Humble v. Harris County Texas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Shantalace Humble,
Plaintiff,
v.
Harris County Texas, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01081
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is a civil rights case. 1 	Defendant Harris County, Texas (“Harris
County”), 	and 	Defendants 	Steven 	Lamar 	Carpenter, 	Jr., 	Omar 	Ramirez,
Bryant Crespin, and Adrian Miller, all of whom are Deputies of the Harris
County Sherriff’s Office (collectively, “the Deputies”), have moved to dismiss
Plaintiff Shantalace Humble’s amended complaint (Dkt. 14) under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Dkts. 15, 24, 30, 33, 41.
After carefully reviewing the motions, responses, Dkts. 27, 46, replies,
Dkts. 39, 47, the record, and the applicable law, the Court (a) grants in part
and denies in part Deputy Carpenter’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 24); (b) grants
in full Deputies Ramirez’s, Miller’s, and Crespin’s motions to dismiss (Dkt. 30,
Dkt. 33; Dkt. 41); and (c) grants Harris County’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 15).
1 All parties consented to the undersigned judge. See Dkt. 6, 25, 31, 43, 34.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 14, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Background
I. 	Factual background
The following facts are taken as true at this stage. They concern a traffic
stop on February 4, 2023.
Humble is a Black woman and the mother of two children, a 15-month-
old daughter and 14-year-old son. Dkt. 14 at 8-9. In January 2023, she bought
a car from “a local dealership/mechanic” known to her and her family. 	Id. at
9. The seller provided Humble with purchase and registration documentation.
Id. The car had paper plates that had not expired as of February 2023. Id.
On the evening of the incident, Humble was driving her children in the
new car. Id. at 9-10. A Harris County Sheriff’s Office cruiser pulled up behind
Humble’s vehicle, and the deputy inside it “appeared to be running her plates.”
Id. at 10. The cruiser activated its lights and sirens. Id. at 11. Humble pulled
over and placed her vehicle in park. Id. Humble’s sister Tanny, who had been
driving behind them in another car with Humble’s mother and siblings,
stopped behind the cruiser. Id. at 10-11.
Carpenter was the Deputy who had stopped Humble’s car. Id. at 11. He
approached Humble’s vehicle and asked for her identification. Id. at 5, 11. She
rolled down her window and provided her name and date of birth. 	Id. at 11.
Humble asked Carpenter multiple times why she had been stopped and
informed him that she suffers from anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic
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stress disorder. Id. at 2, 12. She did not attempt to flee. Id. at 11. Carpenter
then ordered Humble to exit her vehicle. 	Id. 	Humble expressed that she was
“uncomfortable,” requested a supervisor, and disclosed her mental health
issues. 	Id. 	at 	11-12. 	But 	Carpenter 	became 	“angry,” 	“annoyed,” 	and
“aggressive.” Id.
Carpenter then aimed his light toward the back seat, commented that
Humble’s son “looks ‘big,’” and demanded that he exit the vehicle. 	Id. at 12.
Humble responded that her son was a minor and would not be getting out of
the car. 	Id. 	She continued to ask why she had been stopped, to express her
discomfort, and to request a supervisor. 	Id. at 13. 	At some point, Humble’s
sister stepped out of her vehicle and identified herself to Carpenter. Id.
Carpenter returned to his patrol car. 	Believing that he was calling his
supervisor, Humble rolled up her window. 	Id. 	When he returned, Carpenter
“was 	aggressive 	and 	angry,” 	banged 	his 	fist 	on 	Humble’s 	window, 	and
demanded her to roll it down. 	Id. 	Instead of doing so, Humble again told
Carpenter that she did not feel comfortable and asked for a supervisor. 	Id.
Humble’s sister informed Carpenter that Humble suffered from mental health
issues, was a victim of domestic violence prone to panic attacks, and expressed
concern that Humble could “freak out.” 	Id. 	But Humble did not make any
threatening movements or attempt to flee. Id. Humble eventually rolled down
her window at her sister’s request. Id. at 14.
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During the traffic stop, Carpenter told Humble that her “license tags
were not coming back.” Id. at 14. She responded that the tags were valid and
offered to show him the documents. Id.
Carpenter ordered Humble to get out of her car, but she did not initially
comply. 	Id. 	Instead, Humble repeated that she did not feel comfortable and
asked for a supervisor. 	Id. 	After her sister persuaded her to exit the vehicle,
Humble did so “peacefully,” making no attempt to flee or resist. Id.
When Humble stepped out, Carpenter “grabbed her arms behind her
back” and screamed that she was under arrest. 	Id. at 2, 14. 	Humble asked
why she was being arrested. 	Id. at 14. 	Carpenter then “violently slammed”
Humble to the ground. 	Id. at 2, 15. 	The impact of her face and head hitting
the ground rendered her unconscious. Id. at 3, 15. When she woke up, Humble
was lying face-down, hands cuffed behind her back, with her breasts exposed.
Id. Although Humble was not resisting, Carpenter kneeled on her back while
an unidentified officer held her down. Id. at 15.
Deputies Ramirez, Miller, and Crespin arrived on scene, although the
complaint does not explain when this occurred. Id. Yet the complaint asserts
that one or more of them “assisted” in restraining Humble. Id. It also accuses
those other deputies of failing to move, restrain, or otherwise de-escalate
Deputy Carpenter’s actions. Id.
