Samuelson v. Aptiv U.S. Services General Partnership et al

1 / 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IDO MOSHE SAMUELSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-CV-02457
APTIV U.S. SERVICES GENERAL
PARTNERSHIP, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Ido Samuelson’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(ECF No. 21). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an employment dispute arising under Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1514A (“SOX”). Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Aptiv U.S. Services General
Partnership (“Aptiv”), a publicly traded technology and software company, as a Principal Cloud
Architect from March 1, 2022 through March 14, 2023. ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”) at ¶ 1. He alleges
that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting practices that he believed were in violation of
federal securities law to Katherine Ramundo, Aptiv’s Chief Legal Officer, as well as other
executives, in violation of SOX’s anti-retaliation provision. Id. at ¶¶ 31-42.
Plaintiff originally filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) on April 5, 2023. Id. at ¶ 15. OSHA dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on
April 10, 2024, finding that he had not engaged in a protected activity under SOX. Id. at ¶ 16.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:26-cv-02457 Document 39 Filed 05/29/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2 / 6
Plaintiff appealed that decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who denied Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss on January 10, 2025, finding that Plaintiff had plead sufficient facts to
overcome a motion to dismiss. Id. at ¶ 17. On April 28, 2025—before OSHA had issued a decision
on Plaintiff’s claims—Plaintiff opted to exercise his right to file a de novo action in federal district
court. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (“[I]f the Secretary [of Labor] has not issued a final decision
within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no showing that such delay is due to the
bad faith of the claimant, [the claimant may seek relief by] bringing an action at law or equity for
de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States.”). Plaintiff originally filed
suit in the District of Colorado, which dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at
¶ 24. He subsequently re-filed the suit in this district on March 26, 2026.
II. DISCUSSION
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff asks
the Court to order Aptiv to provide “preliminary economic reinstatement” of the compensation
package he received while employed by Aptiv. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that Aptiv be
ordered to pay him $827,000 per year, or $68,917 per month, at least until the next scheduled
hearing on July 10, 2026. ECF No. 21 (“Motion”) at 12-13. This amount is reflective of Plaintiff’s
base salary of $430,000, his annual incentive target of $172,000, and his annual long-term
incentive award of $225,000. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff argues that this unusual preliminary relief is justified through a combination of
the Court’s authority to issue preliminary injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
and the statutory scheme of § 1514A(b). The Court disagrees on both counts.
A. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65.
Case 4:26-cv-02457 Document 39 Filed 05/29/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3 / 6
A preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is an “extraordinary
and drastic remedy.” Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Only when the movant has “clearly
carried the burden of persuasion” should a court grant preliminary injunctive relief. Anderson v.
Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, the second factor—whether Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief—is dispositive. As Defendants note, the law is clear that “[t]here can
be no irreparable injury where money damages would adequately compensate a plaintiff.” DFW
Metro Line Servs. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1990). Here, Plaintiff’s
alleged injuries are monetary in nature and are compensable by money damages.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[i]n lawsuits alleging wrongful termination or adverse
employment action, the plaintiff is ordinarily not irreparably harmed.” Sambrano v. United
Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022). This is because “the
statutory relief available at the conclusion of a successful lawsuit (including reinstatement and
back pay) can adequately compensate the plaintiff for the employer’s wrongful conduct.” Id. As
Plaintiff acknowledges, these same remedies are available under SOX. In Sambrano, the Fifth
Circuit noted that “any harm caused by [the adverse employment] action is compensable if at all
only at the end of the suit.” Id. at *7. This Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff cannot show that
Case 4:26-cv-02457 Document 39 Filed 05/29/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4 / 6
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of court-ordered preliminary economic
reinstatement.1
Plaintiff argues that he will be irreparably injured absent a preliminary injunction because
of the dire financial and other consequences he faces as a result of his allegedly wrongful
termination—including falling behind on mortgage payments, accumulating extensive credit card
and medical debt, and the potential removal of his children from their school for failure to pay
tuition. Motion at 18-19. But devastating as these circumstances undoubtedly are for Plaintiff, they
are exactly the type of harm that “resulted only from the employer’s decision to fire [Plaintiff].”
