Blecher v. NEMO Arms, Inc, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Alan Blecher,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEMO Arms, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-00047
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
In this trademark dispute, Plaintiff Alan Blecher, who is pro se, moved
for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunctive relief,
Dkt. 7, and to appear remotely at any hearing on that motion, Dkt. 8.
Defendant 	NEMO 	Arms, 	Inc. 	(“NEMO”) 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	original
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 21. 	All Defendants—NEMO,
Kelly Link, Jeff Sipe, and William King—then moved to dismiss Blecher’s
amended complaint, either under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) or 12(b)(6), and to
strike certain allegations. Dkts. 28, 35.
After 	carefully 	reviewing 	the 	motions, 	Dkts. 	7, 	8, 	21, 	28, 	35, 	the
responses, Dkts. 29, 36, the replies, Dkts. 31, 37, the pleadings, and the
applicable law, it is recommended that the motions to dismiss be granted in
part but denied as moot for the rest. It is further recommended that Blecher’s
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction be denied. 	Blecher’s related
request to appear remotely at a hearing is also denied.
Background
The following facts are largely taken from Blecher’s first amended
complaint (Dkt. 23), which was targeted by the motions to dismiss listed above.
Those facts are taken as true at this stage.
I. 	Factual background
A. 	The products and the MONGOOSE mark
Blecher is a “specialized innovator” in the firearms industry. Dkt. 23 at
13. 	He 	“design[s], 	manufactur[es], 	transport[s], 	and 	market[s], 	the
MONGOOSE 	weapon 	system.” 	Id. 	Blecher 	first 	“conceived 	of 	the
[MONGOOSE] mark in 2009” and began making products that bear the mark
in 2012. See id.; see also id. at 24, 26.
NEMO is an entity that acquires other innovators in the firearms
industry. 	See id. at 14. 	Link is NEMO’s current CEO, Sipe is a director or
officer at NEMO, and King was the president and CEO of NEMO from January
2024 through November 2025. See id. at 20-21, 126-28.
NEMO has sold products bearing the MONGOOSE mark “since at least
January 2024.” Id. at 36 (quotation omitted). Both NEMO and Blecher operate
“within the highly specialized and boutique ‘High-End Ultra-Lightweight’”
sector of the firearms market. Id. at 22; see also id. at 82.
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On May 6, 2025, NEMO served Blecher with a letter demanding that he
cease and desist using the MONGOOSE mark. See id. at 12; see also id. at 36.
Blecher responded with information allegedly proving his superior priority
rights. 	See id. 	Despite informing Blecher that it would “get back to [him]
shortly,” NEMO never responded. See id. at 37.
B. 	Conspiracy allegations
According to Blecher, NEMO then assembled a “crisis management
team” which “deploy[ed] an intelligence network to target [Blecher] and his
son”—whom Blecher refers to as “The Consultant.” Id. at 12; see also, e.g., id.
at 	43 	(accusing 	NEMO 	of 	assembling 	a 	“covert 	‘Intelligence 	Network’”).
Blecher claims that this network—or “shadow nexus conspiracy”—“consist[s]
of non-employee agents directed by executive leadership to execute a covert
campaign 	of 	industrial 	espionage, 	trade 	secret 	misappropriation, 	and
pretextual ‘regulatory harassment’ designed to entrap” Blecher and his son.
Id. at 12-13, 17; see also, e.g., id. at 48-49. 	Blecher asserts, on “information
and belief,” that Link, Sipe, and King (collectively, “Individual Defendants”),
were the drivers behind that “shadow nexus conspiracy.” See id. at 127-28.
Blecher refers to the various non-employee third-parties as “Agents A
through H.” 	Despite claiming to know their identities, Blecher explains that
he has deliberately omitted naming all but one of them—a Turkish company
named Black Sea Defense Industry (“Agent H”)—purportedly to maintain
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“investigative integrity” and to mitigate harm to “unwitting dupes” drawn into
the supposed conspiracy. 	See id. at 45. 	Blecher describes the remaining
“Agents” as a third parties who contacted Blecher or his son in 2025 or 2026 as
part of a “calculated” effort to obtain information that would “destroy” his case.
See 	id. 	at 	55; 	see 	also, 	e.g., 	id. 	at 	66 	(alleging 	Agent 	G 	engaged 	in 	a
“jurisdictional manhunt” by asking where Blecher’s son was traveling to).
Those “Agents” A through G are professionals, attorneys, acquaintances, and
Blecher’s prior employee. See id. at 48, 54, 56, 59, 60-61, 64, 76.