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Carpenter put Humble in the back of a police vehicle. 	Id. at 16. 	She
remained handcuffed. 	Id. 	At some point, paramedics arrived and examined
her. Id. Carpenter eventually told Humble that she was free to go. Id. at 16.
No citation was issued. Id. at 3.
Sometime later, Carpenter filed an affidavit with the Harris County
District 	Attorney’s 	Office, 	alleging 	that 	Humble’s 	rolling 	up 	her 	window
supported a charge for interference with public duties. Id. at 16. The charges
were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Id. at 16.
The incident left Humble with a concussion, a foot injury, and “serious
and long-term mental and emotional consequences.” 	Id. at 3. 	She filed an
Internal Affairs complaint but received no response. Id. at 17.
II. 	Procedural history
On February 4, 2025, Humble sued Harris County and the Deputies in
state court. 	Dkt. 1-1 (original petition). 	Harris County timely removed the
case. Dkt. 1 (notice of removal).
Post-removal, Humble filed a motion requesting that Harris County be
ordered to provide the Deputies’ addresses for service of process. Dkt. 11. The
Court 	granted 	the 	motion, 	Dkt. 	13, 	and 	Harris 	County 	provided 	the
information as directed on April 21, 2025, see Dkt. 46 at 5. 	Carpenter was
served on May 29, 2025. 	Dkt. 18. 	Ramirez and Crespin were served on June
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9 and June 11, 2025, respectively. Dkts. 19, 20. Miller was served on June 26,
2025. Dkt. 37.
Humble filed an amended complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 	premised 	on 	violations 	of 	the 	Fourth, 	Fourteenth, 	and 	First
Amendments. 	See Dkt. 14 at 20, 32. 	And she also asserted a Section 1983
municipal liability claim against Harris County. See id. at 27.
Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. 	Dkt. 15 (Harris County);
Dkt. 24 (Carpenter); Dkt. 30 (Ramirez); Dkt. 33 (Crespin); Dkt. 41 (Miller).
Humble responded to Harris County’s motion, see Dkt. 27; see also Dkt. 28
(amended certificate of service to Dkt. 27), prompting Harris County to file a
reply, Dkt. 39. 	Humble also filed a consolidated response to the Deputies’
motions to dismiss, Dkt. 46, to which the Deputies replied, Dkt. 47. 	The
motions are ripe for resolution.
Legal Standard
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Analysis
Defendants’ motions to dismiss raise one overlapping contention. 	They
all maintain that Humble’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. But
as explained below, Humble filed suit within the limitations period. 	And
because her diligence in effectuating service cannot be ascertained from the
pleadings 	alone, 	the 	timeliness 	of 	her 	claims—which 	is 	an 	affirmative
defense—is not appropriately resolved at this motion-to-dismiss stage.
Apart from limitations, the Deputies assert that qualified immunity bars
Humble’s Section 1983 claims that challenge the constitutionality of her initial
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traffic stop; allege that the arresting deputy, Deputy Carpenter, used excessive
force; accuse other deputies of wrongfully failing to intervene; and assert that
Carpenter retaliated against her for exercising protected speech. 	The Court
agrees that Humble has not adequately alleged that Deputy Carpenter lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop her. 	But she has alleged enough facts to suggest
that 	Carpenter 	violated 	clearly-established 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights 	by
slamming Humble to the ground after she had already complied with his
directives and continued to apply force even when she was unconscious.
On the other hand, Humble’s allegations are insufficient to show that
Deputy Carpenter violated any clearly-established First Amendment right.
Likewise, Humble has not plausibly alleged that Deputies Ramirez, Miller, and
Crespin can be liable as bystanders with respect to Carpenter’s use of force.
And the lack of a viable First Amendment retaliation claim against Carpenter
forecloses any related bystander theory against those other deputies, too.
Humble’s remaining claims against Harris County are barred. 	Her
allegations fail to show that County officers had a pattern of using excessive
force under similar circumstances. 	And her assertions about the County’s
customs or policies are conclusory and lack any articulated connection to the
incident in this case. There is no basis for municipal liability.
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I. 	Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the Section 1983
claims based on their limitations defense.
Defendants first contend that Humble’s claims are barred by the statute
of limitations. See Dkt. 15 at 5; Dkt. 24 at 10; Dkt. 30 at 8; Dkt. 33 at 8; Dkt. 41
at 8. 	Humble pleaded that she timely filed her petition and served Harris
County soon thereafter. See Dkt. 14 at 4-5. In her response brief, Humble also
asserts that she diligently sought to serve the Deputies. Dkt. 46 at 1-2.
A. 	Texas law, which supplies the limitations period, looks at
when suit was filed and when the defendants were served.
“Because no specified federal statute of limitations exists for § 1983 suits,
federal 	courts 	borrow 	the 	forum 	state’s 	… 	personal-injury 	limitations
period ….” 	Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cnty., Miss., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir.
2012) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). 	In Texas, the
statute of limitations for personal-injury claims is two years. 	See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003. For § 1983 claims, accrual “occurs when the
plaintiff knows, or should have known, of the facts that form the basis of the
claim.” Griffin v. New Orleans City, 628 F. App’x 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2016).
