Sandoval Salmeron v. Bradford et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JOSE PATRICIO SANDOVAL
SALMERON,
Petitioner,
versus
BRET BRADFORD, et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-03918
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Jose Patricio Sandoval Salmeron filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 on
May 15, 2026. Dkt 1. He acknowledges illegal entry into
the United States at a prior date but nonetheless asserts
that his present detention violates (i) procedural due
process, (ii) substantive due process, and (iii) the Accardi
doctrine as to 8 CFR §287.8(c)(2). Id at ¶¶49–79. He further
requests a stay of his removal proceedings. Id at ¶¶80–84.
Prior order noted that the petition may raise only
issues resolved by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494 (5th Cir 2026),
and prior decisions by the undersigned. See Dkt 4 at 1–2.
Even so, the Government was ordered to show cause with
a filing establishing the propriety of Petitioner’s continued
detention. Id at 2.
Pending also is a motion by the Government for
summary judgment. Dkt 6. It maintains that Petitioner is
lawfully detained under 8 USC §1231(a)(6) pursuant to a
final order of removal. Id at 2. In that regard, it maintains
that Petitioner’s detention of approximately two months
remains presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v
Davis, 533 US 678, 701 (2001). It also maintains that any
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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delay in his removal is solely attributable to his decision to
pursue further meritless litigation and thus should not be
counted against the six-month presumption. Id at 6. It also
argues that, in any event, Petitioner fails to carry his initial
Zadvydas burden because he “fails to cite any evidence that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id at 7.
Petitioner on reply asserts that the Government’s
motion “incorrectly frame[s] this case as involving only a
statutory challenge under Zadvydas and 8 USC §1231.”
Dkt 8 at 5. He instead purports to argue an “independent”
due process challenge based on (i) “denial of any
meaningful individualized custody determination,”
(ii) “continued civil detention without procedural
safeguards,” (iii) “arbitrary and excessive nature of
detention as applied to him,” and (iv) “the Government’s
refusal to provide any meaningful mechanism through
which Petitioner may contest the necessity of his
confinement.” Id at 5–6. He also reasserts arguments as to
the Accardi doctrine. Id at 11–17.
It is appropriate to review Petitioner’s complicated
immigration history as set forth in the Government’s
motion and his reply. Dkt 6 at 2–4; see Dkt 8 at 3–5 (reply
by Petitioner).
o In 2006, Petitioner entered the United States
without lawful permission. Dkt 1 at ¶38. He
maintains that he was initially “authorized to
remain in the United States” due to
cooperation with federal authorities but was
placed in removal proceedings once such
cooperation ended. Id at ¶39.
o In August 2018, an immigration judge denied
Petitioner’s application for cancellation of
removal proceedings and ordered him removed
to El Salvador. See Dkt 6-1.
o Petitioner appealed the IJ’s order to the Board
of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed and
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dismissed the appeal in January of 2021.
Dkt 6-2.
o Petitioner further petitioned for review of that
decision to the Fifth Circuit, which was denied
in May of 2022. Dkt 6-3.
o Petitioner later moved the BIA to reopen his
case, which was denied in September of 2022.
Dkt 6-4.
o Petitioner again petitioned for review of that
decision before the Fifth Circuit, which
dismissed the petition in July of 2023. Dkt 6-5.
o In June of 2023, Petitioner filed an application
for asylum with United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services. Dkt 6 at 2.
o In July of 2025, DHS issued a notice to appear
after USCIS referred the asylum application to
an immigration judge. Dkt 1-4 at 4–6.
o On April 9, 2026, DHS moved to dismiss the
2025 NTA as improvidently issued because
Petitioner was already subject to a final order
of removal. The IJ granted that motion,
terminating proceedings under the 2025 NTA.
Dkt 6-6.
o On May 19, 2026, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s
order to the BIA. Dkt 6-7. That appeal remains
pending.
This record of apparent and abundant allocation of
process given to Petitioner stands in stark contrast to his
arguments as to a lack of due process. To be clear, he
nowhere disputes assertion that he is subject to a final
order of removal or that 8 USC §1231 applies to him. As
such, the Zadvydas framework regarding detention
pending removal governs here. The undersigned
considered that framework at length in Abuelhawa v
Noem, 2025 WL 2937692, *4–6 (SD Tex). That analysis is
incorporated.
In short, the Supreme Court interprets 8 USC
§1231(a)(6) to limit post-removal order detention to a
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period “reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s
removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 US at 689.
It further holds in that regard that post-removal-period
detention for six months is “presumptively reasonable.” Id
at 701. But after such six-month period, “once an alien
provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,
the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing.” Ibid.
Petitioner has been in detention since March 24, 2026.
Dkt 1 at ¶16. His detention of approximately two months
is thus without question presumptively reasonable under
Zadvydas, and “any challenge to his continued post-
removal order detention is premature.” See Agyei-Kodie v
Holder, 418 F Appx 317, 318 (5th Cir 2011).
Beyond that, Petitioner doesn’t even attempt to argue
under the Zadvydas framework that there is “good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 533 US at 701.
Instead, he relies on Zadvydas for the general proposition
that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Dkt 8
at 6, citing 533 US at 690. But this ignores the actual
holding of Zadvydas, which construed the detention
statute under the constitutional-avoidance canon, while
nevertheless recognizing a presumptively reasonable six-
month period of post-removal order detention. 533 US
at 701.
Petitioner’s present detention of two months, then,
cannot be said to violate substantive due process. And any
further delay after this is due to Petitioner’s own decision
to appeal termination of the 2025 NTA. See Lawal v Lynch,
156 F Supp 3d 846, 854 (SD Tex 2016) (holding equitable
tolling of six-month period to apply where alien prolongs
detention by pursuing litigation challenging his removal
order); see also McLean v Tate, 2021 WL 6007123, *3
(SD Tex) (same); Abu-Hamdah v Vergara, 2025 WL
4089348, *4 (SD Tex) (same).
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Arguments by Petitioner as to procedural due process
are of a similar, meritless nature. The undersigned has
previously determined that procedural due process doesn’t
require an individualized custody determination beyond
the mandate of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). See Penafiel Clavijo
v Thompson, 2026 WL 923310 (SD Tex). The same analysis
applies to detention under 8 USC §1231(a)(6), which states,
“An alien ordered removed . . ., may be detained beyond the
removal period . . . .” Notably, as with §1225(b)(2)(A),
nothing in §1231(a)(6) makes any mention of a bond
hearing or suggests that detention requires an
individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness.
Procedural due process thus doesn’t require such hearing
in this context.
As to the Accardi doctrine, such claims are foreclosed
by the undersigned’s prior determination that claims as to
lawfulness of arrest fail because an illegal arrest has no
bearing on the legality of detention following arrest. See
Llanes Carnesolta v Tate, 2026 WL 948727 (SD Tex).
Petitioner thus hasn’t established that his current
detention violates either the Constitution or federal law.
The motion by the Government for summary judgment
is GRANTED. Dkt 6.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Jose Patricio Sandoval Salmeron is DENIED. Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A final judgment will enter separately.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on ______________ , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
June 01, 2026
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