Morales et al v. BPD Transport, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Jessie Morales et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BPD Transport, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-05311
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
This is a personal injury case. 	Plaintiffs Jessie Morales and Mayra
Jimenez, individually and a/n/f of V.P., X.M., and I.M., moved to remand the
suit to state court. 	Dkt. 4. 	They also moved to strike (Dkt. 20) Defendants
Braxton 	Dumensil’s and 	BPD 	Transport, LLC’s 	(“Removing Defendants”)
amended notice of removal (Dkt. 18) and “supplemental response” (Dkt. 19) to
the motion to remand. Removing Defendants thereafter sought leave to amend
their notice of removal. Dkt. 21.
Plaintiffs also moved for leave to amend their complaint to add Fast Trac
Transportation, LLC as a defendant, claiming that including that entity will
destroy 	complete 	diversity 	and 	require 	remand. 	Dkt. 	23. 	Removing
Defendants do not oppose the requested amendment but maintain that Fast
Trac’s citizenship is diverse from Plaintiffs’. Dkt. 26.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 07, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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After carefully considering the motions, Dkts. 4, 20, 21, 23, responses,
Dkts. 9, 21, 26, reply, Dkt. 22, the record, and the applicable law, the Court (a)
grants Plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Dkt. 20) the amended notice of removal
(Dkt. 18), (b) denies Removing Defendants’ request for leave to amend (Dkt.
21) their notice of removal, and (c) grants Plaintiffs’ request to strike Removing
Defendants’ “supplemental response” (Dkt. 19) to the motion to remand. 	It is
further 	recommended 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	to 	remand 	and 	interrelated
request for attorneys’ fees (Dkt. 4) be denied. The Court also grants Plaintiffs’
motion (Dkt. 23) for leave to amend their complaint but concludes that adding
Fast Trac as a defendant does not affect this Court’s jurisdiction.
Background
This case concerns a motor vehicle collision in Harris County, Texas. On
June 3, 2024, Morales was driving while his wife, Jimenez, and their three
minor children, V.P., X.M., and I.M., were riding in the car. 	Dkt. 1-4 at 3.
Dumesnil was driving a tractor-trailer for BPD Transport, LLC. 	Id. at 3-4.
According to Plaintiffs, Fontaine Commercial Trailer, Inc. owned and had
entrusted the vehicle to Dumensil. 	Id. at 4. 	Plaintiffs allege that Dumensil
“abruptly” merged into their lane. 	Id. at 3. 	His tractor-trailer collided with
Plaintiffs’ car, injuring them. Id. at 3-4.
On March 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit in state court, asserting that
Dumensil, BPD Transport, LLC, and Fontaine Commercial Trailer, Inc. were
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negligent. 	Dkt. 1-4 (original petition). 	The petition states that Morales and
Jimenez, “individually and a/n/f/ of V.P., X.M., and I.M., minors” are “citizen[s]
and resident[s] of Harris County, Texas” and had been “at all times relevant to
the suit.” 	Id. at 1. 	The petition does not specify the minors’ citizenship. 	It
does 	identify 	BPD 	Transport, 	LLC 	as 	“a 	Louisiana 	limited 	liability
corporation,” assert that Fontaine “is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do
business in the State of Texas,” and claim that Dumensil “is a Louisiana
resident.” See id. at 1-2. The petition asserts that Plaintiffs have suffered over
$1,000,0000 in damages. Id. at 8.
Removing Defendants were served on July 9, 2025. 	Dkts. 4-2, 4-3. 	No
record indicates that Fontaine was served or appeared in this case.
While in state court, Removing Defendants propounded interrogatories
on Morales and Jimenez that asked basic background information, including
their 	current 	and 	past 	addresses. 	See 	Dkt. 1-8 	at 	3-4 	(Morales’s
interrogatories); Dkt 1-9 at 3-4 (Jimenez’s interrogatories). 	Morales’s and
Jimenez’s October 27, 2025 responses reflected that they had lived in Houston,
Texas for the past ten years. See Dkt. 1-8 at 4; Dkt. 1-9 at 4.