Blecher 	admits, 	however, 	that 	the 	individuals 	he 	denominates 	as
“Agents” acted “in disparate professional and social spheres and share[d] no
direct link to one another.” Id. at 47; see also id. at 121. He maintains, purely
based on the timing of those communications and the fact that some of the
“Agents” share a common educational background, that these individuals
contacted him or interacted with him or his son as part of a NEMO-directed
“Hub-and-Spoke conspiracy.” 	See, e.g., id. at 46-47. 	He posits that those
interactions must be part of a conspiracy because he deems the alternative to
be improbable. 	See id. at 46 (calling the alternative “a statistical zero”).
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II. 	Procedural background
Blecher filed this suit on January 5, 2026. Dkt. 1. He then filed a motion
for a TRO and preliminary injunction, Dkt. 7, and a request to appear remotely
at any hearing on that motion, Dkt. 8.
Within two weeks, NEMO submitted a federal trademark application for
the MONGOOSE mark (Ser. No. 99/599,272). 	See Dkt. 23 at 38. 	NEMO also
filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. 21.
Blecher then filed a first amended complaint, asserting the following
claims: 	(1) 	federal 	trademark 	infringement, 	unfair 	competition, 	false
designation of origin, and federal trade dress infringement under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); (2) Texas common law unfair competition; (3) trade
secret 	misappropriation 	under 	the 	Texas 	Uniform 	Trade 	Secrets 	Act
(“TUTSA”), and (4) civil conspiracy under Texas law. 	See Dkt. 23 at 91-125.
He 	also 	asserted 	“director 	personal 	liability” 	claims 	against 	Individual
Defendants. 	See id. at 125-128. 	Blecher sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 132-134.
Defendants NEMO, King, and Sipe moved to dismiss Blecher’s first
amended complaint under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 28. 	Defendant
Link filed a separate motion to dismiss the suit that incorporates by reference
the other defendants’ arguments. 	Dkt. 35 at 5 n.1, 6. 	All defendants further
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request that the Court strike “immaterial or prejudicial allegations” under
Rule 12(f). See Dkt. 28 at 22; Dkt. 35 at 8.
At the ensuing June 12, 2026 initial conference, Blecher agreed to
abandon his trade dress infringement claim (Count II of his first amended
complaint, Dkt. 23 at 96-100). 	Dkt. 49 (minute order). 	The Court also
authorized Blecher to file a second amended complaint, solely “to detail what
products bearing his trademark [] he has sold and when and to whom those
sales occurred.” Id.
Blecher filed his second amended complaint on June 22, 2026. 	Dkt. 51.
That live pleading omits his previous trade-dress infringement claim but
renews his claims for (1) federal trademark infringement, unfair competition,
and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, (2) unfair competition
under Texas common law, (3) trade secret misappropriation under TUTSA,
and (4) civil conspiracy. 	Id. at 95-126. 	The factual allegations recited above
remain substantially unchanged. 	As instructed, however, Blecher expanded
on the factual allegations regarding his use and sales of products with the
MONGOOSE mark. Compare Dkt. 23 (first amended complaint), with Dkt. 51
at 36-40 (Section F-1: “The Documented Record of Bona Fide Sales and Use of
the MONGOOSE Mark in Commerce”).
On 	July 	6, 	2026 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	second
amended 	complaint. 	Dkt. 	55. 	That 	motion 	incorporates 	all 	arguments
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asserted in their prior motion, modifying their contentions only to address
Blecher’s newly expanded trademark infringement allegations. See id.
Blecher’s 	motions 	related 	to 	injunctive 	relief 	(Dkts. 	7 	and 	8) 	and
Defendants’ motions to dismiss the original and first amended complaint
(Dkts. 21, 28, 35) are ripe for resolution. Those motions are addressed in turn.
Legal Standard
I. 	Rule 12(b)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) governs motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. 	When confronted with a Rule 12(b)(2) motion,
“the plaintiff bears the burden to identify facts that demonstrate a prima facie
case of jurisdiction.” 	Bulkley & Assocs., LLC v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels, 1 F.4th
346, 350 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 464
(5th Cir. 2013). 	A district court may consider “affidavits, interrogatories,
depositions, oral testimony, or any combination” thereof to determine if the
plaintiff made a prima facie showing. 	Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th
Cir. 2002). 	The court accepts as true “the nonconclusory, uncontroverted
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint” and “resolve[s] conflicts between the
facts contained in the parties’ affidavits ... in the plaintiff’s favor.” 	Bulkley &
Assocs., 1 F.4th at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). 	But “the prima-
facie-case 	requirement 	does 	not 	require 	the 	court 	to 	credit 	conclusory
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allegations, even if uncontroverted.” 	Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001).
When the court resolves a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without an evidentiary
hearing, the party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden to make a prima facie
case that personal jurisdiction is proper. 	See Cent. Freight Lines Inc. v. APA
Transp. Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2003). 	The court “must accept the
plaintiff’s ‘uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in [the plaintiff’s] favor all
conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits and other
documentation.’” 	Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 431 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Revell, 317 F.3d at 469).
II. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
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“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Aus., 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
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Analysis
Blecher’s amended pleadings moot several of Defendants’ arguments for
dismissal. 	But 	Individual 	Defendants’ 	personal-jurisdiction 	challenge
warrants dismissing all claims against them under Rule 12(b)(2). And because
NEMO’s arguments against the trade secret and civil conspiracy claims are
well-taken, those claims should also be dismissed. 	Defendants have not,
however, shown that any part of the pleadings should be stricken.
Further, Blecher is not entitled to a TRO or a preliminary injunction at
this juncture. No hearing regarding that requested relief is necessary.
I. 	Blecher’s amendments moot some of the Defendants’ arguments.
Blecher 	amended 	his pleadings 	twice. 	He filed 	the first amended
complaint (Dkt. 23) after NEMO had moved to dismiss (Dkt. 21) the original
complaint. 	And Blecher filed his second amended complaint (Dkt. 51) while
Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkts. 28, 35) his first amended complaint
remained pending. The latest amended complaint affects some, but not all, of
Defendants’ arguments.
“It 	is 	well-settled 	in 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	that 	an 	amended 	complaint
supersedes the original complaint, and the original complaint has no legal
effect, except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into the amended
complaint.” See Freilich v. Green Energy Res., Inc., 297 F.R.D. 277, 282 (W.D.
Tex. 2014) (citing Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly,
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“[t]he filing of an amended complaint generally renders pending motions
moot.” Stredwick v. Dall. Margarita Soc’y, Inc., 2012 WL 12893430, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. June 27, 2012) (collecting cases); see Ready Aim Flyer, LLC v. Aviat
Aircraft, Inc., 2016 WL 4376612, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2016) (discussing
split 	amongst 	district 	courts 	regarding 	whether 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	are
automatically mooted by amendment).
“[W]hen a plaintiff amends the complaint while a motion to dismiss is
pending, the court has discretion to deny the motion as moot or consider the
merits of the motion in light of the amended complaint.” 	Howard v. John
Moore, L.P., 2014 WL 5090626, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); see also Bell
v. Moawad Grp., LLC, 2017 WL 2841679, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Tex. June 30, 2017)
(noting court’s discretion); 1010 E. Ave. J LLC v. Union Ins. Co., 2020 WL
13892598, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2020) (same). As concluded below, Blecher’s
amended complaints render some of Defendants’ contentions moot. 	But the
Court will review certain arguments presented in the motion to dismiss as
though they targeted the live pleading (Dkt. 51).
First, NEMO’s motion to dismiss Blecher’s original complaint (Dkt. 1)
has 	been 	mooted 	by 	the 	expanded 	factual 	allegations 	in 	his 	subsequent
pleadings. 	In 	fact, 	the 	first 	amended 	complaint 	injects 	new 	allegations
designed to address contentions raised in that motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Dkt.
23 at 40 (“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss … reaches a level of tactical absurdity
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….”). 	The revised pleading merits denying the first motion to dismiss. 	See,
e.g., Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 WL
10990119, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2015) (motion to dismiss was moot “given
the substantive changes in the amended complaint, new causes of action, and
more specific facts about the infringement that may go to the heart of the
motion to dismiss”).
The analysis differs in part with respect to Defendants’ motions to
dismiss the first amended complaint. 	See Dkts. 28, 35. 	Most obviously,
Blecher’s explicit abandonment of the trade dress infringement claim—which
he omitted in the second amended complaint, see Dkt. 51—moots Defendants’
challenges to that claim. See Dkt. 28 at 14-15; Dkt. 35 at 6.
Material additions in the live, second amended complaint also warrant
denying—without prejudice—Defendants’ request to dismiss the trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims. 	See Dkt. 28 at 10-12, 15-16;
Dkt. 35 at 6. 	Most notably, Blecher’s latest pleading expands on the factual
allegations supporting his purported use and sale of products bearing the
MONGOOSE mark. 	Compare Dkt. 23, with Dkt. 51 at 36-40 (new section F-
1). Defendants have already filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 55) those expanded
allegations, which is not yet ripe for resolution and will be resolved in a later
opinion. 	That latest motion reinforces that Defendants’ prior motions to
dismiss the same trademark-related claims are moot.
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As 	for 	the 	remaining 	claims—trade 	secret 	misappropriation, 	civil
conspiracy, and director liability—the relevant factual allegations remain the
same in Blecher’s second amended complaint. Compare Dkt. 23, with Dkt. 51.
