In re: MV/ MS Adalyn

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IN RE: MV/MS ADALYN
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-1984
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
In November 2023, the M/V MS ADALYN, a workboat carrying eight individuals and its
captain, ran aground and hit a steel pipe, injuring those on board. 	Those individuals sued the
petitioners, Hunter Marine Group, LLC and Michael Quain Neward Pittman, who seek relief under
the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. The question is whether the ADALYN is a “covered small
passenger vessel” excluded from the Act’s limitation of liability. 	Based on the pleadings, the
motion, the record, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the court concludes that the
ADALYN is a covered small passenger vessel. The claimants’ motions for summary judgment
and to lift the stay, (Docket Entry Nos. 25, 40), are granted. The petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment, (Docket Entry No. 45), is denied. 	The court separately enters a final judgment
dismissing the petition and lifting the stay. The reasons for these rulings are set out below.
I. 	Background
The petitioners, Hunter Marine Group, LLC and Michael Quain Neward Pittman, own the
ADALYN (Registration No. AL1279RA), a 38-foot aluminum-hulled commercial workboat
weighing less than 100 gross tons. 	Pittman is the bareboat owner and registered owner of the
vessel, and Hunter Marine is the bareboat charterer and owner pro hac vice of the vessel, all under
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 01, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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a Bareboat Charter Agreement between Pittman and Hunter Marine. (Docket Entry No. 1 ¶ 3).
Under the Charter Agreement, Hunter Marine was responsible for, among other things, manning,
providing equipment, maintenance, and repairs for the vessel, and operating the vessel. (Id. ¶ 4).
Hunter Marine and Encore Dredging Partners, LLC (d/b/a Inland Dredging Co., LLC)
entered into a Contractor Agreement under which Hunter Marine agreed to “provide equipment
and perform services” to meet Encore’s needs. (See Docket Entry No. 47 at 2). The “equipment”
consisted of the ADALYN, a commercial workboat, and the JOHN D, a tug. (Id.). The ADALYN
was available for Encore’s use 24/7. “Encore paid a flat rate of $2,000 per day, regardless of how
(or whether) the vessel was used,” in addition to fuel and charter hire, and regardless of the number
of trips made, who or what was carried, or how many tasks the vessel was used for each day. (Id.).
Hunter Marine provided the JOHN D to Encore on similar terms. (Id.).
In November 2024, Encore was performing maintenance dredging on the Alabama River
and using the vessels in that work. On November 3, the ADALYN began traveling from the M/V
DREDGE RANGER, which was working on the Alabama River near Monroeville, Alabama.
After leaving the M/V DREDGE RANGER’s location, the ADALYN proceeded north on the
Alabama River, toward a landing just north of the Highway 84 Bridge crossing. (Docket Entry
No. 1 ¶ 11). The ADALYN carried eight Encore employees. (Id. ¶ 12).
At approximately 18:30 local time, the ADALYN encountered an unexpected shoaling and
shallow water south of the Highway 84 Bridge, which caused the vessel to run aground. It hit a
stationary steel pipe. (Id. ¶ 13). 	The petitioners allege that under regular water conditions, the
steel pipe would have anchored a floating channel marker next to a wing dam. 	(Id.). 	The
petitioners allege that when the accident occurred, the channel marker was instead laying sideways
in the sand due to an apparent rapid drop in the water levels earlier in the day. (Id.). When the
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ADALYN hit the pipe, it came to an abrupt stop with enough force to damage its aluminum hull
plating, as well as some of its navigational equipment and electronics. (Id. ¶ 14). Employees of
Encore aboard the ADALYN reported injuries and were transported for local emergency medical
care. (Id. ¶ 15).
In December 2024, the Encore employees who had been on board the ADALYN when the
accident occurred—the claimants in this action—filed state-law personal injury actions in state
court against Hunter Marine and Encore. (See Docket Entry No. 40 at 2). In May 2025, Hunter
Marine and Pittman filed this action under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. (Docket Entry
No. 1). This court stayed the state-court proceedings. (Docket Entry Nos. 13, 18). The claimants
have filed a motion to lift the stay, which the petitioners oppose. (Docket Entry Nos. 16, 17, 22,
25, 29). After a scheduling conference, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and those
motions are ripe for review. (Docket Entry Nos. 40, 44, 47).
II. 	The Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). An issue of fact is genuine if a reasonable trier of fact could
return judgment for the non-moving party. 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). And a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law”
and is not “irrelevant or unnecessary.” Id. The court must construe all the evidence and draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). 	If the non-moving party
prevails as a matter of law after so construing the record, or if reasonable minds could differ on
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the import of the evidence presented, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment.
Sanchez v. Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020).
III. 	Analysis
Under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq., “a shipowner can limit
its liability for damages caused by an incident to the value of the vessel at the end of its voyage,
plus any pending freight as long as the shipowner had no privity or knowledge of any unseaworthy
condition or negligent act that was a proximate cause of the incident.” 	In re Graham Offshore
Tugs LLC, 752 F. Supp. 3d 619, 622 (E.D. Tex. 2024) (citing SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C. v. Aris
T M/V, 24 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2022)); see 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a)–(b). Under the Act, federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a shipowner is entitled to limited liability.