Humble’s claims accrued on February 4, 2023, the date of the traffic stop.
Dkt. 14 at 2. She filed suit on February 4, 2025, which is within the limitations
period. See Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 1-1.
“To comply with a statute of limitations,” however, Texas law also
requires that defendants be served “within the limitations period.” 	Ortega v.
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Young Again Prods., Inc., 548 F. App’x 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Slagle
v. Prickett, 345 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.)). 	“[T]he
date of service will relate back to the date suit was filed” if the plaintiff
exercised due diligence in obtaining service of process. 	See Henderson v.
Repub. of Tex., 672 F. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2016); see also, e.g., Lopez v.
Unknown Galveston Police Officer, 2006 WL 3702895, at *9-10 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
13, 2006) (applying this principle to a § 1983 claim). 	To meet that test, a
plaintiff must “present evidence regarding the efforts that were made to serve
the defendant” and “explain every lapse in effort or period of delay.” 	Proux v.
Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007).
Moreover, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. 	That
defense supports dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if “it is evident from the
plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise
some basis for tolling or the like.” 	Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th
Cir. 2003).
B. 	Humble 	diligently 	served 	Harris 	County, 	making 	her
claims against it timely.
Harris County was served on February 17, 2025, thirteen days after the
limitations period expired. 	See Dkt. 1-2 at 2-4. 	It argues that Humble failed
to exercise due diligence by waiting until the final day of the limitations period
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to file this suit and not serving Harris County until afterwards. See Dkt. 15 at
5 n.3 (citing and incorporating Dkt. 4 at 13).
Humble responds that she undertook diligent efforts to serve Harris
County. 	Dkt. 27 at 3. 	This is evident on the face of her pleadings. 	She
requested issuance of the citation immediately upon filing suit. See Dkt. 14 at
4 (first amended complaint). Eight days passed before the district clerk issued
the citation. See id. at 5 (February 12, 2025 citation); see also Dkt. 1-3 (copy of
citation). That brief delay was not within Humble’s control. Once the citation
was issued, Humble ensured that Harris County was served with process
quickly, within five days. See Dkt. 14 at 5 (February 17, 2025 date of service).
That is sufficiently diligent for the date of service to relate back to the filing of
suit, making her claims against the County timely.
C. 	Whether Humble diligently served the Deputies cannot be
resolved at this stage.
The 	Deputies 	similarly 	invoke 	the 	limitations 	period. 	But 	their
contentions implicate matters outside the pleadings and thus are insufficient
to merit dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
According 	to 	the 	Deputies, 	Plaintiff’s 	waiting 	until 	the 	end 	of 	the
limitations period to sue in state court, especially when removal was “likely,”
showed a lack of diligence. See Dkt. 47 at 2. But there is nothing wrong with
filing suit on the last day of the limitations period—just like Humble did in
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this case. 	See, e.g., Larkins v. S.D.P. Mfg. Inc., 2024 WL 3744396, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 8, 2024) (state court suit was timely filed on the next business day
after the limitations period ended); McPhaul v. Kimbrough, 2020 WL 5735173,
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2020) (Section 1983 claim was timely filed on the last
day of the two-year limitations period), adopted by 2020 WL 5709270 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 24, 2020).
The only remaining question is whether Humble diligently served the
Deputies. “[O]nce the defendant demonstrates that service occurred after the
limitations deadline, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to explain the delay.”
Sutton Place 1 Townhouse v. AmGuard Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 3d 684, 690 (W.D.
Tex. 2023) (quoting Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215). Because determining if service
was diligent can be a fact-intensive inquiry, it is often resolved on summary
judgment or at trial. See id. (collecting cases).
There are some instances where failure to diligently serve has led to
dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. 	That has occurred when (1) in response
to the motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff offered no excuse—or excuses that were
invalid as a matter of law—for” the delay, (2) “documents subject to judicial
notice (such as court dockets) evinced” a lack of due diligence, and (3) neither
party attached relevant evidence to the motion or response. 	Id. at 691
(collecting cases). None of those categories applies.
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Far from failing to explain the delayed service, Humble provided a
detailed account of her service efforts when responding to the motions to
dismiss. 	See Dkt. 46 at 4-5. 	She also attached an affidavit corroborating her
allegations, see Dkt. 46-1, which is not a proper subject for judicial notice. And
in other filings, Humble maintained that she tried to serve the Deputies sooner
but only learned their correct addresses after Harris County finally agreed to
and then was ordered to divulge them. See Dkt. 11 at 2; Dkt. 13 (April 17, 2025
order compelling Harris County to supply those addresses).
Based on the pleading alone, this Court cannot determine whether
Humble’s service efforts were adequately diligent. 	No judicially noticeable
records conclusively negate the possibility that she exercised the requisite
diligence. And this Court declines to consider materials outside the pleadings,
which would require converting the 	motions to dismiss 	into motions for
summary judgment. See Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Huntsman Corp., 255 F.R.D. 179,
188 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (when matters outside the pleadings are submitted to
support or oppose a motion to dismiss, courts may, but are not required to,
convert the motion to one of summary judgment and consider those materials).
The statute of limitations cannot justify dismissal at this stage.
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II. 	Humble has adequately pleaded one Section 1983 theory against
Deputy Carpenter but none against the other deputies.
