SAUCEDA v. Allstate Texas Lloyds, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
OSCAR SAUCEDA, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 7:25-CV-00228
§
ALLSTATE TEXAS LLOYD’S, INC., §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Oscar Sauceda owns a home in Hidalgo County, Texas, that sustained
storm damage in April 2023. (Dkt. No. 13 at 3). Defendant Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, Inc.
(“Allstate”), insured the home. (See id.). The Parties dispute the amount of loss covered
by the insurance policy.
Pending before the Court is Allstate’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and
Abatement, (Dkt. No. 12), Sauceda’s Motion for Oral Argument on the Motion to Compel,
(Dkt. No. 15), and Sauceda’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Depositions after Fact-
Discovery Deadline, (Dkt. No. 16). For the following reasons, the Court STRIKES
Allstate’s Motion without prejudice, (Dkt. No. 12), DENIES Sauceda’s Motion for Oral
Argument as moot, (Dkt. No. 15), and DENIES Sauceda’s Motion for Leave, (Dkt. No.
16).
I. BACKGROUND
Sauceda made a wind and hail claim on Allstate after an April 2023 storm. (Dkt.
No. 13 at 3). In February 2024, Allstate inspected the property and informed Sauceda that
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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its estimate was below the deductible. (Id.). Dissatisfied, Sauceda hired a different
contractor to prepare another estimate, which was submitted to Allstate. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at
5).
On February 26, 2025, Sauceda sued Allstate in state court in Hidalgo County for
breach of contract, Texas Insurance Code violations, breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act violations, fraud, conspiracy to commit
fraud, and responsibility/ratification for acts of agents. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 14–21). On May
8, 2025, Allstate answered, (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 35–39), and removed the case to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction, (Dkt. No. 1).
On January 13, 2026, the Parties unsuccessfully mediated the dispute. (Dkt. No.
13 at 4). Allstate invoked appraisal1 that same day, (id.), and moved to compel appraisal,
(Dkt. No. 12). Sauceda responded, indicating that it was opposed to appraisal and noting
that Allstate did not confer with its counsel prior to filing the Motion. (Dkt. No. 13 at 4).
On January 27, 2026, Sauceda requested Allstate’s availability for five depositions.
(Dkt. No. 16 at 5). The next day, Allstate responded that it would be virtually impossible
to schedule, let alone complete, any deposition before the fact-discovery deadline of
February 2, 2026, which had been in place since the Scheduling Order was entered in
August 2025. (Dkt. No. 17); (see also Dkt. No. 6). Accordingly, it did not agree to an
extension of the deadline. (Dkt. No. 17). Sauceda submitted a letter with the Court
requesting permission to file a motion for leave to complete the depositions after the fact-
1 The insurance policy contains an appraisal clause allowing either party to demand
appraisal of disputed loss amounts. (Dkt. No. 12 at 74–75).
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discovery deadline. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 3). On January 29, 2026, Sauceda filed his Motion
for Leave. (Dkt. No. 16 at 4). Allstate responded. (Dkt. No. 17).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. MOTION TO COMPEL APPRAISAL
“[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.” Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. v. R&R Marine, Inc., 756 F.3d 825, 834 (5th Cir.
2014) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 2219,
135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996)). Accordingly, this Court applies “the substantive insurance law
of Texas.” Int’l Ins. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir. 2005).
“An insurance policy is a contract that establishes the respective rights and
obligations to which an insurer and its insured have mutually agreed . . . .” In re Farmers
Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 621 S.W.3d 261, 270 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (quoting USAA
Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 488 (Tex. 2018)). Policies are generally
construed in the same manner as any other contract. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 488.
Appraisal clauses are included in most insurance policies as a way of resolving disputes
over the amount of covered losses. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888–89
(Tex. 2009). “These clauses are generally enforceable, absent illegality or waiver.” In re
Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding).
B. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “authorizes the district court to
control and expedite pretrial discovery through a scheduling order.” Geiserman v.
MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1990). Consistent with this authority, the Court
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has “broad discretion” to enforce its scheduling order. See id. (“[O]ur court gives the trial
court ‘broad discretion to preserve the integrity and purpose of the pretrial order.’”
