Ruff v. Victoria County

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
MICHAEL LEE RUFF,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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§
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§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00028
VICTORIA COUNTY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO RETAIN CASE
Plaintiff Michael Lee Ruff is a Texas inmate who is appearing pro se and in forma
pauperis (“ifp”). He filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff’s case is subject to screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2), 1915A.
For purposes of screening, the undersigned recommends the Court RETAIN
Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Victoria County for having a policy of
restricting or denying its inmates in the Victoria County Jail (VCJ) mental health treatment
which resulted in deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical and mental health
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. BACKGROUND AND PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal
Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) who is currently housed at the TDCJ Cotulla Unit, in
Cotulla, Texas, although his claim in this case arises out of his period of incarceration at
the Victoria County Jail, in Victoria, Texas. The Court received Plaintiff’s original
complaint on April 15, 2026. (D.E. 1). After granting Plaintiff’s application to proceed ifp,
the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and subsequently granted
him an extension. (D.E. 14, D.E. 20). The Court received Plaintiff’s amended complaint
on June 26, 2026. (D.E. 22).
Plaintiff alleges he was an inmate in the Victoria County Jail (“VCJ”) from about
June 26, 2025, to April 8, 2026.1 Plaintiff alleges he suffers from a serious mental health
condition which requires him to be treated with medication. He further alleges that from
his initial booking at the VCJ, he informed VCJ staff he is a disabled veteran in need of
mental health services and medication. The undersigned understands Plaintiff’s pleading
to be he was taking prescribed medication immediately prior to being incarcerated at the
VCJ, but that as an inmate, he was unable to obtain his required medication and the VCJ
1 The dates of Plaintiff’s incarceration at the VCJ are taken from his original complaint. (D.E. 1, p. 4).
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either refused or neglected Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain his medications. Plaintiff made
repeated requests to be seen by a mental health provider and each request was either
ignored or denied. Plaintiff submitted at least seven grievances in which he documented
his need for, and the denial of, mental health treatment and medication. Plaintiff alleges he
was never seen for his mental health condition and was without his medication for
approximately ten months. (D.E. 22, p. 6). Plaintiff alleges his ten months without
medication was “complete torture” and his lack of medication resulted in physical
symptoms and other manifestations such as talking to himself and being agitated and
unable to function on a normal level with others. Plaintiff’s symptoms were pronounced to
the degree that he was assaulted by other inmates because of his condition. Plaintiff alleges
the physical manifestations of his illness, his inability to function normally, and his being
physically assaulted would not have happened but for his denial of mental health treatment
and medication. While Plaintiff alleges he is suing for both individual or official capacity,
it appears he does not understand the distinction because he has only named Victoria
County as a defendant and does not sue any individual. Plaintiff alleges he is suing Victoria
County because the Victoria County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity he can sue. (D.E.
22, pp. 6-7).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law
if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the
improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya,
291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
IV. DISCUSSION
Construing Plaintiff’s claims liberally, Plaintiff alleges Victoria County acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by consistently and repeatedly denying
him medical treatment for his serious mental health condition which also included the
denial of his prescribed mental health medication. Plaintiff alleges approximately ten
months of denial of medical services despite repeated requests for treatment.
An Eighth Amendment violation occurs when a prison official is deliberately
indifferent to an inmate’s health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In order to state a § 1983 claim for denial of adequate medical
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treatment, a prisoner must allege that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
The test for deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective prong.
Under the objective prong, the inmate “must first prove objective exposure to a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Trevino v. Livingston, No. 3:14-CV-52, 2017 WL 1013089, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (citing Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir.
2006)). To prove the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test, the inmate “must
show both: (1) that the defendant was aware of facts from which the inference of an
excessive risk to the [inmate’s] health or safety could be drawn; and (2) that the defendant
actually drew the inference that such potential for harm existed.” Trevino, 2017 WL
1013089, at *3 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 397 and Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159
(5th Cir. 1999)).
In the context of medical treatment, the prisoner must show “that prison officials
refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or
engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Deliberate indifference may be exhibited by prison doctors in their response to
prisoners’ needs, but it may also be shown when prison officials have denied an inmate
prescribed treatment or have denied him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating
the need for treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. A “delay in medical care can only
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constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference [that]
results in substantial harm.” Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis
in original).
The deliberate indifference standard “is an extremely high standard to meet.”
Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim.l Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). “Unsuccessful
medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate
indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment, absent
exceptional circumstances.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.
Under § 1983, a municipality such as Victoria County may only be held liable for
acts for which it is actually responsible. See Doe on Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480 (1986)). The governmental body must either itself subject a person to a
deprivation of rights or cause a person to be subjected to such deprivation. Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011). A municipality is liable for the constitutional violations
of its employees only if the alleged constitutional deprivations resulted from municipal
policy or custom. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);
see also Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2010) (a
municipality may not be subject to liability merely for employing a tortfeasor; liability
requires deliberate action attributable to the municipality that is the direct cause of the
alleged constitutional violation).
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Liability of a municipality under § 1983 therefore requires proof of three elements:
a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving
force” is the policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.
“Where a policy is facially unconstitutional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it was
promulgated with deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequences that
constitutional violations would result.” Duke v. Dallas Cnty., No. 3:20-CV-117-G (BH),
2021 WL 3525106, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 3204565 (N.D.
Tex. July 29, 2021) (citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579-80 & n.22); accord Peterson v.
City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 849-50 (5th Cir. 2009). “[I]solated unconstitutional
actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability,” because “the
unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some
sort of official action or imprimatur.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges a plausible claim that Victoria County has a
policy of not providing its inmates with medical treatment for serious mental health
problems. Plaintiff alleges he is a disabled veteran with a serious mental health problem
who is treated with prescribed medications. Over the course of approximately ten months,
from his initial booking to his transfer to the TDCJ, Plaintiff suffered mental health
problems which went untreated and unmedicated. The lack of treatment and medication
resulted in physical manifestations, plaintiff being unable to function, and Plaintiff being
assaulted by other inmates due to his condition. The undersigned does not make this
recommendation in a vacuum. The undersigned is aware of another case currently pending
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in this Court where another inmate of the Victoria County Jail raised similar claims. See
Hernandez v. Victoria County, No. 6:25-cv-00074, (S.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2026)(screening
M&R retaining Monell claim against Victoria County for restricting or denying inmates
access to mental health treatment). Whether Victoria County has such a policy, neglected
Plaintiff, or is liable to Plaintiff is yet to be determined. However, for purposes of judicial
screening and whether or not Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim, Plaintiff has met his
initial pleading burden.
Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim
against Victoria County be retained.
V. CLAIMS NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS MEMORANDUM
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); See also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se parties are normally accorded more
leniency in the construction of their pleadings).
The undersigned has attempted to articulate and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an
impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate leniency to pro se litigants while at
the same time requiring compliance with applicable pleading and screening standards. To
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the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim not specifically addressed by the
undersigned in this Memorandum and Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to state such
claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the claim to be identified, understood,
or analyzed by the Court.
Plaintiff is therefore advised that any claim not addressed in this Memorandum and
Recommendation is not currently before this Court because Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
For purposes of screening and for the reasons set forth above, the undersigned
recommends the Court RETAIN Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Victoria
County for having a policy of restricting or denying its inmates in the Victoria County Jail
with mental health treatment which resulted in deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical and mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Respectfully submitted on July 27, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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