West v. Pierce et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MICHAEL ENGLAND WEST,
(SPN # 01729896),
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
vs. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-4709
THE HONORABLE TAMI PIERCE, et §
al.,
Defendants.
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§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Michael England West (SPN # 01729896), is a pretrial detainee
in custody at the Harris County Jail. Proceeding prose and informa pauperis, he
filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Harris County•
District Judge Tami Pierce, the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting his case, and
-court-appointed counsel Quinon Brooker are violating his civil rights in his on-
going state-court criminal proceedings. (Dkt. 1).
West's complaint is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
which requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners proceeding in
forma pauperis as soon as feasible after docketing and dismiss any claims that are
frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
that seek money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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U.S.C. 	§ 1915(e)(2)(B). 	Having conducted the required screenmg of West's
complaint, the Court dismisses this action for the reasons explained below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Publicly available records show that West is currently injail awaiting trial on
several serious felony charges. See Search Our Records, www.hcdistrictclerk.com
(last visited July 17, 2026). 	On June 12, 2026, he filed a "Prisoner's Civil Rights
Complaint," identifying the defendants as Judge Pierce, the unidentified Assistant
District Attorney who is prosecuting his case, and Brooker. (Dkt. 1, pp. 2-3).
West alleges that at a recent court appearance, the prosecutor made a plea
offer of forty years in prison on the charge of murder. 	(Id. at 4). 	The prosecutor
told him that ifhe did not accept the offer, the charge would be increased to capital
murder. 	(Id.). 	West alleges that Judge Pierce, Brooker, and the prosecutor all
agreed that this was a fair offer, but he believes that the offer and the responses to
it reflect bias and prejudice against him and his case. (Id.). 	As relief, he wants ''to
be treated as innocent until proven guilty." (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
West brings his action under42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 does not create
any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for violations
of statutory and constitutional rights." 	Lafleur v. Texas Dep't of Health, 126 F.3d
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758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979). 	To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a
violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
(2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. 	See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez v
Galman, 	18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). 	The first element
recognizes that "state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff
under[§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right." 	Nesmith v. Taylor, 715
F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 	The second element means that
generally only state actors-not private parties-can be liable for violations of civil
rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. of Nw. Miss. Reg'! Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283
(5th Cir. 1985).
B. 	The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA, which governs West's action, requires the Court to examine the
legal and factual basis of a prisoner's complaint and dismiss the case ifit determines
that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief." 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see·azso 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
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A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." 	Geiger
v. 	Jowers, 	404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992)). 	"A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint
alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." 	Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319,327 (1989)). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the
plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged
are clearly baseless." 	Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013)
(cleaned up). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if
it does not contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678
(2009)).
In conducting its screening review, the Court must construe all allegations
"liberally in favor of the plaintiff' and must consider whether "with every doubt
resolved on [the plaintiff's] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 	Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up). 	But if the complaint does not state a claim for relief, it may be
dismissed, even before service on the defendants. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F .2d
1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
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C. 	Pro Se Pleadings
West is proceeding pro se in this action. 	Courts construe pleadings filed by
prose litigants under a less stringent standard of review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, "[a] document filed prose
is 'to be liberally construed.'" 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this
liberal standard, pro se litigants must still "abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts." 	E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475,484 (5th Cir. 2014). 	They must
"properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim
to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment
evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal." Id. ( cleaned up).
Thus, while pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than
attorneys, they "still must actually argue something that is susceptible of liberal
construction" 	Toole v. Peak, 361 F. App'x 621, 621 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Claims Against Judge Pierce
West alleges that Judge Pierce violated his constitutional rights by agreeing
that the plea offer and the circumstances surrounding its making were fair. 	He
contends that this approval of the prosecutor's actions demonstrates Judge Pierce's
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bias and prejudice against his case, and he requests an injunction ordering her to
treat him as innocent until he is proven guilty.
"The federal civil rights laws do not provide a vehicle . . . to sanction the
conduct of state court judges for actions taken within the scope of their judicial
authority." 	Bogney v. Jones, 904 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1990). 	The doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity protects judges from liability for all actions taken in their
judicial capacities, so long as they do not act in a clear absence of all jurisdiction.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). That said, absolute judicial immunity
does not apply in certain limited circumstances. See Davis v. Tarrant County, Tex.,
565 F.3d 214,221 (5th Cir. 2009). Specifically,judges are not immune from claims
for purely prospective relief based on an ongoing violation of federal law. 	See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
To state a claim under the Ex parte Young exception to judicial immunity,
the plaintiffs action must "(l) be brought against state officers acting in their
official capacities; (2) seek prospective relief that will redress ongoing conduct; and
(3) allege a violation of federal law." 	Tex. Ent Ass 'n v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 507
(5th Cir. 2021). A plaintiff must satisfy all three requirements to be entitled to relief
under this exception. 	See, e.g., Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz,
969 F.3d 460,471 (5th Cir. 2020) (en bane).
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West's allegations satisfy the first requirement because Judge Pierce is a state
officer who is acting in her official capacity. 	But his allegations fail to satisfy the
two remaining requirements.
