Cardona v. Maritime Association - ILA Retirement Plan et al

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Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 39

United States District Court
Southem District of Texas

ENTERED
February 13, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION
§
Jesus Cardona, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§ Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01582
v. §
§
Maritime Association — I.LA. §
Retirement Plan, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
§

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a suit for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). Maritime Association — I.L.A. Retirement Plan (the
“Plan”), its Board of Trustees (the “Board”), its Administrator Linda Nowaski,
and its legal counsel Carolyn Wallace (collectively, “Defendants”), moved to
dismiss Plaintiff Jesus Cardona’s first amended complaint, Dkt. 12. Dkt. 14.
After carefully considering the motion, Cardona’s response, Dkt. 15, the
pleading, Cardona’s opening brief, Dkt. 30, and the applicable law, it is
recommended that the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 14) be granted.

Background

The relevant facts are drawn from the pleadings and the records of

related cases that are proper subjects of judicial notice. See Canada v. United

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States, 950 F.3d 299, 313 n.16 (5th Cir. 2020) (taking judicial notice “of the
record in prior related proceedings”); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (d) (authorizing
judicial 	notice 	“at 	any 	stage 	of 	the 	proceeding” 	of 	facts 	“not 	subject 	to
reasonable dispute” that are “readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned”).
Cardona is a Plan participant. Dkt. 12 at 1. On October 5, 2023, he and
his wife, Damary Carolina Torres Murillo, executed a written agreement
partitioning 	their 	community property under 	Section 	4.102 of 	the 	Texas
Family Code in which Cardona allocated 100% of his Plan benefits to Murillo.
See Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 2, Cause No. 125217, In re
Jesus Cardona and Damary Carolina Torres Murillo (461st Jud. Dist. Ct.,
Brazoria Cnty., Tex. Oct. 6, 2023) (“Petition,” attached in the Appendix).
The next day, Cardona and Murillo filed a petition for declaratory
judgment in the 461st Judicial District Court of Brazoria County. 	Id. 	The
Petition asked the state court to “recognize[]” that Cardona and Murillo
“entered into a binding and enforceable petition of community property in
accordance with the Texas Family Code” and Murillos’s right to receive 100%
of Cardona’s Plan benefits. Id. at 2-3.
It is undisputed that Cardona and Murillo had not legally separated, nor
had they filed for divorce, before seeking a declaration that the partition
agreement is enforceable. 	See id. at 1. 	Nor did the couple have any other
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ongoing or imminent legal dispute between them that prompted the filing. See
id.; see also Dkt. 15 at 2 (Cardona’s admission that “[b]oth spouses consented
to the QDRO. 	There was no dispute or challenge”). 	Nevertheless, the state
court issued an “Agreed Qualified Domestic Relations Order” (the “Order”) that
“assigns to [Murillo] One Hundred Percent (100%)” of Cardona’s “total vested
account balance in the Plan as of the Valuation Date,” i.e., the “date the
assigned amount is segregated by the Plan Administrator from” Cardona’s
account. See Dkt. 12 at 13-14 (PX-A).
Under 	the 	Order, 	Murillo’s 	interest 	“shall 	be 	payable 	as 	soon 	as
administratively feasible following the qualification of the Order.” 	Id. at 14.
The Order declares that it is “based upon a valid and enforceable written
Partition of Community Property executed by” Cardona and Murillo “pursuant
to Section 4.102 of the Texas Family Code,” which the court “hereby approve[s]
....” 	Id. at 13. 	The Order also declares that the issuing state court retains
“continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to Section 9.104
of the Texas Family Code to the extent necessary to render a domestic relations
order that is qualified” in the event the Plan Administer determines that the
Order is not qualified. Id. at 17.
Cardona submitted the Order to the Plan, requesting a distribution of
his account balance to Murillo. 	Id. at 2. 	Cardona alleges that the Order was
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materially identical to 29 other qualified domestic relations orders that were
previously submitted to and approved by the Plan. Id.
The Plan’s legal counsel (Wallace) sent a letter denying Cardona’s
request. 	Id. at 3, 18-19 (PX-B, October 1, 2024 denial letter). 	Citing In re
Banigan, 660 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, orig. proceeding), the letter
stated that the Plan would not honor the Order because there was “no
jurisdictional or legal basis” to enter it “in the absence of a bona fide domestic
relations dispute.” 	Id. at 19. 	The Plan therefore maintained that the Order
did not constitute a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) under Texas
law or ERISA. Id.
The Plan Administrator hewed to that position in an ensuing letter
denying Cardona’s claim for benefits. 	See id. at 21 (PX-C, January 7, 2025
letter). 	So did the Board of Trustees in its final claim determination. 	See id.
at 34-35. (PX-E, March 10, 2025 letter). 	The final letter also addressed
Cardona’s contention that the denial was inconsistent with the Plan’s approval
of “29 prior QDROs,” see id. at 33 (quotation omitted), explaining as follows:
When the Plan has reviewed purported QDROs and recognized
that they are not the product of a bona fide domestic relations
dispute 	and 	only 	supported 	by 	an 	agreed 	upon 	partition 	or
exchange agreement, it has refused to process the QDROs. If it is
the 	case 	that 	the 	Plan 	has 	inadvertently 	processed 	improper
QDROs in the past based on vague, incomplete, or misleading
information contained in those distribution submissions, this does
not support improper processing of your claim or other claims.
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Id. at 34.
On April 7, 2025, Cardona filed this suit, alleging that Defendants
(1) violated 	Section 	502(a)(1)(B) 	of 	ERISA, 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1132(a)(1)(B), 	by
treating his Order differently from other QDROs; (2) breached their fiduciary
duty as a result; (3) engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct; and (4) failed
to disclose plan documents related to the processing of the 29 other QDROs
that the Plan had approved. Dkt. 1 at 4-5. The factual allegations focus on the
Plan’s change of position on the validity of QDROs. 	See generally id. at 3-4.
After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, Cardona moved for leave to
amend, Dkt. 9, which the Court granted, Dkt. 11.
Cardona then filed a first amended complaint centering around the
theory that the Plan had improperly “bypassed” the Order’s explicit terms. See
generally Dkt. 12 at 3-4. His pleading carried forward the original four ERISA
claims but added a claim that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)
by failing to return to the state district court to seek clarification of the Order.
See Dkt. 12 at 5-8. 	Defendants moved to dismiss all five claims, Dkt. 14, and
Cardona responded, Dkt. 15 (filed June 20, 2025).
Five 	months 	later, 	Cardona 	filed 	a 	“supplemental 	memorandum”
opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 26. The Court struck the filing,
finding “no good cause for allowing yet more briefing on those issues five
months after all briefing has closed.” Dkt. 27. Two months after that, Cardona
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filed an opening brief that largely addressed the same issues that the parties
had already briefed in connection with the motion to dismiss his claims, but
also purported to raise new claims not included in his amended complaint. See
generally Dkt. 30.
Legal standard
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Analysis
Defendants contend that Cardona attempted to circumvent ERISA’s anti-
assignment restrictions by using a flawed family court order to manufacture a
benefits 	payout 	to 	his 	spouse, 	even 	though 	their 	marital 	status 	remains
unchanged. 	As explained below, Defendants are correct that the Order was
void because the state court lacked jurisdiction to enter it. Defendants did not
abuse their discretion in denying Cardona’s claim for benefits, nor has Cardona
stated any other valid claim under ERISA. This suit should be dismissed.
I. 	Cardona 	has 	not 	plausibly 	alleged 	that 	Defendants 	violated
ERISA by wrongfully denying benefits.
As his first claim (Count I), Cardona alleged that Defendants violated 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) by wrongfully denying benefits that should have been
paid to his spouse under the Order. 	Dkt. 12 at 5. 	Cardona also raised an
