Hoskins et al v. Plaza Place Owners Association, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Hlevictor 	A. 	Hoskins, 	Jr. 	and
Tracey R. Young,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Plaza 	Place 	Owners 	Association,
Inc. 	and 	Associa 	Principal
Management Group of Houston,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01107
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
This is disability discrimination and housing dispute. Three motions are
pending. 	Defendant Plaza Place Owners Association, Inc. (“Plaza Place”) and
Associa 	Principal 	Management 	Group 	of 	Houston 	(“Associa”) 	moved 	for
summary judgment against Plaintiff Hlevictor Hoskins, Jr. Dkt. 28. Plaintiffs
Hoskins and Tracey R. Young sought leave to amend their complaint. Dkt. 42.
And Defendants moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert Gerard J. Duhon. Dkt. 47.
After carefully considering the motions, the responses, Dkts. 34, 44, the
record, and the applicable law, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. 28) be granted. 	It is ordered that Plaintiffs’ motion
for leave to amend (Dkt. 42) is denied as to Hoskins but granted as to Young.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 04, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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It is also ordered that Defendants’ motion to exclude Duhon’s expert testimony
(Dkt. 47) is denied.
Background
Hoskins and Young live in a condominium complex managed by Plaza
Place, 	a 	homeowner’s 	association, 	and 	Associa, 	a 	property 	management
company. See Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 28 at 6. On August 9, 2024, Hoskins sued Plaza
Place in state court, claiming that Plaza Place was negligent and violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and unspecified “HUD” regulations.
See Amended Petition at 1-2, Hoskins v. Plaza Place Condominiums, No.
1232502 (Civil Ct. No. 2, Harris Cnty., Tex. December 19, 2024) (the “State
Court Suit”). 	Hoskins’s pleading alleged that Plaza Place failed to properly
maintain the foundation, causing interior damage; wrongfully denied his
requests 	for 	handicap 	parking 	to 	accommodate 	his 	documented 	“100%
disability status”; failed to accommodate or otherwise respond “to medical
necessity requests”; retaliated against and harassed him for making requests
for accommodation; and denied him equal access to the facilities. Id. at 1-2.
While the suit was pending, Hoskins and Young filed this parallel suit
in federal court against Plaza Place and Associa, alleging violations under the
ADA 	and 	the 	Fair 	Housing 	Act 	(“FHA”), 	and 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty,
negligence, and harassment and retaliation. 	See Dkt. 1 (filed March 4, 2025).
Their complaint asserts that Defendants wrongfully denied them accessible
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parking, required them to leash a service animal, failed to maintain common
areas or rectify security concerns, and negligently performed foundation work
that caused damage to their condominium unit. 	See Dkt. 1 at 3-6. 	Plaintiffs
further allege that Defendants “engaged in a pattern of harassment and
retaliation” to discourage them from pursuing their grievances. See id. at 6-7.
They seek damages, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and fees and costs.
See id. at 11-12.
In the State Court Suit, Hoskins filed a notice flagging his new federal
suit. 	Notice of Filing of Federal Action, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law No.
2, Harris Cnty., Tex. May 14, 2025) (“Notice”). 	Contemporaneously, Hoskins
filed a motion asking the state court to stay the proceedings in light of his
federal suit. See Motion to Stay Proceedings, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law
No. 2, Harris Cnty., Tex. May 14, 2025).
While the motion for stay was pending, Plaza Place filed a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment. Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary
Judgment, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law No. 2, Harris Cnty. Tex. May 21,
2025). 	Regarding Hoskins’s Texas state-law claims, the motion argued that
Hoskins had no evidence supporting any of the elements of his claims, whether
for failing to provide adequate security to prevent criminal conduct or for
negligently maintaining the property. 	Id. at 3-6. 	As for Hoskins’s claims
premised on federal law, Plaza Place argued that Hoskins had no evidence that
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it “owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation” that is “subject
to the ADA,” and that Hoskins “cannot produce any evidence” that Plaza Place
violated any specific “statute of HUD ....” 	Id. at 6. 	Hoskins did not file a
response to the motion.
