Cruz et al v. City of Rosenberg et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Stephine Nelson Cruz and
Hansel Rodriguez,
Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Rosenberg, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-06097
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
This is a civil rights case. 	Plaintiffs Stephine Nelson Cruz and Hansel
Rodriguez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Officers Christopher Delgado, J.D.
Delgado, L. Andrade, and Saul Hernandez (collectively “Officers”) and the City
of Rosenberg. Dkt. 1. They also applied to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
Dk. 2. 	After carefully reviewing the application, the pleadings, and the
applicable law, it is ordered that Plaintiffs’ IFP applications are granted, but
it 	is 	recommended 	that 	their 	claims 	be 	dismissed 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Background
The following facts are taken as true at this stage. 	On June 7, 2022,
Cruz was driving in Fort Bend County, Texas when she was stopped by
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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unnamed Rosenberg Police Department officers. 	Dkt. 1 at 2. 	Shortly after
Cruz pulled over, other police units arrived. 	Id. 	Despite Cruz’s cooperation
and peaceful conduct, the four named Officers approached Cruz’s vehicle with
their firearms drawn, announced that she was under arrest, and issued verbal
commands. Id. at 2-3.
The Officers’ actions caused Cruz to experience a mental health crisis at
the scene. Id. at 3. She alleges that “[t]his psychological harm was overt and
apparent ….” 	Id. 	Cruz faults the Officers for failing to de-escalate the
situation and provide medical or psychological intervention. Id.
The Officers arrested Cruz, detained her, and impounded her vehicle.
Id. 	Cruz 	claims 	that 	her 	arrest 	directly 	caused 	her 	to 	suffer 	severe
psychological harm. 	Id. 	She was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder 	(“PTSD”), 	major 	depressive 	disorder, 	and 	generalized 	anxiety
disorder. Dkt. 1-3 at 11 (July 23, 2025 clinical letter); see also Dkt. 1 at 3. Due
to her psychological trauma, Cruz maintains that her “memory of the events
surrounding 	her 	arrest 	and 	subsequent 	proceedings 	is 	significantly
impaired ….” Dkt. 1 at 4.
Rodriguez provided emotional and financial support to Cruz in the
aftermath of the arrest. 	See id. at 8. 	This included relocating with her,
assuming financial responsibility for Cruz and her minor daughter, and
driving Cruz to her daily activities. See id.
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Beginning in 2025, Plaintiffs made several attempts to obtain records
relating to Cruz’s arrest and the ensuing court proceedings. See id. at 4-5; Dkt.
1-3 at 21-35 (records requests and communications). 	When these attempts
proved unsuccessful, they lodged a complaint with the Texas Office of the
Attorney General, which issued a ruling on July 25, 2025. See Dkt. 1-3 at 36-
44; see also Dkt. 1 at 6.
Months later, on December 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this suit against the
Officers and the City of Rosenberg. Dkt. 1 (complaint). Cruz brings: (1) a Texas
Public Information Act (“TPIA”) claim, (2) unreasonable search and seizure,
excessive force, and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) disability
discrimination claims under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and (4) negligence claims
under Texas common law. 	See id. at 11-12. 	Rodriguez—whose relationship
with Cruz is not disclosed—sues Defendants for “derivative emotional distress
and financial harm” under Texas common law. 	Id. at 12-13. 	Together,
Plaintiffs maintain that the Officers’ use of unreasonable and excessive force,
deliberate 	indifference 	towards 	and 	“failure 	to 	accommodate” 	Cruz’s
psychological distress, “and the infliction of additional psychological torment
by threatening jail … form the basis of” their claims. See id. at 4.
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Contemporaneously with filing their complaint, Plaintiffs moved to
proceed IFP. 	Dkt. 2. 	Thereafter, the case was referred to the undersigned
judge. Dkt. 5 (order of referral). The motion is ripe for resolution.
Legal standard
“[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor” upon a
showing that “the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). This statute applies both to prisoner and non-prisoner
cases. 	See Hayes v. Scott, 116 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1997). 	But the right to
proceed in forma pauperis is not absolute. “Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the district
court is required to dismiss an IFP case ‘at any time’ if it determines that the
case is ‘frivolous or malicious’ or ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 	Doe v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 131 F.4th 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2025)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii)).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it
alleges insufficient facts, when taken as true, to state a basis for relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also, e.g., Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x
65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Iqbal for the legal standard governing
a court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
Analysis
Plaintiffs’ financial circumstances support their request for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. But this raises the question of whether they have
stated a cognizable basis for relief. 	The answer is no. 	Accordingly, this case
should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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I. 	The IFP application is granted.
