Bob v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Ronald Bob,
Plaintiff,
v.
Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action H-24-4642
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING MOTIONS
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 43. Pending
before the court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 24;
Plaintiff’s 	Motions 	for 	Leave 	to 	Refile 	Stricken 	Motions,
ECF Nos. 38, 41, 	42; Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Conduct
Limited Discovery, ECF No. 49; Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
a 	Jurisdictional 	Notice 	and 	a 	Motion 	Addressing 	Standing,
ECF 	No. 50; 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Declare 	Conveyance,
ECF No. 51. The court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 24, be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s pending motions,
ECF Nos. 38, 41, 42, 49, 50, and 51, are DENIED as MOOT.
1. Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff Ronald Bob, proceeding pro se, alleges multiple
claims related to the completed foreclosure on his home at 4010
Cypress Hill Drive, Spring, Texas 77388 (the Property). See ECF
No. 1-1 at 5. Plaintiff seeks to set aside the foreclosure sale of the
Property, which occurred in March 2024, as well as monetary
damages. Id. at 23, 29.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 19, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Before turning to the facts, it is necessary to discuss the
sources 	from 	which 	those 	facts 	are 	drawn. 	Generally, 	when
considering a motion to dismiss, the court must limit itself to:
(1) the 	facts 	in 	the 	complaint; 	(2) documents 	attached 	to 	the
complaint; and (3) matters of which the court may take judicial
notice. Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735
(5th Cir. 2019). The court also has discretion to consider exhibits
attached to the complaint, as well as exhibits attached to a motion
to dismiss, if they “are central to the claim and referenced by the
complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC,
594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally, “the district court
may properly take judicial notice of public state court records.”
Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x 888, 892
(5th Cir. 2020).
Of course, the court considers Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF
No. 1-1 at 5–30, and its attachments, which include (1) a Business
Records Affidavit from the eviction suit against Plaintiff involving
the Property,1 ECF No. 1-1 at 32–33; (2) the Substitute Trustee’s
Deed with attached Affidavit of Yosemite Lopez and Notice of
Foreclosure Sale, ECF No. 1-1 at 34–41; (3) the Deed of Trust and
its Riders, ECF No. 1-1 at 42–66, and (4) correspondence sent to
Plaintiff 	regarding 	the 	foreclosure 	and 	associated 	tracking
information, ECF No. 1-1 at 67–89. To their Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants 	attached 	(1) the 	Warranty 	Deed, 	ECF 	No. 	24-1;
(2) the Adjustable Rate Balloon Note (Note), ECF No. 24-2; (3) the
Deed 	of 	Trust, 	ECF 	No. 	24-3, 	and 	(4) the 	Transfer 	of 	Lein,
1 Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Bob, No. 1231724 (Harris Co. Ct. at Law No. 4, Tex.
Apr. 19, 2023). The state trial court awarded Deutsche Bank a writ of possession on
the Property. Id. The Bobs appealed the case to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals of
Texas, but the appeal was dismissed as moot. Bob v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.,
No. 13-24-00636-CV, 2025 WL 454225 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2025,
no pet.).
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ECF No. 24-4. The court considers the documents submitted by
Defendants because Plaintiff’s Complaint refers to them, and they
are central to Plaintiff’s claims.
Additionally, 	because 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	respond 	to
Defendant’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss, 	it 	is 	deemed 	unopposed. 	See
S.D. Tex. L.R. 7.4 (stating that failure to respond to a motion is
“taken as a representation of no opposition”). Therefore, the court
may 	accept 	the 	unopposed 	facts 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	motion 	as
undisputed. Cf. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174
(5th Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court’s acceptance of the facts
in 	support 	of 	the 	defendant’s 	summary 	judgment 	motion 	as
undisputed, where the plaintiff made no opposition to the motion).
A. Background Facts
In February 2006, Plaintiff and his spouse2 obtained a home
mortgage loan (Loan) in the amount of $108,000.00, from New
Century Mortgage Corporation (New Century). ECF No. 1-1 at 18,
42–43. The Loan encumbered the Property. Id. at 42–43. The Loan
was memorialized through the Deed of Trust and Note, which were
both recorded in Harris County. Id. at 42–66; ECF No. 24-4.
