Cundari et al v. The City of Pharr, Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
LORENA CUNDARI and MICHELE §
PISZCZOR, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 7:25-CV-00005
§
THE CITY OF PHARR, TEXAS, §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In January 2023, a pack of dogs fatally attacked 91-year-old Estela Manteca in her
own home. The dogs were owned by her son. Following Manteca’s death, her daughter,
Lorena Cundari, and granddaughter, Michel Piszczor, sued the City of Pharr, Texas (“the
City”). They allege that the City knew that the dogs were dangerous and failed to address
the issue. Cundari and Piszczor contend that they have suffered severe emotional trauma
as a direct result of witnessing the aftermath of the attack and the City’s failure to protect
their relative.
Pending before the Court is the City’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim for Relief. (Dkt. No. 7). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
(Id.). Piszczor’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and Cundari’s claims are
DISMISSED without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 1).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 14

2
I. BACKGROUND1
Estela Manteca lived with her son, Alex Aranda, and his dogs at a home in Pharr,
Texas. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1). In January 2023, Manteca was attacked by her son’s dogs, leaving
her in a coma and requiring the amputation of both legs. (Id. at 2). She eventually
succumbed to her injuries and died in May 2023. (Id.).
Before the attack, family members and “other concerned individuals” allegedly
notified the City2 about the dogs’ dangerous behavior. (Id. at 1–2, 5). On January 24,
2022, the City issued a Vicious Dog Declaration for several of Aranda’s dogs. (Id. at 5–6);
(see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 16–33). The City allegedly “failed to follow up to ensure
compliance” with any of the dogs cited that day. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6). In January 2023,
before the attack, the City issued a Notice of Impoundment for Destruction for one of
Aranda’s dogs after he allegedly attacked another individual. (Id. at 6). Cundari and
Pisczor allege that Aranda has recently “accumulated another large number of dogs on
the same property,” which the City failed to remove. (Id. at 8).
Cundari and Piszczor brought suit, alleging that they have suffered severe
emotional trauma as a result of the City’s mishandling of the dangerous dogs. (Id. at 3).
Specifically, Cundari and Piszczor assert four causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.
at 8–14). The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing and have failed
1 The Court accepts all factual allegations in the Complaint, (Dkt. No. 1), as true and views
them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, see White v. U.S. Corrs., LLC, 996 F.3d 302, 306–
07 (5th Cir. 2021).
2 The Complaint’s references to “the City” encompass the City of Pharr Police
Department, the City of Pharr Public Works Department, and the Texas Department of Family
and Protective Services. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7).
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 14

3
to state a claim for relief. (Dkt. No. 7). Cundari and Piszczor responded, (Dkt. No. 10),
and the City replied, (Dkt. No. 11).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. RULE 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move
to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” When considering a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must “accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 496 (5th Cir. 2021). Dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction is appropriate when the plaintiff does not “plausibly allege all
jurisdictional elements.” Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 217, 141 S.Ct. 740, 749, 209 L.Ed.
2d 33 (2021); Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2021). “For a 12(b)(1) motion,
the general burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Dickson v. United States, 11 F.4th
308, 312 (5th Cir. 2021).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, the court should
consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion ‘before addressing any attack on the merits.’” D&G
Holdings, LLC v. Becerra, 22 F.4th 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ramming v. United States,
281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).
B. RULE 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 14

4
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
“[T]he pleading standard [that] Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed
factual allegations,’ but it demands more than . . . ‘labels and conclusions . . . .’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “The
defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving that no legally cognizable
claim for relief exists.” Flores v. Morehead Dotts Rybak, Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00265, 2022 WL
4740076, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022) (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.)).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. White v. U.S. Corrs., LLC, 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2021). The court must
evaluate whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 14