On June 24, 2025, the state court signed an order that granted Plaza
Place’s summary-judgment motion, “DECREED that Plaintiff [Hoskins] take
nothing against” Plaza Place, and dismissed all his claims “with prejudice.”
Order Granting No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, State Court Suit
(Civ. Ct. at Law No. 2, Harris Cnty., Tex. June 24, 2025) (the “Final Order”).
Hoskins immediately filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court
had improperly granted summary judgment. See Motion for New Trial Based
on Legal Error, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law No. 2, Harris Cnty., Tex. June
24, 2025). The trial court did not issue an order resolving that motion.
A few months later, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in
federal 	court, 	arguing 	that 	the 	disposition 	of 	the 	State 	Court 	Suit 	bars
Hoskins’s parallel claims here. 	Dkt. 28 (raising res judicata). 	Hoskins
responded. Dkt. 34. Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their complaint,
Dkt. 42, which Defendants opposed, Dkt. 44.
On January 27, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to exclude Plaintiffs’
designated expert witness, Gerard J. Duhon, because Plaintiffs failed to supply
a written report by the January 20, 2026 deadline. Dkt. 47; see also Dkt. 36 at
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1 	(scheduling 	order). 	Later 	that 	day, 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	a 	supplemental
designation that includes Duhon’s expert report. 	Dkt. 48. Plaintiffs also
responded to the motion to exclude, arguing that the few days’ delay in
supplying the expert report was harmless. 	Dkt. 51 at 2. 	More recently, on
February 24, 2026, the parties submitted a joint letter concerning the same
issue and reprising the same contentions about the tardy expert report. 	All
motions (Dkts. 28, 42, 47) are ripe for review.
Analysis
As concluded below, Hoskins’s claims are barred by the state court’s
Final Order rejecting his parallel claims arising from the same transaction as
this federal suit and dismissing them with prejudice. 	Summary judgment is
therefore warranted for Defendants on those claims. 	And because Hoskins’s
claims are barred as a matter of law, his request for a continuance for more
discovery is denied, as is his request for leave to amend.
Plaintiff Young, however, is entitled to amend her pleading in minor
part, particularly because Defendants have not shown that the amendment
was unduly delayed, prejudicial, asserted in bad faith, or futile. The mere fact
that Young mistakenly represented that Defendants were unopposed to her
request to amend—an error she promptly rectified—does not warrant striking
or otherwise denying her motion for leave. Likewise, Young’s immediate steps
to provide a missing expert report mere days after the deadline expired, and
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on the same day that Defendants flagged her omission, does not justify striking
her expert. 	Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend is granted only
as to Young, and Defendants’ request to strike Young’s expert is denied.
I. 	Hoskins’s claims are barred by res judicata.
In 	their 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	Defendants 	contend 	that
Hoskins’s claims are barred by res judicata. Dkt. 28. They argue that the state
court has already entered a final judgment rejecting Hoskins’s substantially
similar claims in his first-filed suit. 	See Dkt. 28 at 2. 	Hoskins responds that
the state court’s judgment is not preclusive; in his view, that case was
dismissed for lack of standing, rather than on the merits. 	See Dkt. 34 at 4.
Hoskins also contends that “[t]he theft and security issues continued even
after” the resolution of his state action. See id. at 5.
As concluded below, all elements of res judicata are met. Defendants are
therefore entitled to summary judgment on Hoskins’s claims.
A. 	Legal standard for res judicata
The preclusive effect of a state court’s proceedings on a pending federal
action is determined by the law of the state where those proceedings occurred.
See Norris v. Hearst Tr., 500 F.3d 454, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Prod.
Supply Co. v. Fry Steel, Inc., 74 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1996)). “Under Texas law,
res judicata requires proof of three elements: ‘(1) a prior final judgment on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in
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privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were
raised or could have been raised in the first action.’” Cox v. Nueces Cnty., Tex.,
839 F.3d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,
919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)). 	Those elements, although “articulated in a
slightly different way,” are substantively identical to the federal standard.
See Matter of 3 Star Props., LLC, 6 F.4th 595, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2021).
B. 	The state court rendered a final judgment.
Defendants maintain that a final judgment was rendered in the state
action. Dkt. 28 at 5. They are correct.