Likewise, 	Blecher’s 	allegations 	supporting 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over
Individual Defendants are unchanged. 	See id. 	Defendants’ challenges to the
trade secret misappropriation, civil conspiracy, and director liability claims in
the first amended complaint thus apply equally to the new second amended
complaint. See Ready Aim Flyer, 2016 WL 4376612, at *2 (considering motion
to dismiss “as though it were in response to Plaintiff’s amended complaint”
because the arguments remain relevant); Howard, 2014 WL 5090626, at *1 n.1
(resolving motion to dismiss where the relevant factual allegations did not
change in amended complaint). 	This Court therefore evaluates both those
claim-specific 	contentions, 	plus 	Individual 	Defendants’ 	global 	personal
jurisdiction challenge, based on Blecher’s live pleading (Dkt. 51).
II. 	The 	Court 	lacks 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	Individual
Defendants.
Individual Defendants contend that all claims against them should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. 	Dkt. 28 at 6-
10; Dkt. 35 at 5-6. According to the motion, Blecher has not plausibly alleged
that Individual Defendants had minimum contacts with Texas, the forum
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state. 	See Dkt. 28 at 2, 6; Dkt. 35 at 1, 5 n.1 (incorporating by reference
arguments made by the other Defendants).
Blecher 	maintains 	that 	this 	Court 	has 	specific 	jurisdiction 	over
Individual Defendants. See Dkt. 51 at 17-18. He theorizes that (1) Individual
Defendants “directed a conspiracy expressly aimed at” Texas, (2) “Agent A”
communicated 	with 	Blecher 	and 	his 	son 	in 	Texas, 	and 	(3) 	Individual
Defendants knew that the injury from the infringement, unfair competition,
and conspiracy would be primarily felt in Texas. 	See id. 	But Blecher has not
met his burden to identify any forum-directed conduct by any of Individual
Defendants. His claims against those defendants should be dismissed.
A. 	Legal standard for personal jurisdiction
In federal question cases, the personal jurisdiction inquiry begins with
the service-of-process provisions of the relevant federal statute. See Omni Cap.
Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1987). 	When, as here,
the statute is silent as to service of process, whether personal jurisdiction over
a defendant is proper depends on the state’s long-arm statute. 	See Aviles v.
Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e);
Bell Geospace, Inc. v. Xalibbur Geophysics Spain S.L., 2023 WL 23254, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2023) (noting Lanham Act’s silence on service of process,
citing Staktek Grp. L.P. v. Kentron Techs., Inc., 2007 WL 9702380, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 7, 2007)), adopted by 2023 WL 4877507 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2023).
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Because Texas’s long-arm statute “extends to the limits of federal due
process,” the two inquiries collapse into a single due process inquiry. 	Sangha
v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quotation omitted); Aviles, 978 F.2d at 204. 	To satisfy due process, the
defendant must have “‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state (i.e., that the
defendant 	has 	purposely 	availed 	himself 	of 	the 	privilege 	of 	conducting
activities within the forum state) and that exercising jurisdiction is consistent
with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 	Sangha, 882
F.3d at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There 	are 	two 	types 	of 	personal 	jurisdiction: 	general 	and 	specific.
General jurisdiction permits a federal court to “hear any claim against that
defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred” outside the
forum state. 	See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255,
262 (2017) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)). 	“[O]nly a limited set of affiliations” will suffice to establish
general jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
In contrast, specific jurisdiction hinges on the relationship between the
claims and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 283-84 (2014). “Specific jurisdiction applies when a non-resident
defendant ‘has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the
litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those
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activities.’” 	Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co.,
921 F.3d 522, 539 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Panda Brandywine Corp., 253 F.3d
at 868). 	“The non-resident’s purposeful availment must be such that the
defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum
state.” 	Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir.
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. 	Blecher has not made a prima facie showing of specific
personal jurisdiction.
Blecher does not maintain that this Court has general jurisdiction over
Individual Defendants. 	Rather, he asserts that specific jurisdiction is proper
under the “effects test” from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). See Dkt. 51
at 17-18; see also Dkt. 29 at 14-15.
According to Blecher, Individual Defendants “directed agents to contact”
him to gather certain information and harass him. 	See Dkt. 51 at 17. 	Upon
Blecher’s information and belief, they also authorized a “ghosting” strategy
where NEMO stopped responding to Blecher’s communications after sending
him a cease-and-desist letter. 	Id. at 19. 	And they were each involved in the
alleged trademark infringement. See id. at 20-21, 127-28.
Those 	allegations 	are 	insufficient 	because 	they 	neither 	support 	an
agency relationship nor show that Individual Defendants’ conduct was aimed
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at Texas. 	Because Blecher has not made a prima facie showing of specific
jurisdiction, his claims against Individual Defendants should be dismissed.
1. 	Blecher has not adequately alleged a basis to impute various
third parties’ Texas contacts to Individual Defendants.
