4:25-cv-04545•Gibbs v. Williams et al
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION BASIL CLARK GIBBS, ex rel. BASIL GIBBS, Plaintiff, § § § § § § § § § § § v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-4545 CATHERINE DIANN WILLIAMS, ET AL., Defendants. MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION Pending before the Court 1 is Defendants Denny’s Corporation and Denny’s Inc.’s (collectively, “Denny’s Entities”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15). Based on a review of the motion, arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Denny’s Entities’ Motion to Dismiss (id.) be GRANTED. I. Background2 This case arises out of a “domestic disturbance” that occurred at a Denny’s restaurant on September 23, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 17). Pro se Plaintiff Basil Clark Gibbs, ex rel. BASIL GIBBS (“Plaintiff”) alleges he entered the restaurant at approximately 1:26 p.m., seated himself, and waited 1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 31). 2 “When considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED July 27, 2026 Nathan Ochsner, Clerk Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 10
2 for waitstaff to take his food order. (Id. at ¶¶ 18–19). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Catherine Williams (“Williams”) initially brought Plaintiff a complimentary coffee. (Id. at ¶ 20). However, Plaintiff then alleges he was ignored for approximately two hours whenever he attempted to order food. (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges that a “crowd of people” entered the restaurant, and waitstaff told Plaintiff he had to leave. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff alleges he told the waitstaff that he believed he was being racially profiled. (Id. at ¶ 25). Waitstaff then allegedly threatened to call police. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges he waited for police to arrive so that he could give a statement as to the waitstaff’s racially discriminatory actions. (Id. at ¶ 26). A police officer allegedly arrived on the scene and took a statement from Williams, who believed Plaintiff was homeless. (Id. at ¶ 28). Plaintiff alleges the police officer provided Plaintiff with an information card and case number, which identified Plaintiff as “the offender.” (Id. at ¶ 32). Plaintiff then alleges he “left the scene without any other issues.” (Id. at ¶ 33). On September 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Denny’s Entities, Williams, and Does 1 through 10. (Id. at ¶ 1). The Complaint contains two causes of action against all Defendants: (1) “denial of right to contract” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and (2) denial of public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. (Id. at ¶¶ 35–67). On Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 10
3 November 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a supplement to his Complaint to add as defendants “Yasmin, Inc. doing business as Denny’s Number 7037” and “Abdul Amir Madani”. (ECF No. 11). On December 31, 2025, Denny’s Entities filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 15). II. Legal Standard Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2). Fintech Fund, FLP v. Horne, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1016 (S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Fintech Fund, F.L.P. v. Horne, 836 F. App’x 215 (5th Cir. 2020). When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the district court’s jurisdiction over the defendant by prima facie evidence. Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) L.L.C., 947 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020). The court determines whether plaintiff has met this prima facie burden by considering the allegations in the complaint as well as the contents of the record at the time of the motion. Id.; Fintech Fund, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1016. However, the court is not required to credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted. Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff meets the prima facie burden, the burden shifts to defendant to show that the assertion of jurisdiction would be unfair. Walk Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 10
4 Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2008). III. Discussion Denny’s Entities argue Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed because (1) it fails to state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) and (2) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Denny’s Entities. (ECF No. 15 at 6–13). The Court will address the personal jurisdiction argument first. See Robertson v. Grey Ventures, LLC, 802 F. Supp. 3d 972, 975 (N.D. Miss. 2025) (“In choosing to address the jurisdictional issues in this case first, this court is following well-settled precedent that courts should first consider whether they have jurisdiction over a case before considering its merits.”). a. Personal Jurisdiction “Personal jurisdiction in federal court is governed by the law of the state in which the federal court sits.” Bulkley v. Associates, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 1 F.4th 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2021). In Texas, courts employ a two-step inquiry to evaluate personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by “ensuring compliance with the state’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. Because the Texas long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of federal due process, the two-step inquiry “collapses into one federal due process analysis.” Id. Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 10
5 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) the defendant has “purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum by establishing ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state,” and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant aligns with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Int’l Shoe Co v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Both prongs of the due process test must be fulfilled for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The first prong of the due process analysis, referred to as the “minimum contacts” requirement, may be satisfied if either: (1) the controversy is “related to” or “arises out of” the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum (specific jurisdiction), or (2) the defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum (general jurisdiction). Alpine View, 205 F.3d at 215; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413– 17 (1984). Under the second prong of the due process analysis, the “fundamental fairness” requirement, a court considers several factors to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice. The factors to be examined include: (1) the burden on the Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 10
