Safi v. Bondi,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
YAHYA SAFI,
Petitioner,
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v. 	Civil No. 5:26-cv-00483
PAMELA BONDI,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,
MARCOS CHARLES,
MIGUEL VERGARA,
US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (ICE),
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
JAVIER ALEMAN,
and TODD M. LYONS, ACTING
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are Petitioner Yahya Safi’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Dkt. No. 1; Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to
the Petition, Dkt. No. 10; Petitioner’s Response, Dkt. No. 12; and the parties’ supplemental
briefings, Dkt. Nos. 16, 17. The Court held a motions hearing on May 29, 2026. May 29 Hr’g
[hereinafter Hr’g] at 1:40–2:19. 	The case was referred to the undersigned for a report and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Dkt. No. 13. For the following reasons, the
undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Dkt. No. 10, be DENIED and that Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. No. 1,
be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Yahya Safi, a citizen of Afghanistan, was apprehended at the border of the United
States in January 2025. Dkt. Nos. 1 at ¶ 43; 10 at 2.1 Petitioner is presently detained in the custody
of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Rio Grande Detention Center
in Laredo, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 7.
On September 25, 2025, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner removed to
Afghanistan, or alternatively to an unspecified country, based on the charge or charges contained
in the Notice to Appear. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 1. Petitioner’s removal order became administratively
final on September 25, 2025, because Petitioner did not apply for relief from removal. 	Hr’g at
2:03; see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 62. 	Not only Petitioner, but also Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) and Respondent waived appeal. 	Dkt. No.10-1 at 2. 	Petitioner’s ninety-day removal
period began on September 25, 2025 and expired on December 24, 2025. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 62; see
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (B)(i). 	The presumptively reasonable six-month detention period
recognized in Zadvydas v. Davis expired on March 24, 2026.2 	See 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on
March 24, 2026. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 22. When Petitioner initiated this habeas proceeding on March
1 The record is unclear as to the exact date Petitioner entered ICE custody. Petitioner alleges that he was taken into
ICE custody on January 21, 2025. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 43. Respondents state that Petitioner has remained in ICE custody
since he was apprehended at the border on January 31, 2025. Dkt. No. 10 at 2. The present record does not establish
whether the discrepancy results from an omitted immigration record or a clerical error. The ten-day discrepancy is
not material because Petitioner’s detention exceeds the relevant period under either date.
2 Although Zadvydas describes the presumptively reasonable period as six months, courts commonly calculate that
period as 180 days. See 533 U.S. at 701. Calculated from September 25, 2025, the 180-day period expired on March
24, 2026. A literal six-calendar-month calculation would yield March 25, 2026. The one-day difference does not
affect the analysis because Petitioner remained detained beyond either date.
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24, 2026, he had been confined for 180 days after the IJ’s order became final on September 25,
2025, and for 427 days from January 21, 2025, when he allegedly first entered detention. See Dkt.
Nos. 1 at ¶ 43; 10-1 at 1. Respondents do not contest the fact. Hr’g at 2:13–14.
Respondents’ supplemental filing and hearing representations addressed why removal to
Afghanistan and third-country removal were not presently available for Petitioner. Dkt. No. 16 at
1; Hr’g at 1:59–2:15. As to Afghanistan, Respondents first stated in their May 19 supplemental
filing that removal was “not an option” unless the Government obtained a travel letter for
Petitioner. Dkt. No. 16 at 1. Respondents also stated that the travel-letter request was still pending.
Id. At the later hearing, Respondents did not report that the request had been granted. 	Hr’g at
2:10–12. 	Respondents explained that the travel letter remained necessary because Afghanistan
requires one before its citizens may enter the country, even when DHS has the person’s passport.
Id. at 2:10–11. Respondents further stated that the United States had requested travel letters for
approximately 200 to 300 Afghan nationals and had obtained some, but not most. Id. Respondents
therefore characterized removal to Afghanistan as subject to an indefinite waiting period. Id.
As to third-country removal, Respondents stated that removal of Afghan nationals to third
countries had been a “virtual impossibility” until recently. 	Dkt. No. 16 at 1. 	Respondents then
stated that counsel learned on May 18, 2026, that the Government had arranged for some Afghan
nationals to be removed to a third country. Id. At the hearing, Respondents identified that country
as the Central African Republic. Hr’g at 2:12. But Respondents did not report any plan to remove
Petitioner there. Id. Respondents stated that Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) had
no plan to remove Petitioner to the Central African Republic, and that no other country had agreed
to accept him. Id.