On 	August 	16, 	2011, 	pursuant 	to 	a 	Transfer 	of 	Lien,
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), as
Trustee for Ixis Real Estate Capital Trust 2006-HE2 Mortgage
Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-HE2, obtained “all of the
right, title and interest owned or held by” New Century in the Deed
of Trust. ECF No. 24-4 at 1. The Transfer of Lien was recorded in
Harris County on August 26, 2011. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff asserts that he made timely monthly payments
under the Loan until June 1, 2020. ECF No. 1-1 at 22. Plaintiff was
2 Although the listed “Borrower” on the Deed of Trust is “CHRISTINA BOB, A Married
Woman,” it appears to the court that Plaintiff initialed and signed the Deed of Trust
and its attachments. ECF No. 1-1 at 42–66. The notarization states that “on this day
personally appeared Christina Bob and spouse, Ronald Bob . . . .” Id. at 57.
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informed 	that 	he 	had 	defaulted 	on 	his 	Loan 	obligations 	in
late 2020. Id. at 23. Plaintiff also asserts that PHH Mortgage
Company (PHH), acting on behalf of Deutsche Bank, issued and
signed a Notice of Default on October 17, 2022, and 91-days later,
a Notice of Trustee Sale. Id. at 23, 37–39. Plaintiff states that he
received both notices. Id. at 18. Nevertheless, Plaintiff “disputes
the validity of the default” and asserts that he “made timely
payments . . . .” Id. at 18.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was not provided with adequate
notice or documentation of the foreclosure process or foreclosure
sale. ECF No. 1-1 at 7, 18. These allegations are contradicted by
Plaintiff’s own evidence. Plaintiff attached the “Affidavit of Notice
to Debtors” to his Complaint. ECF No. 1-1 at 40 (Lopez Aff.). In the
Affidavit, Yosemite Lopez, Trustee Sale Assistant, states:
The attached Notice of Trustee’s Sale was posted at
least twenty-one (21) days preceding the date of the
sale and the Courthouse door of the County in which
the property is located and a signed Notice of Trustee’s
Sale was filed in the office of the County Clerk of such
county at least twenty-one (21) days preceding the
date of the sale. In addition, a notice of acceleration
and 	Notice 	of 	Trustee’s 	Sale 	was 	served 	upon 	all
debtors obligated to pay the debt according to the
records of the mortgagee by certified mail at the last
known address for each debtor in accordance with law.
The debtor(s) in default . . . were served written notice
by certified mail of their default, and given proper time
to cure the default in accordance with law.
Id. Ms. Lopez’s Affidavit is prima facie evidence that Plaintiff
received proper notice under the Loan. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann.
§ 51.002(e) (“The affidavit of a personal knowledgeable of the facts
to the effect that service was completed is prima facie evidence of
service.”). Other than conclusory allegations, Plaintiff does not
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present any facts to show that the Affidavit, which he attached to
his own Complaint, is inaccurate.
Plaintiff alleges that he “requested a loan modification or
other loss mitigation options, but Defendants failed to engage in a
good faith review” of the application and pursued foreclosure.
ECF No. 1-1 at 7. In 2024, Power Default Services Inc. (Power
Default), 	allegedly 	acting 	on 	behalf 	of 	Deutsche 	Bank 	and
Altisource Solutions, Inc. (Altisource), initiated foreclosure on the
Property. Id. A foreclosure sale was held on March 5, 2024. Id.
at 34. Deutsche Bank purchased the Property for $230,972.51. Id.
B. Procedural History
On 	October 	29, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	suit 	against 	New
Century, Deutsche Bank, PHH, Altisource, and Power Default
(collectively, Defendants) in the 295th District Court of Harris
County, Texas. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. At the time of the lawsuit,
Deutsche Bank was the mortgagee of record on the Property, and
PHH was the Loan servicer. ECF No. 24 at 6. Power Default
“provided trustee services in connection with the foreclosure[,] and
Altisource is an affiliate of Power Default. Id. Plaintiff asserts
various claims related to the Loan and the foreclosure of the
Property. He appears to assert all of his claims against all of the
Defendants, without distinguishing between the parties.
It does not appear that Plaintiff ever effectuated service of
process on Defendants. See ECF No. 1-4 (“No party has been
properly served to date.”). Nevertheless, Defendants removed the
case 	to 	federal 	court 	on 	November 	25, 	2024. 	ECF 	No. 	1.