On November 6, 2025, Removing Defendants removed the case, invoking
diversity jurisdiction. 	Dkt. 1. 	For the parties’ citizenships, the notice of
removal stated that “no defendant is a citizen of Texas” and cited Morales’s
and Jimenez’s October 27, 2025 interrogatory responses—rather the petition—
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to show that those plaintiffs are Texas citizens. See id. at 2-3. For the amount
in controversy, the notice cited Plaintiffs’ allegation that their damages exceed
$1 million. Id. at 3 (citing Dkt. 1-4).
Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely. Dkt. 4.
Removing Defendants then served interrogatories to I.M., V.P., and X.M.
(“Minor Plaintiffs”), asking where Minor Plaintiffs had resided for the past ten
years. Dkts. 9-1 at 5, 9-2 at 5, 9-3 at 5 (served November 25, 2025). Removing
Defendants also responded to the motion to remand and requested leave to
conduct this discovery after-the-fact. 1 See Dkt. 9. Minor Plaintiffs responded
to the interrogatories on January 22, 2026, stating that they have resided in
Texas for the past ten years, resided with Jimenez when suit was filed, and
“will remain with [their] parents.” 	See Dkt. 18-14 at 4, 16 (I.M.’s responses),
18-15 at 4, 17 (V.P.’s responses), 18-16 at 4, 15 (X.M.’s responses).
The 	parties 	discussed 	the 	motion 	to 	remand 	at 	an 	initial 	pretrial
conference. See Dkt. 11 (order setting conference). Removing Defendants then
unilaterally filed an amended notice of removal (Dkt. 18) and a “Supplemental
Response” (Dkt. 19) to Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Plaintiffs moved to strike
both filings. 	Dkt. 20. 	Removing Defendants responded and sought post-hoc
leave to amend their notice of removal, Dkt. 21, and Plaintiffs replied, Dkt. 22.
1 This Court struck Plaintiffs’ untimely reply supporting remand. 	Dkt. 13 (striking
Dkt. 12).
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On March 17, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their pleadings
to add Fast Trac as a defendant, which they claim might be a Texas citizen
whose 	joinder 	would 	destroy 	diversity. 	Dkt. 	23. 	Removing 	Defendants
responded that they are unopposed to the amendment but submitted evidence
showing that Fast Trac is not a Texas citizen. Dkt. 26. 2 The motion to remand
(Dkt. 4), motion to strike (Dkt. 20), motion for leave to amend the notice of
removal (Dkt. 21), and motion for leave to amend the complaint (Dkt. 23) are
all ripe for resolution.
Legal standard
A 	defendant 	can 	remove 	a 	state-court 	action 	if 	that 	action 	could
originally have been filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts,
in turn, are authorized to hear cases that either (1) involve questions of federal
law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens
of different States,” id. § 1332(a)(1).
A motion to remand can challenge a defect in removal procedure or the
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 	28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 	Either way, the
defendants have the burden to show that removal was proper. 	See Roth v.
Kiewit Offshore Servs., Ltd., 625 F. 	Supp. 2d 376, 382 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
2 Plaintiffs’ reply supporting their motion for leave to amend was stricken as
untimely. See Dkt. 27 (reply); Dkt. 28 (order striking).
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(Defendant bears the burden “not only to demonstrat[e] a jurisdictional basis
for removal, but also necessary compliance with the requirements of the
removal statute.”) (quoting Albonietti v. GAF Corp.-Chem. Grp., 520 F. Supp.
825, 827 (S.D. Tex. 1981)). 	Moreover, the removal statute must “be strictly
construed and any doubt as to the propriety of removal should be resolved in
favor of remand.” In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007).
Analysis
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	remand 	is 	warranted 	because 	Removing
Defendants failed to timely remove the case. 	Dkt. 4. 	According to Plaintiffs,
that deadline was triggered by the service of the original petition, which
revealed that all requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met. See id. at 5.
