Dzorvakpor v. Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Leslie Dzorvakpor, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action H-25-3054
§
Fujifilm North America Corporation, 	§
Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies 	§
Texas, LLC, 	§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the court is Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss. 	ECF No. 21. 	This 	case 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	the
undersigned magistrate judge for all pretrial purposes. ECF No. 3.
The court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED
and that this case be DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
1. Facts and Procedural Posture
Plaintiff Leslie Dzorvakpor brings this case under Title VII.
ECF 	No. 12 at 1 	His 	complaint 	is 	sparse 	on 	facts. 	The 	court
understands that Plaintiff worked for Defendants as an analytical
chemist in 2023 and 2024. Id. at 3. He alleges discrimination
based on race, sex, and national origin. Id. at 2. As adverse actions,
Plaintiff alleges failure to promote and termination. Id. Because
the court recommends dismissal of this case as time barred, it will
not discuss the facts of the case beyond the following timeline of
events:
• 	Plaintiff was terminated on May 16, 2024. Id. at 3.
By 	definition, 	any 	failure 	to 	promote 	must 	have
occurred 	before 	that 	date, 	while 	Plaintiff 	was
employed by Defendants.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 30, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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• 	Plaintiff filed his charge of discrimination with the
EEOC on March 21, 2025. Id. at 2.
• 	Plaintiff received his Notice of Right to Sue from the
EEOC on March 25, 2025. Id. The Notice of Right to
Sue states in bold letters that any lawsuit must be
filed within 90 days of receipt of the notice. Id. at 6.
• 	Plaintiff filed this action in federal court on June 27,
2025. ECF No. 1.
2. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court determines whether
the plaintiff’s complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable 	inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.3d 	576, 	580 	(5th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Ultimately, the “[f]actual allegations [in the complaint]
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
A 	statute 	of 	limitations 	may 	support 	dismissal 	under
Rule 12(b)(6) where it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that
the action is time barred, and the pleadings fail to raise a basis for
equitable tolling. Kirkland v. Big Lots Store, Inc., 547 F. App’x 570,
572 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Jones v. Alcoa Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366
(5th Cir. 2003)).
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3. Exhaustion and Filing Deadline Under Title VII
Aggrieved 	employees 	who 	seek 	to 	file 	a 	lawsuit 	under
Title VII must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). In Texas, the charge must be filed within
300 days 	of the alleged 	wrongful conduct. 	Weathers 	v. 	Hous.
Methodist Hosp., 116 F.4th 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2024). A claim is time
barred if it is not filed within the 300-day period. 	Kirkland,
547 F. App’x at 573. A claim is considered filed when the EEOC
receives it. Id. Generally, when an employment discrimination
charge is untimely filed with the EEOC, a suit based upon the
untimely charged should be dismissed. Id. The exception is when
the plaintiff can carry the burden of proof to show that there is
some basis to toll the deadline. Id.
After 	filing 	an 	EEOC 	charge, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	file 	suit
within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1). The ninety-day period is strictly construed, and if
a plaintiff files suit more than ninety days after receiving notice of
their right to sue, the court will dismiss the plaintiff’s action.
Washington v. City of Gulfport, 351 F. App’x 916, 918 (5th Cir.
2009).
4. Analysis
Plaintiff was terminated on May 16, 2024, and he filed his
EEOC charge on March 21, 2025—309 days later. The EEOC
charge was nine days late. Plaintiff admits he received the Notice
of Right to Sue letter on March 25, 2025, and he filed this lawsuit
on June 27, 2025—94 days later. This lawsuit was filed four days
late. Plaintiff’s claims are time barred.
Plaintiff has presented no facts to suggest that equitable
tolling should apply. Courts have allowed equitable tolling in the
context of Title VII claims when (1) a plaintiff timely files suit in
the wrong forum, (2) a plaintiff is unaware of the facts giving rise
to the suit because the defendant intentionally concealed them, or
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(3) the EEOC misleads a plaintiff about her rights. Granger v.
Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
list 	is 	not 	exhaustive). 	Equitable 	tolling 	should 	be 	applied
sparingly. Id.
In his one-page Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiff identifies no facts that would warrant tolling. There is
nothing to suggest he was unaware of his termination, or that he
mistakenly filed in the wrong forum. There is nothing to suggest
that the EEOC misled him about his rights. Plaintiff states only
that he “considers 	all 	arguments 	by 	the 	defendant regarding
timeliness to lack merit, as it undermines the severity of the
plaintiff’s cause.” ECF No. 23. He refers to his status as a pro se
litigant, but he does not say whether, or how, that status prevented
him from timely pursuing his right to sue under Title VII. Tolling
does not apply.
Because Plaintiff has admitted all the facts that require
dismissal of this case, because there is no suggestion that he has
additional relevant facts at his disposal, and because the court has
already allowed one amendment to his complaint, further leave to
amend would be futile and is denied.
5. Conclusion
Because 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	are 	time 	barred, 	the 	court
recommends that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, be
GRANTED. 	The 	court 	recommends 	that 	this 	case 	be
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Failure to timely file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
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conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th
Cir. 1988). The court's previous order barring filings without
permission does not apply to objections, which Plaintiff may file.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on March 30, 2025.
_____________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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