interrelated contention (under “Count III”), which he later explained is not a
“standalone” cause of action, but instead articulates the standard of review for
the denial of benefits in this case. 	See Dkt. 15 at 16. 	In particular, Cardona
alleges that Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously both by refusing to
recognize the Order despite honoring “29 prior materially identical QDROs”
and failing to seek clarification from the state court when determining the
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Order’s validity. See Dkt. 12 at 6-7. The second of those contentions dovetails
with 	Cardona’s 	Count 	V, 	which 	likewise 	posits 	that 	the 	Order 	required
Defendants to seek the state court’s input when determining if the Order was
valid. See id. at 8.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that they properly refused
to honor Cardona’s Order. 	According to Defendants, the Order was not a
qualified domestic relations order under ERISA because the issuing state court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter it. 	Dkt. 14 at 14-16. 	In addition,
Defendants maintain that the Order did not require them to seek the state
court’s 	input 	when 	determining 	whether 	the 	Order 	satisfied 	ERISA’s
requirements for qualified domestic relations orders. 	Dkt. 14 at 22-24. 	They
also assert that ERISA did not require the Plan to honor the Order just because
it may have mistakenly approved similar ones in the past. Id. at 18.
Cardona responds that his Order is a “valid court order entered under
the Texas Family Code and ERISA § 1056(d)(3),” and that Defendants acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to honor it. Dkt. 15 at 2, 16. Cardona
emphasizes that the same attorney who represented him and his wife in the
state-court proceeding “prepared 29 previously approved QDROs for this same
Plan,” which the Plan had accepted “without objection ....” 	Id. at 4. 	He also
contends that the Order itself “require[s] the Plan to return to [state] court if
any qualification issue arises ...” Id. at 9.
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A. 	Defendants’ interpretation of Plan terms is reviewed for
abuse 	of 	discretion, 	but 	their 	legal 	determinations 	are
reviewed de novo.
Section 	1132(a)(1)(B) allows a 	participant or 	beneficiary 	to sue 	“to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.” 	29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 	A denial of benefits challenged
under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is reviewed under a de novo standard “unless the benefit
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” 	Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Here, the Plan vests the Board
with such discretionary authority, allowing it to “make benefits eligibility
determinations” and to “interpret Plan rules, regulations, and provisions.” See
Dkt. 14-1 at 45. 	The Board also has discretion to delegate plan management
or administration responsibilities to other parties, see id. at 45, 47, and has
delegated such to Nowaski. Dkt. 14 at 7.
“When a plan gives such discretion, a district court will overrule the plan
administrator’s interpretation of 	plan 	terms 	only 	if 	the 	interpretation is
‘arbitrary and capricious.’” Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 563 (5th Cir.
1999) 	(citing 	Firestone 	Tire, 	489 	U.S. 	at 	115). 	An 	administrator’s
interpretation of a plan or determination of eligibility for benefits is arbitrary
and capricious only if it is “made without a rational connection between the
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known facts and the decision” or is not “supported by substantial evidence.”
Conn. Gen. Life. Ins. Co. v. Humble Surgical Hosp., LLC, 878 F.3d 478, 483
(5th Cir. 2017).
“However, the court affords no such deference to the Administrator’s
interpretation of controlling law and statutory interpretation.” Brown v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 2009 WL 3365911, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2009) (citing Penn v.
Howe-Baker Engineers, Inc., 898 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1990)), aff’d 647
F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2011). “The interpretation of ERISA itself must be made de
novo by the court.” Penn, 898 F.2d at 1100.
B. 	ERISA’s anti-alienation provision and its limited exception
for qualified domestic relations orders.
ERISA’s anti-alienation restrictions are central to this dispute. 	As a
starting 	point, 	ERISA 	generally 	prohibits 	the 	assignment 	of 	retirement
benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated”). 	This restriction
“bespeak[s] a pension law protective policy of special intensity: Retirement
funds shall remain inviolate until retirement.” 	Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833,
851 (1997) (quotation omitted).
Congress created an exception to the anti-alienation provision when
passing the Retirement Equity Act (REA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat.
1426, which sought to ensure that private retirement-income systems would
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provide fair treatment for women. 	See Boggs, 486 U.S. at 843. 	In particular,
ERISA’s prohibition on alienation and assignment of pension benefits does not
apply to an order determined to be a “qualified domestic relations order.” 	29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). 	And under ERISA, “[e]ach pension plan shall provide
for the payment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of
any qualified domestic relations order.” Id.
ERISA defines a “qualified domestic relations order” as an order that
“assigns to an alternate payee the right to … receive all or a portion of the
benefits 	payable 	with 	respect 	to 	a 	participant 	under 	a 	plan.” 	Id.
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(l). 	In turn, a “domestic relations order” is “any judgment,
decree, or order” which “relates to the provision of child support, alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other
dependent” and is made pursuant to a “State or Tribal domestic relations law.”
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii).
C. 	The Order is not a qualified domestic relations order under
ERISA.
Whether Defendants wrongfully denied benefits hinges on whether the
Order constitutes a valid qualified domestic relations order “made pursuant to
State ... law.” 	29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 	Because the Order is “a
separate judicially approved contract between [the plan participant and the
non 	participating 	spouse] 	which 	the 	Plan 	administrator 	has 	no 	special
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discretion 	to 	interpret,” 	Defendants’ 	determination 	regarding 	the 	Order’s
validity is a legal question reviewed de novo. See Matassarin, 174 F.3d at 563.
Like their denial letter, see Dkt. 12 at 19, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
relies 	on 	In re 	Banigan, 	660 	S.W.3d 	307 	(Tex. App.—Dallas 	2023, orig.
proceeding), to argue that the Order is void because the state court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to issue it. 	Id. at 14-15. 	In Banigan, a husband
and wife entered into a partition agreement dividing their community property
under section 4.102 of the Texas Family Code. 660 S.W.3d at 310. That same
day, the husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment in a Texas district
court, and that court issued a declaratory judgment holding that the partition
agreement 	was 	enforceable, 	valid, 	and 	binding. 	Id. 	In 	a 	later 	divorce
proceeding, 	the 	husband 	sought 	to 	enforce 	an 	arbitration 	clause 	in 	the
partition agreement. 	Id. at 311. 	The wife argued that the declaratory
judgment was void because there was no justiciable controversy when the court
issued it. Id. at 312. But the court presiding over the divorce proceeding issued
an order compelling arbitration, prompting the wife to seek mandamus relief.
See id. at 311-12.
Agreeing with the wife, the appellate court held in Banigan that the
declaratory judgment was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
there 	was 	no 	live 	controversy 	between 	the 	husband 	and 	wife 	when 	the
judgment was sought. 	Id. at 313. 	As the court explained, the Uniform
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Declaratory 	Judgments 	Act 	“does 	not 	give 	courts 	the 	power 	to 	rule 	on
hypothetical situations or determine questions that are not essential to the
decision of an actual controversy, even though the questions may require
adjudication in the future.” Id. Yet in that case, there was no indication that
the parties had “either a pending cause of action” between them “or a clear
indication of the extent of the parties’ differences such that a court may
presume one is imminent.” 	Id. at 314. 	To the contrary, when responding to
her husband’s petition for declaratory relief, the wife “confirmed the facts set