5
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “Dismissal . . . is
appropriate where the plaintiff fails to allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’ and thus does not ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”
Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses the City’s argument that Cundari and Piszczor lack
standing. The Court concludes that Cundari has standing to assert claims under Section
1983, but that Piszczor does not. The Court then considers whether Cundari has stated a
plausible claim for relief. She has not.
A. RULE 12(b)(1)
A party who has standing under Texas’s wrongful death or survival causes of
action also has standing to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pluet v. Frasier, 355 F.3d
381, 383 (5th Cir. 2004). Because Section 1983 is silent on who may sue on behalf of a
deceased person, federal courts are instructed to look to state law to fill in the gaps. Id.;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Texas recognizes two types of claims when someone dies due to another’s
actions: wrongful death and survival claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 71.002,
71.021. A wrongful death claim is brought by a decedent’s “surviving spouse, children,
[or] parents,” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.004(a), to compensate for their “loss of
future pecuniary benefits, loss of inheritance, mental anguish, and loss of society and
companionship.” Diaz ex rel. Diaz v. Mayor of Corpus Christi, 121 F.App’x 36, 38–39 (5th
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 14

6
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Gandara v. Slade, 832 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin
1992, no writ)). A survival claim, by contrast, belongs to the decedent’s estate and
redresses the decedent’s injuries. Diaz, 121 F.App’x at 38 (quoting Gandara, 832 S.W.2d at
167).
Because neither allege that they are a legal representative of Manteca’s estate,
Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a survival action. See Diaz, 121 F.App’x at 39.
Plaintiffs instead rely on Texas’s wrongful death statute. (Dkt. No. 10 at 10) (“Plaintiffs
Lorena Cundari and Michele Piszczor . . . bring claims rooted in their own severe
emotional trauma, PTSD, and enduring psychological harm directly caused by
witnessing their mother’s and grandmother’s preventable suffering and death.”).
Cundari, as Manteca’s daughter, (Dkt. No. 1 at 4), has standing to sue for wrongful
death under Texas law and thereby has standing to assert her Section 1983 claims here.
Piszczor, however, is Manteca’s granddaughter. (Id.). Grandchildren are not among the
classes of individuals authorized to sue under Texas’s wrongful death statute. Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.004(a); see also Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing individuals “within the class of people entitled to recover under Texas’s
wrongful death statute” can sue under § 1983 for their own injuries). Piszczor therefore
lacks standing and her claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
B. RULE 12(b)(6)
Now the Court must assess whether Cundari has satisfied the Rule 12(b)(6)
pleading standards for each of her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a cause of
action under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must (1) allege the defendant violated ‘a right
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 14

7
secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,’ and (2) show ‘a person
acting under color of state law’ committed the violation.” Perdomo v. City of League City,
765 F.Supp.3d 613, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Peterson v. Johnson, 57 F.4th 225, 231 (5th
Cir. 2023)). For the reasons discussed below, Cundari has not sufficiently pled her claims.
1. Count I – Deprivation of Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection Monell Claim – Failure to Train and Supervise3
Cundari alleges that the City’s failure to adopt appropriate policies and to train its
employees regarding dangerous dogs amounted to deliberate indifference. (Dkt. No. 1
at 8–9). She characterizes the City’s conduct as reflecting a longstanding policy of
inaction. (Dkt. No. 10 at 5). She claims that the City’s systemic failure to enforce animal
control laws over a decade constitutes a de facto custom of deliberate indifference. (Id.).
The City argues that Cundari failed to identify a specific official policy or a
widespread custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation. (Dkt. No. 7 at 8, 10).
Further, Cundari’s own pleadings show that the City did act by citing the dog owner and
declaring the dogs dangerous. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6). And in any event, the City argues,
one prior incident from 2021 is legally insufficient to establish a pattern or custom for
Monell purposes. (Dkt. No. 11 at 4).
A municipality cannot be vicariously liable under Section 1983 for its employees’
actions. Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.E.2d 611
(1978). Municipal liability exists only when an official policy or custom, adopted or
3 In her Response, Cundari labels her first count as simply “deliberate indifference.” (Dkt.
No. 10 at 5).
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 14

