Duardo Tamayo v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
YAILENIS DUARDO TAMAYO, §
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-1007
WARDEN, HOUSTON CONTRACT
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Yailenis Duardo Tamayo is detained in the custody of officials with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Through counsel, the petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1).
The petition and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a citizen of Cuba;
that she entered the United States on or about June 19, 2024; that DHS granted her
discretionary parole into the country under INA § 212(d)(5), with conditions and reporting
requirements; that she lived openly in the country as authorized for over a year and
complied with all conditions; and that she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.
On or about September 19, 2025, when the petitioner appeared for a routine check-in
appointment at ICE, the respondents took her into custody. She states that officials gave
her no notice, no explanation of the reason for her detention, no statutory or regulatory
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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basis for revoking her parole, no interview or hearing to contest the detention, and no
procedural protections under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) or otherwise. She brings claims under
the Due Process Clause, among others, and seeks release from custody and restoration of
parole.
The federal respondents filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 8) arguing that
the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and that her due-
process and other claims fail. They do not contest the facts recited by the petitioner. The
petitioner responded (Dkt. 9).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
to the petitioner’s claim that her current detention violates her rights under the Due Process
Clause. The Court has previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Avila Perez v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-957 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28,
2026); Gonzalez Monrreal v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-925 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27,
2026); Barrera Leon v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-1341 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026);
Gallegos Perez v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:26-351 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Cruz Osorio
v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:25-6390 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil
Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026); Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil
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Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026); Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action
No. 4:26-650, 2026 WL 517983 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).
The Constitution guarantees due process of law to every person in the United States,
regardless of the person’s immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(the Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); see A.A.R.P. v
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (procedural due process protections apply to removal
proceedings for persons detained under the Alien Enemies Act).
The Court notes at the outset that the petitioner in this case challenges only her
detention, and not her right to relief from deportation or removal. Courts across the country
have recognized that as-applied due process challenges to detention without an
individualized hearing are not foreclosed by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103 (2020), or other Supreme Court precedent.1 Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, ___
F.4th ___, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11-13 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026); Vieira v. De Anda-
Ybarra, 806 F. Supp. 3d 690, 697-700 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F.
Supp. 3d 668, 681-85 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-00131,
1 In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen seeking “initial entry” to the
United States enjoys only the rights provided by statute because the “power to admit or exclude
aliens is a sovereign prerogative” over which the political branches have plenary authority.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (cleaned up) (considering case regarding noncitizen detained
25 yards from the border and for whom immigration officials rejected his “credible fear” claim for
purposes of political asylum). However, a challenge to detention, rather than to immigration
proceedings, does not implicate the “sovereign prerogative” on which Thuraissigiam relies. See
Rincon v. Hyde, No. CV 25-12633-BEM, 2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*6 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025)
(discussing “entry fiction” doctrine and its purposes).
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2026 WL 539475, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); Castro Coneo v. Almodovar, No. 25-
CV-09850 (NSR), 2025 WL 3754079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025); Destino v. FCI
Berlin, Warden, No. 1:25-CV-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL 4010424, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H. Dec. 24,
2025) (noting a “growing consensus” among district courts and collecting cases); Rincon,
2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*7. Many cases cited above also distinguish Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), from the
detention challenge at issue in this case. See, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at
*12-13; Rodriguez v. Frink, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 4:26-CV-00798, 2026 WL 709487,
at *2-4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2026); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9; Destino,
2025 WL 4010424, at *3-*8; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *4-*8.2 The Court agrees with
this consensus and thus proceeds to review the petitioner’s constitutional claim.3
2 In Demore, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), a
statutory provision that provides for mandatory detention of non-citizens who have been convicted
of certain crimes, and held that the facial challenge failed. In so holding, the Court discussed
extensively the fact that Congress enacted § 1226(c) based on evidence of increasing criminal
activity by criminal aliens, as well as high rates of recidivism and flight. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-
19. The Court also relied on the fact that a detainee under § 1226(c) was a “criminal alien” who
was detained for “the limited period of his removal proceedings.” Id. at 531; see id. at 529-31
(citing facts in the record showing that detention under § 1226(c) lasted for an average of 47 days,
and that 100% of the detentions lasted five months or less). Finally, the Court noted that the
detainee in Demore had been afforded procedural protections, including “the full procedural
protections our criminal justice system offers” for his prior convictions and the opportunity for a
“Joseph hearing” at which he would have been entitled to raise any non-frivolous argument to
demonstrate that he was not properly included in the mandatory detention category. Id. at 513-14
& n.3.
3 See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001) (“a serious Suspension Clause issue
would be presented” if a statute deprived federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review “pure
questions of law”).
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When adjudicating a procedural due-process claim from a civil detainee, courts
apply the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and balancing the following
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
Regarding the first Mathews factor, the petitioner has a liberty interest that the Due
Process Clause protects. Freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
A noncitizen who has lived for years in the interior of the United States and established
connections in the country acquires a protectible liberty interest. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107 (“aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in
deportation proceedings”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noncitizen has a “weighty” interest in his or her right
“to stay and live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).