forth in the petition and consented to the entry of the orders declaring the
validity of the partition agreement.” 	Id. at 313. 	As a result, “the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction” to enter the order. Id.
Contrary to Cardona’s assertions, Banigan is on all fours with this case.
For instance, the record refutes Cardona’s contention that his Order is not a
declaratory judgment. Just like the spouses in Banigan, Cardona and his wife
had entered into a partition agreement under Section 4.102 of the Texas
Family Code. 	And just like what occurred in Banigan, Cardona and his wife
sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement is enforceable, invoking
Texas’s version of the Uniform Declaratorys Judgment Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code §§ 37.003-37.004, as a basis for jurisdiction. See Petition at 1. And
the Order itself plainly constitutes a declaratory judgment because it purports
to “create[]” and “recognize” Murillo’s right to receive Cardona’s Plan benefits
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pursuant to the couple’s partition agreement. 	See Halliburton Energy Servs.,
Inc. v. Axis Techs., LLC, 444 S.W.3d. 251, 262 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.)
(explaining that a declaratory judgment “determines the rights of the parties”).
Also just like Banigan, there was no live controversy when the petition
was filed or when the Order was entered. As Cardona admits, “[b]oth spouses
consented to the QDRO. There was no dispute or challenge.” Dkt. 15 at 2. He
and his wife were and have remained married, both before and after the Order
was entered. 	Dkt. 12 at 13-17. 	Because there was no justiciable controversy,
and as a matter of law, Defendants correctly concluded that the Order is void
for lack of jurisdiction.
Defendants are also correct that neither Texas law nor ERISA provided
the state court with an independent basis for jurisdiction to issue the Order.
See Dkt. 14 at 15-16. At most, Texas law authorizes married spouses to enter
into a partition agreement between themselves via a written agreement. 	See
Tex. Fam. Code § 4.102. But it does not give a court subject matter jurisdiction
“create” or “recognize” a partition agreement absent a live controversy. 	And
nothing in ERISA specifies that a state court has jurisdiction to enter such a
decree either.
At bottom, because Texas law confirms that the Order is void for lack of
jurisdiction, the Order was not “made pursuant to state domestic relations law”
and therefore does not satisfy ERISA’s statutory definition of a qualified
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domestic relations order. 	See 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 	So Cardona
cannot show that Defendants violated the Plan by refusing to honor the Order.
D. 	Defendants are not bound to the Order’s clause concerning
continuing jurisdiction.
The foregoing conclusion defeats Cardona’s allegation that Defendants
arbitrarily or capriciously “ignored” a “mandatory clause” in the Order that
required Defendants to return to the issuing state court for clarification of its
terms. 	Dkt. 12 at 6. 	Because the Order is void for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, none of its terms are enforceable.
Moreover, the undersigned agrees with Defendants that the Order does
not 	obligate 	the 	Plan 	to 	seek 	clarification 	from 	the 	state 	court 	when
determining the Order’s validity. 	See Dkt. 14 at 22-24, 26-27. 	The operative
language states that “[i]f the Plan Administrator determines that this Order is
not qualified,” the issuing court retains jurisdiction “over the parties … to the
extent necessary to render a domestic relations order that is qualified.” 	Dkt.
12 at 17 (emphasis added). The Plan Administrator is not one of “the parties”
referenced in the Order. Rather, the only “parties” to the Order were Cardona
and his wife. The Order does not impose any duties on Defendants, generally,
or the Plan in particular.
Cardona’s reliance on 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) is also inapt. 	That
provision only requires a plan administrator to “separately account for the
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amounts” that “would have been payable to the alternative payee” until it is
resolved whether an order is in fact a qualified domestic relations order.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H). 	Nothing in that provision requires Defendants to
ask the issuing state court whether the Order satisfies ERISA’s requirements.
Cardona’s contrary theory should be rejected.
E. 	Defendants did not arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to
honor Cardona’s Order.
As another theory, Cardona challenges Defendants’ denial of benefits
based on the Plan’s past acceptance of “materially identical” orders, asserting
that their changed position was arbitrary and capricious. 	Dkt. 12 at 6.
Defendants contend that Cardona’s disparate treatment theory is flawed,
including because it wrongly presupposes “that a plan can never course-correct
for past errors in adjudication of claims.” Dkt. 14 at 18.
When reviewing an administrator’s denial of benefits, courts generally
scrutinize whether the administrator’s interpretation of the plan is legally
correct and, if the answer is no, whether the administrator’s decision was an
abuse of discretion. Gosselink v. American Tel. & Tel., Inc., 272 F.3d 722, 726
(5th Cir. 2001). 	During the first of those two steps, the court considers
(1) whether the administrator has given the plan a uniform construction,
(2) whether its interpretation is consistent with a fair reading of the plan, and
(3) any unanticipated costs resulting from different interpretations of the plan.
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Wilbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted). Of those three considerations, the “most important factor” is whether
the administrator’s interpretation comports with a fair reading of the plan.
Gosselink, 272 F.3d at 727.
Here, the Plan contains an anti-alienation provision, providing that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided with respect to ‘qualified domestic relations
orders’” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), “no right[] or interest of any kind in
any 	benefit 	shall 	be 	transferable 	or 	assignable 	by 	any 	Member 	or 	any
beneficiary ….” 	Dkt. 14-1 at 52, § 15.2. 	This language tracks ERISA’s anti-
alienation mandate. 	See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). 	And as concluded above, Texas
authorities confirm that a state court lacks jurisdiction to issue a valid
domestic relations order declaring that a couple’s partition agreement is
enforcement when there is no live controversy between the spouses. See supra
Part I.C (discussing In re Banigan, 660 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023,
orig. proceeding)). 	That state law prohibition means that the Order on which
Cardona relies does not constitute a qualified domestic relations order under
ERISA or the Plan.
Defendants have therefore correctly construed Section 15.2 to prohibit
Cardona’s request to enforce the Order and distribute Plan benefits to wife.
Indeed, Defendants’ enforcement of the Plan’s anti-alienation provision in
conformity with ERISA is not only consistent with a fair reading of the Plan
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but compelled by federal law. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (“Each pension plan shall
provide 	that 	benefits 	provided 	under 	the 	plan 	may 	not 	be 	assigned 	or
alienated.”).
The Plan’s prior approval of similar orders does not alter this conclusion.
It is true that uniformity of interpretation is a relevant consideration. See, e.g.,
Pedersen, 742 F. Supp. 3d at 752-53 (determination that plan administrator
had changed how it interpreted a plan provision supported the conclusion that
the administrator’s interpretation was legally incorrect). 	But in this context,
construing the Plan to allow enforcement of domestic relations orders entered
without proper jurisdiction would violate ERISA’s anti-alienation provision.
The mere fact that Defendants mistakenly approved analogous orders until
realizing that participants like Cardona were gaming the system does not
foreclose them from enforcing the anti-alienation restriction now. 	There was
no abuse of discretion here.
II. 	Cardona fails to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
For 	his 	second 	claim 	(Count 	II), 	Cardona 	alleges 	that 	Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by disregarding the terms of his Order, failing
to consult with the issuing court, and denying Cardona’s claim after allegedly
approving 29 materially identical orders. Dkt. 12 at 5-6. Although his pleading
invokes Section 404 of ERISA, which defines the “prudent man standard of
care” applicable to fiduciaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1104, Cardona later clarified that
Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 18 of 39