Nearly all of Blecher’s allegations regarding Individual 	Defendants
concern conduct that they supposedly directed Agents A through H to do on
their behalf. 	For example, Blecher pleaded that they “directed agents to
contact” 	him 	to 	inquire 	into 	his 	firearms 	license 	and 	investigate 	his
corporation. 	See Dkt. 51 at 17. 	And he claims that Sipe “directed or ratified”
“non-employee agents” to harass Blecher and “disrupt [his] business.” 	Id. at
20. 	Individual 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	those 	allegations 	are 	insufficient
because the complaint does not plausibly claim that “Agent A through H” are
their agents as a matter of law, which forecloses reliance on their actions to
establish specific personal jurisdiction. Dkt. 28 at 3-4. The Court agrees.
“[T]he actions of an agent may establish minimum contacts over a
principal ….” 	McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 761 (5th Cir. 2009). 	But it is
not enough to assert, in conclusory fashion, that an agency relationship exists.
See, e.g., Weisskopf v. United Jewish Appeal-Fed’n of Jewish Philanthropies of
N.Y., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 912, 927 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“conclusory assertions”
that an entity served as the defendant’s “local office in this District” and was a
conduit between that defendant and local donors were not enough to support
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personal jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Horton v. SunPath, Ltd., 2021 WL 982344,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2021) (no personal jurisdiction; “conclusory allegation
that Defendant acted in an agency relationship” with others to contact plaintiff
in Texas “does not suffice to impute” the actions of others to Defendant “under
an agency theory”), adopted by 2021 WL 977065 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021).
While Blecher labels various unnamed persons as “Agents,” his pleading
acknowledges that they are not NEMO employees. 	See, e.g., Dkt. 51 at 12
(“This network consisted of non-employee agents ….”). They include a student,
attorneys from different regions, a professional in the software and AI space,
Blecher’s or his son’s acquaintances, and a Turkish manufacturing company.
See Dkt. 51 at 51, 58, 80. 	Those so-called “Agents” are admittedly “separate
individuals” that happen to have attended the “same educational institution.”
See id. at 50. 	Even Blecher acknowledges that those supposed “Agents” had
“act[ed] in disparate professional and social spheres and share[d] no direct link
to one another”—or seemingly Defendants. See id. at 51.
Blecher’s allegations that “Agents A through H” acted as Individual
Defendants’ agents is speculative, at best, and delusional, at worst. As “proof”
of that conspiracy, Blecher merely declares that “[t]he only explanation for” the
Agents to have contacted him or his son within a similar period of time—
around April 2025 through January 2026—“is a Vertical Directive from a
centralized ‘Hub’”—namely NEMO. 	Id. 	He asserts that “[t]he probability” of
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those individuals “reaching out simultaneously with identical ‘regulatory’
questions by coincidence is a statistical zero.” 	Id. 	But Agent A through H’s
communications were far from simultaneous; they spanned months. See id. at
52, 64. 	And their questions were hardly “identical.” 	Compare, e.g., id. at 59
(asking whether Blecher’s son had done computer-aided design for Blecher’s
products), with 62 (asking Blecher’s son where he was based). 	Nor do those
inquiries appear to be an “anomaly.” 	See id. at 92-93. 	Indeed, each Agents’
contact was based on their pre-existing relationship with Blecher or his son, or
were prompted by Blecher’s or his son’s own public outreach regarding their
work. See, e.g., id. at 52 (Agent A had a “pre-existing professional association”),
63 (Agent D reacted to a social media post regarding Blecher’s products), 64
(Agent 	E 	reacted 	to 	Blecher’s 	son’s 	social 	media 	post). 	Blecher’s
characterization of those interactions as part of a global plot directed against
him by Individual Defendants wholly lacks a plausible basis in fact.
Blecher’s argument that Defendants “judicially admitted” an agency
relationship by claiming attorney work product privilege in response to his
preservation of evidence notice is a non-starter. 	See Dkt. 29 at 12; Dkt. 51 at
71-73. Defense counsel Larry Laycock merely asked Blecher to clarify what he
meant by his request to preserve “Third-Party Outreach and intelligence
gathering” and to “confirm that [Blecher is] not requesting any materials
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prepared by counsel ….” Dkt. 51 at 72. In no way does that innocuous request
that Blecher clarify his cryptic demand admit that any conspiracy exists.
Because 	Blecher 	failed 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	an 	agency 	relationship
between 	the 	purported 	“Agents” 	and 	Individual 	Defendants, 	those 	third-
parties’ 	actions 	cannot 	supply 	the 	requisite 	minimum 	contacts 	between
Individual Defendants and the forum state. 	See, e.g., Weisskopf, 889 F. Supp.
2d at 927 (citing Townsend v. Univ. Hosp., 83 S.W.3d 913, 921 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied)); see also Lowe v. MAC Fed. Credit Union, 2018
WL 2422999, at *6 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2018) (granting Rule 12(b)(2) motion
where agency relationship allegations were speculative). There is no basis for
personal jurisdiction over Individual Defendants.
