Wheaton v. Spring Branch Independent School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Cayla Wheaton,
Plaintiff,
v.
Spring Independent School District,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-04335
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendant Spring Independent School District (the “District”) moved to
dismiss this employment suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 12. 	After
carefully reviewing the motion, Plaintiff Cayla Wheaton’s response, Dkt. 16,
the District’s reply, Dkt. 17, the pleadings, and the applicable law, it is
recommended that Wheaton’s claims be dismissed with prejudice.
Background
The following facts are taken as true. 	Wheaton is an African American
female. 	Dkt. 7 at 2. 	She has worked for the District since January 2016,
initially as a special education teacher, and later as a mental health behavior
specialist. Id. at 3.
On April 29, 2023, Wheaton filed a grievance with the District. Id. She
alleges that the grievance “oppos[ed] disability discrimination against her co-
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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worker Mayre Garcia” and reported non-ADA-compliant procedures. 	Id. 	But
the grievance itself largely complains of Wheaton’s personal conflicts with a
colleague (Tiffany Chaney), and with Wheaton’s supervisor (Crystal Collins),
who allegedly overlooked Wheaton and accused her of “creating cliques in the
workplace ....” See Dkt. 12 at 20-23. Its sole mention of Mayre Garcia accuses
Chaney of going to Garcia’s home and “reliev[ing] her of her duties without
informing” 	Wheaton, 	causing 	Garcia 	to 	“blame[]” 	their 	department 	and
“threaten[ ] to get an attorney.” Id. at 20.
Wheaton alleges the grievance triggered a series of retaliatory acts. She
applied for short term disability leave to undergo lipoma surgery. Dkt. 7 at 5.
But approval was delayed, which she maintains was retaliatory. 	See id.
Wheaton also pleaded that the retaliation affected her daughters. See id. at 4.
Wheaton filed a second grievance in May 2024. 	Id. at 5. 	According to
the complaint, the second grievance “object[ed] to the District’s failure to
implement” ADA-compliant “procedures for processing and accommodating
mental health disabilities” and reported retaliation by Collins. 	Id. 	But that
grievance actually discussed Wheaton’s ongoing conflict with Collins, largely
concerning 	an 	incident 	where 	Collins 	mocked 	Wheaton’s 	attire 	during 	a
presentation. 	See Dkt. 12 at 24, 26. 	The grievance also requested that
Wheaton’s Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) paperwork be signed so that
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she could take leave for surgery and complained that the FMLA evaluator
“called seeking information about [Wheaton’s] diagnoses.” See id. at 25, 27.
Wheaton took her leave and returned in August 2024. 	See Dkt. 7 at 6.
She met with the assistant superintendent of human resources, Tameka
McKeithan, “to follow up on” the two grievances. 	Id. 	In that meeting,
McKeithan told Wheaton that her grievances had been “leaked” to her co-
workers, 	which 	allegedly 	spawned 	more 	retaliation. 	Id. 	The 	District
investigated Wheaton’s grievances in October 2024, which included a meeting
between Wheaton and the District’s legal counsel. 	See id. at 6-7. 	Wheaton
then filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). Id. at 7.
After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Wheaton filed this suit, initially
claiming gender discrimination, hostile work environment, ADA violations,
and retaliation. 	Dkt. 1. 	But her subsequent amended complaint abandoned
all causes of action except for her ADA retaliation claim. Dkt. 7.
The District moved to dismiss the amended complaint suit under Rule
12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 12. 	Wheaton responded, Dkt. 16, and the District replied,
Dkt. 17. The motion is now ripe for resolution.
Legal Standard
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Analysis
Moving to dismiss, the District argues that (1) Wheaton failed to exhaust
claims predating January 24, 2024; (2) her grievances are not protected
activity under the ADA; and (3) she cannot recover punitive damages. Dkt. 12.
In response, Wheaton conceded that any retaliatory actions occurring prior to
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January 	24, 	2024 	“are 	not 	actionable” 	because 	of 	the 	ADA’s 	exhaustion
requirement. See Dkt. 16 at 1. And she admits that “punitive damages are not
available.” 	Id. at 2. 	But Wheaton maintains that she has sufficiently alleged
ADA-protected activity, as required to support a retaliation claim.
A prima facie retaliation claim requires “(1) engagement in an activity
protected by the ADA, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal
connection between the protected act and the adverse action.” Strife v. Aldine
Indep. Sch. Dist., 138 F.4th 237, 249 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Seaman v. CSPH,
Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1999)). 	The District contends that the
grievances identified in the complaint do not constitute “protected activity”
because they do not concern conduct that the ADA protects. See Dkt. 12 at 10-
14. 	The Court agrees. 	For the reasons below, Wheaton’s allegations are not
actionable under the ADA.
I. 	The grievances are properly considered at this stage.
A threshold question is whether this Court can consider certain key
documents attached to the District’s motion to dismiss. 	Those documents are
copies of Wheaton’s April 2023 and May 2024 workplace grievances that
underlie her retaliation claim. 	See Dkt. 12 at 18-23 (“2023 Grievance”), 24-28
(“2024 Grievance”). 	The District contends that both grievances should be
considered when determining if Wheaton has plausibly stated her claim. 	See
id. at 15 (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99
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(5th Cir. 2000); Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Wheaton disagrees, claiming that the exhibits should be disregarded. See Dkt.
