Warren v. Carmensita Transportation LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Wanda Warren, Individually, and
as Representative of the Estate of
Khari Reid, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
Carmensita Transportation LLC
and Erik Vera,
Defendants.
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Civil Action H-25-6156
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 8. Pending before
the court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. ECF No. 7. The court
recommends that the Motion be DENIED.
1. Background and Procedural History
This case arises from a motor vehicle collision in Fort Bend
County, Texas, on August 25, 2025. ECF No. 22 at 2. Khari Reid
was a passenger in a vehicle that collided with a tractor-trailer
operated by Erik Vera, an employee of Carmensita Transportation
LLC (Carmensita). ECF No. 7 at 1. Reid was killed in the collision.
ECF No. 22 at 2.
Plaintiff 	Wanda 	Warren, 	Reid’s 	mother, 	sued 	Vera 	and
Carmensita (collectively, Defendants), both individually and on
behalf of Reid’s estate. ECF No. 23. As representative of Reid’s
estate, Plaintiff asserts a survival action, alleging various theories
of negligence and gross negligence by Defendants. Id. at 2–6; see
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.021 (providing for survival
actions, 	which 	“survive[] 	to 	and 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	heirs, 	legal
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 07, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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representatives, and estate of the injured person”). Individually,
Plaintiff brings a wrongful death claim for the loss of Reid. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit in the 295th Judicial
District Court of Harris County, Texas in December 2025. ECF
No. 1-4. Two days later—before either of the Defendants were
served with process—Carmensita unilaterally removed the case to
federal 	court. 	ECF No. 1 at 3.1 	In 	its 	Notice 	of 	Removal,
Carmensita 	alleged 	that 	the 	court 	has 	diversity 	jurisdiction.
Id. at 2. Carmensita alleged that both Defendants are citizens of
Texas, and Plaintiff is a citizen of Georgia. Id. Carmensita made
no mention of Reid’s citizenship.
On January 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to
Remand. ECF No. 7. She argues that the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the parties are not
completely 	diverse, 	and 	that 	Carmensita’s 	removal 	was
procedurally 	improper. 	Id. at 3. 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Reid’s
citizenship must also be considered because of the survival claim
brought on behalf of his estate. Id. at 4. Doing so, she argues,
destroys diversity, because, according to Plaintiff, Reid was a
Texas resident prior to his death. Id. at 2, 5. Plaintiff points to her
own 	affidavit 	as 	evidence 	of 	Reid’s 	residency.
Pl. Aff., ECF No. 7 at 9–11. In the affidavit, Plaintiff states that
Reid and his friend, Reggie Massie, Jr., moved to a townhome in
Houston, Texas, in 2025. Id. ¶ 5. She states that Reid intended to
“make Houston his new residence . . . .” Id. ¶ 8.
Carmensita timely 	responded to Plaintiff’s Motion. ECF
No. 11. 	It 	conceded 	that 	Reid’s 	citizenship 	is 	relevant 	to 	the
diversity jurisdiction analysis for Plaintiff’s claims on behalf of
Reid’s estate. Id. ¶ 10. However, it disputed Plaintiff’s argument
1 Erik Vera was served on February 17, 2026, pursuant to an order issued by the court
on February 12, 2026. ECF Nos. 15, 19.
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that Reid was a citizen of Texas at the time of his death. Id. It
requested that the court allow jurisdictional discovery if it believed
that there was a question regarding Reid’s citizenship. Id. at 5.
The court granted the request for limited jurisdictional discovery.
ECF No. 15.
After engaging in jurisdictional discovery, Carmensita filed
an Amended Response. ECF No. 22. Plaintiff did not file a reply or
submit 	any 	additional 	evidence. 	In 	its 	Amended 	Response,
Carmensita reasserts that Reid was a resident of Georgia at the
time of his death. Id. Therefore, it argues, there is complete
diversity of the parties, and the court has diversity jurisdiction
over 	this 	matter. 	Id. 	Carmensita 	did 	not 	address 	Plaintiff’s
argument concerning the alleged procedural defects in the removal
process.
2. Evidentiary Objection
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	the 	court 	considers 	Carmensita’s
evidentiary objections to paragraphs 5 through 8 of Plaintiff’s
affidavit.2 	ECF No. 22 ¶ 14. 	The 	affidavit, 	if 	accepted 	into
evidence, shows that Reid told his mother he was moving to Texas
where he intended to stay; that Reid’s mother believed that he took
all of his possessions from her home; that Reid sent his mother a
video tour of the apartment where he was staying; and that Reid
received packages his mother sent to him in Houston. ECF No. 7
at 9–10. Carmensita objects that these statements are hearsay and
are outside of Warren’s personal knowledge. ECF No. 22 ¶ 14.