Plaintiffs 	have 	filed 	motions 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	under
28 U.S.C. § 1915, which would allow them to proceed with this case without
prepaying fees or costs. 	Dkt. 2. 	To proceed without paying the filing fee, an
applicant must show that they are financially “unable to pay such fees.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Although an applicant need not “be absolutely destitute,”
they still must show by affidavit that their financial condition renders them
unable to “pay or give security for the costs ... and still be able to provide
[themself] and [their] dependents with the necessities of life.” 	Adkins v.
DuPont Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
After 	reviewing 	Plaintiffs’ 	applications, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	their
financial resources render them unable to afford the costs of this litigation
while continuing to support themselves and Cruz’s daughter. 	They are
economically eligible to proceed IFP.
II. 	Plaintiffs have not stated a cognizable basis for relief.
Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1915(e)(2)(B), 	however, 	this 	Court 	also 	must
scrutinize Plaintiffs’ claims to determine if they have pleaded a basis for relief.
Cruz asserts federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, and the
Rehabilitation Act, and Texas claims under the TPIA and for common-law
negligence. See Dkt. 1 at 11-12. But as explained below, the TPIA claim should
have been brought in state court, and her remaining claims are time-barred.
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Moreover, 	Rodriguez’s 	claim 	for 	“derivative 	emotional 	distress 	and
financial harm” is not actionable under Texas law. 	See id. at 12-13. 	Because
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, their claims
should be dismissed under Section 1915(e)(2)(B).
A. 	Relief under the TPIA must be sought in state court.
Cruz alleges that the City of Rosenberg violated the TPIA because it
“willfully and unlawfully withheld public records, misrepresented the status of
the underlying criminal case to the Office of the Attorney General, and failed
to comply with” the law. See Dkt. 1 at 12 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.001
et seq.). 	She seeks the release of the requested records, attorneys’ fees and
costs, and other declaratory and injunctive relief. 	See id. at 12, 14. 	But that
relief must be sought in state court.
The TPIA’s purpose is “to provide public access ‘at all times to complete
information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public
officials and employees.’” 	City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d
351, 355–56 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.001). 	“Upon a
request for public information, a governmental body’s officer for public records
must promptly produce” that information unless the statute provides for an
exception from disclosure. 	See id. (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.221,
552.101).
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There are “two provisions authorizing suit when a requester is aggrieved
by 	the 	governmental 	unit’s 	response.” 	City 	of 	Georgetown 	v. 	Putnam,
646 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied), disapproved on other
grounds by Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership,
Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. 2025). A requester may bring an action under Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.321 for a writ of mandamus to compel the government
to 	release 	the 	withheld 	information. 	Or 	“[a]n 	action 	for 	declaratory 	or
injunctive relief may be brought” under Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.3215
“against a governmental body that violates” the statute. Id. § 552.3215(b).
Cruz does not specify under which provision of Chapter 552 she relies.
Regardless, by statute, mandamus relief under Section 552.321 must be sought
“in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental
body are located.” 	Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.321(b). 	Federal courts have
construed this provision to require relief to be sought in the relevant state
court. 	See Post Hole Ventures, LLC v. City of Kerrville, Tex., 2022 WL
11455956, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2022) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Davis
v. Logan, 2024 WL 4627646, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2024) (dismissing claim
without prejudice because it “is not actionable in this Court”), adopted by 2024
WL 4626085 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2024); Perez v. Araiza, 2007 WL 3125287, at
*2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2007) (dismissing TPIA claim that should have been
raised in state court), aff’d, 275 F. App’x 385 (5th Cir. 2008).