19
he seeks equitable relief for this claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), see Dkt.
30 at 17. Moving to dismiss that claim, Defendants assert they committed no
breach of fiduciary duty because they acted properly when refusing to honor
the Order. See Dkt. 14 at 20-21.
Section 1132(a)(3) allows a participant to bring a civil action to “enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan,” and “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief … to redress such
violations” or “to enforce … the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). But
as 	concluded 	above, 	Cardona 	has 	not 	plausibly 	alleged 	that 	Defendants
violated ERISA or the Plan’s terms in any respect. 	As a result, his breach of
fiduciary duty claim should be dismissed.
III. 	Cardona has not 	stated a 	claim 	that Defendants 	wrongfully
failed to disclose documents.
As another claim (Count IV), Cardona alleges that Defendants failed to
disclose Plan documents in violation of Sections 1024(b)(4) and 1132(c)(1)(B).
Dkt 12 at 7. 	He asserts that, on January 24, 2025, he sent a formal written
request to the Plan Administrator requesting “comparative documentation
concerning the 29 previously approved QDROs, including any internal Plan
rules, procedures, or guidelines used to evaluate those submissions.” 	Id.
Defendants argue that the January 24, 2025 letter included no request for
documents, and that Cardona would not be entitled documents concerning
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20
other participants anyway. Dkt. 14 at 25. Cardona responds that his request
was “clear, specific, and made in good faith,” thereby triggering Defendants’
disclosure obligations. Dkt. 15 at 10.
Defendants are correct that Cardona’s letter contains no request that the
Plan Administrator provide him with documents. It only states: “I respectfully
request that the plan provide a direct and substantive explanation for the
discrepancy between the treatment of my QDRO and the 29 prior approvals.”
Dkt. 12 at 42. 	This cannot reasonably be read as a request that Cardona be
provided with specific documents, much less those that address the Plan’s
approval of other participants’ benefits requests.
Moreover, ERISA did not require Defendants to produce documents
about those other approvals even if Cardona had sought them. 	The provision
that Cardona cites requires the administrator to provide, upon written request,
a copy of the latest updated summary plan description, annual report, any
terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or
“other instruments under which the plan is established or operated.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(4). 	The “catch-all provision” referencing “other instruments” is
interpreted “narrowly so as to apply only to formal legal documents that govern
a plan.” 	Murphy v. Verizon Comm’ns, Inc., 587 F. App’x 140, 144 (5th Cir.
2014). It does not encompass documents addressing other participants’ claims.
Accordingly, Count IV should be dismissed.
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21
IV. 	The 	Court 	disregards 	new 	claims 	and 	new 	contentions 	in
Cardona’s latest brief.
Months after the motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Cardona filed an
opening brief regarding his claims for relief. 	See Dkt. 30. 	Much of the brief
attempts to raise new claims that Cardona failed to raise in his amended
complaint or makes new arguments about the administrative record. 	The
Court declines to consider any of those claims and contentions at this stage.
First, Cardona cannot use his brief to raise new claims that he failed to
properly plead, much less after the pending motion to dismiss was fully briefed.
Cf. Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“A claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in
response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.”);
iamond Beach Owners Assoc. v. Stuart Dean Co., 2018 WL 7291722, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 21, 2018) (“[I]t is wholly inappropriate to use a response to a motion
to dismiss to essentially raise a new claim for the first time.”), adopted by 2019
WL 245462 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2019). 	That principle forecloses Cardona’s
newfound theories that Defendants’ denial letter violated 29 U.S.C. § 1133 by
including inadequate information and that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(3) by failing to promptly process the Order. See Dkt. 30 at 9-10.
Second, 	Cardona 	attempts 	to 	raise 	new 	arguments 	about 	the
administrative record, see Dkt. 30 at 12-17, but those arguments have no
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22
bearing on whether his pleading states a cognizable claim. 	“[I]n deciding a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts must limit their inquiry to
the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or
incorporated in the complaint.” 	Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d
1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996). 	Cardona cannot rely on items found elsewhere to
avoid dismissal.
More fundamentally, complaints about alleged incompleteness of the
administrative record do not alter the result. 	Defendants’ letters—which
Cardona attached to his own pleading—confirm that they told him that the
Order lacked a “jurisdictional or legal basis” because there was no “bona fide
domestic relations dispute,” citing In re Banigan, 660 S.W.3d at 313. 	Dkt. 12
at 19 (October 1, 2024 letter); id. at 22 (January 7, 2025 letter); id. at 32 (March
10, 2025 final denial, incorporating prior letter). 	Defendants’ final letter also
explained why their refusal to honor the Order was not discriminatory, namely
that “inadvertently process[ing] improper QDROs in the past based on vague,
incomplete, 	or 	misleading 	information 	contained 	in 	those 	distribution
submissions ... does not support improper processing of [Cardona’s] claim or
other claims.” 	Id. at 34. 	Cardona cannot show that Defendants needed to
provide anything more when explaining why his claim was denied. 	And
because Defendants’ position was correct as a matter of law, Cardona cannot
obtain relief under any standard of review. His claims should be dismissed.
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23
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants’
motion to dismiss (Dkt. 14) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff Jesus Cardona’s
claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this opinion to Plaintiff,
by email and regular mail, to his record addresses.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on February 13, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Yvvvvoon	n	n	nne Y. Hoo
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 23 of 39