Removing 	Defendants 	do 	not 	dispute 	that 	the 	state-court 	petition
disclosed that this controversy exceeds the minimum requirement to support
diversity jurisdiction. Rather, they maintain that the petition did not provide
sufficient information to conclude that Plaintiffs were Texas citizens and were
therefore diverse. 	According to Removing Defendants, they did not acquire
that essential information until Plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses confirmed
their Texas domiciles. See Dkt. 9 at 3.
As detailed below, the original petition did not affirmatively reveal that
this case was removable with respect to Minor Plaintiffs. 	As a result, the 30-
day removal deadline did not expire until after the case was removed, which
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merits denying Plaintiffs’ motion for remand and interrelated request for
attorneys’ fees (Dkt. 4). 	But the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to strike
(Dkt. 20) Removing Defendants’ amended notice of removal (Dkt. 18) and sur-
reply (Dkt. 19) as improperly filed without leave of court and denies their
request for leave (Dkt. 21) to submit the amended notice after-the-fact.
Plaintiffs’ further, unopposed request for leave to amend (Dkt. 23) their
complaint to add a new defendant is granted. Removing Defendants, however,
have shown that the new defendant is not a Texas citizen whose inclusion
would defeat diversity jurisdiction.
I. 	Removing Defendants are not entitled to amend the notice of
removal.
On 	February 	6, 	2026, 	Removing 	Defendants 	unilaterally 	filed 	an
amended notice of removal, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and § 1653. Dkt. 18.
Only after Plaintiffs moved to strike the submission did Removing Defendants
request leave to file it. 	Compare Dkt. 21 at 2, with Dkt. 20. 	Because the
amended notice of removal is procedurally barred, it is stricken.
The amended notice of removal is untimely. 	The statute provides only
30 days to amend a notice of removal as a matter of right. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b). “Outside of the 30-day removal period, Defendants must seek leave
to amend a notice of removal ….” VTX Commc’ns, LLC v. AT&T Inc., 2020 WL
918670, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2020); see Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
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364 F. App’x 62, 66 (5th Cir. 2010) (The statute “grants courts the authority
and discretion to allow parties to” amend.). 	Removing Defendants’ unilateral
submission of the amended notice of removal was therefore improper. 	This
alone warrants striking it.
Moreover, Removing Defendants are not entitled to amend the notice of
removal. Section 1653 only permits amendment “to cure defective allegations
of jurisdiction.” Menendez, 364 F. App’x at 66. Those types of deficiencies are
“technical” ones, like the failure to specifically allege a party’s citizenship. VTX
Commc’ns, 2020 WL 918670, at *13 (citing Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
841 F.2d 1254, 1258 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988); Whitmire v. Victus Ltd., 212 F.3d 885,
887-88 (5th Cir. 2000); Menendez, 364 F. App’x at 66). 	They doenot include
“adding a new theory to establish the same type of subject matter jurisdiction
asserted in the original notice of removal ....” 	Crow v. Melton, 2018 WL
10419358, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2018) (denying leave to amend), adopted
by 2018 WL 10419359 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2018). 	And “where the notice of
removal is procedurally defective, 28 U.S.C. § 1653 cannot be used as a means
to cure what is otherwise a substantial defect in the removal proceedings.”
Moody v. Com. Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 753 F. Supp. 198, 201 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
(classifying “failure to join all defendants in the notice of removal” within the
necessary 30-day window as “a non-jurisdictional defect”).
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Removing Defendants contend that they are merely amending “to correct
a technical defect.” 	Dkt. 21 at 3. 	The Court disagrees. 	The proposed
amendment 	includes 	a 	new 	justification 	for 	the 	timing 	of 	removal 	that
Removing Defendants raised, for the first time, when responding to the motion
to 	remand 	(Dkt. 	9) 	and 	mentioned 	during 	the 	January 	23, 	2026 	initial
conference. 	Compare Dkt. 1 at 4 (arguing that removal is timely because the
interrogatories pertaining to Morales’s and Jimenez’s citizenship “provided
Defendants 	with 	the 	necessary 	evidence 	of 	federal 	jurisdictional
requirements”), with Dkt. 18 at 4-5 (contention removal was timely because
Minor 	Plaintiffs’ 	interrogatory 	responses 	“provided 	Defendants 	with 	the
necessary evidence of federal jurisdictional requirements”) (emphasis added).