As their alternative basis for dismissal, the Deputies invoke qualified
immunity. Dkt. 24 at 14; Dkt. 30 at 13; Dkt. 33 at 13; Dkt. 41 at 13. Humble
responds that she has alleged enough facts to overcome qualified immunity by
detailing 	how 	each 	of 	the 	Deputies 	violated 	her 	clearly 	established
constitutional rights. 	See Dkt. 46 at 7, 9-10. 	The Court agrees with the
Deputies, as concluded below, that most of the Section 1983 theories are
barred. 	Nevertheless, the Court also concludes that Humble has adequately
stated an excessive force theory against Deputy Carpenter.
A. 	Qualified immunity
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government
officials from civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must “plead specific facts that both
allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with
equal specificity.” 	Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Overcoming qualified immunity requires sufficient allegations both that
(1) the defendant’s conduct, as alleged, violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights; and (2) the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of
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clearly established law. 	See Alexander v. Eeds, 392 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir.
2004). 	For the second requirement, the Court determines “whether the
allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of
the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively
unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.” Hare v. City of
Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Hare III”). 	A right was “clearly
established” if “a legislative directive or case precedent” made it “sufficiently
clear such that every reasonable officer would have understood that what he is
doing violates the law.” Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2020).
B. 	One theory against Deputy Carpenter survives dismissal.
According 	to 	the 	complaint, 	Deputy 	Carpenter 	violated 	Humble’s
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and First Amendments.
Dkt. 14 at 20, 32. 	Specifically, Humble alleges that Carpenter unlawfully
stopped her car, used excessive force against her during the stop, and did so to
retaliate against her protected speech. Id. at 20, 23, 32.
Humble has adequately alleged that Carpenter violated her clearly
established rights by using excessive force. 	But her initial stop was lawful.
And her failure to address the First Amendment theory warrants its dismissal.
1. 	Carpenter had reasonable suspicion to stop Humble’s car.
According to the complaint, Deputy Carpenter stopped Humble’s vehicle
without 	reasonable 	suspicion 	and 	profiled 	her 	because 	of 	her 	race 	and
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temporary dealer plates. 	Dkt. 14 at 23-24. 	Carpenter counters that the stop
was justified because the temporary plate was not showing as valid. 	See Dkt.
24 at 14 (citing Dkt. 14 ¶ 45).
“The 	legality 	of 	a 	traffic 	stop 	is 	analyzed 	under 	the 	framework
articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” United States v. Lopez-Moreno,
420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). This is a two-part inquiry, asking “whether
the officer’s action was: (1) ‘justified at its inception’; and (2) ‘reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
“For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an
objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a
traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur ....” Id.; see also United States v.
Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 2007) (lawful stop of vehicle that
failed to display a front license plate); United States v. Fontenot, 284 F. App’x
193, 194 (5th Cir. 2008) (stop was proper when officer did not see a rear license
plate on the car). 	For this inquiry, the Court looks to the facts known to the
officer at the time of the stop, not his motivations, even if they are pretextual.
See United States v. Escalante, 239 F.3d 678, 680-81 (5th Cir. 2001).
Humble’s 	own 	allegations 	confirm 	that 	there 	was 	an 	objectively
reasonable basis for Deputy Carpenter to believe that she had violated traffic
laws. 	The complaint concedes that Carpenter “appeared to be running her
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plates” before pulling her over. 	Dkt. 14 at 10. 	It also admits that Carpenter
told Humble, during the traffic stop, that her paper tags were not returning as
valid. 	See id. at 14. 	As Defendants note, Dkt. 47 at 4-5, driving with an
unauthorized temporary tag would violate Texas law. 	See Tex. Transp. Code
Ann. § 503.067(b) (2021), repealed by Act 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 668, § 32(7) (eff.
July 1, 2025); see also id. § 503.094(1) (making it a Class C misdemeanor),
amended by Acts 2023, 88th Leg., ch. 668, § 32(9) (eff. July 1, 2025). 	The
suspected violation was enough to justify stopping Humble.
2. 	Humble adequately pleaded that Carpenter violated clearly
established law by using excessive force.
The complaint also alleges that Carpenter violated Humble’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by “violently slamm[ing] Ms. Humble to the
ground 	with 	such 	force 	that 	she 	hit 	her 	face 	and 	head 	and 	lost
consciousness ....” 	Dkt. 14 at 15. 	Carpenter argues that his use of force was
justified because Humble had failed to cooperate with his instructions. Dkt. 24
at 15; see also Dkt. 47 at 5. 	But Humble’s allegations—which must be taken
as true—paint a different picture.
Claims “that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly
or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free
citizen” are “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’
standard.” 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 	“To prevail on an
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excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury, (2) which resulted
directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” 	Tarver v. City of Edna,
410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005). 	“The court considers the totality of the
circumstances, i.e., (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the
suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and
(3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Barnes v. Felix, 152 F.4th 669, 674 (5th Cir. 2025) (quotation
omitted). That fact-intensive analysis must balance “the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 	Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
(quotations omitted).