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Respondents did not identify a disciplinary infraction, mental health issues, prior
immigration violations, flight risk, danger to the community, or failure to cooperate that would
independently support continued detention. Hr’g at 2:13–14. The present record does not identify
any criminal history predating Petitioner’s arrival in the United States. 	Id. 	Petitioner has four
brothers who supported the former Afghan government and the United States and now reside in
the United States as lawful permanent residents. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 54. A credible fear interview was
conducted pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Hr’g at 2:01; see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3. An
asylum officer determined that it was more likely than not Petitioner would be tortured and killed
by the Taliban if he is removed to Afghanistan because of his association with the previous Afghan
government. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3. 	No evidence suggests that Petitioner is linked to terrorist
organizations. Hr’g at 2:01, 2:15.
Petitioner brings four claims: (1) He seeks declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Dkt.
No. 1 at ¶¶ 7–9. Petitioner alleges that his continued detention is not authorized because removal
is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future; Respondents have failed to rebut
that allegation; and Respondents have not complied with 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. 	Id. at
¶¶ 77–83. 	(2) Petitioner alleges that Respondents violated the Immigration and Nationality Act
and its implementing regulations, including 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(3) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and
241.13, by continuing to detain him rather than releasing him under an Order of Supervision. Id.
at ¶¶ 84–89. (3) Petitioner alleges that his continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at ¶¶ 90–93. (4) Finally, Petitioner alleges that Respondents’ continued-
detention policy violates the Administrative Procedure Act because it is arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to law. Id. at ¶¶ 94–99; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B).
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Petitioner requests several forms of relief. He asks the Court to: (1) exercise jurisdiction;
(2) expedite consideration of the Petition and issue an Order to Show Cause; (3) restrain
Respondents from moving him outside Texas while the Petition remains pending; (4) require
seventy-two hours’ notice before any intended movement; (5) require Respondents, before
removing Petitioner to an allegedly safe third country, to provide a full merits hearing before an IJ
on asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture,
with a right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals; (6) order his immediate release; (7)
declare that Respondents acted arbitrarily and capriciously; (8) declare that Respondents failed to
comply with binding regulations and precedent; (9) declare that his detention violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (10) permanently enjoin removal to a third country unless
Respondents provide the requested immigration proceedings; and (11) award attorney’s fees and
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1–11.
Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to the Petition. 	Dkt.
No. 10. Petitioner filed a Response. Dkt. No. 12. The Court ordered Respondents to supplement
their Motion with any updates concerning efforts to facilitate Petitioner’s removal to a third
country and directed the parties to address permissible terms of supervised release or any
justification for continued detention. 	Dkt. Nos. 14, 15. 	Respondents filed a Supplement. 	Dkt.
No. 16. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Response. Dkt. No. 17. The Court held a motions hearing
on May 29, 2026. The motions are ripe for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Respondents’ request for summary judgment on a habeas petition requires the Court to
apply both 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A person held in federal
custody may seek habeas relief if the detention violates the Constitution, federal law, or a treaty of
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the United States. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	District courts have subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Section 2241 petitions challenging the lawfulness of a noncitizen’s detention. Imran v.
Harper, No. 25-30370, 2026 WL 93131, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (per curiam) (citing Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)). The Fifth Circuit has likewise recognized that “federal courts
retain habeas jurisdiction to review statutory and constitutional claims.” Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341
F.3d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 2003). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing facts sufficient to
warrant habeas relief. See Irving v. Breazeale, 400 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1968). The petitioner
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the detention is unlawful.
Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 696 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Skaftouros v. United States,
667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011)). A court considering a habeas petition must promptly award the
writ or direct the respondent to show cause why the writ should not issue unless the petition shows
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. After receiving the return, the court
must determine the facts and dispose of the matter as law and justice require. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant establishes that no genuine dispute exists
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). 	“As a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to
summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases.” 	Clark v.
Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The Court may not weigh
the evidence, make credibility determinations, or resolve factual disputes at the summary-
judgment stage. 	Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160 (5th Cir. 2021). 	The
nonmovant 	opposing 	summary 	judgment 	may 	not 	rely 	solely 	on 	conclusory 	allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).
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The movant bears the initial Rule 56 burden. Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 371
(5th Cir. 2010). 	“If the burden of proof at trial lies with the nonmoving party, the movant may
satisfy its initial burden by ‘showing—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” 	Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the
nonmovant’s favor. Guzman, 18 F.4th at 160. If the movant fails to satisfy its initial burden, “the
motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Duffie, 600 F.3d at 371.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses subject matter jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction because
Petitioner challenges his present physical custody and is detained in this District. A Section 2241
petitioner who challenges present physical custody in the United States generally must file in the
district of confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). In Trump v. J.G.G., the
Supreme Court reiterated that a habeas petition belongs in the district of confinement. 604 U.S.
