Khatri v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
RAMESH KHATRI,
Petitioner,
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V. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-00189
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, ET AL.,1
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner is currently detained in federal immigration custody in Texas. Before the
Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Dkt. No. 1), and Respondents’
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 18).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s deprivation of liberty without constitutionally
adequate procedures is a violation of his due process rights, and the failure to provide due
process warrants his release. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is granted in part. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner by June
11, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Respondents are ordered to notify the Court of the status of
Petitioner’s release by June 12, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Nepal, challenges his ongoing detention without a bond
hearing. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in 2023. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3).2
Shortly after entering the United States, Petitioner was apprehended by immigration
officials and served a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court. (See id.; Dkt. No. 18-1 at 1). He
was subsequently released into the United States on parole. (See id; Dkt. No. 18-2 at 1).
1 Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted for Kristi Noem in this case under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(d). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute this party on the docket sheet.
2 When citing to the page numbers of any document in the record, the Court will cite to the page
numbering of the Court’s internal CM/ECF docket system, and not to the page numbers in the underlying
documents.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 10, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Petitioner represents that he has no criminal history. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 3).
On November 1, 2025, Petitioner was apprehended by ICE while travelling to work.
(Id.). Petitioner has been ordered removed by an Immigration Judge. (Dkt. No. 18-3 at 1).
Petitioner filed an appeal of that order of removal. (Dkt. No. 18-4). Petitioner remains
detained while his appeal is pending and seeks release. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6).
B. Legal Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
released interim guidance in July 2025, announcing a new legal position on detention
authorities for noncitizens. The guidance interpreted the mandatory detention provision of
Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as applying to
the detention of all “applicants for admission,” including all noncitizens who have not been
admitted, whether they arrive at a port of entry or enter without inspection. This position
was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in September 2025. Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In the months following the shift in policy, federal district courts across the country
found the Government’s interpretation at odds with the text of the statute and ordered bond
hearings, or release, for noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under the policy. See,
e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4, n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
26, 2025) (collecting cases). In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit held that Section 1225(b)(2)
applies to all applicants for admission, regardless of whether they are actively “seeking
admission” when they are detained. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir.
2026). However, Buenrostro did not address the validity of due process claims such as those
raised by Petitioner in this case. See, e.g., Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-131, 2026
WL 539475, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); see also Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara, No.
5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025), overruled by Buenrostro-Mendez, 166
F.4th 494 (explaining the Court’s prior statutory interpretation of Section 1225).
C. Procedural Background
Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, maintaining that he
is entitled to release from detention. In his pro se petition, Petitioner raises several claims:
unlawful civil detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241; violation of the Fifth Amendment due
process clause; misclassification of detention authority; violation of the administrative
procedure act; and relief under the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. While the petition has
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been pending, Petitioner was ordered removed by an IJ. Automated Case Information, Exec.
Off. Immigr. Rev., https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseinformation (last visited June 8, 2026).
However, Petitioner appealed the decision to the BIA and the appeal remains pending, so his
order of removal is not final. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.
Pro se litigants’ pleadings are construed liberally and held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The
Court liberally construes Petitioner’s claims as to the constitutionality of his detention as a
procedural due process challenge to his continued detention without a bond hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
Respondents move for summary judgment, asserting that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention pursuant to Buenrostro and that his detention does not violate due
process. The Court finds that his detention violates due process.3 The Court incorporates the
legal standards and analysis applied in its prior order granting a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under similar facts. Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 27, 2026).
There, this Court found that Buenrostro does not foreclose due process challenges to
mandatory detention, a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention may bring an as-applied
due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225(b)(2), Supreme Court precedent does not
foreclose that type of challenge, and liberty interests in freedom from detention must be
protected by due process of law, including individualized justification for civil detention. See
id. The Court then applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge and found that the
petitioner’s procedural due process rights had been violated. Id. at 13 (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 	424 	U.S. 	319, 	333 	(1976)). 	The 	Court 	ordered 	immediate
release for the due process violation. Id. at 17.
The Court finds that the same reasoning applies to these facts, though Petitioner’s
length of presence in the United States is factually distinct from Lopez Moncebais. Petitioner
has resided in the United States since 2023. The Court’s reasoning in Lopez Moncebais relied
on the petitioner’s length of residence in the United States in evaluating his liberty interest.
Here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s residence in the United States since 2023 still creates
a sufficient liberty interest to require that his detention is safeguarded with constitutionally
3 Because the Court grants Petitioner’s requested relief without consideration of his other claims,
the Court will decline to address the merits of those claims.
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adequate procedures, including an individualized determination of whether he should be
detained.
Additionally, the Court has previously found that a prior release like Petitioner’s
strengthens the liberty interest of a noncitizen because their release created an expectation
that they would be free from detention during the pendency of their removal proceedings.
Bonilla Barrios v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-172, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026). As the Court
explained there, liberty interests “may arise from an expectation or interest created by state
laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In this case, Petitioner had
an expectation, in addition to his residence since 2023, that he would be free from detention
or at least entitled to seek bond while his removal proceedings were pending. He was released
from detention in 2023 and spent almost three years out of custody before he was re-detained.
Respondents do not assert that Petitioner violated any conditions of his release. Petitioner
was apprehended by ICE while travelling to work and was taken into custody without any
advance warning or explanation. That expectation interest strengthens his liberty interest.
The Court also notes that several cases analyzed for their persuasive authority in Lopez
Moncebais similarly considered prior release as a factor strengthening the liberty interest of
noncitizens detained under Section 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing. See Lopez Moncebais,
No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 7 n.6 (collecting cases).
For these reasons and the reasons discussed in the Court’s analysis in Lopez
Moncebais, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention violates his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to relief, and the appropriate remedy
is to order Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.4
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Dkt.
4 A district court has equitable discretion in determining the appropriate remedy “as law and justice
require” for unlawful detention in a habeas petition. See Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 127–28 (2022).
The Court finds that the specific harm Petitioner suffered—unlawful deprivation of liberty without due
process—is remedied by granting his immediate release, rather than ordering a bond hearing. As explained
in Lopez Moncebais, “[t]he Court recognizes the weight of its decision to order Petitioner’s release from
custody .” No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 16. Though, the Court reaches this conclusion for several reasons.
First, the Fifth Circuit has held that Section 1226(a), which provides for a bond hearing, does not apply
to any applicants for admission. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494. Additionally, a hearing after
Petitioner’s unjustified deprivation of liberty does not cure the deprivation. See Bonilla Chicas, No.
5:26 CV-131, 2026 WL 539475, at *12. Finally, the Court finds that an Immigration Judge would be
unlikely to hold the bond hearing if ordered because the BIA’s position is that there is no jurisdiction
to hold bond hearings for all applicants for admission detained under Section 1225(b)(2). Matter of
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No. 1), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Respondents’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, (Dkt. No. 18), is DENIED.
Respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE Petitioner from custody by June 11,
2026, at 5:00 p.m., under reasonable conditions of release, and to submit a status report to
the Court confirming Petitioner’s release by June 12, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Petitioner should
be released in a public place during daytime hours. At the time of his release from custody,
Respondents must return to Petitioner any and all identification documents taken from him
at the time of his apprehension or during his detention. Additionally, upon his release,
Respondents must provide Petitioner with a printed copy of this Order granting his habeas
petition and ordering his release from custody.
All other relief requested by Petitioner is DENIED.
If Petitioner is re-detained, Petitioner must be afforded procedural due process as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A final judgment will follow.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on June 10, 2026.
______________________________
John A. Kazen
United States District Judge
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216; see also Rojas v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-443, 2025 WL 3038262, at
*4, n.2.
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