8
maintained with deliberate indifference, is the “moving force” behind a constitutional
violation. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2038).
An “official policy” can be shown in three ways. First, a promulgated policy
statement, ordinance, or regulation whose enforcement violates one’s constitutional
rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660–61, 98 S.Ct. at 2020 (city issued a policy requiring pregnant
employees to take unpaid leave before any medical need arose). Second, where no official
policy exists, but a policy maker’s action itself violates a constitutional right. See Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1418–19, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (city
council censured and discharged an employee without a hearing). Third, when a policy
doesn’t exist and the policymaker doesn’t act, but the need to act is so obvious that doing
nothing violates a constitutional right. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109
S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). A custom, on the other hand, requires showing
a “persistent, widespread practice . . . [that] is so common and well-settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735
F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
A process of elimination is needed to understand Cundari’s allegations. The
Complaint does not specify a City policy, ordinance, or regulation relating to dangerous
dogs. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). Nor does the Complaint name a City policymaker
involved in the purported violation of her rights, or even use the word “custom” at all.
(See generally id.). So, as the Court understands it, the Complaint alleges that the need to
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 8 of 14

9
act—i.e., train its employees—was so obvious that failing to do so violated Manteca’s
constitutional rights.
To establish a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that (1) the
training was inadequate; (2) the municipality’s policymaker was deliberately indifferent
in adopting the training procedures; and (3) the failure to train caused the constitutional
injury. Huong v. City of Port Arthur, 961 F.Supp. 1003, 1007 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (citing Baker
v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir. 1996)). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference
for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360,
179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (quoting Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)).4
The Complaint alleges no facts about the City’s training procedures, identifies no
policymaker or his/her involvement, and pleads no pattern of similar constitutional
violations. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). The Court therefore dismisses this claim without
prejudice.
4 To be sure, without a pattern, a plaintiff “may proceed only under the ‘single-incident
exception’—a narrow and rarely successful theory that applies where the specific constitutional
violation at issue was the highly predictable result of complete lack of training.” Thompson ex rel.
Neveah T. v. Martinez, 789 F.Supp.3d 491, 531 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Connick, 563 U.S. at 63, 131
S.Ct. at 1361). This exception applies only in the “total absence of training,” not a failure to train
in a particular subject. Id. (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 849 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Cundari does not allege that the City never trained its employees at all, but rather in the limited
area of handling dangerous dogs. Therefore, the single-incident exception is not implicated here.
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 9 of 14

10
2. Count II – Deprivation of Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection5 Deliberate and Indifferent Conduct that Shocks the
Conscience
Cundari next alleges that the City’s inaction “shock[s] the contemporary
conscience” because officials were aware of the escalating danger posed by the dogs but
deliberately refused to act. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10).
Substantive due process liability in this context attaches only to conduct that is so
egregious and outrageous “that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1717 n.8,
140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Conduct that is intended to injure is likely to meet the
conscience-shocking standard while negligently inflicted harm does not. Sterling v. City
of Jackson, 715 F.Supp.3d 918, 929 (S.D. Miss. 2024), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded
on other grounds, 159 F.4th 361 (5th Cir. 2025), vacated reh’g en banc granted, No. 24-60370,
167 F.4th 806 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026); see also id. at 932 (quoting White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d
1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen someone not in custody is harmed because too few
resources were devoted to their safety and protection, that harm will seldom, if ever, be
cognizable under the Due Process Clause.”)).
Here, Cundari does not allege that the City intentionally sought to injure Manteca,
let alone any facts to support that conclusion. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). While Cundari
alleges that the City “ignored credible reports of threats to [Manteca’s] safety, failed to
5 In her Response, Cundari asserts that this claim is brought under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 10 at 6). No reference is made to the Equal Protection
Clause. (See generally id.). Therefore, the Court will limit its analysis to Cundari’s allegations in
the context of the Due Process Clause.
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 10 of 14