As stated above, the petitioner was previously paroled into the United States and
complied with all conditions of release. Her current detention began in September 2025,
when she appeared as instructed for a check-in appointment at ICE, and the respondents
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do not point to any condition of release she violated or other changed circumstance
justifying her re-detention. Therefore, the petitioner acquired a protected liberty interest
before the detention challenged in this case. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Vieira,
806 F. Supp. 3d at 700; Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025);
Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d. at 685-86; Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *12; Barros v.
Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025).
Moreover, she currently is pursuing relief from removal. See EOIR Automated Case
Information, available at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last visited May 28, 2026). The
first factor weighs heavily in the petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s
liberty interest by the procedures used for her current detention, as well as the probable
value of additional safeguards. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Due process requires adequate procedural protections to weigh the governmental interest
against that of the individual. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“[G]overnment detention
violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding
with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow[,] nonpunitive
circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint”) (cleaned up). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (cleaned up). Immigrant
detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the
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case.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (cleaned up); see Lopez-Campos, 2026
WL 1283891, at *11 (“The hallmark of procedural due process is notice and an opportunity
to be heard”) (cleaned up).
The respondents argue that the petitioner’s claim should be denied based on
Demore, 538 U.S. 510, which rejected a facial due-process challenge to a different statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, the Court does not consider in this case whether
§ 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional, that is, “unconstitutional in all of its applications.”
See United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6677,
2026 WL 568341 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026) (cleaned up); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at
*6. Instead, the Court considers whether § 1225(b)(2), “though constitutional in some
circumstances,” has been unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner. See Morgan, 147
F.4th at 526.4
4 Apart from the fact that it decided a facial challenge, Demore is distinguishable for
additional reasons. First, the statute at issue in Demore applied to a specific subset of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In contrast, § 1225(b)(2) is a broad, “catch-
all” provision. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287); see id. at
505 (holding that, although “[i]t is true that § 1226 applies to aliens in the United States,” the
application of § 1226 “does not preclude § 1225 from also applying to such aliens” because “the
two provisions overlap”). Moreover, as stated above, the Demore petitioners had received criminal
procedural protections, as well as the opportunity for a Joseph hearing, and were detained for an
average of 47 days. In the case at bar, however, the petitioner has received no procedures to protect
the liberty interest impacted by her current detention, and nothing in the record suggests that the
length of detention will be limited. Finally, unlike in Demore, nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is justified by evidence of danger to the
community. For all of these reasons, Demore does not foreclose the petitioner’s as-applied
challenge. See Bonilla Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Destino, 2025
WL 4010424, at *8-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *7-*8
(distinguishing Demore).
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Civil detention can be permissible based on the government’s showing that the
person is a danger to the community. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746, 748-49 (1987) (the government’s regulatory interest in community safety can
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest in avoiding pre-trial detention if the person poses
a danger) (collecting cases). In such cases, the civil detention must be “limited” and
“subject to strong procedural protections.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357(1997) (“We have consistently upheld [forcible civil
detainment of persons who pose a danger to public health and safety] provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”);
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding bail reform statute which required the government,
“[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing,” to “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person”).
Here, the petitioner has been detained for over eight months and the respondents
provide no information about when the detention will end. Moreover, the respondents have
made no showing that the petitioner’s current civil detention is justified by her danger to
the community, flight risk, or any other weighty government interest. Rather, they argue
that danger and flight risk are irrelevant under the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), thus
ending the inquiry (Dkt. 8, at 4-6 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1
(2003)). They also argue that any claims based on her prior parole are defeated by the
language of § 1225(b)(2) (id. at 10). However, the question of whether procedural
safeguards for the petitioner’s liberty interest are adequate is a constitutional question, not
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a statutory one, and a statute may not deprive a person of rights that are constitutionally
guaranteed. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Palm Valley
Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 947 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the Constitution, not statutes,
determine the minimum procedures that due process requires”).5 The respondents identify
no procedures afforded to the petitioner to provide notice, an opportunity to be heard, or
any individualized determination regarding her current detention. To the extent they might
rely on any procedures at her initial entry, those procedures are inadequate to address the
liberty interest she has acquired since that time based on established connections in the
United States. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271;
5 Moreover, Doe is distinguishable on several grounds. The plaintiff in Doe challenged a
Connecticut statute that mandated registry of sex offenders based only on the person’s past
conviction for a sex offense, arguing that the registry requirement without a hearing to show he
was currently dangerous violated his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court held that,
because current dangerousness was irrelevant under the statute, the plaintiff had no procedural due
process right to a hearing. The Court joins other courts in holding that Doe is distinguishable from
the facts and issues in this case. See, e.g., Aliaga Zamora v. Bondi, No. SA-26-CA-00447-XR,
2026 WL 693054, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026); Betancourth v. Tate, No. 4:26-CV-01169,
2026 WL 638482, at *2 & n.4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026); Noyola v. Bondi, No. 1:26-CV-405-RP,
2026 WL 607266, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Diaz Yanez v. Bondi, No. EP-26-CV-00486-
DB, 2026 WL 690005, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Villegas Angel v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-
00384-DAE, 2026 WL 594368, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2026). First, the petitioner in this case
does not challenge a registry requirement, which the Doe Court assumed arguendo implicated a
liberty interest, but rather freedom from physical detention, “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. Second, civil immigration detention is constitutional only
when it is justified by a sufficient, non-punitive purpose. Foucha v. La., 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992);
Betancourth, 2026 WL 638482, at *2 n.4; Diaz Yanez, 2026 WL 690005, at *2. Once a protected
interest is implicated, “the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Aliaga Zamora, 2026
WL 693054, at *5 (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)); Villegas
Angel, 2026 WL 594368, at *3. Third, the statutory language indicates that flight risk and danger
are not irrelevant to detention under § 1225(b), given that “noncitizens who are detained under
§ 1225(b) may be released on parole for humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, so long
as they present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” Noyola, 2026 WL 607266, at *3
(cleaned up) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)); Aguilar v. Bondi, No. 5:25-
CV-01453-JKP, 2025 WL 3471417, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025).