NO. __________
IN THE MATTER OF 	§ 	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
JESUS CARDONA AND 	§ 	______ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAMARY CAROLINA TORRES MURILLO §
§
PETITIONERS 	§ 	BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Jesus Cardona and Damary Carolina Torres Murillo, spouses, petition the Court for entry
of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order declaring the right of Petitioner, Damary Carolina Torres
Murillo, to receive the assignment of the retirement plan benefits held in the name of Petitioner,
Jesus Cardona. Petitioners would show the Court the following:
A. 	Jurisdiction
1. 	This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this Petition under TEX. CIV .
PRAC. & REM . CODE , §§37.003 –37.004; 26 U.S.C. §414(p) 1 and 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)2 .
B. 	Facts
2. 	Petitioners are spouses. They reside in Harris County, Texas.
3. 	Petitioner, Jesus Cardona, is an employee of Maritime Association in Pasadena,
Texas. Petitioner, Jesus Cardona, is a participant in the Maritime Association - I.L.A. Retirement
Plan (hereinafter, “the Plan”) sponsored by Maritime Association of Houston, Texas.
4. 	The retirement benefits payable to Petitioner, Jesus Cardona, under the Plan (the
“Plan Benefits”) are Petitioners’ community property.
5. 	The Administrator of the Plan is Maritime Association.