Approximately two weeks later, Defendants, seeking leave to file
a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	filed 	a 	letter 	requesting 	a 	pre-motion
conference before the court. ECF No. 8. The request was referred
to the undersigned on March 21, 2025. ECF No. 16. On April 3,
2025, the undersigned held the requested pre-motion conference
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via video. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff was present. See id. During the
conference, the court granted Plaintiff’s oral motion for leave to file
an amended complaint. Id. It ordered Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint that addressed “all of the 	deficiencies identified in
Defendants’ letter, ECF No. 8,” by April 24, 2025. Id. Additionally,
the court warned: “The court is not likely to grant further leave to
amend” the complaint. Id.
Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint by the court’s
deadline. On May 15, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss all of
Bob’s claims for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff did
not respond to Defendant’s motion. On June 27, 2025, Defendants
filed a Notice of No Response, in which they requested that the
court consider their Motion to Dismiss unopposed. ECF No. 26
(citing S.D. Tex. L.R. 7.4)). Just over five weeks later—and four
months since the court granted Plaintiff’s first request for leave to
amend his Complaint—Plaintiff filed a new Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 27. On November 17,
2025, the court struck the motion for failure to comply with the
Southern District of Texas’s Local Rules. ECF No. 46. Plaintiff did
not refile the motion, and he has not otherwise repeated his
request to amend the complaint.
While the court considers Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to
be unopposed, the court will not grant a dispositive motion merely
because it is unopposed. See Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc.,
631 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing the district court’s
decision to grant defendants’ motions to dismiss merely because
they were unopposed). Instead, the court considers the Motion on
its merits.
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2. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court determines whether
the plaintiff’s complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable 	inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.3d 	576, 	580 	(5th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
Courts accept “all well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Allen v. Walmart
Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A plaintiff need only
plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim
to survive a motion to dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med.
Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level . . . on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A]
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable[.]” Id. at 556.
Only statements of fact are to be taken as true. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Conclusory allegations are “disentitled . . . to the presumption of
truth.” Id. at 681. Thus, the court, in reviewing the plaintiff’s
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complaint, may neither “accept conclusory allegations” nor “strain
to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs.” Southland Sec. Corp.
v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
The court liberally construes pro se pleadings. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a plaintiff’s complaint fails
to state a claim, the court should generally give the plaintiff a
chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing
the action with prejudice, unless doing so would be futile. See Great
Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,
329 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Ayers v. Johnson, 247 F. App’x 534,
535 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court acts within its discretion
when dismissing a motion to amend that is frivolous or futile.”).
3. Standing to Foreclose
Before turning to 	each specific cause 	of action 	Plaintiff
alleges in his Complaint, the court will address an issue that
Plaintiff raises throughout his pleadings—whether Defendants
had standing to foreclose on Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff bakes
into all of his causes of action the notion that Defendants lacked
standing. This argument is based on a misunderstanding of Texas
law.
In Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249,
253 (5th Cir. 2013), the Fifth Circuit addressed and rejected the
same arguments that Plaintiff now asserts. There, the homeowner
presented 	an 	argument 	“conflating 	ownership 	of 	a 	note 	with
constitutional 	standing.” 	Martins, 	722 	F.3d 	at 	252–53. 	The
homeowner also argued that the servicer could not foreclose on her
home mortgage loan because (1) the assignment was defective, and
(2) even if it was a valid assignment of the mortgage, the servicer
was only assigned the mortgage, and not the promissory note. Id.
at 252–56.
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The Fifth Circuit found that the homeowner’s argument
merged two common theories on which mortgagees in wrongful-
foreclosure cases often attempt to rely: the “show-me-the-note”
theory and the “split-the-note” theory. Martins, 722 F.3d at 253.
The show-me-the-note theory “posits that to foreclose, a party
must produce the original note bearing a ‘wet ink signature.’” Id.
The split-the-note theory is that the foreclosing “party must hold
both the note and the deed of trust.” Id. at 254.
The court rejected both theories. It held that in Texas, “[t]he
original, signed note need not be produced in order to foreclose.”
Martins, 722 F.3d at 254. Additionally, it held that “where the
foreclosing party is a mortgage servicer, and the mortgage has
been properly assigned[, t]he party to foreclose need not possess
the note itself.” Id. at 255.
In 	Martins, 	the 	evidence 	showed 	“a 	signed, 	notarized
assignment 	document 	[from 	the 	original 	mortgagee 	to 	the
defendant] that had also been recorded by the county clerk.”