670, 672 (2025) (per curiam). Petitioner is presently detained at Rio Grande Detention Center in
Laredo, Texas. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 7. 	Rio Grande Detention Center is located within the Southern
District of Texas. 	Id. at ¶ 24. 	Respondents conceded at the hearing that Zadvydas governs the
analysis of Petitioner’s continued post-removal detention.3 	Hr’g at 2:00; see 533 U.S. at 701.
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider Petitioner’s challenge
to the lawfulness of his continued detention. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442–43.
3 Respondents initially argued that Zadvydas did not decide whether Section 1231(a)(6)’s reasonable-time limitation
applies to noncitizens detained at the threshold of initial entry and suggested that the limitation did not apply to
Petitioner. Dkt. No. 10 at 3–5. That argument rested on the entry-fiction doctrine, which treats certain noncitizens
denied entry as if they were stopped at the border for some constitutional purposes, even if physically present in the
United States. Id. At the hearing, however, Respondents withdrew that position and conceded that Zadvydas applies
in this case. Hr’g at 2:00.
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The material facts relevant to Petitioner’s continued detention are undisputed. The parties
did not materially dispute the relevant facts at the May 29 hearing. Hr’g at 1:50–55, 2:13. Viewing
the evidence in Petitioner’s favor, Respondents have not shown an absence of evidence supporting
Petitioner’s claim. 	See Guzman, 18 F.4th at 160; Duffie, 600 F.3d at 371. 	Petitioner identifies
specific obstacles to removal rather than relying solely on the duration of his detention. Dkt. Nos.
1 at ¶¶ 44–56; 12 at 4–6; see also Hr’g at 1:50–55. 	Because the parties do not dispute those
underlying facts, the dispositive question is whether those facts establish that Respondents are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Duffie, 600 F.3d at 371.
The Court first considers whether Petitioner has been detained beyond the presumptively
reasonable period. 	The removal period begins on the latest of the dates specified in Section
1231(a)(1)(B), including “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” 	8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court construed Section 1231(a)(6) not to
authorize indefinite detention. 	533 U.S. at 689. The Court identified six months as the
presumptively reasonable period of post-removal-order detention. Id. at 701. The same statutory
limitation applies to inadmissible aliens. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005). Petitioner’s
removal order became administratively final on September 25, 2025, because Petitioner did not
apply for relief from removal. Hr’g at 2:03. Respondents also waived appeal. Dkt. No.10-1 at 2.
Petitioner’s ninety-day removal period began on September 25, 2025 and expired on December
24, 2025. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 62; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (B)(i). Since September 25, 2025, is
the correct date of administrative finality, the six-month period recognized in Zadvydas expired on
March 24, 2026. 	See 533 U.S. at 701. 	Thus, his detention has exceeded the presumptively
reasonable six-month period, and Respondents do not dispute the fact. Hr’g at 2:13.
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The Court next considers whether Petitioner has made his initial showing under Zadvydas.
Petitioner has provided good reason to believe that his removal is not significantly likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future. 	Detention beyond six months is not automatically unlawful.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. After six months, however, the detainee may seek release by providing
good reason to believe that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Id. A detainee cannot satisfy that burden merely by pointing to the length of detention or making
conclusory statements that removal is unlikely. See Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th
Cir. 2006). Petitioner identifies concrete obstacles to removal and relies on more than the duration
of his detention. 	Dkt. Nos. 1 at ¶¶ 44–56; 12 at 1–6; Hr’g at 1:50–55. 	An asylum officer
determined that Petitioner would be tortured and killed if removed to Afghanistan. Dkt. Nos. 1 at
¶ 3; 12 at 5. 	Petitioner has remained detained for nearly eighteen months. 	Hr’g at 1:51.
Afghanistan has not responded to the request for travel documents and has not issued any
documents to accept Petitioner. Id. No third country has agreed to accept him. Id. Petitioner is
nonviolent, poses no flight risk, and has family ties in the United States. Id. at 1:52–53. He has
no criminal history or disciplinary infractions. 	Id. at 1:53–54. 	He has not received a custody
review. Id. at 1:54, 2:14. Because Petitioner has provided good reason to believe that his removal
is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and identifies concrete obstacles
without making conclusory statements, Petitioner has satisfied his initial burden.
