William v. Collins et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LA PRENDIA DANIELLE
WILLIAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICIA S. COLLINS, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:25-cv-5277
JUDGE DENA PALERMO’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1
This is a pro se case. ECF No. 11. Because Plaintiff failed to prosecute this
action and comply with the Court’s orders, the Court recommends that the case be
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit in state court against the Bureau of Engraving and Printing
and Patricia Collins. ECF No. 1-2. Defendants removed the case because the Bureau
of Engraving and Printing is an agency of the United States, and therefore, removal
is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). ECF No. 1. The Bureau filed a motion for
more definite statement, arguing that that Plaintiff’s handwritten complaint is
illegible and Plaintiff’s contact information in the complaint is incorrect. ECF No. 5.
The Court granted the motion for more definite statement and ordered Plaintiff to
1 The district judge to whom this case is assigned referred all pre-trial proceedings to the
undersigned. Referral Order, ECF No. 6.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 17, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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file a typed complaint by December 12, 2025. ECF No. 8. To date, Plaintiff has not
responded.
In the same order, the Court noted that the Bureau could not contact Plaintiff
with her provided information and so ordered Plaintiff to update her contact
information by December 12, 2025. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff has never communicated
with the Court. In that order, the Court warned Plaintiff that failure to file an
amended complaint or update her contact information may result in her case being
dismissed for want of prosecution. ECF No. 8.
II. 	PLAINTIFF’S LAWSUIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR WANT OF
PROSECUTION.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that if “the plaintiff fails to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Castillo v. Becka, No. 2:21-CV-00162,
2022 WL 5264612, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2022), adopted, No. 2:21-CV-00162,
2022 WL 5264650 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Pursuant
to this rule, the Court “has the inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for
failure to prosecute, with or without notice to the parties,” which flows from the
Court’s “inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the
disposition of pending cases.” Id. (quoting Clofer v. Perego, 106 F.3d 678, 679 (5th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962))). The
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decision to dismiss under Rule 41(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lancon v.
Stafflink, Inc., No. 	C.A. H-182051, 2019 WL 1046951, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5,
2019), adopted, No. CV H-18-2051, 2019 WL 1040980 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2019)
(citing Link, 370 U.S. at 633; Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.
1982)).
Generally, a dismissal for want of prosecution is without prejudice. Castillo,
2022 WL 5264612, at *3 (Ray v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:20-CV-129-DMB-RP,
2021 WL 1030987, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 2021)). “[A] dismissal with prejudice
for failure to prosecute is an extreme sanction which is to be used only when the
integrity of the judicial process is threatened by plaintiff’s conduct in such a way
that the court is left with no choice except to deny that plaintiff its benefits.” Id.
(citing Gist v. Lugo, 165 F.R.D. 474, 477 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citing McNeal v.
Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988))). Rule 41(b) dismissal is “an extreme
sanction” which requires: (1) a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by
Plaintiff; and (2) a finding that lesser sanctions would be, or proved to be, futile. See
id. (citing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992);
McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988)). Frequently, the Court
requires proof of at least one aggravating factor: (1) the delay is caused by the
Plaintiff and not Plaintiff’s attorney, (2) Defendants were actually prejudiced
because of the delay, or (3) the delay is intentional. Lancon, 2019 WL 1046951,
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at *2 (Papasan, 842 F.2d at 790; Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight Corp., 778 F.2d 1154,
1159 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Despite the Court’s order to do so, Plaintiff has not filed an amended
complaint or keep her contact information current on CM/ECF. Plaintiff’s failure to
communicate is not confined to correspondence with the Court, though—the Bureau
represented in its motion to stay motion that they were unable to discuss whether
Plaintiff opposed the motion because the phone number is an incorrect number and
the email address provided is illegible. ECF No. 3 at 3. Plaintiff has not had any
contact with the Court since this matter was removed on November 5, 2025.
These facts constitute a clear record of delay caused by Plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute this case. Castillo, 2022 WL 5264612, at *2 (“Dismissal is warranted,
because Plaintiff failed to update the Court regarding her search for new counsel,
failed without excuse to attend a scheduled hearing, failed to respond to Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, and failed otherwise to communicate with the Court.”) (citing
Gilmore v. Guild Mortg. Co., L.L.C., No. 1:21-CV-00621-MAC-ZJH, 2022 WL
2712385, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2022), adopted, No. 1:21-CV-00621, 2022 WL
2712382, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2022) (dismissal appropriate under Rule 41(b)
where the plaintiff failed to confer with the defendant and failed to respond to the
motion to dismiss); Douglas v. Zabransky, No. H-18-4168, 2019 WL 3628748, at *1
(S.D. Tex. July 18, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 3570451, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5,
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2019) (dismissal warranted where the plaintiff failed to comply with court orders,
failed to respond to the motion to dismiss, and did not appear at a scheduling
conference); Connely v. City of Pascagoula, No. 1:11-CV-293-HSO-JMR, 2013 WL
2182944, at *2 (S.D. Miss. May 20, 2013) (granting a motion to dismiss for want of
prosecution where the plaintiffs failed to take action in the case, contact the court,
and comply with court orders); Martin v. Gilbert, No. 1:12-CV-327-HSO-RHW,
2013 WL 4014990, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 2013) (same)).
Furthermore, the Court unsuccessfully admonished Plaintiff, a lesser sanction.
In the order discussed above, the Court warned Plaintiff that her failure to update her
contact information and file an amended complaint may result in the case being
dismissed for lack of prosecution. The Court is not convinced that monetary
sanctions would have any effect, considering Plaintiff’s pro se status. See Lancon,
2019 WL 1046951, at *3. The Court finds that sanctions other than dismissal would
be pointless, especially given the Court’s inability to correspond with Plaintiff due
to her failure to update her contact information. It appears that Plaintiff has
abandoned her suit.
The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed with prejudice.
There is a sufficient record to find the delay is the result of Plaintiff’s inactions. See
Lancon, 2019 WL 1046951, at *2. The two duties enumerated in the Court’s order:
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to update contact information and file an amended complaint fall on Plaintiff’s
shoulders as a pro se litigant. On this record, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.
Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing this case with prejudice, in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Castillo, 2022 WL
5264612, at *2.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court 	RECOMMENDS 	that this lawsuit be 	DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
The 	Parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review
of factual findings or legal conclusions, except for plain error. Ortiz v. San
Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on December 15, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
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Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
_______________________________
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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