Based on those factors, Humble has sufficiently pleaded an excessive
force claim. 	The suspected crime—driving with an invalid plate—is a minor
traffic infraction, which “substantially lower[s]” the need for force. See Hanks
v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2017) (driving below the speed limit); see
also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (speeding). 	The
complaint also alleged both that she posed no threat while seated in her car,
and that she did not “attempt to flee or resist.” See Dkt. 14 at 12.
Carpenter’s position that Humble’s resistance prompted him to use force
does not track the order of events detailed in the complaint. 	To be sure, the
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complaint acknowledges that Humble initially refused to comply with Deputy
Carpenter’s order to get out of the car. 	See id. at 13-14. 	But Humble’s sister,
who had intervened, successfully persuaded Humble to step out. See id. at 14.
Humble then exited the car “peacefully,” without “attempt[ing] to flee” or
“display[ing] any violence or resistance.” Id. at 14.
At that point, Humble had complied with Deputy Carpenter’s directive.
Her lack of resistance eliminated any justification for using force. See Lytle v.
Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n exercise of force that is
reasonable 	at 	one 	moment 	can 	become 	unreasonable 	in 	the 	next 	if 	the
justification for the use of force has ceased.”). 	Yet the complaint asserts that
Carpenter not only slammed her to the ground—with enough force to render
her unconscious—but continued to kneel on her back for an unspecified period
even after she was handcuffed. See Dkt. 14 at 14-15.
Well-established 	law 	reflects 	that 	it 	was 	unreasonable 	for 	Deputy
Carpenter to use such force when Humble was no longer resisting and posed
no threat. 	Whereas Carpenter merely lists cases where use of force was
deemed permissible—without regard to their specific circumstances, see Dkt.
24 at 14-15—Humble cites on-point binding precedent finding the use of force
was excessive and unreasonable on strikingly similar facts.
In Hanks v. Rogers, the court found it “obvious” that an officer had used
excessive force. See 853 F.3d at 747. Like Humble, the plaintiff in Hanks was
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stopped for a minor traffic infraction. Compare Dkt. 14 at 14 (Humble stopped
for suspected invalid license tags), with Hanks, 853 F.3d at 745 (plaintiff
stopped for driving below speed limit). Also like Humble, see Dkt. 14 at 13-14,
the plaintiff did not immediately comply with the officer’s directives but “made
no attempt to flee.” See Hanks, 853 F.3d at 742 (non-compliance with order to
exit the vehicle and kneel). 	The officer in Hanks nevertheless struck the
plaintiff, pushed him to the ground, and injured him, even though the plaintiff
posed no immediate safety threat. See id. at 743, 745.
Reversing the district court’s conclusion that the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit explained in Hanks “that an officer
violates 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	if 	he 	abruptly 	resorts 	to 	overwhelming
physical force rather than continuing verbal negotiations with an individual
who poses no immediate threat or flight risk, who engages in, at most, passive
resistance, and whom the officer stopped for a minor traffic violation.” 	Id. at
747 (citing Deville, 567 F.3d at 167-69; Doss v. Helpenstell, 626 F. App’x 453,
459-60 (5th Cir. 2015); Brothers v. Zoss, 837 F.3d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 2016)).
That is sufficiently similar to Humble’s allegations to show that any reasonable
officer in Deputy Carpenter’s position should have known that his use of
violent force against Humble was unlawful.
The conclusion is reinforced by another decision, Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d
492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008). 	There, the court found it amply clear that an officer
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“could not forcefully slam [a suspect’s] face into a vehicle while she was
restrained 	and 	subdued.” 	Id. 	at 	502 	(holding 	that 	defendants 	failed 	to
establish qualified immunity). The same principle fits this case, where Deputy
Carpenter allegedly slammed a non-resisting Humble forcefully to the ground
and 	continued 	to 	kneel 	on 	her 	after 	she 	was 	cuffed 	and 	unconscious.
Carpenter’s motion to dismiss the excessive force theory is denied.
3. 	Qualified 	immunity 	bars 	the 	First 	Amendment 	theory
against Deputy Carpenter.
The 	conclusion 	differs 	for 	Humble’s 	theory 	that 	Deputy 	Carpenter
violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her. Dkt. 14 at 32.
Although Deputy Carpenter raised a qualified immunity defense with respect
to that theory, Dkt. 24 at 15, Humble wholly failed to address it. Dkt. 46.
Even outside the qualified immunity context, “[a] plaintiff abandons
claims when it fails to address the claims or oppose a motion challenging those
claims.” 	See Terry Black’s Barbeque, L.L.C. 	v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,
22 F.4th 450, 459 (5th Cir. 2022); see also McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist.,
63 F.4th 	996, 	1010 	(5th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(characterizing 	this 	as 	“well-settled
precedent”). 	That conclusion applies with especial force here because it is
Humble’s burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense. 	See Willis v.
Bastrop Cnty., 2019 WL 252051, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2019) (plaintiff failed
to meet this burden “because he has failed to even respond to the qualified
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immunity defense”). 	Yet nowhere does her response even mention the First
Amendment theory, see Dkt. 16, thereby abandoning it. 	Her Section 1983
claim premised on any First Amendment violation is dismissed.
C. 	Humble has not stated plausible claims against Deputies
Ramirez, Miller, and Crespin.
Humble also brings Section 1983 claims against Ramirez, Miller, and
Crespin (collectively the “Remaining Deputies”). Dkt. 14 at 24. The Remaining
Deputies assert qualified immunity from all claims. 	Dkt. 30 at 13; Dkt. 33 at
13; Dkt. 41 at 13.