16 at 3-5.
Generally, if “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 	Nevertheless, courts can
consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss if they are referenced in
the complaint and central to the plaintiff’s claim. 	See In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (considering contracts that
were not attached to, but were referenced in, the complaints). 	“Although the
Fifth Circuit has not articulated a test for determining when a document is
central to a plaintiff's claims, the case law suggests that documents are central
when they are necessary to establish an element of one of the plaintiff’s
claims.” Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 999 F. Supp. 2d 919, 926 (N.D. Tex.
2014) (quoting Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D.
Tex. 2011)).
Wheaton’s grievances meet that threshold. Her ADA claim hinges on the
grievances, asserting that the District retaliated against her for submitting
them. 	See, e.g., Dkt. 7 at 3 (alleging retaliation for 2023 Grievance), at 6
(asserting Wheaton felt threatened after co-workers learned of grievances); see
also Dkt. 16 at 6-8 (identifying the grievances and related investigations as the
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protected 	activities 	at 	issue). 	The 	grievances 	are 	thus 	indispensable 	to
whether 	she 	engaged 	in 	protected 	activity—an 	element 	of 	Wheaton’s
retaliation case. 	See Strife, 138 F.4th at 249. 	That makes the grievances
proper to consider at this stage. 	See Norman v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist.,
2025 WL 1179983, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2025) (Facebook post constituting
the alleged protected activity was “central” to retaliation claim), aff’d, 2026 WL
1180537 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2026); see also Hoyt v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 2021 WL
2823449, 	at 	*9 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	July 	6, 	2021) 	(written 	complaint 	about
discrimination was “central” to retaliation claim).
Instead, Wheaton contends that the District’s copies of the grievances
are “untrustworthy” and “dubious.” 	Dkt. 16 at 3, 9. 	A court can decline to
consider a document whose authenticity is disputed. 	Cf. Walch v. Adjutant
Gen.’s Dep’t of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering documents
when 	conducting 	12(b)(6) 	analysis 	because 	“[n]o 	party 	questions” 	their
authenticity); see Ryan, LLC v. Inspired Dev., LLC, 2013 WL 6159288, at *10
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) (collecting cases where only “undisputably authentic”
documents were considered on motions to dismiss). According to Wheaton, “at
least” the 2024 Grievance exhibit “is fraudulent” because page 28 of that
document “was never part of” her grievance. See id. at 3-4. That disputed page
appears to be a separate letter sent by Wheaton. 	Dkt. 12 at 28. 	But when
pressed on this issue at the initial conference, Wheaton’s counsel admitted
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that—aside from their mistaken inclusion of one extra page—the grievances
provided by the District are identical to the ones that Wheaton gave him.
The correspondence on the single, extra page (Dkt. 12 at 28) has no
bearing on the issues raised in the motion to dismiss. 	Because the other
portions of the documents are undisputedly authentic, they are properly
reviewed to determine whether Wheaton’s ADA claim survives dismissal.
II. 	Wheaton has not engaged in protected activity under the ADA.
Wheaton contends that she engaged in protected activity by (1) filing the
2023 Grievance, (2) filing the 2024 Grievance, (3) meeting with assistant
superintendent for human resources McKeithan about those grievances, and
(4) meeting with the District’s outside counsel regarding the investigation of
those grievances. 	See Dkt. 16 at 6-8 (citing Dkt. 7 at ¶¶ 14, 22, 25, 27-28).
While the District acknowledges that “[f]iling an employee grievance … can
constituted protected activity,” it argues that neither the 2023 nor 2024
Grievance qualifies as activity protected by the ADA. See Dkt. 12 at 10-14.
Engaging in protected activity under the ADA means “oppos[ing] any act
or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” Besser v. Tex. Gen. Land Off., 834 F.
App’x 876, 886 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting St. John v. Sirius Sols., LLLP, 299 F.
App’x 308, 309 	(5th Cir. 2008)); 42 	U.S.C. § 12203(a). 	“To satisfy this
requirement, [Wheaton] must show that [she] had a ‘reasonable belief that the
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices’ under the ADA.”
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Besser, 834 F. App’x at 886 (quoting DeBlanc v. St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd.,
640 F. App’x 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)). The ADA does “not protect
opposition to all forms of unscrupulous conduct.” 	Brown v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2010).
Wheaton 	pleaded 	that 	her 	2023 	Grievance 	“oppos[ed] 	disability
discrimination against her co-worker Mayre Garcia” by her supervisor Collins
and reported ADA compliance issues. Dkt. 7 at 3. And she describes the 2024
Grievance as “objecting to the District’s failure to implement procedures for
processing and accommodating mental health disabilities … and objecting to
the ongoing retaliation ….” 	Id. at 5. 	“While it is true that we must accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss,
‘[c]onclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted
as true, especially when such conclusions are contradicted by facts disclosed by
a document” that is appropriately considered at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Carter
v. Target Corp., 541 F. App’x 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Associated
Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting
plaintiff’s allegation that she filed an EEOC charge when the record showed
that no such charge existed).