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As 	for 	Section 	552.3215, 	the 	Court 	has 	found 	no 	federal 	decision
anywhere 	that 	has 	granted 	declaratory 	or 	injunctive 	relief 	under 	this
provision. Instead, federal courts have concluded or observed that such claims
belong in state court. 	See Greer v. Gill, 2025 WL 1904336, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
June 	24, 	2025) 	(citing 	Tex. 	Gov. 	Code 	§§ 	552.321–.327 	and 	dismissing
plaintiff’s TPIA claim because their remedy was “not through this court”); see
also, e.g., Barnes v. Zitman, 2024 WL 2891341, at *2 (5th Cir. June 10, 2024)
(noting that if plaintiff “believes that a state governmental body has not
provided information requested pursuant to a [TPIA] request, then he may be
entitled to relief in state court under section 552.3215 of the Texas Government
Code” (emphasis added)); Dyer v. City of Mesquite, 2016 WL 2346740, at *7
(N.D. 	Tex. 	May 	3, 	2016) 	(similarly 	noting 	that 	“Plaintiffs 	may 	have 	an
available avenue of relief in state court” under Section 552.3215 (emphasis
added)). Because Cruz’s TPIA claim is not properly before this Court, it should
be dismissed.
B. 	Cruz’s remaining claims are time-barred.
For her remaining theories, Cruz invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts
disability discrimination and negligence claims. Those claims are untimely on
their 	face—a 	defect 	that 	this 	Court 	can 	raise 	“sua 	sponte 	in 	an 	action
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” See Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019, 1022 (5th Cir.
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1998) (affirming dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because suit was
barred by statute of limitations). All the claims are barred.
C. 	Texas’s two-year statute of limitations applies.
Cruz’s causes of action—whether under Section 1983, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, or for negligence—are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations. 	Because federal law does not supply a limitations period for
Section 1983, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act claims, courts apply the forum
state’s statute of limitations for personal injury suits. 	See Edmonds v.
Oktibbeha Cnty., Miss., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012) (Section 1983); Frame
v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 237 (5th Cir. 2011) (ADA and Rehabilitation
Act). 	In Texas, personal injury suits have a two-year limitations period. 	See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003. That limitations period therefore
governs both Cruz’s federal claims and her state-law negligence claim. 	See
Ledford v. Keen, 9 F.4th 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 16.003(a)).
1. 	The limitations period expired before this suit was filed.
Because Cruz complains of wrongdoing during her June 7, 2022 traffic
stop and arrest, that is the date when her claims accrued. 	The two-year
limitations period thus expired on June 7, 2024—over 18 months before Cruz
brought this suit, see Dkt. 1 (filed December 17, 2025).
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a. 	The federal claims accrued during the traffic stop.
Although the limitations period for Cruz’s federal claims is determined
by reference to state law, their accrual date is governed by federal law. 	See
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause
of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state
law.”); Frame, 657 F.3d at 238 (same for ADA and Rehabilitation Act). Under
federal law, a claim accrues “the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he
has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured.” Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted)
(applying standard to Section 1983 claim); Frame, 657 F.3d at 238 (5th Cir.
2011) (same for Title II ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims).
Cruz’s federal claims accrued when the traffic stop occurred. 	That was
when Cruz maintains that she was subjected to excessive and unreasonable
force, in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. 	Dkt. 1 at 11. 	It is also
when Defendants allegedly violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing
to “reasonably accommodate her disabilities,” “escalat[ing] the encounter,” and
“exacerbating her psychological crisis.” See id. at 12.
Likewise, Cruz’s due process claim accrued the same day because it
challenges her arrest, her detention, and the seizure of her car. Id. The accrual
date is not extended merely because the claim implicates legal proceedings
post-dating Cruz’s initial arrest. 	See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397 (“[T]he statute
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of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal
proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant
to legal process.”).
b. 	The state law claims also accrued during the stop.
Cruz’s negligence claims also accrued on June 7, 2022 because that is
when the challenged conduct caused her initial injury. In Texas, “a negligence
claim accrues when the defendant’s negligent conduct causes any legal injury
for which the claimant may obtain legal relief.” 	Regency Field Servs., LLC v.
Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 815 (Tex. 2021). 	“This ‘legal-
injury’ rule’ provides that the limitations period begins to run even if the
claimant does not yet know that a legal injury has occurred, has not yet
experienced the full extent of the injury, or cannot yet ascertain the resulting
damages.” Clouse v. S. Methodist Univ., 2025 WL 2427755, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug.
22, 2025) (per curiam) (citing Regency Field Servs., LLC, 622 S.W.3d at 814).