The conclusions above foreclose most of Humble’s claims against the
other deputies. Because the initial traffic stop was valid, see supra Part II.B.1,
Humble cannot show that any other deputy wrongfully stopped her. 	And
because Humble failed to defend her First Amendment retaliation theory, that
theory is abandoned with respect to all the Deputies. 	See supra Part II.B.3.
Nor could the Remaining Deputies be derivatively liable as bystanders for any
of Deputy Carpenter’s actions that the Court has concluded did not violate
Humble’s clearly established constitutional rights. 	See Est. of Parker v. Miss.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 245 (5th Cir. 2025) (bystander liability
requires an underlying constitutional violation); see also Buehler v. Dear,
27 F.4th 969, 989 (5th Cir. 2022).
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That leaves Humble’s theory that the Remaining Deputies wrongfully
failed to intervene during Deputy Carpenter’s use of excessive force. 	Dkt. 14
at 24. 	The Remaining Deputies argue that Humble has alleged no facts
showing they were present when unlawful force was applied or were otherwise
aware of its use. Dkt. 47 at 6. They are right.
“[A]n officer who is present at the scene and does not take reasonable
measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s use of excessive force may
be liable under section 1983.” 	Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir.
1995). 	Bystander liability attaches when an officer: “(1) knew a fellow officer
was violating an individual’s constitutional rights, (2) was present at the scene
of the constitutional violation, (3) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
harm but nevertheless, (4) chose not to act.” Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph
v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020).
Bystander liability “requires more than mere presence in the vicinity of
the violation;” courts must “also consider whether an officer acquiesced ….” Id.
at 343 (quotations omitted). 	Relevant considerations include how long the
force was used, the bystanders’ physical proximity to the officer who used force,
their conduct in response to the use of force, and their prior training. See, e.g.,
Timpa v. Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020, 1039 (5th Cir. 2021) (officers trained in how
to properly restrain subjects “stood mere feet away,” laughed, and made jesting
comments during a fourteen-minute restraint of an incapacitated arrestee);
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Hale, 	45 	F.3d 	at 	919 	(officers 	“stood 	by 	and 	laughed” 	and 	“yelled
encouragement” as another officer used excessive force).
To 	overcome 	qualified 	immunity, 	Humble 	primarily 	relies 	on 	an
unpublished decision, Greene v. DeMoss, 2022 WL 3716201 (5th Cir. Aug. 29,
2022). 	See Dkt. 46 at 7. 	There, the plaintiff plausibly alleged bystander
liability where the officers “watched” and personally participated in the use of
excessive force for a period of almost thirty minutes while fellow officers beat
an unresisting suspect. Id. at *4.
But Humble’s allegations are far too sparse to show that any of the
Remaining Deputies could be liable, let alone that their conduct violated
clearly established law. 	At best, the complaint asserts that Ramirez, Miller,
and Crespine “arrived at the scene” while Humble was unconscious and did not
“move [] Carpenter off” her or otherwise intervene while he was kneeling on
her back. 	Dkt. 14 at 15. 	It also pleads that “at least one” of the Remaining
Deputies held Humble down as Carpenter kneeled on her. 	See id. at 15, 22.
This is not enough to show that these Remaining Deputies acquiesced to
Carpenter’s use of force. 	Nothing indicates that any of those deputies were
there long enough such that they should have known that the force applied
was unreasonable. 	Likewise, the factual allegations do not reflect that the
Remaining Deputies had a sufficient opportunity to prevent excessive force
from being used. 	And the lack of factual detail makes it impossible to show
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that their unspecified conduct violated clearly established law, whether as
bystanders or otherwise.
Humble explains that she lacks further detail because she was face-down
and regaining consciousness when Deputy Carpenter kneeled on her back. See
Dkt. 14 at 15. 	She contends that “[f]urther details will have to be flushed out
in discovery ….” Dkt. 46 at 7. But Humble had access to information necessary
to flesh-out her bystander claim. 	After all, her sister was right there at the
scene. 	Her complaint even relies on her sister’s actions and statements that
reflect her sister’s proximity to where Humble exited the car and was taken to
the ground. See Dkt. 14 at 14, 16 (explaining how Tanny convinced Humble to
get out of the car and then obtained Defendant Carpenter’s permission to help
Humble sit up after she was handcuffed). 	The fact that Humble chose to
include some of her sister’s observations, while omitting any facts describing
the actions of the Remaining Deputies whom the sister would have plainly
observed, is telling. 	Indeed, Humble had a duty to investigate those facts
readily available to her before filing the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
In short, Humble has not pleaded a plausible basis to conclude that the
Remaining Deputies violated her rights. And Humble has not shown that their
conduct, which she fails to adequately describe, rises to the level of violating
clearly established law. 	Her claims against Deputies Ramirez, Miller, and
Crespin are dismissed.
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III. 	Humble’s allegations against Harris County are deficient.