The proposed amendment therefore attempts to address potential procedural
defects in removal, which is not permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Removing
Defendants’ post hoc request for leave to amend (Dkt. 21) their notice of
removal is denied.
II. 	Removal 	was 	timely 	because 	the 	original 	petition 	did 	not
affirmatively reveal that all parties are diverse.
Moving to remand, Plaintiffs maintain that removal was untimely under
28 U.S.C. § 1446. Dkt. 4. Removing Defendants defend the timing of removal
by arguing that the original petition lacked sufficient information to determine
any of the Plaintiffs’ citizenships. See Dkt. 9 at 3.
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When resolving that debate, the Court disregards Removing Defendants’
“supplement” 	to 	their 	response. 	Dkt. 	19. 	That 	filing 	constitutes 	an
unauthorized sur-reply. 	See Judge Yvonne Y. Ho, Court Procedures § 5(e)
(permitting responses and replies, but “[n]o further briefing is permitted
without leave of Court”; further emphasizing that “[t]he Court disfavors
requests for further briefing”). It is therefore stricken.
In the remaining briefs, both sides focus on whether the original petition
affirmatively revealed Jimenez’s and Morales’s citizenships. 	As concluded
below, their Texas citizenship was clearly alleged. Nevertheless, the petition’s
silence about Minor Plaintiffs’ citizenship means that the pleading did not
trigger the deadline for removal. Removal was therefore timely.
A. 	Deadlines for removal
The timing of removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 	“In essence,
when read as a whole, § 1446(b) provides a two-step test for determining
whether a defendant timely removed a case.” 	Decatur Hosp. Auth. v. Aetna
Health, 	Inc., 	854 	F.3d 	292, 	297 	(5th 	Cir. 	2017) 	(quoting 	Chapman 	v.
Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Under 	Section 	1446(b)(1), 	a 	party 	must 	remove 	within 	30 	days 	of
receiving “the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
action or proceeding is based ….” 	28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). 	To trigger that
deadline, a pleading must “affirmatively reveal on its face” that the suit is
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removable. 	See Chapman, 969 F.2d at 163; see also Bosky v. Kroger Tex., LP,
288 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2002); J.R. Laughead, Inc. v. Air Dayco Corp.,
942 F. Supp. 	339, 	342 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	1996) 	(remanding 	because 	the 	petition
“affirmatively revealed that diversity existed”).
Alternatively, Section 1446(b)(3) states that “a notice of removal may be
filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant … of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained
that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
“[D]iscovery responses can constitute an ‘other paper’ under the removal
statute.” Jeanmarie v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 603 F. Supp. 3d 364, 371 (E.D.
La. 2022) (citing Cole ex rel. Ellis v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 416 F. App’x
437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011)). 	But that alternative deadline in Section 1446(b)(3)
applies only “[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.”
Bosky, 288 F.3d at 212.
B. 	The petition did not affirmatively reveal Minor Plaintiffs’
domiciles.
In their notice of removal, Removing Defendants invoked Morales’s and
Jiminez’s October 27, 2025 interrogatory responses detailing their Texas ties
as the trigger date for removal. 	Dkt. 1 at 3. 	Only after Plaintiffs moved to
remand did Removing Defendants suggest that they also lacked information
about Minor Plaintiffs’ citizenships. 	See Dkt. 9 at 2; see also Dkt. 18 at 5.
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Nevertheless, case law confirms that the petition omitted the necessary facts
regarding Minor Plaintiffs’ citizenship. 	Because this is an objective test,
Removing Defendants’ shifting justifications for the timing of removal do not
inform the analysis. The motion to remand should be denied.
Natural persons like Plaintiffs are citizens of the state where they are
domiciled. 	See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d
793, 798 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir.
