nor does it
appear to be a contributing factor in any alleged denial of his public records requests. 	While
Plaintiff understandably takes issue with the tone and dismissive nature of Defendants Mirabelle
Garza and Imelda Perez, Plaintiff is unable to show that he was denied access to services because
of his disability, and Plaintiff's allegations thus fail to rise to the level necessary to survive
dismissal.
Accordingly, claims against the City of Pharr should be dismissed.
11. 	Ricardo P. Rodguez Jr.
In the Original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges retaliatory obstruction of legal filings involving
Rodriguez. 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 3). 	Specifically, Plaintiff claims that, while Defendant Rodriguez Jr.
served as District Attorney, Defendant Rodriguez Jr. failed to prosecute a "hate-based assault"
involving Plaintiff as a felon y, despite clear evidence of tampering with the crime scene and
physical relocation of Plaintiff's body. (Id. at 7).
Similarly, Plaintiff filed correspondence with the Office of the Attorney General indicating the same. (See
Dkt. No. 17-4 at 1-4, 13). "The court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the
complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced
by the complaint." Lone Star Fund V (U S ), L.P v. Barclays Bank PL C, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley De an Witt er, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). Thus, Plaintiff's
separately filed attachments were reviewed solely for the purpose of affording Plaintiff the benefit of liberal
construction .
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Prosecutors are shielded by absolute immunity. As the Fifth Circuit has emphasized:
A prosecutor is absolutely immune for initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution, for actions taken in her role as "advocate for the state" in the courts,
or when her conduct is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process ....
. . . Our decisions applying those of the Supreme Court make clear that
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken to initiate prosecution, and that
this absolute immunity shelters prosecutors even when they act maliciously,
wantonly, or negligently.
Nicolais, 2024 WL 4113752, at *3. Simply stated, " [a]bsolute prosecutorial immunity is therefore
sweepingly broad." 	Id. 	Thus, if Plaintiff challenges actions '" intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process ,' his claims must fail because the prosecutor's actions are
ones to which 'a bsolute immunity app[lies] with full force. "' Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S . 409, 430 (1976)).
Here, Plaintiff makes no assertion that Defendant Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. acted outside of
the scope of his prosecutorial duties, nor that he took any action not "intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process[.]" Nicolais, 2024 WL 4113752, at *3 . In fact, Plaintiff's
entire claim appears to surround Defendant Ricardo Rodriguez Jr.'s decision, while he was head
prosecutor for the county, to not prosecute an alleged assault as a felony. 	( 0kt. No. 2 at 3). This
is precisely the type of claim that is protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity, and Plaintiff
therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. See Boggess v. Chamness,
No. 6:25-CV-00064-JDK, 2025 WL 978998, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2025) (dismissing claims
under§ 1915(e)(2) screening where " [a]ll of her factual allegations relate to the prosecution of the
alleged matter that is within the scope of the duties as a prosecutor.").
Moreover, even if Defendant Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. was not entitled to prosecutorial
immunity, Plaintiff has no right to direct the prosecution of another individual. 	See Morrison,
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2023 WL 9231399, at *5; Lefebure, 15 F.4th at 657. Thus, Plaintiff fails to identify a constitutional
violation and fails to state a claim.
Accordingly, claims against Defendant Ricardo Rodriguez Jr. should be dismissed.
12. 	Daniel Rodriguez
While Daniel Rodriguez is added as a defendant in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (see
Dkt. No. 20 at 1), Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against him. 	In fact, a careful review of
the filings reveals no factual assertions regarding Defendant Daniel Rodriguez. 	This will not
suffice, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Daniel Rodriguez. Se e Oliver, 276 F.3d at
741 ; Nicolais, 2024 WL 4113752, at *2; Raphiel, 2025 WL 2046538, at *2 .
Accordingly, the claim against Daniel Rodriguez should be dismissed.
13. 	Officer Flores
While "Officer Flores" is added as a defendant in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (see Dkt.
No. 20 at 1), Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against him/her. A careful review of the filings
fails to reveal this defendant's full name, much less any factual assertion in support of a claim for
relief. Thus, this claim must fail. See Oliver, 276 F.3d at 741; Nicolais, 2024 WL 4113752, at *2;
Raphiel, 2025 WL 2046538, at *2.
Accordingly, the claim against Defendant "Officer Flores" should be dismissed.
14. 	Juan Alvarez
Juan Alvarez, too, was added as a defendant in Plaintiff's Amended Comp la int (s ee Dkt.