Cruz bases her negligence claim on the Officers’ conduct during the
traffic stop, which allegedly caused her to suffer emotional distress. 	See Dkt.
1 at 12 (alleging that Defendants negligently “employ[ed] excessive force,
fail[ed] to de-escalate the encounter, and disregard[ed] Plaintiff’s medical and
psychological needs”). 	Because her legal injury occurred when those events
transpired, the limitations period expired long before she filed this suit.
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2. 	No tolling is warranted.
Cruz nevertheless contends that her “claims are timely under the Texas
discovery rule and the doctrine of equitable tolling.” 	Dkt. 1 at 8. 	Because
Texas’s 	statute 	of 	limitations 	governs 	all 	claims, 	so 	too 	does 	its 	tolling
principles. 	See Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998). 	Cruz
cannot show that she is entitled to tolling under Texas law.
“As a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a
statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but
some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014). 	But the Texas Supreme
Court “has not articulated a general test for determining when equitable
tolling is available ….” 	Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd.,
670 S.W.3d 622, 630 (Tex. 2023); see also Sorrow v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci.
Ctr. at Hou., 2024 WL 2763378, at *3 n.6 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] May
30, 2024, no pet.). Rather Texas has “recognized two doctrines that may delay
accrual 	or 	toll 	limitations: 	(1) 	the 	discovery 	rule 	and 	(2) 	fraudulent
concealment.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2015); see also
Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2018) (making the same
observation when analyzing timeliness of Section 1983 claim).
Of those two bases for tolling, the only one that Cruz invokes is the
discovery rule. 	The discovery rule provides only a “very limited exception to
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the statute of limitations.” 	See King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist.,
803 F.3d 754, 764 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)). The “rule defers accrual of the cause of
action if ‘the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable and the
evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.’” Id. (quoting Childs v. Haussecker,
974 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. 1998)). 	“An injury is inherently undiscoverable if
it is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations
period despite due diligence.” 	Marshall v. First Baptist Church of Hou.,
949 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). 	“The
requirement of inherent undiscoverability recognizes that the discovery rule
exception should be permitted only in circumstances where it is difficult for the
injured party to learn of the negligent act or omission.” Comput. Assocs. Int’l,
918 S.W.2d at 456 (quotation omitted).
Cruz contends that she “could not have discovered [] the nature and
causal connection of her psychological injuries until her formal diagnosis in
2025.” 	Dkt. 1 at 8. 	That does not matter because “[t]o bring a suit, it is not
necessary for the victim to connect the [wrongful act] to any subsequent
psychological injuries or understand the full extent of [her] injuries.” 	Doe v.
St. Stephen’s Episcopal Sch., 382 F. App’x 386, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2010) (Texas’s
discovery rule did not apply even though plaintiffs obtained a diagnosis only
after the limitations period expired). Put another way, the claim accrues when
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some injury occurs, regardless of whether “the plaintiff later discovers that his
injuries are more serious than originally thought ....” 	See Albertson v. T.J.
Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 1984).
Even if Cruz did not fully appreciate the long-term psychological harm
caused by her stop and arrest until her later diagnosis, she had enough
information during the traffic stop to know that she sustained some type of
injury. See Whitaker v. McDonald, 2022 WL 68972, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022)
(Section 	1983 	claim 	accrued 	“the 	moment 	[plaintiff] 	… 	ha[d] 	sufficient
information to know that [she was] injured” (quoting Walker, 550 F.3d at 414)).
In fact, Plaintiffs’ own allegations state that the Officers’ conduct during the
stop caused her “to experience severe psychological distress and an acute
mental health crisis at the scene.” See Dkt. 1 at 3 (emphasis added). Her injury
was discoverable at that time.
Cruz 	also 	asserts 	that 	the 	psychological 	symptoms 	of 	her 	trauma,
including 	memory 	gaps, 	“impaired 	[her] 	ability 	to 	recognize 	the 	legal
significance of her injuries” and thus pursue claims within the limitations
period. Id. at 8-9. But memory loss does not satisfy the discovery rule when a
plaintiff was aware that some injury had occurred. See St. Stephen’s Episcopal
Sch., 382 F. App’x at 389 (“Texas courts have distinguished cases in which
victims were at least in some way aware of the abuse from cases in which the
victim repressed all memories of the abuse.”). 	Nothing suggests that Cruz’s
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memory of the stop was so suppressed that she could not recall until recently
that the stop had even happened.