As will be discussed below, there is no doubt that Reid
traveled 	to 	Texas 	and 	stayed 	with 	Massie. 	However, 	the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that he did not intend
to live in Texas permanently. Thus, even considering Warren’s
2 There are two paragraphs numbered “5” in Plaintiff’s affidavit. Pl. Aff. at 9–10. The
court considers both paragraphs and uses “paragraph 5” to refer to both, collectively.
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affidavit, the outcome is the same. Carmensita’s objections are
OVERRULED as moot.
3. Legal Standard and Analysis
A defendant may remove a civil action from state court if the
federal courts would have had original jurisdiction had the action
been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); In re Deepwater
Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2014). “The party seeking to
assert 	federal 	jurisdiction . . . has 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence that subject matter jurisdiction
exists.” New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321,
327 (5th Cir. 2008). “[O]perative facts and pleadings are evaluated
at the time of removal.” Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 163. “Any
ambiguities are construed against removal because the removal
statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand.” Manguno
v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The court must first determine whether it has diversity
jurisdiction. Removal may be based on diversity jurisdiction when
the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000 and the dispute is
between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Priester v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 832 F. App’x 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2020).
The parties do not dispute that the amount-in-controversy
requirement is satisfied. The amount in controversy is ordinarily
determined based on “the sum demanded in good faith in the
initial pleading.” Durbois v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 37 F.4th
1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)). Plaintiff’s
Original Petition requests damages in excess of $1,000,000. ECF
No. 1-4 at 1.
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The parties dispute whether the citizenship requirement is
satisfied. Complete diversity of citizenship between the parties is
required under Section 1332. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S.
81, 89 (2005). Complete diversity “means that ‘all persons on one
side of the controversy [must] be citizens of different states than
all persons on the other side.’” Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 978
F.3d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2004)).
“[D]iversity of citizenship must exist both at the time of filing in
state court and at the time of removal to federal court.” Ashford v.
Aeroframe Servs., L.L.C., 907 F.3d 385, 386–87 (5th Cir. 2018)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
The parties agree about the citizenship of Plaintiff and
Defendants. The citizenship of individual persons “is determined
by domicile, which requires residency plus an intent to make the
place of residency one’s permanent home.” SXSW, L.L.C. v. Fed.
Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff is a citizen of
Georgia, and Vera is a citizen of Texas. ECF Nos. 1 at 2; 1-4 at 2.
Carmensita is a limited liability company. Id. The citizenship of
a limited liability company “is determined by the citizenship of
all of its members.” Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d
1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2008). Carmensita has only one member—an
individual person who is a citizen of Texas. ECF No. 1 at 2.
Therefore, Carmensita is a citizen of Texas for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.
Reid’s citizenship is at issue. When a plaintiff brings claims
as 	the 	representative 	of 	a 	decedent’s 	estate, 	the 	decedent’s
citizenship is attributed to the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
Because Plaintiff asserts claims as representative of Reid’s estate,
the issue of whether complete diversity exists is dependent upon
Reid’s citizenship at the time of his death.
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The evidence shows, and the parties do not dispute, that
Reid was domiciled in Georgia until at least “late May or early
June 2025,” when he traveled to Texas. ECF No. 7 at 10. However,
the parties dispute whether that travel constituted a change in
Reid’s domicile.
“A person’s domicile persists until a new one is acquired or
it is clearly abandoned.” Coury, 85 F.3d at 250. When a litigant’s
citizenship is disputed, the court looks to “all evidence shedding
light on the litigant’s intention to establish domicile.” Id. at 251.
The court may consider a variety of factors, including the “places
where the litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays taxes,
owns real and personal property, has driver’s and other licenses,
maintains bank accounts, belongs to clubs and churches, has
places of business or employment, and maintains a home for his
family.” Id. (citations omitted). “No single factor is determinative”
in the analysis. Id. “A litigant’s statement of intent is relevant to
the determination of domicile, but it is entitled little weight if it
conflicts with the objective facts.” Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that Reid moved to Texas with the intent of
establishing a new domicile. ECF No. 7. To support her argument,
Plaintiff relies on her own January 2026 affidavit, as well as a
video tour of the townhome that was recorded and sent to her by
Reid. Id. In her affidavit, Plaintiff asserts that Reid took all of his
personal belongings from her home in Georgia and moved to Texas,
intending to make Texas his “new home.” Pl. Aff. ¶ 5. She also
argues that she sent packages to Reid using a P.O. Box in Houston,
Texas. Id. ¶ 7.
Carmensita, on the other hand, argues that Reid remained
a Georgia resident despite his travel to Texas. ECF No. 22. It notes
that Reid voted in Georgia until at least November 2024, and he
remained a registered Georgia voter until his death. Id. ¶ 9 (citing
ECF No. 22-7). It also points out that in March 2025, Reid certified
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to a Georgia court, in connection with his release on bail on a
criminal charge, that his home address was in Riverdale, Georgia.