Humble’s Section 1983 claim against Harris County depends on Monell
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and
its progeny. 	See Dkt. 14 at 27. 	Harris County contends that the allegations
are conclusory and fail to meet the Monell standard. See Dkt. 15. The County
is correct. Other than citing general principles and incorporating passages in
her complaint, Humble offers little in the way of response. 2 See Dkt. 27.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor ....” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original). “Consequently,
the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality
through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional
actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Piotrowski
v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted). 	To
recover, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	plausibly 	allege 	that: 	“(1) 	an 	official 	policy
(2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind
the violation of a constitutional right.” Martinez v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 123
F.4th 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 2025 WL
1727389 (U.S. June 23, 2025).
2 Plaintiff filed an amended certificate of service regarding her response to the
County’s motion to dismiss, which for whatever reason is characterized on the docket
sheet as a “motion.” Dkt. 28. Because the amendment has already been filed without
objection, the Court denies any “motion” to amend the certificate as moot.
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Based on the disposition of Humble’s other claims, the only potential
basis for municipal liability concerns Deputy Carpenter’s use of excessive force.
For that claim, the complaint asserts, in somewhat disjointed fashion, that
(1) the County’s officers have a pattern of using excessive force, which the
County has failed to address, see Dkt. 14 at 28-32; (2) the County has other
official or unofficial policies or customs regarding hiring practices, use of
special patrol units, and insurance that led to Deputy Carpenter’s use of
excessive force, see id. at 17, 19, 36, 37; and (3) the County failed to properly
train its deputies, see id. at 17-18, 37-38. 	But as concluded below, those
theories do not provide a plausible basis for municipal liability here.
A. 	Humble has not alleged a pattern of sufficiently similar
excessive force incidents.
The complaint asserts that Harris County has “an official policy or
custom of systemic unwillingness to address” its officers’ use of excessive force. 3
Dkt. 14 at 28. 	Conclusory allegations that a custom or policy exists are
insufficient to support municipal liability. 	See Martinez, 123 F.4th at 289.
Instead, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	sufficiently 	plead: 	(1) 	a 	written 	policy, 	(2) 	“a
widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a
3 Humble also makes passing references to the County’s “ratification” of the Deputies’
conduct. 	Allegations that the County failed to change policies or customs that
allegedly led excessive force to be used do not fit within any “extreme factual
situation’ where ratification applies.” Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 217
n.48 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting ratification theory).
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custom that fairly represents municipal policy,” or (3) the rare circumstance
where the official policymaker performed the act underlying the Section 1983
claim. 	See Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quotation 	omitted). 	A 	claim 	based 	on 	a 	widespread 	practice 	“requires
similarity and specificity; [p]rior indications cannot simply be for any and all
bad or unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.”
Peterson v. City of Ft. Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davidson v. City of Stafford,
Tex., 	848 	F.3d 	384, 	396 	(5th 	Cir. 	2017) 	(“A 	pattern 	requires 	similarity,
specificity, and sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”).
Harris County argues that the examples mentioned in the complaint lack
sufficient similarity and specificity to show a systemic practice or policy of
failing to address excessive force. 	See Dkt. 15 at 8. 	The Court agrees.
Incidents within the Harris County jail, see id. at 28-29 (DOJ memorandum
“Investigations of the Harris County Jail”); id. at 29-30 (excessive force against
inmates), involve an entirely distinct environment from the traffic stop here.
See Woods v. Harris Cnty., 2022 WL 18396216, at *12 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2022)
(rejecting reliance on same DOJ report and incidents in jails to substantiate
municipal liability in non-jail setting), adopted in relevant part by, 2022 WL
22596773 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2022), aff’d, 2024 WL 1174185 (5th Cir. Mar. 19,
2024). 	Equally deficient is Humble’s reference to a police dog biting someone
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during a home raid in a 2011 suit, which not only bears no similarity to the
traffic stop here, but did not lead to any finding that excessive force was used.
See Complaint, Prespentt v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:13-cv-1678, Dkt. 1 at 4-5 (S.D.
Tex. June 18, 2013); Agreed Motion to Dismiss, Prespentt, Dkt. 28 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 30, 2015) (plaintiff’s voluntary motion to dismiss with prejudice); Order of
Dismissal, Prespentt, Dkt. 29 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015).
Humble’s 	declaration 	that 	there 	were 	“over 	3000 	excessive 	force
allegations against Harris County in 2015” fares no better. Dkt. 14 at 29. Mere
allegations do not constitute findings that excessive force was used, even in
2015. They also have no bearing on the County’s actions eight years later when
Humble was stopped. 	Humble’s conclusory assertions, whether about 2015
statistics or other incidents in 2016 or 2017, “do not raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” See Verastique v. City of Dall., Tex., 106 F.4th 427, 432
(5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted) (rejecting pattern-or-practice allegations
premised on incidents that were not described with adequate factual detail),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 772 (2024). 	Humble’s pattern or practice theory is
dismissed. 4
4 Humble also alleges that the County “has an official policy or unofficial custom of
justifying” arrests without probable cause. 	See Dkt. 14 at 28. 	But she did not
affirmatively plead that she was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor
does she invoke such a claim in her responses.
Nothing in the complaint approaches the threshold for sustaining a related Monell
claim against Harris County. Much like her excessive force argument, Humble fails
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B. 	Humble inadequately pleaded deliberate indifference or
causation with respect to Harris County’s policies.
