Larkin v. Hudspeth et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
WARD SCHURMAN LARKIN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
HARRJS COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-05133
Pending before this Court is Defendants Harris County, Teneshia Hudspeth, in her official
capacity as the Harris County Clerk, and John Resat Karpiuk, in his official capacity as the Harris
County Precinct 0615 Election Center Judge, (collectively, the "Harris County Defendants")
Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 31) and Motion to Di smiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 36).
Plaintiff Ward Schurman Larkin ("Larkin") responded to these Motions. (Doc. Nos. 33, 40).
Pending also before this Court are also several pending motions filed by Larkin regarding the
claims against Defendant John Resat Karpiuk, in his individual capacity ("Karpiuk"). (Doc. Nos.
35, 38, 43 , 47, 48). The Court separately addresses the Motions filed by the Harris County
Defendants and the pending matters related to Karpiuk below.
I. 	Factual Background
This is a § 1983 case regarding the alleged failure to accept a United States Passport as
voter identification and the alleged failure to provide a provisional ballot. On November 7, 2023,
Larkin alleges that he attempted to vote at Precinct 0615 Election Center in Houston, Texas. (Doc.
No. 30 at 4). Larkin alleges that he presented his passport and his Harris County Voter Registration
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 19, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Certificate as proof of identity, but the election clerks "repeatedly told him that he was not
registered to vote." (Id.). After several attempts to explain that his passport was a valid form of
identification, the Presiding Election Judge, Defendant Karpiuk, told Larkin that he would not be
able to vote and "did not offer him a provisional ballot." (Id. at 5). After Larkin left the polling
location, he alleges that he "contacted the Harris County Clerk's Office, the Texas Secretary of
State, and his State Representative." (Id.). According to Larkin, the "Clerk's Office staff instructed
[him] to return later and assured him that his right to vote would be honored." (Id.).
Larkin alleges that he returned to the same polling location later that evening, but when he
arrived "Defendant Karpiuk immediately threatened [him] with arrest for trespassing if he did not
leave and forced [him] to exist the Election Center." (Id.). Larkin alleges that "[t]he Harris County
Clerk's Office contacted law enforcement regarding the incident," and an officer arrived at the
scene. (Id. at 6). Larkin alleges that he then went to a different polling location, and that "two
election clerks again refused to accept [his] United States Passport and demanded a Texas Driver
License." (Id.). Larkin alleges that he "was allowed to vote only after the Presiding Election Judge
personally intervened and overrode the clerks' refusal." (Id.).
On October 28 , 2025, Larkin filed claims against Harris County, Teneshia Hudspeth, in her
official capacity as the Harris County Clerk, and John Resat Karpiuk, both in his official capacity
as Harris County Election Center Judge and in his individual capacity. (Doc. No. 1, 30). Larkin
brought § 1983 claims against the Defendants for the alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments based on his inability to vote at the Precinct 0615 Election Center. For the claims
against the Harris County Defendants, Larkin requests "[d]eclaratory relief that Defendants'
policies, customs, and practices violated [his] 	constitutional rights" and "[i]njunctive relief
requiring adequate training, supervision, and enforcement of Photo ID [sic] and provisional-ballot
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procedures." (Doc. No. 30 at 12). For the claims against Karpiuk, in his individual capacity, Larkin
seeks compensatory damages "for emotional distress and constitutional injury" and punitive
damages "for willful and reckless misconduct." (Id.). The Court considers the claims below.
II. 	The Claims Against the Harris County Defendants
The Harris County Defendants, including Harris County, Teneshia Hedspeth, in her official
capacity as the Harris County Clerk, and John Resat Karpiuk, in his official capacity as Harris
County Election Center Judge, filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). 1 (Doc. No. 36). The Harris County Defendants argue, among other theories
that the Court need not address in this Order, that this case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)( 1)
because Larkin does not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. The Court agrees.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l). Federal courts are courts oflimitedjurisdiction
and must have statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a claim. Home Builders Ass 'n of
Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). A federal court has original
jurisdiction to hear a suit when it is asked to adjudicate a case or controversy that arises under
federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. U.S . CO NST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Whether a federal court
has jurisdiction must "be established as a threshold matter" and "is inflexible and without
exception." Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Steel Co . v. Citizens for a
Better Env 't, 523 U.S. 83 , 94-95 (1998)).
1 While the Motion to Dismiss is titled "Defendants Harris County and Harris County Clerk
Teneshia Hudspeth's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint," the Motion
clarifies that "[t]o the extent Plaintiff's claims against Karpiuk in his official capacity could be
treated as claims against the County, those claims should be dismissed for the same reasons." (Doc.
No. 36 at 6 n.1).