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443–45 (2001); In re N&W Marine Towing,
L.L.C., 31 F.4th 968, 971 (5th Cir. 2022).
The Limitation of Liability Act applies to “seagoing vessels and vessels used on lakes or
rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters,” but does not apply to
“covered small passenger vessels.” 46 U.S.C. § 30502(a)–(b). The Act defines a “covered small
passenger vessel” as “a small passenger vessel . . .that is” (i) “not a wing-in-ground craft; and” (ii)
“carrying” (I) “not more than 49 passengers on an overnight domestic voyage; and (II) not more
than 150 passengers on any voyage that is not an overnight domestic voyage.” Id. § 30501(1)(A).
The Act defines a “small passenger vessel,” as follows:
“small passenger vessel” means a wing-in-ground craft, regardless of tonnage,
carrying at least one passenger for hire, and a vessel of less than 100 gross tons as
measured under section 14502 of this title, or an alternate tonnage measured under
section 14302 of this title as prescribed by the Secretary under section 14104 of this
title—
(A) carrying more than 6 passengers, including at least one passenger for
hire;
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(B) that is chartered with the crew provided or specified by the owner or the
owner’s representative and carrying more than 6 passengers;
(C) that is chartered with no crew provided or specified by the owner or the
owner’s representative and carrying more than 12 passengers;
(D) that is a submersible vessel carrying at least one passenger for hire; or
(E) that is a ferry carrying more than 6 passengers.
Id. § 2101(47).
The Act does not limit the ADALYN’s liability if the vessel meets both statutory
definitions. The petitioners make two arguments for why the ADALYN does not do so. First, they
argue that “small passenger vessels” must be both “a wing-in-ground craft . . . and a vessel of less
than 100 gross tons.” (Docket Entry No. 45-1 at 11). Second, they argue that the claimants are
neither passengers nor passengers for hire, so the vessel does not satisfy § 2101(47)(A). 	(Id. at
19–22). The parties do not dispute that the ADALYN satisfies the other aspects of the statute’s
definition of “small passenger vehicle” and the additional requirements of a “covered small
passenger vehicle.”
The statutory definition of “small passenger vessels” is disjunctive, not conjunctive. The
Act’s definition does not cover only wing-in-ground crafts weighing less than 100 gross tons.
Although the definition uses “and” in between the wing-in-ground and 100-gross-tons criteria, the
statute places the article “a” before each vessel description and uses a comma to separate them.
This tells the reader that the operative verb in the definition, “means,” is distributive. A recent
Supreme Court case explains the concept:
[A]n introductory phrase (here, “does not have”) may apply to, or modify, several
terms coming after it, one by one by one. Suppose a person says after visiting a
bookstore, “I bought a novel, a memoir, and a travel guide.” That is just a more
efficient way of saying “I bought a novel, bought a memoir, and bought a travel
guide.” 	The verb in the sentence carries over—some grammarians use the term
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“distribut[es]”—to every item on the ensuing list. That practice is pervasive, indeed
inescapable, in every kind of speech and writing. 	Consider this, perhaps half-
remembered line from childhood: “On Saturday he ate through one piece of
chocolate cake, one ice-cream cone, one pickle, one slice of Swiss cheese, one slice
of salami, one lollipop, one piece of cherry pie, one sausage, one cupcake, and one
slice of watermelon.” The introductory words “ate through” apply independently
and equivalently to each of the ten foodstuffs that follow. Or if that example seems
too trifling, take a couple from the Constitution. Article III provides that “[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties.” That statement means—but says more
concisely—that the judicial power extends to cases arising under the Constitution;
extends to cases arising under federal law; and extends to cases arising under
treaties. . . . So again, the verb phrase operates on each term seriatim, not on the
combination of the three.
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 134–35 (2024) (internal citations omitted). Applying that
principle here, the statute is most sensibly read to define a “small passenger vessel” to “mean[] a
wing-in-ground craft, regardless of tonnage, carrying at least one passenger for hire” or to
“mean[] . . a vessel of less than 100 gross tons.” 46 U.S.C. § 2101(47).
Other courts have adopted this reading of the Act. See, e.g., In re Texas Petroleum Inv. Co.,
No. 23-cv-1931, 2024 WL 4107680, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2024); In re Freedom Marine Sales
LLC, No. 8:23-cv-2890, 2024 WL 2874817, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. In the Matter of Petition of Freedom Marine Sales LLC, No.
8:23-cv-2890, 2024 WL 4201970 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2024); In re Koch, No. 8:25-cv-300, 2025
WL 2774405, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:25-cv-
300, 2025 WL 2771064 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2025); In re John Cornell, 8:24-cv-900, 2025 WL
3192187, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2025).
There is no dispute that the ADALYN is a “vessel of less than 100 gross tons.” 	The
remaining question is whether the vessel satisfied § 2101(47)(A). It did. The ADALYN carried
“more than 6 passengers, including at least one passenger for hire.” 	A “passenger” is “an
individual carried on the vessel except . . . a member of the crew engaged in the business of the
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vessel who has not contributed consideration for carriage and who is paid for on board services.”
