Jemi-Alade III v. Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TUNJI JEMI-ALADE III,
Plaintiff,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-03176
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Tunji Jemi-Alade III proceeds here pro se. He
filed this lawsuit, seeking judicial review of the decision by
the Administrative Law Judge that he wasn’t required to
reimburse the Social Security Administration for
purported overpayment of benefits. Dkt 8. The matter was
referred for disposition to Magistrate Judge Christina A.
Bryan. Dkt 5.
Plaintiff framed his complaint as a request for judicial
review. But he ultimately seeks a determination he isn’t
disabled, along with an order that the SSA provide him
documents allowing him to access a bank account in his
name. Dkt 8 at 4–5. Prior order dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt 14.
Final judgment entered on that basis. Dkt 15.
Pending is a motion by Plaintiff for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis and to seal the matter. Dkt 16. Judge
Bryan recommends that the motion to proceed IFP on
appeal should be denied because any appeal is “not taken
in good faith” in light of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the
SSA’s administrative process. Dkt 17 at 1–3, citing Federal
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 30, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). She also recommends
that the motion to seal should be denied because he
provides no basis for such request. Id at 4.
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
Plaintiff filed an “affidavit to proceed with finder of
facts.” Dkt 18. The assertions are quite muddled but will
be construed as objections to the M&R. Plaintiff takes issue
with the recommendation that he should be denied IFP
status because “the appeal is not taken in good faith” under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3). Id at 3–4. He
appears to argue that he should be given leave to proceed
on appeal IFP because he was granted IFP status at the
outset of this action. Ibid; see Dkt 1. He also requests that
the action be sealed. Id at 6–7.
Upon de novo review and determination, Plaintiff’s
objections wholly lack merit.
Rule 24(a)(4) allows a district court to deny a motion to
proceed IFP on appeal if “the appeal is not taken in good
faith.” See also 28 USC §1915(a)(3). And an appeal is taken
in good faith if a party seeks appellate review on a legal
point arguable on its merits such that it isn’t frivolous.
Howard v King, 707 F2d 215, 219–20 (5th Cir 1983). The
motion doesn’t at all address the basis on which this action
was dismissed, being Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the
SSA’s administrative processes as required to seek judicial
review of the SSA decision. See Dkt 13 at 4–5. Instead, the
one-paragraph motion raises “technical issues” irrelevant
to the dispositive exhaustion determination. See Dkt 16. As
such, the well-reasoned Memorandum and
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Recommendation correctly concluded that the motion fails
to identify any non-frivolous appellate issues that might
warrant IFP status on appeal. Dkt 17 at 3.
The objection regarding the motion to seal also fails to
articulate any coherent rationale for such relief. Nor do the
objections otherwise demonstrate any legal error on the
part of the Magistrate Judge.
The objections by Plaintiff to the Memorandum and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
Dkt 18.
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 17.
The motion by Plaintiff Jemi-Alade III to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED. Dkt 16.
The motion by Plaintiff Jemi-Alade III to proceed
under seal is DENIED. Dkt 16.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on _______________, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
July 30, 2026
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