As to the second requirement, West's allegations concern only Judge Pierce's
past conduct at a single hearing at which a plea offer was made. 	This single past
act is not sufficient to demonstrate an ongoing violation of West's civil rights. And
prospective injunctive relief is available only to stop an ongoing violation, not to
remedy a past one. 	See Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2022)
("The general dividing line is between impermissible suits seeking remedies for
past violations of federal law and permissible suits seeking prospective relief to
prevent ongoing violations."). 	West's allegations therefore do not satisfy the
second Ex parte Young requirement.
And as to the third factor, West does not allege facts showing that Judge
Pierce's view of the validity of the State's plea offer rises to the level of"a colorable
constitutional claim." 	Hall v. Tex. Comm 'non Law Enf't, 685 F. App'x 337, 341
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 	Accordingly, his allegations do not satisfy the third
requirement to fall within the Ex parte Young exception.
Because West's allegations do not satisfy all three requirements of Ex parte
Young, he fails to state a claim against Judge Pierce upon which relief can be
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granted. His claim against her must therefore be dismissed with prejudice under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Claims Against the Assistant District Attorney
West also sues the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting his criminal case,
contending that the plea offer was made in bad faith and reflects bias and prejudice
against him and his case.
District attorneys, who prosecute cases on behalf of the State, are entitled to
absolute immunity for actions they take to prosecute a defendant in a criminal case.
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). This includes immunity "for
their conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case insofar as
that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."
Wooten v. Roach, 964 F.3d 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478,486 (1981)).
West's allegations concern the Assistant District Attorney's alleged actions
in bringing and pursuing the pending criminal charges against him. 	In offering
West a plea deal and "threatening" to modify the charges against him if it is rejected,
the Assistant District Attorney was clearly acting in a prosecutorial role and is
immune from the West's claims.
West's claims against the Assistant District Attorney are dismissed under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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c. 	Claims Against Attorney Brooker
Finally, West alleges that Brooker is court-appointed to represent him in
these criminal proceedings, and he challenges Brooker's assessment that the plea
offer valid and his advice urging its acceptance. 	But court-appointed defense
counsel may not be sued under § 1983 for actions taken in defending an individual
charged with criminal acts.
To be liable under§ 1983, the defendant must be acting under color of state
law in taking the challenged actions. 1 But neither public defenders nor appointed
or tetained private defense attorneys act under color of state law when performing
a lawyer's traditional functions in representing a criminal defendant because, in that
capacity, he or she is acting on behalf of the defendant rather than on behalf of the
State. 	See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,318, 324-25 (1981); Mills
v. Crim. Dist. Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that "private
attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally
are not subject to suit under section 1983"); Amir-Sharif v. Dallas Cnty. Public
1Limited exceptions to this general rule exist when the plaintiff can show that the
private actor was implementing an official government policy or when the private actor's
actions are fairly attributable to the government. See Rundus v. City of Dallas, Tex., 634
F.3d 309,312 (5th Cir. 2011). A private party who conspires with state actors to deprive
another of his constitutional rights may also be considered a state actor. 	See Priester v.
Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 2004). 	West's complaint does not allege
facts showing that any of these exceptions apply to his case.
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Defender's Office, 233 F. App'x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (dismissing
claims against a county's public defenders "because they are not state actors for
§ 1983 purposes").
In his capacity as court-appointed defense counsel for West, Brooker is not
acting "under color of state law" while taking actions to represent him. 	West's
disagreements with Brooker' s position concerning the validity and merits of the
plea.offer may give rise to a malpractice action, but they will not support a claim
for a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983.
West's claims against Brooker are dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. West's civil rights action, (Dkt. 1), is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
3. Final judgment will be separately entered.
4. 	This dismissal will count as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U;S.C. § 1915(g).
The Clerk shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the
plaintiff. The Clerk shall also send a copy of this dismissal to the Three-Strikes List
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Manager at the following email: Three Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on ----1--w1:,t,,_«~-=--i,___>_J-~' 2026.
~bkU:--DAVID HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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