2. 	The “effects” theory does not provide a basis for personal
jurisdiction here.
Aside from Blecher’s allegations concerning conduct ostensibly carried
out by “Agents,” Blecher pleaded that Individual Defendants “authorized” the
trademark infringement at issue and NEMO’s “ghosting” strategy. 	See, e.g.,
Dkt. 51 at 20, 127-28. He maintains that those allegations establish personal
jurisdiction under Calder’s “effects test” because Individual Defendants knew
that the injury resulting from 	their conduct “would be 	felt primarily in
Texas”—the state where Blecher resides and operates. 	See id. at 17-18. 	But
the Supreme Court has categorically rejected that reading of Calder.
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In Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling that a federal officer’s allegedly wrongful seizure of
respondents’ cash at an airport in Georgia, while knowing that respondents
lived in Nevada, was enough to create personal jurisdiction in Nevada over the
officer. 	As Walden explained, “mere injury to a forum resident is not a
sufficient connection to the forum.” 	Id. at 290. 	“The proper question is not
where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the
defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id.
That critical connection between the defendant’s conduct and the forum
state was lacking in Walden. 	Respondents’ injury, i.e., their lack of access to
the seized cash, was not “tethered to Nevada in any meaningful way.” 	Id.
Rather, respondents “lacked access to their funds in Nevada” only due to the
happenstance that “respondents chose to be” in Nevada “at a time when they
desired to use the funds seized by petitioner.” 	Id. 	And respondents’ reliance
on where they felt the impact of the officer’s conduct “improperly attributes a
plaintiff’s forum connections to the defendant and makes those connections
decisive in the jurisdictional analysis.” Id. at 289 (quotation omitted).
Moreover, as Walden clarified, those limitations were reflected in Calder
itself, where the defendant’s libelous acts in the forum state of California—by
publishing an article in California based on California sources and that was
read 	by 	California 	citizens—had 	“connected 	the 	defendants’ 	conduct 	to
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California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there.” 	See id. at 287-88. 	Those
“reputation-based ‘effects’ of the alleged libel connected the defendants to [the
forum], not just the plaintiff.” Id. at 287.
Unlike 	Calder, 	Blecher’s 	allegations 	merely 	assert 	that 	Individual
Defendants’ activities outside the forum state affected him here. 	Blecher
claims that King and the others made “strategic decisions” to “Ghost” him by
not responding to his letter. See, e.g., Dkt. 51 at 19, 21. Blecher says that Link
“personally sanctioned the initial ‘Soft Launch’ of the infringing line in 2024”
and its expansion “at the 2026 SHOT Show,” a Las Vegas trade event. Dkt. 51
at 20, 31; see also Dkt. 7 at 2 (location of the SHOT Show). Blecher claims that
Sipe 	“personally 	directed” 	NEMO’s 	“integration 	of 	the 	stolen 	‘Ultra-
Lightweight’ market intelligence into” its product. 	Id. at 128. 	And Blecher
accuses King of “personally authoriz[ing] the adoption and commercial launch
of the infringing ‘MONGOOSE’ mark in January 2024 ….” Id. at 21, 127.
Tellingly, none of those allegations indicate that Individual Defendants
committed any act in Texas or that they sold an infringing product in Texas.
See AllChem Performance Prods., Inc. v. Aqualine Warehouse, LLC, 878 F.
Supp. 2d 779, 793 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (no personal jurisdiction in copyright
infringement case because “[p]laintiff has not alleged facts showing that
Defendants committed any acts in the forum state nor alleged any sale or
purchase of [] infringing product in Texas”). 	It is not enough to say that
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Individual Defendants knew their conduct would affect Blecher in Texas. 	See
Walden, 571 U.S. at 290; Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs.,
2010 	WL 	2277389, 	at 	*5 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	June 	3, 	2010) 	(defendant’s 	alleged
“infringing acts with knowledge that the owner of the infringed intellectual
property 	resides 	in 	Texas 	… 	is 	insufficient 	to 	create 	specific 	personal
jurisdiction” for trademark claims). 	Yet that is all that Blecher offers here.
Under Rule 12(b)(2), all claims against those defendants should be dismissed.
III. 	Blecher 	has 	not 	plausibly 	pleaded 	trade 	secret 	or 	civil
conspiracy claims against NEMO.
Individual Defendants and NEMO also assert that the trade secret
misappropriation and civil conspiracy claims should be dismissed on the
merits. 	Much like the personal jurisdiction argument, Defendants maintain
that Blecher has not plausibly linked the discrete acts of so-called “Agents” to
Defendants. See Dkt. 28 at 16-19; Dkt. 35 at 6.
