State Of Texas v. Carley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
State of Texas,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jerry Lavon Carley,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-05574
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an ongoing state criminal prosecution that Defendant Jerry
Lavon Carley attempted to remove to this Court. 	See Dkt. 1. 	Because this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it should remand the case to state
court.
Background
The following facts are taken from the state court record, which Carley
submitted. 	See Dkt. 8. 	On September 15, 2025, the State of Texas filed a
criminal complaint against Carley in the 486th Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas, charging him with aggravated assault, a felony offense.
Id. at 4. 	The complaint alleges that Carley “unlawfully, intentionally, and
knowingly threaten[ed]” the complainant, Tyson Muniz, “with imminent bodily
injury by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely, a motor vehicle.” Id.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Contemporaneously 	with 	filing 	the 	complaint, 	the 	State 	filed 	a 	motion
requesting that bond conditions and a sufficient bail be set. See id. at 5, 9.
The next day, the state court found probable cause to support the
charged offense and ordered that bail be set at $30,000. 	Id. at 13-16. 	In its
findings, the case court noted that the incident involved a “road rage assault”
where Carley “repeatedly rammed another vehicle driven by” the complainant
Muniz, 	“pushing 	[Muniz’s] 	truck” 	onto 	the 	grass, 	and 	then 	got 	out 	and
attempted to break Muniz’s window by punching it—all of which was caught
on video. Id. at 16. Carley posted bail on September 18, 2025. Id. at 23.
Carley then submitted multiple filings. 	First, despite being appointed
an attorney, id. at 19, Carley himself filed a “notice of special appearance”
asserting he was appearing “pro per” and “not submitting to any alleged
jurisdiction.” Id. at 27. That notice was promptly followed by Carley’s motion
to dismiss the case for lack of “subject matter jurisdiction” claiming that the
incident 	did 	not 	constitute 	a 	criminal 	offense 	and 	that 	the 	investigator
improperly relied on the complainant’s account of the events, id. at 35-37. His
attorney then moved to withdraw, indicating that Carley wished to proceed pro
se. Id. at 42. The motion to withdraw was granted. Id. at 43.
Second, Carley filed a motion to recuse the state district judge, claiming
that the judge denied him due process by labeling Carley’s appearance as being
pro 	se 	instead 	of 	“in 	propria 	persona,” 	disregarding 	Carley’s 	“special
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appearance” to challenge personal jurisdiction, and violated 18 U.S.C. § 241 by
“conspiring with the prosecution” to violate Carley’s civil rights. 	Id. at 44-46.
The state district judge referred the motion to the presiding judge of the
relevant judicial region, id. at 49, who promptly denied it as untimely and
because Carley’s complaints about adverse rulings provided no grounds for
recusal, id. at 52-53.
A few days later, Carley filed his notice of removal. 	Dkt. 1. 	The notice
reprises his complaints about the district judge’s decisions, asserting that the
judge denied Carley’s right to proceed “in propria persona,” did not provide
certified copies of information and charging instruments, and denied Carley’s
Sixth 	Amendment 	right 	to 	confrontation, 	to 	“due 	process 	of 	law, 	equal
protection of the laws, and judicial review ....” 	Id. 	Carley followed that
submission with a filing that includes the state court records, Dkt. 8, and, later,
a one-page brief alleging that federal law entitled him to remove the case, Dkt.
9. Carley also filed a “motion to release information and evidence.” Dkt. 7.
Analysis
Carley’s 	notice 	of 	removal 	alleges 	that 	the 	ongoing 	state 	criminal
prosecution has violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution. 	Dkt. 1. 	But
the law is clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, which should
be remanded to state court.
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“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 	“Therefore, United States
District Courts and Courts of Appeals have the responsibility to consider the
question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if it is not raised by the
parties and to dismiss any action if such jurisdiction is lacking.” Giannakos v.