722 F.3d at 252. The court found that the homeowner’s argument
failed, and that there was “no doubt” that the mortgage was
transferred. Id. at 252–53.
The 	same 	is 	true 	here. 	Much 	like 	the 	homeowner’s
arguments in Martins, Plaintiff’s arguments merge common legal
theories and principles. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he deed of trust[]
and the promissory note must always be together, and without the
note and the loan accounting entries, the attorney has failed to
prove there was any debt . . . .” ECF No. 1-1 at 16. Plaintiff’s
argument under the “split-the-note” theory is not supported under
Texas law. See Martins, 722 F.3d at 256.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants have failed
to produce the original promissory note, chain or title, or other
documents proving they has [sic] the legal right to foreclose on the
Property.” ECF No. 1-1 at 19. Plaintiff attached to his Complaint
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the Deed of Trust for the Property. Id. at 42–66. Defendants
submitted the Transfer of Lien, which was recorded in Harris
County. ECF No. 24-4. The Transfer of Lien states that New
Century 	assigned 	and 	transferred 	the 	Deed 	of 	Trust 	for 	the
property to Deutsche Bank. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s mortgage was
transferred to Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank need not produce a
wet-ink signature to foreclose. See Martins, 722 F.3d at 253–54.
Plaintiff 	also 	appears 	to 	assert 	that 	Defendants 	lacked
standing to foreclose because Plaintiff owes nothing under the
loan. ECF No. 1-1 at 19. He states that he “was never provided
with a loan” and his “financial asset was exchanged for FED’s
promissory notes in an even exchange.” Id. He argues that his
“signature created the promissory note in dispute, and it was sold
to the Federal Reserve in exchange for the plaintiff’s signed note.”
Id. at 20. As the court previously explained, the Transfer of Lien
demonstrates 	that 	New 	Century 	assigned 	Plaintiff’s 	Loan 	to
Deutsche Bank. ECF No. 24-4. There is nothing to indicate that
the Loan was sold, transferred, or assigned to the Federal Reserve.
And even if that were true, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to
how it would reduce his debt under the Loan to zero.
Plaintiff’s assertions that the Defendants lacked standing to
foreclose on the Loan are baseless. The court now turns to each of
Plaintiff’s claims.
4. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims for wrongful foreclosure, breach of
contract, 	violations 	of 	the 	Fair 	Debt 	Collection 	Practices 	Act
(FDCPA), violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), violations
of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), slander of
title, slander of credit, fraud, intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress, conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and conspiracy to violate
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his civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Plaintiff appears to assert
each of his claims against all of the Defendants, collectively. He
fails to distinguish which defendant engaged in what alleged
conduct. The court also notes that Plaintiff’s allegations are almost
entirely conclusory and devoid of any factual content. The court
addresses each of Plaintiff’s claims accordingly.
A. Wrongful Foreclosure
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants wrongfully foreclosed on
the Property. ECF No. 1-1 at 7. Under Texas law, to state a claim
for wrongful foreclosure, a plaintiff must plead: (1) that there was
“a defect in the foreclosure sale proceedings;” (2) that the property
was sold at a “grossly inadequate price;” and (3) that there is “a
causal connection between the defect and the grossly inadequate
selling price.” Carey v. Fargo, No. 15-1666, 2016 WL 4246997, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2016) (citing Martins, 722 F.3d at 256).
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	there 	were 	several 	defects 	in 	the
foreclosure process, including Defendants’ “fail[ure] to provide
proper notice of default and right to cure,” denial of Plaintiff’s
request for a loan modification, and use of “fraudulent documents.”
ECF No. 1-1 at 7. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this conduct,
he has “suffered significant financial loss, emotional distress, and
damage to credit.” Id. Plaintiff did not plead that the property was
sold at a grossly inadequate price or that the alleged defects caused
the property to sell at a grossly inadequate price. Because Plaintiff
did not plead the required elements, he cannot recover on a claim
for wrongful foreclosure.