1954)). 	“[T]he question of a person’s domicile is a matter of federal common
law.” Acridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc., 334 F.3d 444, 448
(5th Cir. 2003) (citing Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Generally, federal courts look to the domiciles of a minor’s parents to
determine the 	minor’s domicile. 	See 	Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (“Since most minors are legally incapable of
forming 	the 	requisite 	intent 	to 	establish 	a 	domicile, 	their 	domicile 	is
determined by that of their parents.”); Dunlap by Wells v. Buchanan, 741 F.2d
165, 167 (8th Cir. 1984). But whether that assumption applies depends on “the
realities 	of 	the 	minor’s 	actual 	situation.” 	See 	Rodriguez-Diaz 	v. 	Sierra-
Martinez, 853 F.2d 1027, 1033 (1st Cir. 1988); Clyde by Clyde v. Ludwig
Hardware 	Store, 	Inc., 	815 	F. 	Supp. 	688, 	691 	(S.D.N.Y. 	1993) 	(collecting
authorities).
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For instance, federal courts have pegged a minor’s domicile to that of
another adult who has care and custody over them, even if the minor’s parents
are alive. See Champagne v. Parrish, 2016 WL 7031331, at *3 (M.D. La. Nov.
7, 2016) (collecting authorities where the minor’s domicile was determined by
non-parents acting in loco parentis), adopted by 2016 WL 7031290 (M.D. La.
Nov. 30, 2016); Linville v. Price, 572 F. Supp. 345, 348 (S.D. W. Va. 1983)
(minor’s domicile was that of his aunt who acted in loco parentis); Elliott v.
Krear, 	466 	F. 	Supp. 	444, 	447 	(E.D. 	Va. 	1979) 	(minor 	domiciled 	where
grandparents lived because he was in their custody). 	As another example,
when minors attend school in a different state than where their parents are
domiciled, courts have considered whether their parents “continue in [their]
parental role in controlling and supporting” the student. See, e.g., Hill-Jackson
v. FAF, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1087 (S.D. Ind. 2011). 	And emancipated
minors may acquire a new domicile that is different from that of their parents.
See Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1945)
(collecting 	cases); 	Appelt 	v. 	Whitty, 	286 	F.2d 	135, 	137 	(7th 	Cir. 	1961).
Ultimately, “[c]ourts addressing the issue of determining a minor’s domicile
have looked at the facts surrounding the care and responsibility for the child.”
W.Z.L. ex rel. Randolph v. Keith, 2009 WL 1309772, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. May 7,
2009) (minor’s citizenship was that of his aunt or grandparents because his
parents were unable to care for him).
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Here, the original petition identifies Morales and Jimenez as “citizen[s]
and resident[s] of Harris County, Texas” and asserts that they have been
“citizen[s] and resident[s] of Harris County, Texas, at all times relevant to this
suit.” 	Dkt. 1-4 at 1 (emphasis added). 	Contrary to Removing Defendants’
position, 	the 	petition 	thus 	affirmatively—indeed, 	explicitly—reveals 	that
Morales and Jimenez are citizens of Texas. 	Cf. MidCap Media Fin., LLC v.
Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313-14 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding the
parties “failed to properly allege diversity of citizenship” because “they alleged
only that [plaintiff] was a California resident, not that he was a California
citizen”); Robinson v. Kmart Corp., 2011 WL 2790192, at *1 n.1, *3 (M.D. La.
Apr. 	28, 	2011) 	(“diversity 	of 	citizenship 	[was] 	satisfied” 	where 	plaintiffs
pleaded that they were “Louisiana citizens”), adopted by 2011 WL 2937952
(M.D. La. July 14, 2011).
The petition does not, however, make the same assertions for Minor
Plaintiffs. At most, it identifies them as the children of Jimenez and Morales.
Dkt. 1-4 at 3. But it does not disclose crucial facts concerning Minor Plaintiffs’
care, custody, or circumstances, like whether they live with their parents or
whether Jimenez, Morales, or both are their legal guardians.
Those omissions mean that the petition does not affirmatively reveal
Minor Plaintiffs’ citizenships, such that its service would trigger the 30-day
clock for removal. 	The removal deadline runs instead from the date when
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Removing Defendants received “other paper” making it “unequivocally clear
and certain” that the Minor Plaintiffs were diverse. 	See Bosky, 288 F.2d at
211. 	Because Removing Defendants did not receive such a paper before they
removed this case, the removal is timely.
