Hernandez Resendiz v. Noem, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CESAR HERNANDEZ
RESENDIZ,
Petitioner,
versus
KRISTI NOEM, et al,
Respondents.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-05940
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Cesar Hernandez Resendiz filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 on December
10, 2025. Dkt 1. He acknowledges illegal entry into the
United States at a prior date but nonetheless asserts that
his present detention under 8 USC §1225(b) is unlawful.
He contends that any detention should instead proceed, if
at all, under 8 USC §1226(a), which may entitle him to a
bond hearing. Id at ¶156. In that regard, Petitioner alleges
violations of (i) the Immigration and Nationality Act, (ii)
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and (iii)
related regulations. Id at ¶¶155–163.
Pending also is a motion by the Government for
summary judgment. Dkt 11. The Government maintains
that no bond hearing is required because Petitioner is an
“applicant for admission” under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A),
which provides for mandatory detention during removal
proceedings. Id at 6.
The Fifth Circuit has now issued a controlling decision
in Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir).
In sum, it holds that anyone present in the United States
without legal admission is both an “applicant for
admission” and deemed to be “seeking admission,” and that
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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all such persons are thus subject to mandatory detention
under 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). See id at *4–10.
The undersigned previously resolved that and an array
of closely related issues upon determination that the
Government may properly apply 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) in
circumstances similar to those of Petitioner. For example,
see:
o Montoya Cabanas v Bondi, 2025 WL 3171331
(SD Tex): Finding that (i) the term “applicant
for admission” is determinative, as it is broadly
defined to include anyone “present in the
United States who has not been admitted,”
(ii) application of §1225(b)(2)(A) doesn’t render
superfluous the amendment to §1226 by the
Laken Riley Act, and (iii) no due process
violation occurs where constitutional argument
depends on rejected statutory interpretation of
§§1225 and 1226.
o Herrera Naranjo v Uhls, 2025 WL 3771447
(SD Tex): Rejecting contention that (i) the text
of §1225(b)(2)(A) is ambiguous, with resort to
other canons of statutory construction thus
being unnecessary, (ii) the location of
petitioner’s arrest may itself violate due
process or otherwise make detention unlawful,
and (iii) prior work authorizations confer
lawful status.
o Rodriguez-Hidalgo v Noem, 4:25-cv-05730
(SD Tex, Jan 9, 2026): Rejecting arguments
based on (i) bond regulations because statutory
language prevails over putative conflicting
regulations, (ii) due process because the
Government may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period
necessary for their removal proceedings, and
(iii) eligibility for adjustment of status under
the Cuban Adjustment Act because such is
outside the scope of habeas jurisdiction.
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o Cairo Ceniz v Bondi, 4:26-cv-00017 (SD Tex,
Jan 21, 2026): Finding “applicants for
admission” to be a subset of those “seeking
admission” under 8 USC §1225(a)(3).
o Garcia Tabon v Dickey, 4:25-cv-06145 (SD Tex,
Jan 22, 2026): Rejecting argument under
Administrative Procedure Act where it
depends on rejected statutory interpretation of
§§1225 and 1226.
o Vargas Ordonez v Frink, 4:25-cv-06386 (SD
Tex, Jan 20, 2026): Rejecting argument under
Fourth Amendment where it depends on
rejected statutory interpretation of §§1225 and
1226.
As noted within the above citations, a claim under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment necessarily
fails to the extent that it proceeds upon reliance of rejected
statutory interpretation as to the applicability of §1226.
For example, see Montoya Cabanas, 2025 WL 3171331
at *6–7; Herrera Naranjo, 2025 WL 3771447 at *2.
Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the
Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens
during the limited period necessary for their removal
proceedings.” Maceda Jimenez v Thompson, 2025 WL
3265493, *1 (SD Tex), quoting Demore v Kim, 538 US 510,
523 (2003).
As also noted above, a claim under the Administrative
Procedure Act likewise fails to the extent that it proceeds
upon reliance of the same rejected statutory interpretation.
Such claims are also foreclosed by 5 USC §704 given that
adequate remedy exists through habeas relief. For
example, see Garcia Tabon, 4:25-cv-06145, Dkt 14 at 3;
Sanchez-Sanchez, 4:26-cv-00144, Dkt 7 at 2–3.
The undersigned has also determined that the order
entered in Bautista v Santacruz, 2025 WL 3713987
(CD Cal), purporting to certify a nationwide class, far
exceeded the jurisdiction of the Central District of
California. See Sanchez-Sanchez, 4:26-cv-00144, Dkt 7
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at 2, adopting reasoning of Calderon Lopez v Lyons, 2025
WL 3683918 (ND Tex) (Hendrix, J). The Bautista order
also remains on appeal in the Ninth Circuit and is, at least
in that sense, not entitled to preclusive effect here. See
Bautista v Department of Homeland Security, 25-7958 (9th
Cir). In any event, a district court isn’t bound by another
district court’s ruling. See Camreta v Greene, 563 US 692,
709 n 7 (2011). This is particularly true in the present
circumstances where the Fifth Circuit has now decided the
same issue contrary to the Central District of California.
See Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 323330 at *4–10.
To the extent Petitioner relies on arguments not raised
and resolved in the decisions above, they lack merit.
First, he attempts to raise a procedural due process
challenge to §1225. Id at ¶¶145–54. But Petitioner has
“only those rights regarding admission that Congress has
provided by statute” because of Congress’s “sovereign
prerogative” over immigration. Department of Homeland
Security v Thuraissigiam, 591 US 103, 140 (2020).
Second, though absent from his asserted claims for
relief, he appears to argue that the Ex Post Facto Clause
bars application of §1225(b)(2) to him. See Dkt 1 at ¶¶135–
139. But the Supreme Court has long recognized that “the
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only
to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected
by them.” Collins v Youngblood, 497 US 37, 41 (1990).
Immigration proceedings are a civil matter. See INS v
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1038 (1984): “A deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility
to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful
entry . . . .” No penal statute is implicated.
Third, Petitioner contends that, because the
Government previously cited §1226 as the basis for his
detention when originally releasing him from custody upon
apprehension after arrival, it cannot now “switch tracks”
and detain him under §1225. Dkt 1 at ¶¶133–34. The
Buenrostro-Mendez decision forecloses that argument. The
Fifth Circuit there observed that “the government’s past
practice has little to do with the statute’s text. The text
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says what it says, regardless of the decisions of prior
Administrations.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 323330
at *8. As such, the Government may lawfully apply
§1225(b)(2) to Petitioner upon his current apprehension.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Cesar Hernandez Resendiz is thus DENIED. Dkt 1.
The motion for summary judgment by the Government
is GRANTED. Dkt 11.
This action is DISMISSED.
This is a FINAL JUDGMENT.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on February 17, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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