ͳ Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended)
ʹ Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (as amended)

Filed for Record
10/6/2023 9:34 AM
Cassandra C. Tigner, District Clerk
Brazoria County, Texas
125217-F
Jasmine Negrete, Deputy
125217-F
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Appendix A
Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 24 of 39

O RIGINAL P ETITION FOR D ECLARATORY J UDGMENT 	Page 2
6. 	On October 5, 2023, Petitioners executed a written Partition of Community Property
Agreement under the authority of Section 4.102 of the Texas Family Code in which they
partitioned 100% of the Plan Benefits to Petitioner, Damary Carolina Torres Murillo, as Damary
Carolina Torres Murillo’s sole and separate property. A copy of the Partition Agreement is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
C. 	Partition is Ineffective in the Absence of a QDRO
7. 	The Plan is regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended (“ERISA”), which prohibits the transfer or assignment of benefits held in employer
retirement plans except by issuance of a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”). 3, 4
D. 	Statutory Authority for Entry of QDRO
8. 	ERISA grants state courts the authority to assign retirement plan benefits by entry
of a QDRO. A QDRO is an order that is made pursuant to a state community property law relating
to the provision of marital property rights for the benefit of a spouse of a participant 5 and that
assigns to such spouse the right to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable to the participant.6
A QDRO can be entered as a stand–alone order in the absence of a divorce proceeding.7
E. 	Prayer
Accordingly, Petitioners, Jesus Cardona and Damary Carolina Torres Murillo, pray that
this Court enter a Qualified Domestic Relations Order recognizing that Petitioners have entered
into a binding and enforceable partition of community property in accordance with the Texas
Family Code and recognizing the right of Petitioner, Damary Carolina Torres Murillo, to receive

329 U.S.C. §514(a).
429 U.S.C. §1056(d)(1).
5 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); §§1144(a) and 1144(b)(7); 26 U.S.C. §414(p)(1)(B).
͸ 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)(3)(b)(i)(I)
7 https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_qdro.html; ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B); IRC § 414(p)(1); Advisory Opinion 90-46A

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O RIGINAL P ETITION FOR D ECLARATORY J UDGMENT 	Page 3
the assignment of 100% the Plan Benefits held in the name of Petitioner, Jesus Cardona, in the
Maritime Association - I.L.A. Retirement Plan.
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________
Henry J. Novak
11782 Jollyville Road, Suite 210
Austin, Texas 78759
henry@henrynovak.com
(512) 765-5450
(512) 577–5380 (cell)
(512) 532–6008 (Fax)
Attorney for Petitioners
State Bar No. 15120000
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EXHIBIT A
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Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 28 of 39

Partition of Community Property
(Texas Family Code, Section 4.102)

The parties to this Partition and Exchange Agreement are Jesus Cardona (“Jesus”) and
Damary Carolina Torres Murillo (“Damary”), of Harris County, Texas.

Stipulations

1. The Parties are entering into this agreement in accordance with article XVI, section
15, of the Texas Constitution, as amended, and relevant sections of the Texas Family Code, as
amended. Section 3.001 of the Texas Family Code defines a spouse’s separate property as the
property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage; the property acquired by the spouse
during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the
spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage. Section
3.002 of the Texas Family Code defines community property as the property, other than separate
property, acquired by either spouse during marriage. Texas law provides that income from separate

property during the marriage is community property. A partition and exchange agreement makes
what would otherwise be community property instead be separate property.

2. The parties acknowledge and agree that they are making and entering into this
agreement voluntarily for the purposes of providing for the financial and economic security of

their marriage.

3. The parties own as community property the benefits held in a retirement plan
sponsored by Jesus’s employer, Maritime Association and held in Jesus’s name, only (“Plan
Benefits”). The parties intend by this agreement to partition the Plan Benefits between themselves
so that following the execution of this agreement, the parties will hold and possess the Plan
Benefits as sole separate property as hereinafter provided.

Therefore, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements contained in this
Agreement, and in consideration of the parties’ desire to effectuate the intentions as hereinabove

set forth, the parties covenant, agree, and contract as follows:

Article 1
Statement of Facts

1.1 Community Property of Parties

Jesus and Damary own as community property the Plan Benefits presently held in Jesus's
Name in the Maritime Association - I.L.A. Retirement Plan sponsored by Jesus’s employer,
Maritime Association of Houston, Texas and more fully described in Exhibit A to this Agreement.

JC DT

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1.2 Partition Exclusive as to Article 1.1 Property

This Partition Agreement is exclusive as to the community property identified in Article
1.1. No other community property of the Parties is being partitioned under this Agreement and
prior to entering into this Agreement no other community property has been partitioned by the
Parties. Jesus represents and warrants to Damary that full and complete disclosure of the nature
and extent of the value of benefits held in Jesus’s name under the Maritime Association - I.L.A.
Retirement Plan had been made, including the information set forth in Exhibit A attached to this

agreement.
Article 2

Partition of Property
2.1 Property Partitioned to Damary

The Parties agree that Damary will own, possess, and enjoy as Damary’s sole and separate
estate, free from any claim of Jesus, one hundred percent (100%) of the Plan Benefits as of the
date of this Agreement (hereinafter, “Damary’s Separate Plan Benefits’).

Jesus hereby partitions to Damary all of Jesus’s community-property interest, in and to
Damary’s Separate Plan Benefits.

Jesus grants and confirms to Damary, and to Damary’s heirs or successors, that Jesus
hereby assigns and releases all right, title, and interest in and to any claims to Damary’s Separate

Plan Benefits, to have and to hold the same forever.

Did Future Plan Benefits

The Parties agree that the remaining balance of the Plan and all future contributions made
to it from and after the date of this agreement shall continue to be community property.

Article 3
Income or Property Derived from Separate Property

3.1 Income from Damary’s Separate Property

Jesus agrees that following execution of this Agreement (a) all income, changes, mutations,
and increases in kind or in value of Damary’s Separate Plan Benefits; (b) all property acquired by
the reinvestment of income from Damary’s Separate Plan Benefits; and (c) all earnings and income
arising from Damary’s Separate Plan Benefits will be Damary’s separate property, unless the
parties agree in writing to the contrary.

3.2 Waiver of Claims
Jesus acknowledges and agrees that Damary’s Separate Property will be free from all

claims of Jesus that may have accrued before the date of this agreement, as well as all claims that

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 2

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may arise following the execution of this agreement. Any money used for the benefit of Jesus will
be presumed to be a gift to Jesus, as contrasted with a payment for which reimbursement or
repayment is later expected, unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. This waiver applies
during the lifetime of both parties, as well as on the death of either or both parties. This waiver
extends to any rights, whether choate or inchoate, that may arise under the laws of Texas or any
other jurisdiction. Jesus further agrees that by signing this agreement to be estopped from making
any claim of any kind at any time to Damary’s separate property or Damary’s separate estate,
except as may expresely be provided for in this agreement.