Wheaton’s 	conclusory 	characterization 	of 	the 	grievances 	flatly
contradicts the grievances themselves. The 2023 Grievance describes a series
of conflicts between Wheaton, her colleague Chaney, and supervisor Collins—
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none of which have anything to do with disability discrimination. See Dkt. 12
at 18-23. For example, Wheaton complained that Collins twice overlooked her
for a promotion without suggesting that it was because of any disability. 	See
id. at 20. 	The lack of any connection to disability negates classifying it as
protected activity. See Gordon v. Acosta Sales & Mktg., Inc., 622 F. App’x 426,
431 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“[W]hen employees make complaints about
harassment without connecting the employment practices to their disabilities,
these complaints do not constitute protected activity.”).
Wheaton 	also 	pleaded 	that 	the 	2023 	Grievance 	reported 	disability
discrimination against Mayre Garcia. See Dkt. 7 at 3. But the grievance says
no 	such 	thing. 	It 	merely 	complains 	that 	Tiffany 	Chaney, 	a 	co-worker,
circumvented 	Wheaton 	by 	relieving 	Garcia 	of 	her 	duties 	without 	telling
Wheaton, causing Garcia to suffer “despair” and to threaten legal action. 	See
Dkt. 12 at 20. 	Those accusations cannot reasonably be construed as opposing
disability discrimination or reporting ADA violations.
Wheaton’s 	allegations 	about 	the 	2024 	Grievance 	likewise 	bear 	no
resemblance to the grievance itself. 	According to the complaint, the 2024
Grievance “object[ed] to the District’s failure to implement procedures for
processing and accommodating mental health disabilities.” 	Dkt. 7 at 5. 	Yet
the actual grievance complains that Collins had criticized Wheaton for conduct
unrelated 	to 	any 	disability, 	including 	for 	insufficient 	communication,
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unprofessional attire, and introducing a student intern to a school principal.
See 	Dkt. 	12 	at 	24-27. 	The 	grievance 	also 	states 	that 	Collins 	made
unsubstantiated accusations that Wheaton failed to work certain hours, failed
to respond to Wheaton’s request for certain training, and “overstepp[ed] into
[Wheaton’s] parenting” by complaining baselessly about Wheaton’s activities
at her daughter’s school. 	See id. 	Those disputes are unconnected to any
disability and are not ADA-protected activity. See Gordon, 622 F. App’x at 431.
In 	the 	same 	grievance, 	Wheaton 	also 	complained 	about 	delays 	in
processing her FMLA request and questions asked by an unnamed evaluator
about Wheaton’s diagnosis. See Dkt. 12 at 25, 27. That is not protected activity
either. See St. John, 299 F. App’x at 309 (complaints about disclosing medical
information 	were 	“not 	protected 	activity”); 	Simonton 	v. 	Hou. 	Methodist
Continuing Care Hosp., 2025 WL 1747023, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June 9, 2025)
(“Neither obtaining FMLA leave nor complaining about discrimination or
harassment regarding the FMLA is a protected activity under the ADA.”),
adopted by 2025 WL 1745129 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2025).
In 	response 	to 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	Wheaton 	merely 	cites 	the
allegations concerning her August and October 2024 meetings with human
resources and the District’s counsel. 	Dkt. 16 at 7-8 (citing Dkt. 7 ¶¶ 25, 27).
But those meetings were directly related to the 2023 and 2024 Grievances. See
Dkt. 7 at 6 (Wheaton met with HR “to follow up on her two outstanding
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grievances”), 	6-7 	(when 	“the 	District 	finally 	got 	around 	to 	investigating
[Wheaton’s] grievances” she met with its counsel “regarding [her] complaints”).
Because those grievances had no discernible link to any act or practice that the
ADA protects, meetings that addressed such non-protected activity could not
constitute protected activity either. 	Wheaton’s further, vague assertion that
she met with the District’s counsel “regarding [her] complaints about the
District’s past discrimination and inadequate procedures for processing and
accommodating mental health disabilities” is too conclusory to satisfy her
pleading burden.
Nor 	can 	the 	deficiencies 	in 	pleading 	be 	cured 	by 	discovery, 	which
Wheaton requests. 	See Dkt. 16 at 6, 9. 	As the District correctly observes, see
Dkt. 17 at 4, Wheaton has personal knowledge about the issues she raised with
the District. 	Thus, the vagueness of Wheaton’s allegations cannot mask the
lack of plausible basis for her ADA retaliation claim. 	This suit should be
dismissed with prejudice.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED 	that Defendant
Spring 	Independent 	School 	District’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	(Dkt. 	12) 	be
GRANTED, 	and 	that 	Plaintiff 	Cayla 	Wheaton’s 	claims 	be 	DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
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The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on June 23, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
______________________________________
Y	Y	Yvvvooon	nne Y. Hooo
United States Magistrate Judge
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