In Re: Kara Bailey as Ownwer of 2011 Godfrey Hurricane 2000 SD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
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IN RE: COMPLAINT AND
PETITION OF KARA BAILEY 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-015
AS OWNER OF A CERTAIN
2011 GODFREY HURRICANE
2000 SD FOR EXONERATION
FROM OR LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Derek 	Cooley 	and 	Megan 	Smith’s,
Individually and as Next Friends of their minor child, D.C. (“Claimants”),
Motion for Summary Judgment.1 	(ECF No. 27). 	Based on a review of the
motion, arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Claimants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (id.) be GRANTED.
I. 	Background
This case stems from a boating accident. 	On July 5, 2024, Petitioner
Kara Bailey (“Petitioner”) was operating a Vessel2 on Taylor Lake, in Harris
County, Texas. 	(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6). 	While Petitioner operated the Vessel for
recreational 	purposes, 	D.C. 	was 	on 	board 	the 	Vessel 	as 	a 	guest 	and
participating in tubing. 	(Id. at ¶ 7). 	Petitioner alleges “D.C. fell off the tube
1 This motion was referred to the Undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
(ECF No. 30).
2 The Vessel is a 2011 Godfrey Hurricane 2000 SD, Hull Identification Number
GDYK3312J011, Texas Registration Number TX1469BU. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 4).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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and Petitioner brought the vessel in a circle on Taylor Lake so that D.C. could
get back on the tube.” 	(Id. at ¶ 8). 	Petitioner adds that a surge of water
brought D.C. in contact with the Vessel’s propeller blades and caused injuries
to his legs, requiring emergency medical attention. (Id. at ¶ 9).
On August 30, 2024, Claimants filed an Original Petition in the 127th
District Court of Harris County, Texas, No. 2024-58623 (the “State Court
Petition”). (Id. at ¶ 15; ECF No. 27 at 2). On January 2, 2025, Petitioner filed
in this Court a Complaint and Petition for Exoneration from or Limitation of
Liability. (ECF No. 1).
On August 19, 2025, Claimants filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 27).
II. 	Legal Standard
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 56. 	Rule 56(a) instructs the Court to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	See
Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment
is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
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a judgment as a matter of law.’” Talasek v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 16 F.4th
164, 168 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” 	Bazan ex rel. v. Hidalgo Cty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.
2001) (emphasis omitted); see Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 406
(5th Cir. 2021). 	“An issue is ‘genuine’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed
to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” 	Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489 (emphasis
omitted). 	The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir.
1997).
The movant is tasked with the initial burden of informing the Court of
the basis for the motion and pointing to relevant excerpts in evidence that
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Coastal Agric.
Supply, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 759 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The movant may also argue that the
nonmovant failed to produce evidence in support of at least one element of a
cause of action for which he bears the burden of proof. 	See Austin v. Kroger
Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017).
If the movant satisfies the initial burden, it shifts to the nonmovant who
must produce evidence of a genuine factual dispute; he may not merely rest on
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the allegations in his pleading. 	See Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., 759 F.3d at
505 (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.
2005)). The Court should not accept “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, 	[or] 	unsupported 	speculation” 	as 	sufficient 	to 	carry 	the
nonmovant’s burden. 	Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th
Cir. 2003). However, where there is evidence of a genuine factual dispute, such
disputes 	are 	resolved 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	nonmoving 	party 	“when 	an 	actual
controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.” 	Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525
(5th Cir. 1999); McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 358 (5th
Cir. 2017). 	Further, a genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baker v. Coburn, 68
F.4th 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2023), as revised (May 19, 2023).
III. 	Discussion
Claimants move for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the Limitation
of Liability Act provides no protection when a vessel’s owner operates the
vessel and (2) the possibility that a person other than Petitioner may also have
been at fault does not negate Petitioner’s privity. (ECF No. 27 at 4–10).
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Under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq. (the
“Limitation Act”), “a shipowner can limit its liability for damages caused by an
incident to the value of the vessel at the end of its voyage, plus any pending
freight 	as 	long 	as 	the 	shipowner 	had 	no 	privity 	or 	knowledge 	of 	any
unseaworthy condition or negligent act that was a proximate cause of the
incident.” 	In re Graham Offshore Tugs LLC, 752 F. Supp. 3d 619, 622 (E.D.
Tex. 2024) (citing SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C. v. Aris T M/V, 24 F.4th 458, 472
(5th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added)); see 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a)–(b). Under the Act,
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a shipowner is
entitled to limited liability. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,
443–45 (2001); In re N&W Marine Towing, L.L.C., 31 F.4th 968, 971 (5th Cir.
2022).
While the Limitation Act generally limits a vessel owner’s liability to the
value of the vessel (post casualty and plus any pending freight), the limit is
removed if the negligence or unseaworthiness that caused the damage was
within the “privity or knowledge” of the owner. 	See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig
Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 753
(E.D. La. 2014) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30505). 	“Privity or knowledge implies
some sort of complicity in the fault that caused the accident.” Brister v. A.W.I.,
Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). 	In the
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typical case, claimants bear the initial burden of proving that their injuries
arose as a result of the owner’s negligence or the vessel’s unseaworthiness.
Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the owner to prove a lack of
“privity or knowledge” of a negligent act or unseaworthy condition. Id.; see In
re Signal Int’l, LLC, 579 F.3d 478, 496 (5th Cir. 2009).