No. 20 at 1). However, Plaintiff makes no factual a ll egations against Defendant Juan Alvarez. A
careful review of the filings provides no clarity. Thus, this claim must fail. 	See Oliver, 276 F.3d
at 741 ; Nicolais, 2024 WL 4113752, at *2; Raphiel, 2025 WL 2046538, at *2.
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Accordingly, the claim against Juan Alvarez should be dismissed.
C. 	Additional Motions
1. 	Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff filed Motion to Appoint Counsel on July 21, 2025. (See 0kt. 	o. 4). Therein,
Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint legal counsel in this matter, explaining that he " is a legally blind,
disabled citizen, facing multiple layers of municipal and governmental retaliation, discrimination,
and civil rights violations." (Id. at 2). Plaintiff claims he has limited access to legal materials and
assistance due to his disability, and "lacks formal legal training or representation to adequately
litigate a matter of this scope and significance." (Id.).
The Court notes that Plaintiff has been able to submit pleadings and request summonses as
to all defendants, file various addendums, draft and file various motions, and file additional
lawsuits against other defendants involving similar claims and without the assistance of counsel.
In other words, Plaintiff has been able to effectively represent himself. 	However, no further
analysis is necessary on this point' 1 as the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint
so this Motion (Dkt. No. 4) should be denied as moot.
2. 	Motion to Withdraw Prior Filing Due to Clerical Error
On August 11 , 2025, Plaintiff filed Motion to Strike or Withdraw Prior Filing Due to
Clerical Error. (See 0kt. No. 15). Therein, Plaintiff explains that he "inadvertently submitted an
11 In a civil case, appointment of counsel is not a constitutional right, and is provided only when exceptional
circumstances exist. 	Day v. Ama zo n. com In c., No. 4:24-CV-512-P, 2024 WL 6051481 , at *I (N.D. Tex. June 17 ,
2024) (c iting Lop ez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15 , 17 (5th Cir. 1982)). In determining whether exceptional circumstances
warrant appointment of counsel courts look at: (I) the type and complexity of the case; (2) plaintiff's ability to present
and investigate the case; (3) the presence of conflicting testimony and necessity of ski lled cross-examination ; (4)
likelihood the appointment would benefit the court, plaintiff, and defendants by shortening the trial and assisting in
just determination. Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 799 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d
190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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incorrect or incomplete version of the filing related to the above-referenced case due to a printing
error." (Id. at 1). Thus, Plaintiff requests the Court strike the previous erroneous submission and
instead rely on the corrected version of the complaint and supporting documentation. 	(Id.).
Further, Plaintiff requests a filing log or receipt confirming the Court's record of submissions to
ensure an accurate docket. (Id.) .
Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, the Court further
recommends this Motion (Dkt. No. 15) be denied as moot.
3. 	Emergency Motion for Criminal Referral and Injunctive Relief
On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed Emergency Motion in Brevis for Criminal Referral, ADA
Enforcement, and Injunctive Relief. 	(See 0kt. No. 18). Therein, Plaintiff alleges retaliation and
derogatory treatment by city staff, failure to investigate hate crimes and assaults targeting Plaintiff
as a disabled person, interception and obstruction of legal communications, and suppression of
investigative records by the City Attorney and District Attorney. 	(Id. at 2) . 	As such, Plaintiff
requests immediate injunctive relief to halt ongoing acts of harassment, retaliation, and ADA
violations, and asks the Court to refer this matter to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division and the U.S . Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas, and to order an
emergency hearing to address ongoing harm and to consider further protective measures. (Id.).
Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, the Court further
recommends this Motion (Dkt. 	o. 18) be denied as moot.
4. 	Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Request for Criminal Investigation
Plaintiff filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Request for Criminal Investigation on
August 11 , 2025 . (See Dkt. No. 19). Therein, Plaintiff requests the Court (1) issue a writ of habeas
corpus declaring that the ongoing acts of retaliation, obstruction, and ADA violations constitute
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unlawful restraint; (2) order immediate cessation of all retaliatory and discriminatory acts by
Defendants; (3) refer this matter to the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, for
criminal investigation and prosecution; ( 4) order protective measures to safeguard Plaintiff's
medical privacy, mobility rights, and access to justice; and (5) grant such other and further relief
the Court deems just and proper. (Id. at 2-3).