46 U.S.C. § 2101(29)(A)(iii). A “passenger for hire” is “a passenger for whom consideration is
contributed as a condition of carriage on the vessel, whether directly or indirectly flowing to the
owner, charterer, operator, agent, or any other person having an interest in the vessel.” 46 U.S.C.
§ 2101(30). Consideration is “an economic benefit . . . accruing to an individual, person, or entity,
but not including a voluntary sharing of the actual expenses of the voyage, by monetary
contribution or donation of fuel, food, beverage, or other supplies.” Id. § 2101(5).
Based on these definitions, the question is whether the claimants, directly or indirectly,
paid Hunter Marine to travel on the ADALYN. See Shawler v. Ergon Asphalt & Emulsions, Inc.,
No. 15-2599, 2016 WL 1019121, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2016) (holding that “‘small passenger
vessel’ status is determined by asking if any passenger, whether directly or indirectly, contributed
consideration as a condition of his or her carriage on the vessel”), aff’d sub nom. Shawler v. Big
Valley, L.L.C., 728 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2018). The parties do not dispute that Encore paid Hunter
Marine to use the ADALYN, including by having it carrying Encore employees. 	Without that
consideration, the claimants would not have been on the vessel when the accident occurred.
The petitioners offer several arguments in response, none persuasive. First, they argue that
the claimants did not contribute consideration for carriage on the vessel because Encore paid a flat,
daily rate for its usage that was invoiced regardless of whether or how many Encore employees
were carried. (Docket Entry No. 45-1 at 19–20). But the statute does not require that a passenger’s
consideration be marginal; it just requires that consideration—any consideration—be a condition
for carriage. 	To illustrate, consider a patron who buys a season pass to Disney World or a
basketball fan who purchases season tickets to the Houston Rockets. The individual does not have
to pay additional consideration for each entry to the theme park or the Toyota Center. But there is
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little question that the patron is able to visit Magic Kingdom or watch the Rockets only because
he or she delivered “an economic benefit” to the Walt Disney Corporation or the Rockets
organization. 	The flat, daily fee—“an economic benefit”—was a condition for the claimants’
carriage on the ADELYN, making them “passengers for hire.”
Second, the petitioners argue that the claimants are not passengers, but instead crew.
(Docket Entry No. 45-1 at 20–23). 	The parties marshal various facts and dispute whether the
claimants are in fact crew. But this dispute is immaterial. Under the statute, a crew member who
has “contributed consideration for carriage” is also a passenger. 	46 U.S.C. § 2101(29)(A)(iii)
(excepting from the definition of passenger “a member of the crew engaged in the business of the
vessel who has not contributed consideration for carriage and who is paid for on board services”).
Even if the claimants were “crew,” they would not satisfy the remainder of the exception precisely
because they are passengers for hire. 	Because the claimants indirectly paid consideration for
carriage aboard the ADALYN, they are “passengers for hire,” which means they are “passengers”
regardless of whether or not they are crew.
The conclusion is that at the time of the accident, the ADALYN was a “covered small
passenger vessel.” The Act’s limitation of liability does not apply.
As a final request, the petitioners argue that this court should not dismiss the case because
Rule F should apply, including the mechanism that aggregates each claim into a single forum.
(Docket Entry No. 45-1 at 23–25). 	The petitioners argue that because the Act does not except
“covered small passenger vessels” from § 30526(b), Rule F applies. 	See 46 U.S.C. § 30502(b)
(“This chapter (except for section 30526) shall not apply to covered small passenger vessels.”).
But the text does not support the petitioners’ argument, and the Act’s purpose does not conflict
with the statutory scheme. The petitioners offer no textual basis to apply Rule F and its concursus
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mechanism. 	Section 30526(b) limits vessel owners’ ability to shorten the time for claimants to
provide notice of their claims or file suit. 	See id. § 30526(b)(1)–(2). 	Congress chose to apply
these discrete restrictions, rather than Rule F, to “covered small passenger vessels.”
The choice against applying Rule F and its concursus mechanism is consistent with the
criteria for “covered small passenger vessels.” The Act states that “covered small passenger
vessels” carry “not more than 49 passengers on an overnight domestic voyage” and “not more than
150 passengers on any voyage that is not an overnight domestic voyage.” 	46 U.S.C. §
30501(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(II). The limit on the number of passengers is a limit on the number of plaintiffs
that an owner of a “covered small passenger vessel” may face in state court, without the application
of the Rule F procedures. 	The Act specifies whether and how to limit liability for owners of
“covered small passenger vessels.” On the facts presented in the record, the Act does not apply to
limit the ADALYN’s liability.
IV. 	Conclusion
The claimants’ motions for summary judgment and to lift the stay, (Docket Entry Nos. 25,
40), are granted. The petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 45), is denied.
An order dismissing the petition and lifting the stay is separately entered.
SIGNED on December 1, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
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Lee H. Rosenthal
Senior United States District Judge
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