In addition to asserting a pattern of excessive force, Humble insinuates
that four other customs or policies are relevant: (1) Harris County’s reliance on
the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement’s (“TCOLE”) minimum standards
for hiring, supervising, disciplining, and retaining deputies, Dkt. 14 at 30, 36-
37, (2) its approach of hiring officers with only a high school-level education,
id. at 18-19, 37, (3) its custom of not requiring deputies to obtain excessive force
claim insurance, id. at 37, and (4) its use of special patrol units, called “jump-
out-boys,” id. at 17. 	Even assuming that these are actionable policies or
customs, Humble does not satisfy other requirements for municipal liability.
One 	of 	these 	hurdles 	is 	deliberate 	indifference. 	“‘[D]eliberate
indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” 	Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). 	This degree of culpability exceeds mere
negligence or even gross negligence; “it must amount to an intentional choice,
not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” 	James v. Harris Cnty.,
to allege instances of sufficiently similar or specific conduct to plausibly support the
existence of a pattern of justifying unlawful arrests.
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577 F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty.,
973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)).
There must also be a direct causal link between the municipal policy and
the violation at issue. See James, 577 F.3d at 617; Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580.
To survive dismissal, the complaint must articulate specific facts supporting
that causal relationship. 	See Henderson v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 51 F.4th 125,
130 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Barnes v. City of El Paso, 677 F. Supp. 3d 594, 615
(W.D. Tex. 2023) (conclusory allegations attempting to link the city’s failure to
implement 	body-worn 	cameras 	with 	plaintiff’s 	injury 	were 	inadequate).
Pleading both deliberate indifference and causation is crucial to ensure that
municipal liability does not devolve into respondeat superior liability. 	See
James, 577 F.3d at 618; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 415.
Humble’s allegations come nowhere close to meeting those standards.
She claims that it is “well known and accepted” that both “training and
oversight 	deficiencies” 	and 	hiring 	deputies 	with 	only 	a 	high 	school-level
education lead to “increased rates of excessive force.” 	See Dkt. 14 at 30, 18.
Those bare assertions do not plausibly suggest that the County’s hiring and
training standards caused Deputy Carpenter to use excessive force.
Humble’s allegation that Harris County’s special patrol units (called
“jump-out boys”) operate without adequate oversight, id. at 17-18, is even less
connected to her claims. She offers no facts suggesting that Deputy Carpenter
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was part of one of those units, such that they could even be relevant to what
occurred. 	Cf. Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th
Cir. 1997) (dismissing municipal liability claims where the cited policy was
“not implicated” by the plaintiff’s circumstances). 	And Humble offers neither
facts nor argument indicating that the County’s policy of not requiring deputies
to obtain insurance coverage for excessive force claims caused the violation she
alleges. 	See Dkt. 14 at 37. 	Indeed, that is far too attenuated on its face.
Humble cannot rely on any supposed policy to support her claim.
C. 	The failure to train allegations are also insufficient.
As a final theory, the complaint alleges that Harris County failed to
adequately train its deputies. 	See Dkt. 14 at 17, 19, 38. 	This theory is
deficient.
“In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train
certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may
rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of Section 1983.”
Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. 	But “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation
of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” 	Id.
(citing Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)). 	“That a particular
officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability
on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other
than a faulty training program.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
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33
390-91 (1989). 	“And plainly, adequately trained officers occasionally make
mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or the
legal basis for holding the city liable.” 	Id. at 391. 	Permitting failure-to-train
cases to move forward on a “lesser standard of fault would result in de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities—a result [the Supreme Court]
rejected in Monell.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94).
To sustain a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must plead “that (1) the
supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate officer; (2) a
causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of
the plaintiff's rights, and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to
deliberate indifference.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 277 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Davidson, 848 F.3d at 397). 	But Humble makes only conclusory
allegations about the Deputies’ training and the causal link between that
training 	and 	the 	violation 	pleaded. 	See, 	e.g., 	Dkt. 	14 	at 	17 	(the
“unconstitutional conduct is a result of failure to train”). 	The complaint does
not identify what made the training inadequate. Merely claiming that training
was subpar does not show deliberate indifference. See Armstrong, 60 F.4th at
277. 	Moreover, “[t]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained”
does not establish causation between that officer’s conduct and the training he
received. 	See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91. 	Nothing in the complaint
bridges that that critical gap. Humble’s failure-to-train theory is barred.
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In sum, Humble has not plausibly stated any theory under which Harris
County can be liable. Her claims against the County are dismissed.
Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	ORDERED 	that 	Steven 	Lamar
Carpenter Jr.’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 24) be GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. 	Humble’s theories under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Deputy
Carpenter 	unconstitutionally 	stopped 	her 	car 	and 	violated 	her 	First
Amendment rights are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 	But Humble’s
excessive force claim against Carpenter survives dismissal.
It is further ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants
Omar Ramirez, Bryant Crespin, and Adrian Miller (Dkt. 30; Dkt. 33; Dkt. 41),
and by Defendant Harris County (Dkt. 15) be GRANTED in full, and all claims
against those defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that Humble’s motion (Dkt. 28) to amend the
certificate of service in her response to the County’s motion to dismiss is
DENIED AS MOOT.
Signed on January 14, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Yvvvoon	n	nne Y. Hooo
U	Uniited States Magistrate Judge
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