Claimants argue that because Petitioner was operating the Vessel at the
time of the incident, the essential element of privity has been established, and
Petitioner is not entitled to limitation for accidents arising from her negligence.
(See 	ECF 	No. 	27 	at 	4–5). 	For 	support, 	Claimants 	point 	to 	Petitioner’s
Complaint that states she was operating the Vessel during the incident (id.
(citing 	ECF 	No. 	1 	at 	¶ 	6)) 	and 	Petitioner’s 	deposition 	testimony 	where
Petitioner acknowledged that she was operating the Vessel when the propeller
struck D.C. (id. (citing ECF No. 27-1 at 4–8)).
In response, Petitioner does not dispute that she was operating the
Vessel at the time of the incident. 	(See ECF No. 28 at 3). 	However, Plaintiff
contends the Court should consider the two-prong test laid out in Farrell Lines
and not grant summary judgment until Claimants have met their burden to
show Petitioner was negligent. (Id. at 3–4).
The Fifth Circuit in Farrell Lines laid out the two-step process for
limitation actions:
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The determination of whether a shipowner is entitled to limitation
employs a two-step process. First, the court must determine what
acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the
accident. 	Second, 	the 	court 	must 	determine 	whether 	the
shipowner 	had 	knowledge 	or 	privity 	of 	those 	same 	acts 	of
negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness. Knowledge or privity
of any fact or act causing the accident is not enough for denial of
limitation; it is only knowledge or privity of negligent acts or
unseaworthy conditions which trigger a denial of limitation. And,
although the petitioner in limitation bears the burden of proving
lack 	of 	privity 	or 	knowledge, 	the 	initial 	burden 	of 	proving
negligence or unseaworthiness rests with the libellants.
Farrell Lines Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir. 1976) (internal citations
omitted). 	However, the Fifth Circuit has also explained that “when an owner
is in control of and operating his pleasure craft he has privity or knowledge
with respect to its operation.” 	Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir.
1969). 	In such cases, the owner “is not entitled to limitation for accidents
arising from his negligence.” Id.
Claimants point the Court to In re Petition of Archer, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1166
(D. Colo. 2014) as dealing with similar facts and arguments. (See ECF No. 27
at 7). 	In Archer, a claimant was injured while waterskiing behind a vessel.
Archer, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1168. 	That claimant filed suit against the owner of
the vessel in Colorado state court. 	Id. 	The owner then filed a complaint in
federal court seeking limitation of liability. 	Id. 	The claimant in Archer
ultimately moved for summary judgment in federal court, arguing that because
the owner “acknowledged that he was operating the vessel at the time of the
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accident, the essential element of privity has been established, negating his
right to seek limitation.” 	Id. 	The owner advanced the same argument as
Petitioner in the instant case:
Petitioner argues that [the claimant] is not entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of privity or knowledge because she has not
yet met her burden of proof on the issue of negligence. 	In other
words, petitioner contends that the two-step process must be
undertaken seriatim, and thus the court may not address the
question of privity or knowledge until that of negligence vel non
has been resolved.
Id. 	at 1169.3 	The court in Archer disagreed, stating that “[t]he law . . . is to
the contrary.” 	Id. 	In relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Fecht, the
Colorado District Court reasoned that “where petitioner clearly is not entitled
to limitation of liability under the Act in any event, there is no right to a
determination of negligence in this court.” 	Id. at 1170 (citing Fecht, 406 F.2d
at 723) (“Where no grant of limitation is possible, the basis for granting
exoneration vanishes. In such a case, a boat owner should not be treated more
favorably than an automobile driver.”). The Colorado District Court also noted
that numerous courts have followed the “logical premise” of the Fecht decision.
Id. (collecting cases).
3 “Seriatim” is defined as “taking one subject after another in regular order; point by
point.”
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While not binding on this Court, the Court finds the reasoning of the
Archer decision persuasive. Further, the Court follows the reasoning in Fecht,
which is binding on this Court. Petitioner has admitted to operating the Vessel
at the time of the incident. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 27-1 at 4–8). When “an
owner is in control of and operating” their vessel, they have “privity or
knowledge with respect to its operation.” 	Fecht, 406 F.2d at 722. 	Because
Petitioner was operating the Vessel, “[i]f there was negligence in the operation
of the [vessel], only [she] could have been guilty of it.” Id. As such, Petitioner
is not entitled to limit her liability. 	Id.; see Archer, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1170
(explaining that “to hold otherwise would run counter to the limited grant of
federal court jurisdiction as to admiralty claims, which ‘save[s] to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.’” (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1)); see also Broadwater v. Duplantier, No. 12-cv-1511, 2013 WL
6000580, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2013) (“In this case, [the co-owner of the
vessel] was operating the vessel at the time of the collision. As a matter of law,
he cannot establish a lack of privity and knowledge for any acts of negligence
on his part that the plaintiffs can prove.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds Claimants are entitled to summary
judgment and Petitioner’s action seeking limitation or exoneration of liability
under the Limitations Act should be dismissed.
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IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Claimants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) be GRANTED. 	The Court further
RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition for Exoneration from or Limitation of
Liability 	(ECF 	No. 	1) 	should 	be 	DENIED 	and 	this 	action 	should 	be
DISMISSED.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on January 22, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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