M/V Bravo Trader, 762 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
Federal law prescribes a procedure for removing certain state criminal
prosecutions to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1455. The notice of removal must
contain “a short and plain statement” of all grounds for removal. 	See id.
§ 1455(a), (b)(2). 	It must be accompanied by “a copy of all process, pleadings,
and orders served upon such [a] defendant ….” Id. § 1455(a). And the deadline
for removal is “not later than 30 days after the arraignment in the State court,
or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier ….” Id. § 1455(b)(1).
Even assuming that Carley had met those procedural requirements,
however, Section 1455 “doesn’t provide state criminal defendants with an
independent right to remove their cases to federal court.” 	Texas v. Bellard,
2026 WL 275914, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2026). 	“So a state criminal
defendant must both comply with the procedural requirements of § 1455 and
show that he has a statutory basis for removing the case to federal court.” Id.
Moreover, Section 1455 instructs federal courts to “examine the notice [of
removal] promptly” and order a summary remand “[i]f it clearly appears on the
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face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be
permitted ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4). That is case here.
To qualify for removal, Carley had to show that the state criminal
prosecution met one of three statutory alternatives. 	Those instances are:
“(i) when the state criminal prosecution is against a federal official or agency,
28 U.S.C. § 1442, (ii) when the state criminal prosecution is against a member
of the armed forces, 28 U.S.C. § 1442a, and (iii) when a person is denied, or
cannot enforce in state court, a right under a law providing for his equal civil
rights[,] 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).” Bellard, 2026 WL 275914, at *2.
Carley does not allege that he is a federal officer or member of the armed
forces, which forecloses the first two alternatives, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1442a.
And for the third alternative, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), the Supreme Court has
specified 	two 	requirements: 	(1) “the 	right 	allegedly 	denied 	the 	removal
petitioner” must “arise[] under a federal law ‘providing for specific civil rights
stated 	in 	terms 	of 	racial 	equality,’” 	and 	not 	“constitutional 	or 	statutory
provisions of general applicability”; and (2) it must be shown that the relevant
federal right cannot be enforced in the state court, which “normally requires
that the ‘denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law,’ such as a state
legislative or constitutional provision, ‘rather than a denial first made manifest
in the trial of the case.’” 	Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1975)
(quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792, 799, 803 (1966)).
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Carley’s notice of removal does not allege that the ongoing prosecution
violates any federal right concerning racial equality. Nor does he claim that a
specific 	Texas 	law 	impairs 	any 	such 	race-based 	right. 	Instead, 	Carley
complains about various rulings in the case and invokes generally applicable
rights to due process, confrontation, and equal protection. 	See Dkt. 1 at 2.
That is insufficient to fit within the limited statutory grounds for removal. See,
e.g. Cnty. of Yazoo, Miss. v. Prewitt, 2023 WL 7381440, at *1-2 (5th Cir. Nov.
7, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming summary remand of criminal case, including
because the statutes that defendant invoked were not “stated in terms of racial
equality”) (quotation omitted); Bellard, 2026 WL 275914, at *2 (remanding
criminal case sua sponte when defendant did not allege he was a federal officer,
member of the armed forces, or that the criminal charge violated a federal law
“providing for specific rights based on racial equality”) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443(1)); Texas v. Garcia, 2025 WL 3675071, at * 2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025)
(concluding analogous deficiency 	required remand), 	adopted 	by 	2025 	WL
3679231 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2025).
Accordingly, there is no basis for jurisdiction. 	And because “it clearly
appears on the face of the notice and exhibits annexed thereto that removal
should not be permitted,” this case should summarily be remanded to state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4).
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Recommendation
For the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it is 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	this 	state
criminal case be REMANDED to the 486th Judicial District Court of Harris
County, Texas, from whence it was removed, and that Defendant Jerry Lavon
Carley’s pending motion to release information and evidence (Dkt. 7) be
DENIED AS MOOT.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on February 5, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Yvvvoon	n	nne Y. Hoo
United States Magistrate Judge
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