On June 24, 2025, the state court signed an order granting Plaza Place’s
no-evidence motion for summary judgment and dismissed Hoskins’s claims
with prejudice. 	See Final Order, State Court Suit. 	That court is a court of
competent jurisdiction over Hoskins’s claims.
The Final Order also constitutes a final judgment for res judicata
purposes. 	Under Texas law, a judgment is final if it disposes of all claims by
and between all parties. 	See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195
(Tex. 2001). 	The Final Order meets that test by resolving all of Hoskins’s
claims. 	And although Hoskins filed a motion for new trial, that motion was
denied “by operation of law” on September 7, 2025, which is 75 days after the
Final Order was signed. 	See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c); Motion for New Trial
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Based on Legal Error, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law No. 2., Harris Cnty.,
Tex. June 24, 2025).
Nor would it matter if Hoskins had appealed the Final Order. 	Indeed,
“Texas law affords final judgments res judicata effect even during the pendency
of an appeal.” 	See Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC,
437 S.W.3d 507, 516 n.7 (Tex. 2014). 	Nevertheless, Hoskins’s deadline for
filing a notice of appeal expired on September 22, 2025. 	See Tex. R. App. P.
26.1(a) (providing 90 days after the judgment is signed, if a motion for new
trial is timely filed).
Hoskins 	does 	not 	dispute 	that 	the 	Final 	Order 	constitutes 	a 	final
judgment. 	Instead, he maintains that the Final Order is not preclusive
because his “case was dismissed for lack of standing, not on the merits.”
Dkt. 34 at 4. But Hoskins’s position cannot be squared with the Final Order’s
language, 	which 	states 	explicitly 	that 	his 	claims 	were 	dismissed 	with
prejudice. 	“A dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits” with
res judicata effect. 	Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 736 (5th Cir. 2017)
(citing Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991)). 	The Final Order
is preclusive.
C. 	The parties are identical or in privity.
Regarding the second element, Hoskins does not dispute that the parties
in the State Court Suit and here are identical or in privity. Quite the opposite,
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Hoskins told the state court that this “federal action involves the same parties”
as this suit. See Notice at 1. He was right.
Hoskins and Plaza Place are parties in both suits. 	While Associa was
not a named defendant in the state case, Defendants note that it “could have
easily [been] included” in that action as the property management company for
Plaza Place. See Dkt. 28 at 6. Associa is closely related enough to Plaza Place
to satisfy the privity test.
“A privy is one who is so connected in law with a party to the judgment
as to have such an identity of interests that the party to the judgment
represented the same legal right.” Phillips v. Allums, 882 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex.
App.—Houston 	[14th 	Dist.] 	1994, 	writ 	denied) 	(citing 	Benson 	v. 	Wanda
Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971)). “When the allegation is that
the parties were in a vicarious relationship … a judgment for the principal bars
a later suit against the agent.” Guardino v. Hart, 2023 WL 3818378, at *3 (5th
Cir. June 5, 2023) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ 	allegations 	reflect 	that 	Defendants 	have 	the 	requisite
vicarious relationship. The complaint asserts that Associa is “the management
company for the Plaza Place condominium complex and acts as an agent for”
Plaza Place with respect to the challenged conduct. 	Dkt. 1 at 2. 	Associa’s
interests were sufficiently represented in the State Court Suit such that the
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Final Order rejecting Hoskins’s claims against Plaza Place likewise precludes
his claims against Associa.
D. 	The same claims or causes of action were involved in both
suits.
For the last res judicata element, Defendants maintain that Hoskins’s
claims in this federal suit arise from the same transaction as those in his State
Court Suit. See Dkt. 28 at 7. The undersigned agrees.
To determine whether the same cause of action is involved, Texas has
adopted the transactional test. 	Garcia v. Shell Oil Co., 355 S.W.3d 768, 774
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing Barr v. Resol. Tr. Corp.,
837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992)). 	Under the transactional approach, a later
suit “will be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter of a previous suit
and which through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior
suit.” Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 631; see also Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 653.
When analyzing whether cases involve the same claims or causes of
action, courts “examine the factual bases, not the legal theories, presented in
the cases.” Samuel v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 434 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex.