The Court then considers whether Respondents have rebutted Petitioner’s showing that his
removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Here, Respondents have
not rebutted Petitioner’s initial burden with sufficient evidence. Once a detainee provides good
reason to believe that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Government must rebut that showing with sufficient evidence. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. If the
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Government cannot do so, a detainee must be released, subject to supervision. Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021). At the May 29 hearing, Respondents did not report that the
travel-letter request for Afghanistan had been granted. Id. at 2:10–12. Respondents explained that
Afghanistan requires a travel letter before its citizens may enter the country, even when DHS has
the person’s passport. Id. at 2:10–11. Respondents further characterized Petitioner’s removal to
Afghanistan as subject to an indefinite waiting period. 	Id. 	As to third-country removal,
Respondents stated that ERO had no plan to remove Petitioner to the Central African Republic.
Id. at 2:12. Respondents also stated that no other country had agreed to accept him. Id.
Furthermore, Respondents did not identify any failure by Petitioner to cooperate with
removal efforts or any action by Petitioner that prevented his removal. 	Hr’g at 2:13–14; see 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). 	Respondents also did not contest Petitioner’s lack of a disciplinary
infraction, 	mental-health 	concern, 	prior 	immigration 	violation, 	flight 	risk, 	danger 	to 	the
community, or other factor weighing against release. Hr’g at 1:50–55, 2:13. The present record
does not identify any criminal history predating Petitioner’s arrival in the United States. 	Id.
Petitioner has family ties in the United States. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 54. 	No evidence suggests that
Petitioner is linked to terrorist organizations. Hr’g at 2:15. Respondents stated that DHS could
release Petitioner subject to conditions. Id. at 2:13; see Dkt. No. 16 at 1–2. Therefore, Respondents
have not rebutted Petitioner’s showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Hr’g at 2:09–12. The Court should grant Petitioner’s Petition in
part and order his prompt release. Upon release, Petitioner shall remain subject to applicable terms
of supervision determined by DHS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), (6); Dkt. No. 16 at 1.
If the Court orders the release of Petitioner, his remaining requests for relief become moot,
unripe, or need not be reached. Petitioner’s requests for expedited consideration and an Order to
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Show Cause, and his transfer-related requests are moot. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2–4. Petitioner’s third-
country-removal requests should be dismissed without prejudice as unripe because Respondents
have not identified any third country that has agreed to accept him. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 10; Hr’g at 2:12.
If the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to release, the Court need not reach his independent
Fifth Amendment claim or his broader requests for declaratory relief. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
689, 701; Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam). The Court should
therefore decline to address Petitioner’s requests for declarations that Respondents acted arbitrarily
and capriciously, failed to comply with binding regulations and precedent, or violated the Due
Process Clause. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7–9.
Lastly, Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act should
be denied. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 11. 	The Equal Access to Justice Act authorizes attorney’s fees in
specified civil actions against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). However, because a
habeas proceeding is a hybrid action rather than a purely civil action, the Fifth Circuit has held that
the Act does not authorize attorney’s fees for successful motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Barco
v. Witte, 65 F.4th 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023); see also Imran, 2026 WL 93131, at *2; Banegas Avila
v. Frink, No. H-26-916, 2026 WL 976144, at *5 n.4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2026).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned requests that the District Court ADOPT the
findings of fact set forth above. 	Further, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that
Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 10, be DENIED. The undersigned further
RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. No. 1, be
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
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Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondents promptly release
Petitioner from continued detention. Upon release, Petitioner shall remain subject to applicable
conditions of supervision determined by DHS consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and (6). The
undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the District Court’s order include any additional
conditions pertaining to Petitioner’s release that it finds necessary to effectuate the order.
The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s requests for expedited
consideration and an Order to Show Cause be DENIED AS MOOT; that his temporary transfer-
related requests be DENIED AS MOOT upon his release; that his requests concerning removal
to a third country be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and that his request for attorney’s
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Signed this June 22, 2026, in Laredo, Texas.
______________________________
Diana Song Quiroga
United States Magistrate Judge
Warnings
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation, unless they waive the
right 	to 	do 	so. 	A 	party 	filing 	objections 	must 	specifically 	identify 	those 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objections are being made. 	The District Court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. 	Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421
(5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)).
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A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the Report—
or the party’s waiver of the right to do so—shall bar that party from de novo review by the District
Court of the proposed findings and recommendations and, except upon grounds of plain error,
shall bar the party from appellate review of proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the District Court to which no objections were filed. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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