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Standing "is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 560 (1992). To establish Article III standing,
"a plaintiff must show: (i) that [he] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury
would likely be redressed by judicial relief." Trans Union LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 , 423
(2021) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). " As the party invoking federal jurisdiction," Larkin
"bear[s] the burden of demonstrating" standing to bring the claims alleged. Id. at 2207.
While the Harris County Defendants challenge all three requirements of Article III
standing, the Court focuses on the third element: redressability. Assuming, arguendo, that Larkin
has sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact and causation to satisfy the first two elements of Article III
standing, the Court notes that Larkin is only seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Harris County Defendants. Larkin bears the burden to show that this Court can redress such an
"injury" through his requested relief. 	Specifically, Larkin requests "[ d]eclaratory relief that
Defendants' policies, customs, and practices violated [his] constitutional rights" and " [i]njunctive
reliefrequiring adequate training, supervision, and enforcement of PhotoID [sic] and provisional-
ballot procedures." (Doc. No. 30 at 12). In Beaumont Chapter of NAACP v. Jefferson County,
Te xa s, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas addressed the requirements
to show redressability in a voting rights case in which the plaintiff only sought declaratory and
injunctive remedies:
Requests for injunctive and declaratory relief implicate the intersection of the
redressability and injury-in-fact requirements. Stringer v. Whitley, 942 F.3d 715 ,
720 	(5th 	Cir. 	2019). 	Because 	injunctive 	and 	declaratory 	relief "cannot
conceivably 	remedy 	any 	past 	wrong," 	plaintiffs 	seeking 	injunctive 	and
declaratory 	relief 	can 	satisfy 	the 	redressability 	requirement 	only 	by
demonstrating a continuing injury or threatened future injury. Id. (quoting
Steel C o. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 108 (1998)). That continuing
or threatened future injury, like all injuries supporting Article III standing, must be
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an injury in fact. Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158
(2014)). To be an injury in fact, a threatened future injury must be (1)
potentially suffered by the plaintiff, not someone else; 	(2) 	concrete and
particularized, not abstract; and (3) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Id. at 720- 21.
The purpose of the requirement that the injury be "imminent" is "to ensure that the
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes." Id. at 721 (quoting
Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA , 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). For a threatened
future injury to satisfy the imminence requirement, there must be at least a
"substantial risk" that the injury will occur. Id. (quoting Susan B. Anthony List,
573 U.S. at 158); see also Chang v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 2d 83 , 90 (D.D.C.
2010) ("[R]egardless of the existence of an unlawful policy, a plaintiff must show
that he is sufficiently likely to be personally subjected to the challenged conduct
again in order to have standing.") (emphasis added). In other words, "past wrongs"
do not "themselves amount" to the kind of "real and immediate threat" of future
injury "necessary to make out a case or controversy" for a claim seeking only
equitable relief. Mich. 	Welfare Rights Org. v. Trump , 600 F. Supp. 3d 85 , 108
(D.D.C. 2022).
685 F. Supp. 3d 414, 422-23 (E.D. Tex. 2023) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Accordingly, as
Larkin only seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from the Harris County Defendants, Larkin
bears the burden of demonstrating that there is a continuing or threatened future injury sufficient
to satisfy the redressability requirement. He fails to do so.
While Larkin does allege that the Harris County Defendants have certain unlawful policies
on voter identification requirements, Larkin still "must show that he is sufficiently likely to be
personally subjected to the challenged conduct again in order to have standing." Chang, 738 F.
Supp. 2d at 90 (relying on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S . 95 , 105 (1983)). Larkin argues
that there is a "real and immediate risk of recurrence" of the alleged constitutional violation
because "[o]n November 4, 2025, at a different Harris County Election Center, an election clerk
again refused to accept [his] United States Passport and requested a Texas Driver License. Another
clerk had to intervene before [he] was allowed to vote." (Doc. No. 30 at 6-7). He argues that
because the alleged violation has already once repeated, he has pleaded sufficient facts to establish
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redressability. That being said, even taking all well-pleaded allegations as true, as this Court must
at this stage of the litigation, Larkin still has not presented alleged sufficient facts to show that
there is a "substantial risk" that he will be "injured" in the imminent future. Clapper, 568 U.S. at
409. Indeed, "past wrongs" do not amount to the kind of "real and immediate threat" of future
injury "necessary to make out a case or controversy" for a claim seeking only equitable relief.
Mich. Welfare Rights Org. , 600 F. Supp. 3d at 108 . Such a claim that this "injury" will imminently
reoccur is precisely the type of hypothetical, conjectural injury contemplated by the United States
Supreme Court. Id. Phrased differently, in order to establish standing in this case, Larkin "would
have had not only to allege that he would" have had another similar encounter with clerks at an
election center in Harris County but "also to make the incredible assertion" that all election clerks
in Harris County always refuse to accept a passport as voter identification or that Harris County
has "ordered or authorized the clerks to act in such a manner." S ee Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 (holding
the same based on other facts). Larkin cannot make such a showing- 	especially when he was
eventually allowed to vote both times.