App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). 	“The main concern is whether the
cases share the same nucleus of operative facts;” that is, “whether the facts
arose out of a single transaction,” including “whether the facts are related in
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time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether they form a convenient unit for
trial.” Id.
Hoskins’s state and federal cases share the same nucleus of operative
facts. They involve the same dispute between Hoskins and the condominium’s
management over accessible parking, his service animal, property damage and
safety issues, and harassment and retaliation for raising various complaints.
Those matters would form a convenient unit for trial.
Notably, Hoskins’s own description of how the two suits are related
underscores that they involve the same transaction. When notifying the state
court about his federal suit, Hoskins admitted that “[t]he federal action
involves … substantially the same subject matter as the [state court] case, but
includes additional federal claims ….” 	Notice at 1. 	Hoskins even touted the
overlap when moving to stay the State Court Suit until the federal case was
resolved. 	See Motion to Stay Proceedings, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law
No. 2, Harris Cnty., Tex. May 14, 2025).
In his summary judgment response, however, Hoskins argues that his
federal claims are not barred by res judicata because the “[t]he theft and
security issues” litigated in state court “continued even after that case.” 	See
Dkt. 34 at 5. But his allegations about theft and security issues were already
litigated in the state suit. 	See e.g., Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, 4-5, State Court Suit (Civ. Ct. at Law No. 2, Harris
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Cnty., Tex. May 21, 2025) (“Plaintiff cannot maintain any cause of action of
negligence related to the theft and break in ….”). 	Mere continuation of
Hoskin’s alleged harm and attendant damages does not alter the conclusion
that both suits arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. Wright v. United
States, 2016 WL 1070838, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2016); see also Payne v.
United States, 2016 WL 454899, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2016) (federal claims
were precluded by state suit because both cases stemmed from defendant’s
negligence in building plaintiffs’ homes, even though the alleged property
damage continued after the state court judgment).
In sum, this action alleges the same claims as those that Hoskins raised
or could have raised in his State Court Suit. 	Because the state court’s Final
Order 	is 	preclusive, 	this 	Court 	should 	grant 	summary 	judgment 	for
Defendants and dismiss Hoskins’s claims.
E. 	A continuance under Rule 56(d) is unwarranted.
Hoskins seeks alternative relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 	Dkt. 34 at
6. 	Under Rule 56(d), a court can defer or deny a summary judgment motion,
or allow additional time for discovery, if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts to justify its
opposition.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 	A party must “show (1) why he needs
additional discovery and (2) how that discovery will create a genuine issue of
material fact.” January v. City of Huntsville, 74 F.4th 646, 651 (5th Cir. 2023)
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(quoting Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 606 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Hoskins cannot satisfy that standard.
Hoskins maintains that Defendants have “critical evidence” that he
contends “is in Defendants’ exclusive possession,” including maintenance logs,
internal board communications, and security reports. 	See Dkt. 34 at 6. 	But
“[t]he res judicata effect of a previous judgment is, in fact, a question of law.”
Sapp v. Mem. Hermann Healthcare Sys., 406 F. App’x 866, 870 (5th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam). 	None of the additional evidence referenced by Hoskins would
alter the conclusion that his claims are barred as a matter of law. 	See id.
(affirming stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion for summary
judgment 	on 	res 	judicata 	grounds). 	Hoskins’s 	request 	for 	a 	Rule 	56(d)
continuance is denied.
II. 	Young, but not Hoskins, may file an amended complaint.
After the motion for summary judgment was filed, Plaintiffs moved for
leave to amend their complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Dkt. 42. Their
proposed pleading raises a new claim for Young, but no new claims by Hoskins.
Compare Dkt. 42-2 with Dkt. 1.
Generally, leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given “when justice
so requires.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 	This rule “evinces a bias in favor of
granting leave to amend.” 	Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987,
994 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	The 	relevant 	factors 	include
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“[(1)] whether 	permitting 	the 	pleading 	would 	cause 	undue 	delay 	in 	the
proceedings or undue prejudice to the nonmovant, [(2)] the movant is acting in
bad faith or with a dilatory motive, [(3)] the movant has previously failed to
cure deficiencies by prior pleadings, or [(4)] the proposed pleading is futile in
that it adds nothing of substance to the original allegations or is not germane
to the original cause of action.” 	Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 239 (5th Cir.