(quoting Hodges v. United States, 597 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1979))).
A scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s
consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking
relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the
party needing the extension.’” S&W Enters., LLC v. South Trust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d
533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)). In determining whether good cause exists, courts
consider four factors: “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely comply with the
scheduling order; (2) the importance of the modification; (3) potential prejudice in
allowing the modification; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such
prejudice.” Squyres v. Heico Cos., 782 F.3d 224, 237 (5th Cir. 2015) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010)). The four
factors are considered holistically. EEOC v. Serv. Temps, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-01552, 2009 WL
3294863, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses Allstate’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and Abatement,
(Dkt. No. 12), as well as Sauceda’s Motion for Oral Argument on the Motion to Compel
Appraisal and Abatement, (Dkt. No. 15), before turning to Sauceda’s Motion for Leave to
Conduct Limited Depositions after Fact-Discovery Deadline, (Dkt. No. 16).
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A. MOTION TO COMPEL APPRAISAL
The Court does not reach the merits of Allstate’s Motion because it failed to
comply with either the District’s or the undersigned’s conferral procedures.2 The Court
therefore strikes Allstate’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and Abatement. (Dkt. No. 12).
The undersigned’s conferral procedures direct parties to follow Local Rule 7, see
Court Procedures, Hon. Drew B. Tipton, https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files
/Tipton%20Procedures.pdf, which requires opposed motions to “contain an averment
that (1) The movant has conferred with the respondent and (2) Counsel cannot agree
about the disposition of the motion.” See LR7.1. The undersigned’s conferral procedures
also instruct parties to “[m]ake serious, timely, good faith efforts to seek agreement on all
disputed matters and requests for relief except dispositive motions. The Court will strike
motions in civil cases . . . that do not include a certificate of conference.” Court
Procedures, Hon. Drew B. Tipton, https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/
Tipton%20Procedures.pdf.
Allstate’s Motion contains no certificate of conference. (See generally Dkt. No. 12);
(Dkt. No. 13 at 8). The record does not show that Allstate conferred with Sauceda or
2 The Court also does not reach the merits of Sauceda’s Response to the Motion to Compel.
(Dkt. No. 13). However, for the sake of clarity with future motion practice, the Court briefly
addresses Sauceda’s argument that the Scheduling Order, (Dkt. No. 6), requires that a party must
obtain permission before submitting a motion to compel appraisal, (Dkt. No. 13 at 4–9). The
Scheduling Order states “[a]ny party wishing to make a discovery or scheduling motion must
obtain permission before the submission of motion papers. This includes any motion to compel,
to quash, for protection, or for extension.” (Dkt. No. 6 at 2). Admittedly, Allstate’s Motion to
Compel Appraisal and Abatement is a motion to compel in a sense. But it is not a discovery or
scheduling motion, so the requirement to submit a letter describing the dispute is not applicable.
Allstate need only comply with the District’s and the undersigned’s conferral procedures before
moving once again to compel appraisal.
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made a “serious, timely, good faith effort[]” to resolve the dispute before filing the
Motion. Therefore, the Court STRIKES without prejudice Allstate’s Motion to Compel
Appraisal and Abatement. (Dkt. No. 12). Additionally, the Court also DENIES
Sauceda’s Motion for Oral Argument on the Motion to Compel Appraisal and Abatement
as moot. (Dkt. No. 15).
B. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
Sauceda has not shown good cause for failing to timely take the depositions. To
determine whether good cause exists to modify a scheduling order, the Court considers
(1) Sauceda’s explanation for the failure to timely comply with the scheduling order,
(2) the importance of the modification, (3) Allstate’s potential prejudice, and (4) the
availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.3 Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237. None of
the factors weigh in Sauceda’s favor.
Sauceda failed to adequately explain his delay. Sauceda notes that he “focused
initial discovery efforts on written discovery, expert disclosures, and Court-ordered
mediation.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 3). But once “mediation concluded without resolution—and
while discovery remained open—Plaintiff promptly sought deposition dates to complete
the fact record.” (Id.). Sauceda also points out that the Parties’ Joint Discovery/Case
Management Plan contemplates the sought depositions. (Id. at 5).