Article 4
Management of Properties

4.1 Management of Properties

Each party has the full, free, and unrestricted right to manage the separate property over
which they have control under section 3.101 of the Texas Family Code or succeeding provisions
of similar import and nature, including without limitation the right to convey or encumber the
property; to dispose of it by sale, gift, or otherwise; and to deal with it without taking into
consideration any rights or interests of the other party. If the joinder of Jesus or Damary (“Joining
Party”) should be required by law in connection with the execution of any document by the other
party with respect to the separate property of the other party, on request and from time to time. the
Joining Party must execute all such documents necessary to affect the desires of the other party,

but without any personal liability of the Joining Party.

Article 5
Undisclosed Property

5.1 Remaining Community Property

All community property not listed in Article 2 and in Exhibit A continues to be owned by
the parties as equal cotenants with right of survivorship.

Article 6
Other Provisions

6.1 Entire Agreement

Each party has carefully read this agreement, including all schedules attached to it and
other documents to which it refers, and has executed it in reliance on the party’s own judgment.
This agreement expresses the entire agreement between the parties concerning the Plan Benefits.

6.2 Incorporation of Exhibit

Exhibit A referred to in this Agreement is incorporated into this Agreement as completely
as if they were copied verbatim in the body of it.

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 3

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6.3 Partial Invalidity

If any provision of this agreement is for any reason found to be unenforceable, all other
provisions nonetheless remain enforceable.

6.4 Enforceability

This agreement may be enforced by suit in law or equity by either of the parties or by their
heirs, executors, attorneys, or assigns. Each party agrees that, by signing this agreement and
accepting any benefit whatsoever under it, they are estopped and barred from making any claim of
any kind at any time to any separate property or the separate estate of the other party or to any
property described in this agreement as being the separate property of the other party. Each party
waives their right to make claims to any separate property of the other party or to any property
designated as belonging to the separate estate of the other party, whether the property is acquired
before or after this agreement is signed.

6.5 Successors

This agreement binds and inures to the benefit of the parties and their respective legatees,
devisees, heirs, executors, legal and personal representatives, assigns, transferees, and successors

in interest.
6.6 Amendment or Modification

This agreement may be waived, abandoned, modified, amended, discharged, or terminated
only by a written instrument signed by both parties that specifically identifies the waiver,
abandonment, modification, amendment, discharge, or termination.

6.7 Effective Date

This agreement takes effect when it is executed by both parties and will remain in effect
even when the parties’ marriage is dissolved by death or otherwise.

6.8 Execution of Documents

Each party agrees to cooperate fully with the other in performing all acts and in executing,
acknowledging, and delivering all instruments and documents required to accomplish the intent of
this agreement, including but not limited to deeds, assignments, and promissory notes. Each party
agrees to execute all documents required to accomplish the intent of this agreement within fourteen
days after the documents are presented to the party for execution.

6.9 Attorney’s Fees and Expenses for Enforcement
If either party defaults in performing any obligation under this agreement so that the other

party is required to engage the services of an attorney for enforcement or relief, or if either party

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 4

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brings an action or other proceeding to enforce this agreement or to enforce any judgment, decree,
or order made by a court in connection with this agreement, the defaulting party must pay all
reasonable attorney’s fees, expert’s fees, and other costs of the other party.

6.10 Waiver of Breach or Term

The waiver of any breach of any provision of this agreement does not waive any other
breach of that or any other provision. Waiver of any term of this agreement may be accomplished
only concerning future performance and only by a written instrument signed by both parties
expressly stating the provisions waived.

6.11 Titles and Captions

Article headings, titles, and captions contained in this agreement are merely for reference
and do not define, limit, extend, or describe the scope of this agreement or any provision.

6.12 Representation

The attorney representing the parties is Henry J. Novak, 11782 Jollyville Road, Suite 210,
Austin, Texas 78759. Both parties have received legal advice from Mr. Novak in connection with
this Partition Agreement and Mr. Novak has advised both parties of the advisability of their
retaining independent counsel to represent each of them in connection with this agreement.

Jesus acknowledges the opportunity to retain independent counsel to represent Jesus in
connection with this agreement and that Jesus has been encouraged by Damary and others to obtain
an attorney of Jesus’s choice to represent Jesus, but that Jesus has specifically declined to do so
and is relying on personal judgment in entering into this agreement. Notwithstanding the fact that
Jesus has been self-represented in this matter, Jesus reaffirms the warranties made in this
agreement and further represents and warrants that Jesus has the requisite knowledge, skill, and
training to fully understand the consequences of the execution of this agreement.

Damary acknowledges the opportunity to retain independent counsel to represent Damary
in connection with this agreement and that Damary has been encouraged by Jesus and others to
obtain an attorney of Damary’s choice to represent Damary, but that Damary has specifically
declined to do so and is relying on personal judgment in entering into this agreement.
Notwithstanding the fact that Damary has self-represented in this matter, Damary reaffirms the
warranties made in this agreement and further represents and warrants that Damary has the
requisite knowledge, skill, and training to fully understand the consequences of the execution of
this agreement.

6.13 Place of Performance and Governing Law

All rights, duties, and obligations under this agreement are payable and enforceable in
Harris County, Texas. This agreement must be construed, and its performance enforced, under

Texas law.

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 5

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6.14. Waiver of Disclosure of Financial Information.

This agreement is signed after execution of a Waiver of Disclosure of Financial
Information a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

Article 7
Representations and Warranties

WARNING

Each party to this agreement understands that by signing this document they are
permanently surrendering rights and claims they would otherwise have under Texas law and under

the law of other jurisdictions.
7.1 Representations and Warranties of Jesus Cardona
My name is Jesus Cardona. I represent and warrant that:
a. I have carefully read each page of this agreement and Exhibit A in their entirety.

b. I am fully and completely informed by my attorney about the law relating to the
subject matter of this agreement and about the spousal rights and liabilities of both parties.