1983). 	Amendment would be futile if a proposed new claim or allegations
“could not survive a motion to dismiss.” 	Rio Grande Royalty Co. v. Energy
Transfer Partners, L.P., 620 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2010).
Regarding Hoskins, the proposed amended pleading reprises the same
claims that are precluded by the state court’s Final Order. See supra Part I.A-
D. 	As a result, Hoskins’s request for leave to amend is denied as futile. 	See
Reddick v. Medtronic, Inc., 2023 WL 5447272, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2023)
(per curiam) (affirming denial 	of leave to amend claims that were barred by
res judicata); John Gannon, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 2025 WL 1179874, at
*7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2025) (denying leave to amend similarly barred claims).
The analysis differs for Young. 	She seeks leave to file an amended
pleading that “clarifies” her FHA and ADA claims and raises a new unfair debt
collection 	claim 	under 	the 	Texas 	Finance 	Code 	§§ 	392.301(8)
and 	392.304(a)(19). 	See 	Dkt. 	42 	at 	1; 	Dkt. 	42-3 	(annotated 	proposed
amendment). 	For 	the 	latter 	claim, 	Young 	asserts 	that 	“Defendant”—
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presumably 	Plaza 	Place (rather 	than 	Associa)—wrongfully “assessed 	and
added approximately $10,000 in attorney’s fees to Plaintiff Young’s HOA
account for separate litigation in which she was not a party and before any
court order authorizing such fees.” Id. at 8.
Young maintains that amendment will not result in prejudice or undue
delay and is neither in bad faith nor futile. 	Dkt. 42 at 2. 	She contends that
“[n]o deadlines will be impacted.” Id. at 1. Nor does she request that discovery
be extended.
Defendants do not claim that any of the Rule 15 factors—i.e., undue
prejudice, delay, bad faith, or futility—counsels against Young’s proposed
amendment. Rather, their sole objection concerns an inaccurate statement in
Plaintiffs’ original certificate of conference indicating that Defendants were
unopposed to the amendment. 	Dkt. 44. 	On this basis alone, Defendants
contend that leave should be denied. Id. at 4. But Young immediately rectified
this error in a “notice of clarification” filed that same day. Dkt. 45. The notice
explained that Young misunderstood Defendants’ position on the requested
relief when filing the motion for leave. 	See id. 	That miscommunication does
not merit denying or striking Young’s motion for leave to amend. 	Her motion
for leave to amend is granted.
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III. 	Young’s extremely short delay providing an expert report does
not justify excluding her expert witness.
On January 20, 2026, Young designated Gerard J. Duhon as an expert
to testify regarding the inspection and evaluation of their condominium unit. 1
Dkt. 46. 	One week later, Defendants moved to exclude Duhon’s testimony
because Young failed to provide an accompanying expert report. Dkt. 47; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Defendants complained that this failure left them with
“no information to determine Duhon’s qualifications” as an expert. 	See id. at
3 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702). Their motion to exclude is denied.
As an initial matter, the motion does not include the required certificate
of conference. 	See Judge Ho’s Procedures § 5(d)(5)(i). 	This deficiency alone
would merit striking it. 2 	Id. § 5(d)(5)(iv) (“A filing that does not include all
required certificates will be stricken.”).
But Defendants’ motion to exclude is also a discovery motion that was
filed in violation of this Court’s pre-motion conference requirement. See Judge
Ho’s Procedures § 5(b) (requiring parties to submit “a joint letter … identifying
the disputes and issues to be addressed”). 	Defendants’ counsel was clearly
1 Although Plaintiffs jointly submitted the filings addressed in this section, only
Young’s claims should survive summary judgment. The following analysis therefore
limits its discussion to Young’s actions.
2 In fact, this is not the first time that Defendants have violated this Court’s
procedures. 	See 	Dkt. 	27 	(order 	striking 	non-compliant 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment); Dkt. 50 (order striking non-compliant discovery motion).