Sambrano, 2022 WL 486610, at *7. Such harms cannot support a preliminary injunction in a
wrongful termination case. Id.; see also Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that the loss of 45% of plaintiff’s family’s income, likely foreclosure on her home, and
loss of medical benefits did not constitute irreparable harm sufficient to support a preliminary
injunction in employment case). While the Court is sympathetic to the impact of Plaintiff’s
termination on Plaintiff and his family, harms stemming directly from an allegedly wrongful
termination are not the type of irreparable injury that can justify the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (“[It is] clear that the temporary loss
of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury.”).
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Does Not Provide a Basis for Preliminary Relief.
Plaintiff acknowledges that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides the appropriate
framework for seeing a preliminary injunction in federal court. However, he contends that the
1 While Sambrano and the cases it cites alleged discrimination under Title VII rather than retaliation under SOX, the
harm suffered by the terminated employee is the same.
Case 4:26-cv-02457 Document 39 Filed 05/29/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5 / 6
remedies provided by SOX weigh in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief in the form of
economic reinstatement. Specifically, Plaintiff points to the fact that SOX authorizes a prevailing
employee to recover “all relief necessary to make the employee whole,” including “reinstatement
with the same seniority status that the employee would have had, but for the discrimination” and
“the amount of back pay, with interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)–(B). He also points out that
when a SOX plaintiff elects to proceed before the administrative agency rather than in federal
court, the statute’s implementing regulations provide that if, after conducting an investigation, “the
Assistant Secretary concludes that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred,” the Assistant Secretary will issue “a preliminary order providing relief to the
complainant,” including “all relief necessary to make the employee whole.” 29 C.F.R. §
1980.105(a)(1). Plaintiff “does not contend that § 1514A independently mandates preliminary
reinstatement,” but rather “contends that § 1514A(b)(1)(B)’s grant of jurisdiction ‘at law or
equity,’ combined with Rule 65 and Rule 65(e)(1)’s savings clause for employer-employee
actions, supplies the authority” for the relief he seeks. ECF No. 30 at 1-2.
These arguments are unavailing. As Plaintiff acknowledges, the portions of § 1514A
relating to reinstatement and other remedies to “make the employee whole” are remedies to be
awarded after a plaintiff has prevailed, not an independent basis for preliminary injunctive relief.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the availability of backpay or other similar compensatory
damages should an employee ultimately succeed on his wrongful termination claim weighs against
granting preliminary injunctive relief. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90 (“[t]he possibility that adequate
compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of
litigation[] weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”). Had Congress wished to afford
Case 4:26-cv-02457 Document 39 Filed 05/29/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6 / 6
this relief to SOX plaintiffs at an earlier stage, it could easily have included a provision providing
for preliminary relief. It declined to do so.
The fact that some form of preliminary relief is available in an agency proceeding likewise
does not alter the Court’s Rule 65 analysis. The applicable regulations provide for preliminary
relief only after the Secretary of Labor has conducted an investigation into the employee’s claim
and issued a preliminary decision in the employee’s favor. Here, Plaintiff elected to forgo his
agency proceedings in favor of filing a federal lawsuit. In so doing, Plaintiff gave up the right to
have his claim investigated by the agency and the possibility that the agency may have issued a
preliminary decision in his favor. The OSHA regulations that Plaintiff cites are not applicable to
this proceeding, and unlike the agency, the Court has no power to independently investigate
Plaintiff’s claim. The fact that Plaintiff may at some point have become entitled to preliminary
relief had he continued to pursue his claim before OSHA does not weigh in favor of granting a
preliminary injunction in federal court.2
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas on May 29, 2026.
_______________________________
Keith P. Ellison
United States District Judge
2 While Plaintiff cites cases in which courts have issued preliminary injunctions in favor of the Secretary of Labor
mandating enforcement of the Secretary’s order for preliminary reinstatement, the agency issued no such order in this
case. See, e.g., Solis v. Tennessee Com. Bancorp, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 701, 717 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). These decisions
are therefore irrelevant to the question before the Court.
Case 4:26-cv-02457 Document 39 Filed 05/29/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6