Id. ¶ 7 (citing ECF No. 22-3). One of his bail conditions was that
he would not change his residence without first notifying the court.
ECF No. 22-3. There is no indication that he gave such notice.
Thus, Reid represented to a judicial officer that he intended to
reside in Georgia permanently, or at least until the criminal case
against him was resolved. Reid knew that he was under a legal
obligation to inform the court of any changes to his home address,
and that failure to comply with that obligation would result in
strong legal consequences. ECF No. 22 ¶8 (citing ECF Nos. 22-3,
22-4, 22-6). Despite his awareness of that condition, upon traveling
to Texas, Reid did not inform the court that he intended to change
his address. Id. (citing ECF No. 22-6). In May 2025, after Reid
failed to appear for a hearing in the Georgia court, a bench warrant
was issued for his arrest. ECF No. 22-5. It turns out that Plaintiff
was unaware of her son’s criminal charges. ECF No. 22-9 at 9.
On July 9, 2025, Reid was charged with a criminal offense in
Fort Bend County, Texas. ECF No. 22-8 at 1. Carmensita points
out 	that 	during 	those 	proceedings, 	Reid 	completed 	a 	sworn
financial data sheet in which he stated that he had no rent
or 	mortgage 	payments, 	no 	car 	payment 	or 	insurance, 	and
no 	household 	utilities 	expenses. 	ECF No. 22 ¶ 20 	(citing ECF
No. 22-8 at 5). The financial data sheet indicates that Reid lived
“w[ith] a friend.” ECF No. 22-8 at 5. According to Plaintiff, that
friend was Massie, who purportedly moved with Reid to a Houston,
Texas townhome. Pl. Aff. ¶ 5. However, Reid was not listed on the
townhome lease, and the lease indicated that Massie was the only
occupant of the property. ECF No. 22-10 at 6–7.
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As further evidence that Reid lacked the requisite intent to
become a domiciliary of Texas, Carmensita points to Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony. Plaintiff testified that Reid had traveled to,
or planned to travel to, at least two other states and Mexico during
the same three-month period in which Plaintiff alleges that Reid
moved permanently to Texas. ECF No. 22-9 at 7:18–8:4.
In the face of the competing narratives presented by the
parties, the court cannot disregard the fact that Reid made an
affirmative representation 	to 	a judicial officer that he 	was a
resident of Georgia. Under his bail conditions, he was legally
obligated to reside in Georgia. It actually appears that Reid was
on the lam in Texas, given that there was an outstanding warrant
for his arrest in Georgia. Given the strong evidence to the contrary,
and the fact that Plaintiff was not even aware of Reid’s criminal
charges, the court gives little weight to Plaintiff’s statements about
Reid’s intention to remain in Texas. Considering all of the evidence
that sheds light on Reid’s intention to establish domicile, the court
concludes that Carmensita has shown, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Reid was not a citizen of Texas at the time of his
death. There is complete diversity of citizenship between the
parties on all claims. Therefore, the court may exercise diversity
jurisdiction over this matter.
The court turns its attention to Plaintiff’s argument that
Carmensita’s removal was procedurally improper.
B. Snap Removal
The forum-defendant rule provides that an action that is
“otherwise removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction]
may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Snap removal usually
allows a non-forum defendant to bypass the forum-defendant rule
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if it removes before the forum-defendant is served. Tex. Brine Co.
v. Am. Arb. Ass’n Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020).
“[T]he plain language of § 1441(b)(2), i.e., ‘properly joined
and served,’ creates an exception allowing removal by even a forum
defendant 	prior 	to 	being 	served 	with 	process.” 	Anaya 	v.
Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 24-20170, 2024 WL 5003579, at *3
(5th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024). The Plaintiff in Anaya appealed the snap
removal by a forum-defendant, claiming that Section 1441(b)(2)’s
language is “ambiguous and should be interpreted in line with
congressional intent and good policy to disallow snap removal.” Id.
at *2. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s
decision to permit snap removal by a forum-defendant prior to
service. Id. at *3. The court relied on the interpretation of Section
1441(b)(2) in Texas Brine—that subsection “is unambiguous and
inapplicable until the defendant is served.” Id. The court held that
Section 1441(b)(2)’s plain language “allow[s] removal by even a
forum defendant prior to being served with process.” Id.
There is no dispute here that removal was effectuated prior
to service on either defendant. ECF Nos. 1 at 3; 7 at 6. Based on
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Anaya, and because the court can
properly 	exercise 	diversity 	jurisdiction, 	Carmensita’s 	snap
removal was proper.
4. Conclusion
The requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied, and
Carmensita’s exercise of snap removal was proper. Accordingly,
the 	court 	recommends 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Remand,
ECF No. 7, be DENIED.
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
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conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th
Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on July 7, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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