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Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. They also do not demonstrate that she was afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard as to the justification for the current detention beginning in
September 2025. See J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673 (immigrant detainees “are entitled to notice
and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case”) (cleaned up); Lopez-
Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11.
In the absence of any available procedure to require the respondents to demonstrate
danger or another adequate justification for detention, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the petitioner’s liberty interest is high. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7 (“When
protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”)
(citing, inter alia, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542 (1971)). When “the only mechanism Petitioner has to test the propriety of
his detention is DHS’s discretionary authority,” that is “no real test at all.” Tenemasa-
Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *9 (D. Mass. Nov. 25,
2025); see Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *13 (noting that the risk is heightened by the
likelihood of lengthy delays in removal proceedings). This risk of deprivation could be
addressed through an individualized assessment such as the bond hearings that
respondents, until late 2025, routinely provided to assess a petitioner’s danger to
community and flight risk. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (courts should assess whether
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would have “probable value”); Lopez-
Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (an individualized hearing would provide an opportunity
to be heard and a meaningful assessment of the petitioner’s dangerousness and flight risk,
and thus would “greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty”); Barros,
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2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (risk of erroneous deprivation “can be easily ameliorated through
a bond hearing”). The Court concludes that the second Mathews factor weighs in the
petitioner’s favor.
The third Mathews factor is the respondents’ interest in the petitioner’s mandatory,
unreviewable detention at issue here. The respondents have not addressed this factor and
do not argue their interest in detaining the petitioner under § 1225(b). To the extent the
respondents rely on their general interest in enforcing the statute, their interest is
insufficient to extinguish the petitioner’s right to due process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 541; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *6 (“legislation cannot detract from the privilege
afforded by the constitution”) (cleaned up) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 565 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)). Although courts have recognized a legitimate governmental interest in preventing
a detainee’s flight and in protecting the community from any danger posed by the detainee,
see, e.g., Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1189, these interests could be addressed by
providing individualized hearings, as discussed above.6 Moreover, to the extent the purpose
6 Courts “generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively
minimal.” Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 2025); see Tenemasa-Lema, 2025 WL 3280555, at *10. Additionally, courts have
recognized that detention itself imposes significant costs and burdens. See Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting the “substantial social costs” of detention that
separates families and removes breadwinners, caregivers, parents, siblings, and employees from
the community); Rodriguez, 2026 WL 709487, at *10 (“Indeed, given the high costs of detention
and the potential for removal proceedings to last multiple years, the Government would reduce its
overall fiscal and administrative burden by detaining only those people who have been determined
to pose a danger or flight risk”) (citing Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 154 (2d Cir. 2024);
Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 34 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that detention of those who have
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of the detention is punitive, the purpose is impermissible in the context of civil immigration
proceedings. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. The respondents have not contested the
petitioner’s facts, including that she complied with all previous conditions of supervision,
is not a danger to the community or flight risk and is pursuing relief from removal. The
third factor therefore weighs in the petitioner’s favor.
Because all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor, she is detained
without due process of law. The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other
courts considering the question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this
petitioner, without an individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard,
violates the petitioner’s right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596
U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”)
(cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
been denied release on bond or the opportunity to seek release “requires the government to
continue funding and overseeing [the petitioner’s] detention”).
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Aroca v. Mason, No. 2:26-CV-00057, 2026 WL 357872, at *19 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 9, 2026)
(cleaned up) (collecting cases).7 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record,
the Court determines that release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention
in this case.
The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1. The respondents’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 8) is DENIED.
2. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED in part.
3. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
4. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner and petitioner’s
counsel of the time and location of release at least three hours before the
release.
5. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of her release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from her
at the time of or during her detention.
6. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
7 In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the respondents
do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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7. The respondents may not re-detain the petitioner during the pendency of her
removal proceedings absent a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge
at which the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that
she is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
8. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
9. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on , 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
May 29
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