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff cannot request relief under 28 U .S.C. § 2241 because he
is not a prisoner "in custody" under the conviction or sentence of any jurisdiction and there is no
conviction or sentence he seeks to attack as he is not currently incarcerated, nor is he attacking any
conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), 2254(a); Stone v. Dallas Cnty. Jail, No. 3:22-cv-882-E-BN,
2022 WL 1557671 , at * 1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2022) ( explaining "in custody" requirement for
habeas relief), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1556157 (N.D . Tex. May 17 , 2022).
Similarly, Plaintiffs request for an investigation is not a form of relief available under § 2241.
Se e Thomas v. Merida, No. 3:21-CV-447-K-BK, 2021 WL 2384697, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 21 ,
2021).
In the same vein, Plaintiffs request for an investigation is not a ground of relief available
through§ 2241. See Thomas v. Merida, No. 3:21 -CV-447-K-BK, 2021 WL 2384697, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. May 21 , 2021 ). And "the judicial branch of government does not interfere with the executive
branch' s authority to investigate and prosecute violations of criminal laws." Wi se v. Warden, FCI
Texarkana, No. 3: l 5-cv-02223 , 2017 WL 2869070, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 5, 2017) (citations
omitted). Thus, an individual has no right to initiate a criminal investigation, and the Court cannot
order such. Johnson v. Nunez, No. 2:23 -cv-00087, 2023 WL 6931352, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23 ,
2023) (collecting cases).
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Nevertheless, despite the noted controlled precedent, because the Court recommends the
dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No. 19) should be denied as moot.
5. 	Motion for Leave to File Electronically as a Pro Se Litigant
Plaintiff filed Motion for Leave to File Electronically as a Pro Se Litigant on August 19 ,
2025. (See Dkt. No. 22). Therein, Plaintiff seeks CM/ECF access as a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA, "due to limited mobility and lingual blindness, which make travel to the
courthouse and manual filing of documents unduly burdensome." (Id. at 2).
The Court notes that Plaintiff was granted permission to email his filings to the District
Clerk for purposes of filing as of September 18 , 2025 . (See Dkt. Entry, Dated September 18, 2025).
However, because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Motion (Dkt. No.
22) should be denied as moot.
6. 	Motion to Consolidate
Finally, on January 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant
to Rule 42(a). 	(See Dkt. No. 32). 	Plaintiff seeks to consolidate Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00362
and Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-00363 because they arise from the same operative facts, involve
common legal issues, and seek similar relief. (Id. at 2).
Because the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, the Court further
recommends this Motion (Dkt. No. 32) be denied as moot.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
Recommended Disposition
After review of the filings and relevant case law, for reasons outlined above, it 1s
recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be DISMISSED with
prejudice for failure to state a claim;
(2) Plaintiff's 	claims 	brought 	against 	the 	municipality 	under 	Monell 	should 	be
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
(3) Plaintiff's claims 	brought under Title 	II 	of the ADA and 	Section 	504 	of the
Rehabilitation Act should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
(4) Any and all claims brought under Texas state law should be DISMISSED without
prejudice; 12 and
(5) Any claims against Laura Renteria, Selena Hinojosa, James Lugo, Israel De La Rosa,
Daniel Rodriguez, Officer Flores, and Juan Alvarez should be DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Finally, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No.
4), 	Motion to Strike or Withdraw Prior Filing Due to Clerical Error (Dkt. No. 15), Emergency
Motion in Brevis for Criminal Referral, ADA Enforcement, and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. No. 18) ,
Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Criminal Investigation (Dkt. 	o. 19), Motion
12 See Lu cky Tunes #3, L.L.C. v. Smith, 812 F. App'x 176, 184 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that state law claims
dismissed where district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should have been dismissed
without prejudice); Bass v. Parkw ood Hosp. , 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that such claims
" should expressly be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may refile his claims in the appropriate state
court.").
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to File Electronically (Dkt. No. 22) and Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Cases Pursuant to Rule
42(a) (Dkt. No. 32), all be DENIED as moot.
It is further recommended that the matter be closed.
Notice to the Parties
Within 14 days after being served a copy of this report, a party may serve and file specific,
written objections to the proposed recommendations. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b ). The district judge to whom this case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon
the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to
which specific written objection has been made. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify
the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained
in this report within 14 days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the
District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual
findings accepted or adopted by the District Court, except on grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice. 	See Douglas v. United Ser v. Auto Ass 'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
bane), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l).
The Clerk shall also provide a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendants.
DONE at McAllen, Texas, this 3rd day of ~
Juan F. Alanis
United States Magistrate Judge
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