The lack of personal jurisdiction over Individual Defendants precludes
this Court from reaching the merits of the claims against them. See supra Part
II. But because NEMO’s arguments are well-taken, the trade secret and civil
conspiracy claims against it should be dismissed with prejudice.
A. 	Blecher has not plausibly alleged that NEMO acquired his
trade secrets.
NEMO challenges Blecher’s trade secret misappropriation claim under
TUTSA. Dkt. 28 at 16-18. To succeed on a TUTSA claim, Blecher must show
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that “(1) a trade secret existed, (2) the trade secret was acquired through a
breach of a confidential relationship or discovered by improper means, and
(3) the 	defendant 	used 	the 	trade 	secret 	without 	authorization 	from 	the
plaintiff.” 	CQ, Inc. v. TXU Min. Co., L.P., 565 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted). NEMO contends that Blecher did not (1) identify the trade
secret with reasonable particularity, (2) describe reasonable measures taken
to maintain its secrecy, or (3) allege that NEMO acquired, used, or disclosed
the trade secret. 	Dkt. 28 at 16-17. 	Their third contention, standing alone,
merits dismissal.
According to Blecher, an unnamed “Agent A” “posed as a prospective
sales 	representant 	and 	business 	developer” 	“to 	extract 	trade 	secrets 	for
transmission to the Defendants’ network ….” 	Dkt. 51 at 52. 	After signing a
non-disclosure agreement, Agent A was given “access to ‘Confidential Sales
Guidelines,’ proprietary pricing models, distributor strategies, and proprietary
Go-To-Market strategies.” 	Id. at 53. 	“Upon information and belief” Agent A
transmitted the trade secret information to NEMO, which “utilized this stolen
commercial 	intelligence 	to” 	expand 	its 	market 	strategy 	for 	one 	of 	its
MONGOOSE products. Id. at 116-17.
Pleading on information and belief carries a caveat: “the complaint must
set 	forth 	a 	factual 	basis 	for 	such 	belief.” 	U.S. 	ex 	rel. 	Thompson 	v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997). 	The
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plausibility 	standard 	“does 	not 	impose 	a 	probability 	requirement 	at 	the
pleading stage,” but “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence” of the necessary claims or elements.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Despite 	filing 	numerous 	iterations 	of 	his 	complaint, 	Blecher 	still
provides no factual basis for maintaining that Agent A acted on NEMO’s behalf
or that NEMO used any trade secrets that Agent A obtained. 	Conclusory
assertions that NEMO “act[ed] through” Agent A to acquire trade secrets do
not suffice. 	See Dkt. 51 at 115. 	Nor does defense counsel Laycock’s inquiry
regarding attorney work product privilege supply the missing link between
Agent A and NEMO. 	See id. at 117; see supra Part II.B.1. 	The lack of any
plausible tie between Agent A and NEMO defeats Blecher’s TUTSA claim.
B. 	NEMO’s alleged involvement in a conspiracy is speculative.
Blecher also pleaded that NEMO is liable for civil conspiracy under
Texas 	common 	law, 	premised 	on 	supposed 	wire 	fraud, 	trade 	secret
misappropriation, and other assorted conduct related to the unnamed “Agents”
A through H. 	See Dkt. 51 at 119-26. 	NEMO contends that Blecher has not
plausibly 	alleged 	a 	meeting 	of 	the 	minds 	between 	NEMO 	and 	any 	co-
conspirators nor stated an underlying tort. 	See Dkt. 28 at 18-19. 	Because
Blecher has not adequately alleged a meeting of the minds, the Court need not
address NEMO’s alternative argument.
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In Texas, civil conspiracy depends on proof that a defendant participated
in an underlying tort. See Homoki v. Conversion Servs., Inc., 717 F.3d 388, 402
(5th Cir. 2013). “The essential elements are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an
object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of
action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate
result.” 	Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983). “In civil
conspiracy, the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable for an injury caused
by a third party who has acted in combination with the defendant for a common
purpose.” Agar Corp. v. Electro Cirs. Int’l LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 140 (Tex. 2019)
(emphasis added). 	Its purpose is to permit “recovery against co-conspirators
who did not commit the underlying unlawful act.” See id. at 141.
According to the live complaint, NEMO acted in combination with
Agents A through H “to accomplish an unlawful purpose: the destruction of
Plaintiff’s senior priority and business … and the acquisition of Plaintiff’s trade
secrets ….” 	Dkt. 51 at 119. 	Blecher asserts that a meeting of the minds
between the Agents and NEMO can be inferred because the Agents’ “actions
were synchronized with a precision that defies coincidence.” See id. at 120.