To be sure, Removing Defendants did not indicate that uncertainty
regarding Minor Plaintiffs’ domiciles affected their removal timeline when
they removed the case. 3 	Rather, the notice of removal only claims that
discovery was needed to ascertain the parents’ citizenships. See Dkt. 1 at 2, 4.
But Fifth Circuit law makes clear that whether a pleading affirmatively
reveals that a suit can be removed is an objective standard that hinges solely
on 	allegations 	in 	the 	pleading 	itself. 	See 	Chapman, 	969 	F.2d 	162-163
(defendant’s actual knowledge that plaintiff sought damages exceeding the
jurisdictional minimum was irrelevant when the pleadings did not assert the
amount in controversy). 	That “bright line rule” exists to “promote[] certainty
and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular
defendant may or may not subjectively know.” Id. at 163.
The inquiry’s objective nature makes a defendant’s subjective knowledge
or belief irrelevant to the timeliness of removal. 	See Verdan Procurement &
Consulting, LLC v. Solugen, Inc., 2025 WL 712690, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5,
3 Indeed, the undersigned highlighted that omission when addressing the motion to
remand at the initial scheduling conference.
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2025) (applying Chapman; evidence that defendants had subjective knowledge
that the parties were diverse did not trigger the 30-day period because
“removability depends on the jurisdictional facts stated in the pleadings”);
Kinyon v. Bullock, 2009 WL 10736797, at *5 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2009) (petition
did not trigger the 30-day period because it alleged that co-defendant was a
Louisiana citizen, even though defendant knew that co-defendant was a Texas
citizen, 	and 	thus 	diverse). 	Moreover, 	“[a] 	defendant 	does 	not 	have 	an
obligation” to pursue discovery that ascertains the suit’s removability “if the
case is not clearly removable based on the plaintiff’s pleading.” 	Verdan, 2025
WL 712690, at *2 (rejecting critique that defendants were not diligent in
discovering plaintiff’s citizenship).
Those principles render it immaterial whether Removing Defendants
genuinely doubted that Minor Plaintiffs’ citizenship was diverse and whether
they diligently sought to resolve that ambiguity. 	The only thing that matters
is the original petition’s lack of affirmative allegations disclosing that Minor
Plaintiffs are, in fact, citizens of a different state than Defendants. 	That
omission warrants rejecting Plaintiffs’ contention that removal was untimely,
denying their motion to remand, and denying their interrelated request for
attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
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III. 	Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend is granted but does not
affect jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs also moved for leave to amend their complaint to add Fast Trac
as a defendant. Dkt. 23. The motion was filed before the deadline for doing so
expired. 	Dkt. 17 (March 23, 2026 deadline); Dkt. 23 (filed March 17, 2026).
Accordingly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) governs, which “declares that leave to
amend shall be freely given when justice so requires ….” Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (quotation omitted). Removing Defendants do not oppose
the request for leave. Dkt. 26 at 1. The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request.
The parties do, however, dispute whether Fast Trac’s addition will
destroy diversity. 	In their motion for leave to amend, Plaintiffs request that
the Court remand this action “if Fast Trac and Plaintiffs are not diverse.” See
Dkt. 23 at 5. Removing Defendants counter that Fast Trac is diverse and that
remand should be denied. See Dkt. 26 at 1.
To substantiate their position, Plaintiffs assert that Fast Trac’s principal
place of business is in Texas and its managing member, Bill Busbice, has a
Texas mailing address. Dkt. 23 at 2; Dkt. 23-2 at 2 (certificate of conversion),
4 	(certificate 	of 	formation), 	6-10 	(Texas 	franchise 	tax 	public 	information
report). From there, Plaintiffs conclude that Fast Trac is a Texas citizen. But
their evidence does not establish Fast Trac’s citizenship.
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Fast Trac is a limited liability company. 	“[T]he citizenship of a LLC is
determined by the citizenship of all of its members.” 	Harvey v. Grey Wolf
Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). So Fast Trac’s principal place
of business does not inform the analysis. See MidCap Media Fin., 929 F.3d at
314 (parties failed to allege diversity of citizenship where they alleged only that
an LLC was “organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas and
had its principal place of business” in Texas.); Villamil v. Fayrustin, 730 F.