The Court finds that there is "not a sufficient likelihood" that Larkin "will be personally
subjected to" the alleged conduct "in future elections." Beaumont Chapter ofNAACP, 685 F. Supp.
3d at 425 . "Any such allegations are purely conjectural and hypothetical." Id. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Larkin lacks standing to bring the claims against the Harris County Defendants.
The claims against Harris County, Teneshia Hudspeth, in her official capacity, and John Resat
Kupiak, in his official capacity, are dismissed with prejudice.
III. 	The Claims Against Defendant John Resat Karpiuk in his Individual Capacity
Finding that Larkin lacks Article III standing to bring the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Harris County Defendants, the Court next turns to the claims against
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Karpiuk in his individual capacity. Karpiuk has not yet answered this lawsuit, but he has appeared
in these proceedings,pro se, and filed a request to stay all proceedings for thirty days to allow him
to obtain counsel. (Doc. No. 45). Larkin has filed several miscellaneous motions related to his
claims against Karpiuk. The Court briefly addresses these motions below.
Larkin filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary
Injunction 	against 	Karpiuk. 	(Doc. 	No. 	35). 	Larkin 	alleges 	that 	he 	received 	certain 	text
communications from Karpiuk related to this litigation, and he requests this Court to issue a no-
contact order between him and Karpiuk. (Id.) . Larkin bears the burden to show "(1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that
the injury outweighs any harm to the other part y, and (4) that granting the injunction will not
disserve the public interest." Brock Servs., L.L. C. v. Rogillio, 936 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2019).
The Court need not address each required element to find that the conclusory allegations (which
have little, if anything, to do with the underlying lawsuit) fail to satisfy that requirements that this
claim has a substantial likelihood of success of the merits or that there will be any injury- 	let alone
irreparable injury- 	to Larkin if this injunction is not granted. The Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Karpiuk (Doc. No. 35) is
DENIED without prejudice. 2
Larkin has also filed several motions related to effectuating service on Karpiuk, including
a Motion for Leave (Doc. No. 38), Motion for Entry of Default (Doc. No. 43), and Motion for
Leave to Amend Proof of Service (Doc. No. 47). Given that Karpiuk has now appeared in this
lawsuit by filing his request for a stay, the Court DENIES the Motion for Leave to Effect Service
2 The Court notes that Larkin is appearing prose and, to date, Karpiuk is appearing prose . As long
as that is the case, Larkin and Karpiuk must have some level of contact with each other. The Court
admonishes both individuals to maintain a respectful and proper tone in these communications.
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(Doc. No. 38) and Motion for Entry of Default (Doc. No. 43). The Court GRANTS Larkin's
Motion for Leave to File to Amend Proof of Service (Doc. No. 47). If Larkin believes that some
information on the Proof of Service is incorrect, he is free to file a Notice with the Court.
Although Karpiuk has appeared in the lawsuit, he has not yet answered the lawsuit.
Acknowledging that Karpiuk may have been under the impression that he was represented by
Harris County, the Court GRANTS his request for a brief stay on the case while he seeks to retain
legal counsel. (Doc. No. 44). The Court extends Karpiuk's deadline to answer this lawsuit under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until June 26, 2026. Karpiuk must answer the Second
Amended Complaint by this date regardless of whether he has hired an attorney or not. No other
filings in this case will be entertained by the Court until the deadline has passed. After June 26 ,
2026, the Court will proceed to consider any motion that is filed.
Lastly, Larkin has requested the Court for permission to register for CM/ECF electronic
filing. (Doc. No. 48). This request is GRANTED and will be addressed in a separate order.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Harris County Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. No. 31) is DENIED, Larkin's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 35) is
DENIED, the Harris County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 36) is GRANTED,
Larkin's Motion for Leave to Effect Service (Doc. No. 38) is DENIED, Larkin's Motion for Entry
of Default (Doc. No. 43) is DENIED, Larkin's Motion for Leave to Amend Proof of Service (Doc.
No. 47) is DENIED, and Larkin's Motion for Leave to Register for CM/ECF Electronic Filing
(Doc. No. 48) is GRANTED. Accordingly, the claims against Harris County, Teneshia Hudspeth,
in her official capacity, and John Resat Karpiuk, in his official capacity, are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The claims against John Resat Karpiuk, in his individual capacity, remain live. This
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case is stayed until June 26, 2026. No filings will be entertained by the Court until that deadline
has passed.
It is so ordered.
.-r"-
Signed on this the _ I _7 _ day of May 2026.
Andrew S. Hanen
United States District Judge
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