While conspiracies may be shown through circumstantial evidence, a
viable 	civil 	conspiracy 	claim 	cannot 	be 	supported 	by 	only 	“unreasonable
inferences.” See Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp.,
435 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. 1968); see also Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 837
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(5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting conspiracy claim that rested “only on an overly
attenuated chain of inferences and ultimately on no more than speculation and
conjecture”). 	The 	Court cannot 	reasonably 	infer 	that 	NEMO worked 	in
combination 	with 	unrelated 	third 	parties 	merely 	because 	they 	contacted
Blecher or his son throughout the course of this suit. 	Yet he offers nothing
more than conjecture that a conspiracy is afoot. 	Blecher’s position, which is
ungrounded in fact, supplies no plausible basis for the conspiracy claim.
IV. 	Defendants have not substantiated entitlement to relief under
Rule 12(f).
Defendants’ further requests to strike Blecher’s allegations related to the
“shadow nexus” conspiracy under Rule 12(f) should be denied. 	See Dkt. 28 at
22; Dkt. 35 at 8. 	The Court has “ample discretion” in deciding Rule 12(f)
motions to strike. 	In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1979). “Rule 12(f) provides that ‘[t]he court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.’” DynaStudy, Inc. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 325 F. Supp. 3d 767, 772
(S.D. Tex. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)).
Dismissal of Blecher’s conspiracy allegations would moot Defendants’
request to strike those allegations. 	See Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp.
2d 618, 646 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (denying request to strike complaint where claims
should be dismissed); Moore v. ExamWorks LLC, 2024 WL 479618, at *8 (W.D.
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Tex. Feb. 7, 2024) (same), adopted by 2024 WL 818398 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26,
2024), aff’d sub nom. Regalado v. ExamWorks, LLC, 2025 WL 1904487 (5th
Cir. July 10, 2025) (per curiam). Regardless, while Defendants claim that the
allegations are “prejudicial,” they do not specify the nature of that prejudice or
why the “drastic remedy” of striking those allegations is justified here. 	See
Dkt. 28 at 22; Dkt. 35 at 8; DynaStudy, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (striking is “a
drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of
justice”). Relief is not warranted.
V. 	Blecher is not entitled to injunctive relief.
Blecher also moved for a TRO and preliminary injunction to enjoin
NEMO 	“from 	displaying, 	marketing, 	or 	selling 	products 	bearing” 	the
MONGOOSE mark at the January 2026 SHOT trade show and to order NEMO
to disable its URL that includes the mark. 	See Dkt. 7. 	Both requests are
denied without prejudice.
“The standards governing a request for a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order are the same.” United States v. Brooks, 2006 WL
2323057, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006). To obtain relief, a movant “must show
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable harm absent the injunction, (3) that the harm she will suffer
without the injunction outweighs the cost to comply with the injunction, and
(4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” 	Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th
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331, 339 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v.
Jefferson 	Par. 	Gov’t, 	849 	F.3d 	615, 	624 	(5th 	Cir. 	2017)). 	Due 	to 	its
“extraordinary” 	nature, 	courts 	cannot 	grant 	preliminary 	injunctive 	relief
unless “the movant has clearly carried the burden” of persuasion on all four
factors. 	See Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir.
2003). Ultimately, the decision whether to grant such relief lies in the district
court’s sound discretion. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985).
Blecher has not shown that injunctive relief is merited at this stage. His
request is largely based on an event that has occurred: the January 2026 SHOT
show. 	The Court denied Blecher’s request for expedited consideration of his
motion ahead of that show. See Dkt. 14. Also, since filing his motion for a TRO
and preliminary injunction, Blecher has amended his allegations about his
ownership and use of the MONGOOSE mark. 	Defendants’ motion to dismiss
those allegations is not yet ripe for review. See Dkt. 55.
Accordingly, Blecher is not entitled to the requested TRO or preliminary
injunction at this juncture. 	His further request to appear remotely “for any
emergency hearing set” regarding that motion is denied. Dkt. 8.
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Recommendation and Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED 	that Defendant
NEMO Arms, Inc.’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 21) the original complaint (Dkt. 1)
be DENIED as moot.
It 	is 	further 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	Defendants 	NEMO, 	William
King’s, 	and 	Jeff 	Sipes’s 	and 	Defendant 	Kelly 	Link’s 	motions 	to 	dismiss
(Dkts. 28, 35) the first amended complaint (Dkt. 23) be GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART as follows:
x 	Defendants’ request to dismiss the trademark infringement, trade
dress 	infringement, 	and 	unfair 	competition 	claims 	should 	be
DENIED AS MOOT;
x 	All claims against King, Link, and Sipes should be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction; and
x 	The trade secret and civil conspiracy claims against NEMO should
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Rule 12(f) motion to
strike be DENIED.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Blecher’s motion (Dkt. 7) for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be DENIED without
prejudice. Relatedly, it is ORDERED that Blecher’s motion for leave (Dkt. 8)
to appear remotely at any TRO hearing be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
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R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on July 17, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
xas.
________________________________________
Yvon	n	nn	n	n	neee Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
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