The Scheduling Order that established the fact-discovery deadline of February 2,
2026, was entered in August 2025. (Dkt. No. 6). Despite having over five months to
3 Neither Sauceda nor Allstate specifically referenced the four factors, but the Court will
construe the Parties’ arguments within the framework of the factors to the best of its ability.
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coordinate the depositions, Sauceda waited until the eleventh hour—i.e., four business
days before the deadline—to even request Allstate’s availability. While Sauceda’s
request may have been prompt relative to the unfruitful mediation, it was not prompt
relative to the Scheduling Order.
Further, the fact that the Parties’ Joint Discovery/Case Management Plan, (Dkt.
No. 5), contemplates the depositions undermines Sauceda’s position. The Plan was filed
in August 2025. (Id.). So, Sauceda didn’t realize the need for these depositions on the eve
of the deadline. See Sustainable Modular Mgmt., Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 3:20-
CV-01883, 2021 WL 4822017, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2021) (finding delay explanation
sufficient because movant first learned of need for additional discovery after deadline).
Rather, Sauceda knew in August 2025 that he would need to depose Allstate’s corporate
representative, their adjusters who inspected or handled the claim, and third-party
vendors like ServPro. (See id. at 3); see Squyres, 782 F.3d at 238 (rejecting delay explanation
for leave to amend complaint where movant knew for eleven months before the deadline
that he would need to amend it). Sauceda’s focus on written discovery, while knowing
for months that the depositions needed to be completed, connotes that he intentionally
deferred the depositions. The Court finds that Sauceda’s explanation for the delay
weighs against permitting the depositions.
Sauceda maintains that modification is important because the depositions are
“necessary to fairly adjudicate issues now squarely before the Court, including
Defendant’s appraisal motion and the effect of insurer-directed mitigation on the
property” and “to complete the factual record on claim handling [and] inspection.” (Dkt.
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No. 16 at 1, 2). The Court disagrees that the depositions are necessary to decide Allstate’s
Motion to Compel Appraisal. (Dkt. No. 12). Sauceda already responded to the Motion
and never said additional discovery was needed to adequately respond. (Dkt. No. 13).
Sauceda also does not explain how the sought-after testimony is important to understand
the effect of the insurer-directed mitigation or to develop the factual record before trial.
The deadline for pretrial motions lapsed in February 2026, (see Dkt. No. 6), and none were
filed. At this point, it is not clear why Sauceda cannot simply call the witnesses at trial
and elicit the desired testimony. See In re Pool Prod. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., No. 2:12-
MD-02328, 2014 WL 1154334, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2014) (“At trial, DPPs can, if they
wish, explore any inconsistencies between the memo and the witnesses’ description of
Zodiac’s distributor application process.”). Because Sauceda has not demonstrated that
the requested modification is important, the factor weighs against permitting the
depositions.
Extending the discovery deadline would prejudice Allstate. As Allstate explains,
an extension would only serve to cause delay and increase the Parties’ costs. (Dkt. No.
17 at 3). And while a continuance might technically be available to cure any prejudice, a
continuance is unwarranted given Sauceda’s failure to establish good cause under the
other factors. “In this Court, as in other courts in the Fifth Circuit, the ‘remedy of
continuance to cure prejudice is seldomly exercised . . . in the absence of a strong showing
of diligence and importance.’” Sanchez v. Cajun Operating Co., No. 7:24-CV-00287, 2025
WL 777076, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2025) (quoting Staton Techiya, LLC v. Samsung Elecs.
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Co., No. 2:21-CV-00413, 2023 WL 2169025, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023)). These factors
weigh against permitting the depositions.
In sum, Sauceda has not met his burden of showing that the fact-discovery
deadline could not have been met despite his diligence. Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237 (citing
Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 734 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 2013)).
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing analysis, the Court STRIKES Allstate’s Motion to
Compel Appraisal and Abatement without prejudice, (Dkt. No. 12), DENIES as moot
Sauceda’s Motion for Oral Argument, (Dkt. No. 15), and DENIES Sauceda’s Motion for
Leave to Conduct Limited Depositions after Fact-Discovery Deadline, (Dkt. No. 16).
It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on May 29, 2026.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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