6 nonresident defendant to defend itself in the forum; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the states’ shared interest in furthering fundamental social policies. Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2006). i. Specific Jurisdiction A court may exercise specific jurisdiction when the “nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state arise from, or are directly related to, the cause of action.” Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams Cnty. Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1996). “Even a single contact can support specific jurisdiction if the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Litvinov v. Bowtech, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 3d 618, 622 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). “The non-resident’s ‘purposeful availment’ must be such that the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court’ in the forum state.” Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 10
7 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege the Denny’s Entities took any action in the underlying case. In fact, Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not even mention the Denny’s Entities. (See ECF No. 1 at 4–6). Instead, it appears Plaintiff is attempting to hold the Denny’s Entities liable “through the conduct” of Williams. (See id. at 7). Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no allegation that the Denny’s Entities are doing business in Texas or availing themselves of Texas laws. The Denny’s Entities argue as such in their Motion to Dismiss, stating that “Plaintiff’s claims stem from the alleged mistreatment by employees at the Katy Restaurant on a particular day” and that “[t]hose events have no causal or substantive connection to any purposeful conduct” by the Denny’s Entities in Texas.3 (ECF No. 15 at 11). The Court agrees. See Lane v. Baywood Hotels, Inc., No. 25-cv-103, 2025 WL 2419727, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2025) (“The Hotel employee’s alleged discriminatory conduct toward Lane is simply too attenuated from Hilton’s policies and its contractual relationship with the Hotel’s franchisee to confer personal jurisdiction.); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 369 (2021) (noting that while 3 In Lane v. Baywood Hotels, Inc., the court held that it lacked specific jurisdiction over the franchisor defendants because they neither owned nor operated the location at which the incident occurred, and the plaintiff in that case was not privy to the franchise agreement. See No. 25-cv-103, 2025 WL 2419727, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2025). Here, the Denny’s Entities does not own nor operate the franchise location where the alleged discrimination occurred, and Plaintiff has not alleged that he is privy to the franchise agreement. Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 10
8 entering into a franchise agreement with a forum-state resident may appear as purposeful direction of its activities to the forum, there must still be a connection between the defendant’s conduct, the forum state, and the claims at issue). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to present allegations sufficient to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the Denny’s Entities in Texas. ii. General Jurisdiction Courts may assert general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants and “hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.’” Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)). The “continuous and systematic contacts” test required for general jurisdiction requires extensive, substantial contacts. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). When a corporation is the defendant, the “paradigm forums” where it is essentially at home are the “corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017). In the “exceptional case,” general jurisdiction may be asserted over a corporation in a Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 8 of 10
9 forum different from where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, but only if its “operations in another forum [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that state.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Proving such an exceptional case is “incredibly difficult.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, Denny’s Corporation is incorporated in Delaware, Denny’s Inc. is incorporated in Florida, and both entities maintain their principal offices in South Carolina. (ECF No. 15 at 10). Needless to say, Texas is not a home forum for the Denny’s Entities. Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that the Denny’s Entities engage in operations in Texas, let alone operations that are so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in Texas. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to present allegations to support the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Defendants in Texas.4 IV. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS the Denny’s Entities’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s causes of actions against the Denny’s Entities be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction. 4 Because Plaintiff’s claims against the Denny’s Entities should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court need not reach the Denny’s Entities’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments. Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 9 of 10
10 The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. SIGNED in Houston, Texas on July 27, 2026. ______________________________ Richard W. Bennett United States Magistrate Judge Case 4:25-cv-04545 Document 40 Filed 07/27/26 in TXSD Page 10 of 10
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