Supp. 3d 328, 337-38 (W.D. Tex. 2024) (“Where an LLC maintains its principal
place of business” and “the state in which the LLC is organized” is “irrelevant”
to the citizenship inquiry.). 	Nor does Busbice’s Texas mailing address equate
to his state of citizenship. 	See Mitchell v. Keith, 2026 WL 879393, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 31, 2026) (defendant’s mailing address was “not enough” to establish
citizenship); see also Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. 137, 141 (1855) (“‘Citizenship’
and ‘residence’ are not synonymous terms.”).
By contrast, Removing Defendants submitted evidence refuting the
theory that Fast Trac is a Texas citizen. 	In a sworn declaration filed by Fast
Trac in a recent case, Busbice states that Fast Trac is wholly owned by Family
Faith Transportation, LLC which, in turn, is owned by The Bill and Beth
Busbice Family Limited Partnership. See Dkt. 26-1; see also Dkt. 26 at 2.
The declaration also traces the citizenship of that Limited Partnership,
which depends on that of each of its partners. 	See Harvey, 542 F.3d at 1079.
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According to the declaration, the Bill and Beth Busbice Family Limited
Partnership has a general partner, BBBus2, LLC. See Dkt. 26-1; see also Dkt.
26 at 2. 	BBBus2, LLC is wholly owned by Bill Busbice, who is a citizen of
Wyoming. Id. The Bill and Beth Busbice Family Limited Partnership also has
several limited partners: (1) BBBus, LLC, which is wholly owned by Beth and
Bill Busbice, both of whom are Wyoming citizens; (2) RBUS, LLC, which is
wholly owned by Ryan Busbice, a Louisiana citizen; (3) MBUS, LLC, wholly
owned by Matthew Busbice, a Louisiana citizen; and (4) SBUS, LLC, wholly
owned by Sarah Busbice, a California citizen. This declaration sworn to by Bill
Busbice himself is sufficient to show that Fast Trac is a citizen of Louisiana,
California, and Wyoming—not Texas. Dkt. 26 at 2.
Plaintiffs did not timely reply. 	And even their untimely submission
failed to controvert Busbice’s sworn declaration. 	At this juncture, there is no
indication that Fast Trac’s addition as a defendant would destroy diversity.
See Chambers v. Bielss, 2008 WL 5683483, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2008)
(denying 	remand 	absent 	evidence 	controverting 	defendant’s 	affidavit
regarding his citizenship); De La Fuente v. KinderCare Educ. LLC, 2023 WL
3794527, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 2023) (denying remand where removing
parties 	submitted 	an 	affidavit 	substantiating 	their 	diverse 	citizenship),
adopted by 2023 WL 3792666 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2023). 	Plaintiffs’ request to
remand this action based on Fast Trac’s citizenship should be denied.
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Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendants Braxton
Dumensil’s and BPD Transport, LLC’s motion for leave (Dkt. 21) to amend
their notice of removal be DENIED, and that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike
(Dkt. 20) the unauthorized amended notice of removal be GRANTED. 	The
amended notice of removal (Dkt. 18) is hereby STRICKEN.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ further request to strike (Dkt. 20)
Defendants’ “supplemental response” to the motion to remand be GRANTED.
That “supplemental response” (Dkt. 19) is hereby STRICKEN.
It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs Jessie Morales’s and Mayra
Jimenez’s, individually and a/n/f of V.P., X.M., and I.M., motion to remand and
interrelated request for attorneys’ fees (Dkt. 4) be DENIED.
It is also ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for leave (Dkt. 23) to file a
first 	amended 	complaint 	be 	GRANTED. 	Plaintiffs 	must 	file 	their 	first
amended complaint on the docket by May 14, 2026.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs’ interrelated request to
remand the case upon amending their complaint be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
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plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on May 7, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
______________________________________
Yvvvooon	nn	ne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-05311 Document 29 Filed 05/07/26 in TXSD Page 21 of 21