Cagiza et al v. Mullin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CARMEN BERTA C. DE
SAITUMA CAGIZA and
ILIDIO DO ROSARIO
DANGE CAGIZA,
Plaintiffs,
versus
MARKWAYNE MULLIN
and JOSEPH B. EDLOW,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-04573
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs Carmen Berta C. De Saituma Cagiza and
Ilidio do Rosario Dange Cagiza proceed here pro se. They
bring a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act
regarding delay in adjudication and ultimate denial of a
I-140 petition by United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services. See Dkt 18 at ¶¶46–68 (amended
complaint). The matter was referred for disposition to
Magistrate Judge Christina A. Bryan. Dkt 7.
Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary
restraining order on July 7, 2026. Dkt 16. They seek to
enjoin the Government from taking any adverse action
based on denial of the I-140 petition and to compel
adjudication of other pending applications for immigration
benefits. See id at 2. They request emergency relief based
on allegations of severe financial harm, including potential
foreclosure of their home. See id at 5.
Judge Bryan ordered the Government to file an
expedited response. Dkt 23. Following full briefing by the
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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parties, she now recommends that the motion for
temporary restraining order be denied. See Dkt 30 at 7. She
further notes that a hearing on the request for preliminary
injunction and a pending motion to dismiss by the
Government will be set promptly. See ibid; see also Dkt 25
(motion to dismiss).
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC §636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
In light of the emergency nature of the relief requested,
Judge Bryan ordered the parties to file objections within
seven days. Dkt 30 at 8.
Plaintiffs filed objections. Dkt 31. They contend that
Judge Bryan erred by (i) failing to address 5 USC §705,
(ii) concluding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on
the merits of their challenge to denial of the I-140 petition,
and (iii) resolving jurisdictional issues related to their
claims seeking to compel agency action prior to the
preliminary injunction hearing. See id at 4–12.
On de novo review and determination, the objections
lack merit.
As to the first objection, Plaintiffs brought the subject
motion under 5 USC §705 and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Dkt 16 at 1. Judge Bryan correctly
and thoroughly applied the factors that apply when a party
seeks preliminary injunctive relief in this context. See
Dkt 30 at 3–4. Nothing cited by Plaintiffs—in §705 or
otherwise—indicates that Judge Bryan failed to consider
additional factors relevant to this analysis.
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As to the second objection, Judge Bryan correctly
applied the standards applicable to denial of an I-140
petition in determining that Plaintiffs were unlikely to
succeed on the merits of this claim. See id at 4–5. As noted
in her recommendation, decisions regarding such petitions
are upheld so long as the agency “considered the relevant
facts and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its
decision.” Id at 5, quoting Joseph v Director of Texas Service
Center, United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, 2025 WL 458001, *3 (5th Cir). Plaintiffs contend
that Judge Bryan failed to actually consider the
explanation offered by USCIS in denying the petition at
issue here. Dkt 31 at 8. To the contrary, as noted by Judge
Bryan, the “extremely restrictive” standard of review
applied in reviewing such denials is itself sufficient at this
stage to show that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the
merits. Dkt 30 at 5, quoting Joseph, 2025 WL 458001 at *1.
Beyond this, the objections rely on the underlying
decision’s interpretation of the record placed before the
agency. See Dkt 31 at 9–10. At least at this stage, these
purported defects fail to demonstrate that Plaintiffs are
likely to be able to show that USCIS failed to consider
relevant facts and did not offer a satisfactory explanation
for denying the petition.
As to the third objection, Judge Bryan correctly
determined that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their claims seeking to compel or enjoin action
under 5 USC §706(1) for lack of jurisdiction. See Dkt 30 at
6–7. Plaintiffs contend that decision in this regard should
be reserved until the upcoming preliminary injunction
hearing. Dkt 31 at 12. To be clear, Plaintiffs remain free to
raise argument in this regard at hearing. But in assessing
the pending motion for temporary restraining order, Judge
Bryan correctly conveyed the preliminary view that a
district court lacks jurisdiction to compel or enjoin an
agency to take or refrain from taking a discretionary action
within a specific timeframe absent a specific statutory or
regulatory command. Dkt 30 at 7, citing Li v Jaddou, 2023
WL 3431237, *1 (5th Cir), and D’Cruz v United States
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Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2024 WL 4523307,
*2 (5th Cir). Plaintiffs nowhere in the objections identify
such a command. They thus fail to demonstrate that they
are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims seeking
to compel or enjoin agency action.
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 30.
The motion by Plaintiffs Carmen Berta C. De Saituma
Cagiza and Ilidio do Rosario Dange Cagiza for temporary
restraining order is DENIED. Dkt 16.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on July 31, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
___________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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