Cruz also contends that her inability to obtain records “further support
the application of the discovery rule and equitable tolling, as [she] could not
reasonably have discovered or acted upon her legal claims while her memory
remained 	impaired 	and 	all 	official 	records 	and 	transcripts 	remained
unavailable ….” 	Dkt. 1 at 5. 	But claims cannot be tolled simply because a
plaintiff wishes to await additional information to flesh out her claims.
Moreover, the complaint reflects that Cruz did not even submit a request
for records until nearly three years after the incident. See Dkt. 1 at 5 (May 27,
2025 public records request); see also Dkt. 1-3 at 21-35. Cruz has not provided
a basis to conclude that she exercised adequate diligence, even assuming her
claims could otherwise be tolled. See Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 47 (“The discovery
rule … expressly requires a plaintiff to use reasonable diligence to investigate
his injury.”). This Court should dismiss Cruz’s claims as time-barred.
D. 	Rodriguez has no basis for recovery.
The claims asserted by co-plaintiff Rodriguez also fail. 	There is no
allegation that Rodriguez was present at Cruz’s traffic stop. 	Nor does the
complaint explain what relationship Rodriguez has with Cruz. Yet Rodriguez
seeks damages under Texas common law for his “derivative emotional distress
and financial harm” when providing support to Cruz and her daughter after
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the June 7, 2022 traffic stop and arrest. See Dkt. 1 at 12-13. Rodrigeuz’s claims
are barred as a matter of law.
First, Cruz’s inability to recover on her Texas law claims forecloses
Rodriguez’s 	derivative 	claim. 	In 	Texas, 	a 	derivative 	tort 	“depends 	on
participation in some underlying tort ....” See Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Cirs.
Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 138 (Tex. 2019) (quotation omitted) (addressing
civil conspiracy). 	Thus, “a defense that tends to constrict or exclude the
tortfeasor’s liability” to the primary injured party “will have the same effect
on” the other’s derivative claim. Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 738-
39 (Tex. 1980) (loss of consortium); see also, e.g., Estate of Barrera v. Rosamond
Vill. Ltd. P’ship, 983 S.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1998, no pet.) (no bystander claim where the victim could not recover). Because
Cruz’s negligence claim is barred by limitations, Rodriguez cannot recover on
his derivative claim either.
Second, Texas law does not recognize a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, to the extent Rodriguez is seeking such relief. 	See Hirras
v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d 278, 280 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Boyles
v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993)); Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 594 (“A claimant
may recover mental anguish damages only in connection with defendant’s
breach of some other legal duty.”). 	“An exception to this rule is allowed for a
bystander who witnesses a serious or fatal accident.” 	Cox Tex. Newspapers,
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L.P. v. Wootten, 59 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied)
(citing Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 597-98). 	To recover as a bystander, Rodriguez
must: (1) have been “located near the scene of the accident;” (2) experience
“shock result[ing] from a direct emotional impact upon [him] from the sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident;” and (3) be “closely related”
to the victim. White v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 3d 780, 786 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
(citing Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 597; Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923
(Tex. 1988)).
Even assuming Cruz had an actionable underlying tort claim, Rodriguez
has not stated a bystander claim. 	There is no allegation that Rodriguez was
at the traffic stop. 	Nor does he explain his relationship with Cruz, which is
fatal to recovery, either as a bystander or for lost consortium. 	Strickland v.
Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 195 (Tex. 2013) (loss of consortium claim is “narrowly
cabined” 	to 	husband-wife 	and 	parent-child 	relationships, 	and 	excludes
recovery for close friends). For those reasons alone, Rodriguez’s claims fail.
Order and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs Stephine
Cruz’s and Hansel Rodriguez’s applications to proceed in forma pauperis
(Dkt. 2) are GRANTED.
It is further RECOMMENDED that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
Plaintiff Stephine Cruz’s claims under the Texas Public Information Act be
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DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and that all other claims asserted by
Cruz and Plaintiff Hansel Rodriguez be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on March 20, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
______________________________________	__
Yvvvoon	n	n	nne Y. Hoo
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-06097 Document 7 Filed 03/20/26 in TXSD Page 19 of 19