11
enforce its own public safety regulations, and took no meaningful corrective action
address the known hazard,” these allegations amount to, at most, gross negligence. (Id.
at 10). Gross negligence does not clear the “shocks the conscience” bar. See Daniels v.
City of Dallas, 272 F.App’x 321, 322–23 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The Court therefore
dismisses this claim without prejudice.
3. Count III – Deprivation of Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection6 Age-Based Discrimination
Cundari alleges that the City “failed to provide adequate protection to Estela
Manteca who was of an elderly age, and who was in a vulnerable position.” (Dkt. No. 1
at 12). Cundari also contends that Estela was treated “differently than similarly situated
individuals who received timely and adequate protective services or responses.” (Id.);
(Dkt. No. 10 at 6) (invoking the “class-of-one” doctrine).
To succeed on an equal-protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that
“two or more classifications of similarly situated persons were treated differently” under
a statute. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gallegos-
Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). Generally,
equal-protection claims “concern governmental classifications that impact groups of
citizens in different ways.” Klinger v. Univ. of So. Miss., 612 F.App’x 222, 232 (5th Cir.
2015) (per curiam). But “age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection
6 In her Response, Cundari asserts this claim only under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 10 at 6).
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 11 of 14

12
Clause.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 646, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522
(2000).
The Complaint alleges that Manteca’s rights were violated because of her age.
(Dkt. No. 1 at 12). But Cundari fails to allege any law or governmental action under
which Manteca was treated differently because of her age, let alone any classifications
that would impact groups of citizens disparately. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). In any event,
age is not a suspect classification. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83, 120 S.Ct. at 646.
Nevertheless, “[a]n equal protection claim that is premised on differential
treatment but not based on membership in a suspect class or the infringement of a
fundamental right may be cognizable as a so-called ‘class of one.’” Wood v. Collier, 836
F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120
S.Ct. 1073, 1074, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000)). To state a “class-of-one” equal protection claim,
a plaintiff must allege that the government intentionally treated her differently from
others similarly situated and that no rational basis justified the differential treatment.
Wood, 836 F.3d at 539 (quoting Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 233 (5th Cir.
2012)).
The Response changes course, arguing that Manteca’s rights were violated by
differential treatment as a “class-of-one.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 6). This is particularly puzzling
because under a claim originally labelled “age-based discrimination,” (Dkt. No. 1 at 12),
Cundari contends that Manteca was singled out for reasons that had nothing to do with
her age, (Dkt. No. 10 at 6). At any rate, Cundari fails to plead any facts establishing how
Manteca was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals or even who
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 12 of 14

13
the similarly situated individuals were. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). Cundari thus fails to
state a claim, and the Court dismisses this claim without prejudice.
4. Count IV – Deprivation of Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection7 State-Created Danger
Finally, Cundari asserts a state-created danger theory, alleging that Aranda was
“emboldened” by the City not responding to warnings about the dangerous dogs. (Dkt.
No. 1 at 13).
The Fifth Circuit recently considered the state-created danger theory. See Sterling,
159 F.4th at 385–86.8 To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts to show a state
actor affirmatively created or enhanced a danger unique to the plaintiff (as opposed to
the general public) and that the conduct shocks the conscience. Id.
The Complaint recycles many of the same conclusory allegations previously raised
in Cundari’s Monell claim to support her “state-created danger” theory. See supra
III(B)(1). In doing so, Cundari does not allege any affirmative act by a City official that
created or enhanced a unique danger to Manteca. (See generally Dkt. No. 1). Nor does the
alleged conduct plausibly rise to a level that shocks the conscience. See supra III(B)(2).
The Court therefore dismisses this claim without prejudice.
7 In her Response, Cundari asserts this claim only under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 10 at 6).
8 The Court notes that the Fifth Circuit recently voted to rehear Sterling en banc and
vacated the original panel opinion as a result. See Sterling v. City of Jackson, Miss., 167 F.4th 806
(5th Cir. 2026) (mem.). As such, current Fifth Circuit precedent does not recognize the state-
created danger theory. Sterling, 159 F.4th at 385–86 (noting that prior to its decision in Sterling,
the Fifth Circuit had not adopted the theory). Regardless of the en banc court’s eventual decision,
however, Cundari fails to state a claim under this theory.
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 13 of 14

14
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court recognizes the terrible loss suffered by Estela Manteca’s family,
however, in light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim for Relief. (Dkt. No. 7). Piszczor’s claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice. (Dkt. No. 1). Cundari’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. (Id.).
It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on March 31, 2026.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 7:25-cv-00005 Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 in TXSD Page 14 of 14