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aware of this rule, as they sent a joint letter on February 24, 2026 and
acknowledged that this letter was “required by Judge Ho’s Rule 5(b).” See Joint
Letter. 	But filing a pre-motion letter nearly a month after improperly filing
the motion itself does not make the motion any less improper.
The 	prematurity 	of 	Defendants’ 	motion 	is 	highlighted 	by 	Young’s
immediate steps to rectify her omission once alerted to it. 	The very day that
Defendants (improperly) filed their motion, Young filed a “supplement” to her
expert designation that includes a written expert report. 	Dkt. 	48. 	This
situation illustrates why the undersigned’s rules mandate that parties fully
confer and participate in pre-motion conferences. Filing motions—particularly
discovery motions—without first conferring with the opposing party wastes
time and slows the judicial process.
In their subsequent letter, Defendants maintain that the Court should
exclude Duhon’s testimony as untimely because the expert report was provided
seven days late. 	See Joint letter; Dkt. 36 (January 20, 2026 expert deadline).
Rule 26 requires a party to disclose “the identity of any witness it may use at
trial to present” expert testimony. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). A party’s expert
“disclosure must be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by
the witness ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). These materials must be disclosed
by the court-ordered deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D).
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Duhon’s expert report, which Young submitted in a “supplement” to her
previous 	expert 	designation, 	was 	untimely. 	The 	rule 	governing
supplementation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(E), does not provide an end-run
around the deadlines for designating experts and producing expert reports.
See Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir.
1998); Charter Sch. Sols. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 5258055, at *2
(W.D. Tex. June 28, 2019) (supplemental reports do not “provide a back-door
means for parties to extend” expert deadlines).
Under Rule 37, a party who fails to make a timely disclosure “is not
allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at
a hearing, or at a trial ….” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 	But there is an exception
when “the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Id.
Defendants contend that they were harmed by the one-week delay in
receiving Duhon’s expert report because it “hampered” their ability to evaluate
the report and complete an inspection of the unit using their own expert. Joint
letter at 1. 	Young explains that January 27, 2026 “was the soonest date that
she could get the report and she produced it as soon as she got it.” 	Id. 	She
argues that she “substantially complied with the designation deadline and no
harm has befallen Defendants.” 	Id. at 2. 	Young has the better of the
argument—by far.
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Duhon’s 	expert 	report 	was 	disclosed 	eight 	days 	before 	Defendant’s
deadline to designate their own expert. 	Dkt. 36 (February 4, 2026 deadline).
Defendants 	blame 	Young’s 	untimeliness 	for 	their 	inability 	to 	meet 	this
deadline. 	See Dkt. 47 at 3. 	But Young “has stated that she would make the
house available for inspection” by Defendants’ expert. 	See Joint Letter at 2.
And 	weeks 	have 	passed 	since 	Defendants 	received 	Duhon’s 	report. 	Yet
Defendants apparently made no effort to designate their own expert witness
or complete an inspection of Young’s unit. See id.
Defendants assert that their motion to exclude “needed to be ruled on”
before they “incurred the large expense” of retaining their own expert. Id. But
Defendants wrongly presuppose that the fault lies with Young. 	The delay at
this point is either attributable to the Court’s crowded docket or, better yet,
Defendants’ 	own 	strategic 	choice 	to 	assume 	that 	their 	own 	procedurally
deficient motion would succeed. Defendants could have sought an extension of
their February 4, 2026 expert designation deadline if they truly needed one.
What they cannot do is blame their own decisions on Young’s extremely brief
and 	patently 	harmless 	seven-day 	delay. 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	exclude
Duhon’s testimony is denied.
Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants
Plaza Place Owners Association, Inc.’s and Associa Principal Management
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Group of Houston’s motion for summary judgment on Hlevictor Hoskins, Jr.’s
claims (Dkt. 28) be GRANTED, and that Hoskins’s claims be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
It 	is 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	their
complaint (Dkt. 42) be DENIED IN PART as to Hoskins but GRANTED IN
PART as to Tracey R. Young.
It is further ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert
testimony of Gerard J. Duhon (Dkt. 47) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on March 4, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_______________________________________
Yvoon	nn	ne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-01107 Document 54 Filed 03/04/26 in TXSD Page 20 of 20