&. I am entering into this agreement voluntarily.
d. I have given careful and mature thought to the making of this agreement.
e, I fully and completely understand each provision of this agreement, concerning

both the subject matter and the legal effect. I further acknowledge that this agreement was not
procured by fraud, duress, or overreaching.

f. I am not relying on any fiduciary obligations owed by one party to the other or on
any duty of disclosure founded on a confidential or other relationship between the parties.
Furthermore, I am not relying on any legal or accounting advice or representation of fact or law
provided by Damary or anyone acting on Damary’s behalf.

g. I fully understand that by signing this agreement I will be legally prevented from
making any claim of any kind at any time, including a divorce proceeding, to the separate property
of Damary herein provided for.

h. I fully understand that by executing this agreement I may be adversely affecting my
inheritance rights and property and that I am permanently surrendering rights to income and
property I would otherwise have under Texas law.

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 6

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1. I am executing this agreement with intent to be bound fully by all its terms.

Jesus Cardonf
7.2 Representations and Warranties of Damary Carolina Torres Murillo
My name is Damary Carolina Torres Murillo. I represent and warrant that:
a. I have carefully read each page of this agreement and Exhibit A in their entirety.

b. I am fully and completely informed by my attorney about the law relating to the
subject matter of this agreement and about the spousal rights and liabilities of both parties.

e. I am entering into this agreement voluntarily.
d. I have given careful and mature thought to the making of this agreement.
&. I fully and completely understand each provision of this agreement, concerning

both the subject matter and the legal effect. I further acknowledge that this agreement was not
procured by fraud, duress, or overreaching.

f. I am not relying on any fiduciary obligations owed by one party to the other or on
any duty of disclosure founded on a confidential or other relationship between the parties.
Furthermore, I am not relying on any legal or accounting advice or representation of fact or law
provided by Jesus or anyone acting on Jesus’s behalf.

g. I am executing this agreement with intent tg be boungfully by all its terms.

”

arolina Torres Murillo

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 7

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EXECUTED on the dates shown below.

STATE OF TEXAS

Lr LZ SP2

COUNTY OF WAS

This instrument was acknowledged before me on Obdbvec SS , 2023, by

Jesus Cardona.
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Notary Public, State-ofTexas

STATE OF TEXAS

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This instrument was acknowledged before me on Ockn\we ia S , 2023, by

Damary Carolina Torres Murillo.

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PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 8

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EXHIBIT A

(Name, sponsor, and plan administrator of Retirement Plan,
and Jesus Cardona’s benefits under the Plan, as of the date of the Partition Agreement)

Plan Name: Maritime Association - I.L.A. Retirement Plan

Plan Sponsor: Maritime Association
11550 Fuqua Street, Suite 425
Houston, Texas 77034
281-484-4343

QDRO Administrator: Carolyn Wallace
Maritime Association
11550 Fuqua Street, Suite 425
Houston, Texas 77034
281-484-4343

PARTITION AGREEMENT Page 9

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EXHIBIT B —
Waiver of Disclosure of Financial Information

This Waiver of Disclosure of Financial Information is made by Jesus Cardona and
Damary Carolina Torres Murillo (the “Parties”). The parties are now married and are executing
this waiver in accordance with the provisions of section 4.105 of the Texas Family Code in
connection with a Partition or Exchange Agreement between them of even date herewith.

1, Waiver of Disclosure by Jesus Cardona

I, Jesus Cardona acknowledge receiving a copy of the proposed partition or exchange
agreement. I have read it and fully understand it. I have been provided a fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property and financial obligations of Damary Carolina Torres Murillo. I
voluntarily waive any further disclosures regarding the property, including its value, and the
financial obligations of Damary Carolina Torres Murillo beyond the disclosures provided in the
proposed partition or exchange agreement. I acknowledge that I have been offered an
opportunity to further investigate the property, including its value, and the financial obligations
of Damary Carolina Torres Murillo. However, I waive the opportunity for further investigation.

2 Waiver of Disclosure by Damary Carolina Torres Murillo

I, Damary Carolina Torres Murillo acknowledge receiving a copy of the proposed
partition or exchange agreement. I have read it and fully understand it. I have been provided a
fair and reasonable disclosure of the property and financial obligations of Jesus Cardona. I
voluntarily waive any further disclosures regarding the property, including its value, and the
financial obligations of Jesus Cardona beyond the disclosures provided in the proposed partition
or exchange agreement. I acknowledge that I have been offered an opportunity to further
investigate the property, including its value, and the financial obligations of Jesus Cardona.
However, I waive the opportunity for further investigation.

3. Execution

The parties acknowledge executing this Waiver of Disclosure of Financial Information in
multiple originals on the dates and at the times of the acknowledgments. The parties further
acknowledge signing this Waiver of Disclosure of Financial Information before the execution of
the partition or exchange agreement.

Executed on Ocholbe 0S , 2023.

(
Vs
Dar

Jesus argona ary-Caroling. Torres Murillo

Copy from re:SearchTX

Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 38 of 39

STATE OF TEXAS

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COUNTY OF §
Oclolac

This instrument was acknowledged before me on a , 2023 by

Jesus Cardona.

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STATE OF TEXAS

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This instrument was acknowledged before me on Odie S , 2023 by

Damary Carolina Torres Murillo.

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Copy from re:SearchTX

Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Dinah LaFrey on behalf of Henry Novak
Bar No. 15120000
dinah@henrynovak.com
Envelope ID: 80321486
Filing Code Description: Original Petition (OCA)
Filing Description: Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment
Status as of 10/6/2023 9:46 AM CST
Associated Case Party: Jesus Cardona
Name
Dinah HaneyLaFrey
BarNumber 	Email
dinah@henrynovak.com
TimestampSubmitted
10/6/2023 9:34:45 AM
Status
SENT
Copy from re:SearchTX
Case 4:25-cv-01582 Document 31 Filed 02/13/26 in TXSD Page 39 of 39