However, even if Plaintiff had alleged that the property was
sold 	at 	a 	grossly 	inadequate 	price, 	that 	allegation 	would 	be
undermined by the facts set forth in the pleadings. A price is
“grossly inadequate” when it is “a consideration so far short of the
real value of the property as to shock a correct mind, and thereby
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raise a presumption that fraud attended the purchase.” Cavazos
Ramirez v. Laredo Nat’l Bank, No. M-10-09, 2013 WL 12394256,
at *25 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2013) (citing Richardson v. Kent, 47
S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1932, no writ). “Courts have
found prices to be ‘grossly inadequate’ where the foreclosure sale
prices were as low as 0.007% of the property value and as high as
44.23% 	of 	the 	property 	value.” 	Id. 	(collecting 	cases). 	At 	the
foreclosure sale, the Property sold for $230,972.51—nearly 88% of
its market value. See ECF No. 1-2 (Harris Co. Appraisal District
Records showing that the Property’s market value was $262,698
2024). Bob has not shown that the property sold at a grossly
inadequate price.
Accordingly, the court recommends that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful
foreclosure.
B. Breach of Contract
Plaintiff states the elements of a breach of contract claim,
but he fails to actually plead facts to support those elements. ECF
No. 1-1 at 27. The elements of a breach of contract claim are
(1) “the existence of a valid contract,” (2) “performance or tendered
performance by the plaintiff,” (3) “breach of the contract by the
defendant,” and (4) “damages sustained as a result of the breach.”
Innova Hosp. San Antonio, LP v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga.,
892 F.3d 719, 731 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim 	fails 	on 	the 	second
element because Plaintiff did not perform or tender performance
under the Loan. “Under Texas law, ‘a party to a contract who is
himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach.’” Vera v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 569 F. App’x 349–51 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. 1990)). Defendants
assert that Plaintiff defaulted on the Loan, and Plaintiff’s own
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evidence shows the same—Plaintiff defaulted on the Loan by
failing to make timely mortgage payments. Therefore, Plaintiff,
himself in default, cannot recover for breach of contract.
Because Plaintiff cannot show that he performed or tendered
performance under the Loan, as he was in default on the Loan,
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails. The court recommends
that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
claim for breach of contract.
C. FDCPA
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendants 	“violated 	the 	FDCPA,
including misrepresentation, fraud, harassment, unfair means,
and deception to collect a debt.” ECF No. 1-1 at 9. The FDCPA
prohibits debt collection methods that threaten, harass, abuse, or
deceive a debtor. Examples of prohibited methods include: sending
a letter to a debtor that looks like it is from a government agency,
using obscene or profane language when contacting a debtor, and
threatening a debtor with violence or illegal action. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692d-1692j.
Plaintiff appears to allege that the Defendants’ conduct
violates the FDCPA because “[w]ithout [the] Note and the original
deed of trust, the defendants cannot verify there was any debt.”
ECF No. 1-1 at 16. This rests, in part, on the “split-the-note” and
“show-me-the-note” theories, which the court has already rejected.
As discussed, the Loan was transferred to Deutsche Bank, and
Deutsche Bank had the authority to foreclose.
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated the FDCPA
by making a “false misrepresentation in the course of collecting a
debt.” ECF No. 1-1 at 17. He states that under the FDCPA, “debt
collectors can’t use false, deceptive, or misleading practices.” Id.
However, Plaintiff does not explain what “false misrepresentation”
Defendants are alleged to have made. He merely argues that an
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unnamed debt-collector’s “attorney violates the FDCPA, as they do
not have a license to collect a debt, they have no bond in place to
be a debt collector[,] and they are not registered in the States they
are attempting to collect in.” Id. at 16; see also id. at 9 (“The law
firm, or the attorney, did not meet the requirements mandated in
the [FDCPA] necessary to be a legal debt collector.”). He asserts
“the defendant used and misrepresented to the court as a licensed
attorney when he did not have a license to practice law.” Id. at 14.
These 	bare, 	conclusory, 	and 	difficult-to-follow 	allegations 	are
insufficient under the federal pleading standard. Plaintiff does not
name the “debt collector,” attorney, or law firm; he does not state
what relationship the “debt collector,” attorney, and law firm have
with the Defendants; and he provides nothing to substantiate his
arguments regarding the attorney’s licensure or the law firm’s
status.
The 	court 	also 	notes 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	shown 	that
Defendants fall within the scope of the FDCPA. Section 1692g of
the statute imposes certain obligations on debt collectors. A “debt
collector” 	under 	the 	FDCPA 	is 	“any 	person . . . who 	regularly
collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due or asserted to
be 	owed 	or 	due 	another.” 	15 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1692(a)(6). 	However,
mortgage lenders and servicers are generally not “debt collectors”
within the meaning of the FDCPA. Montgomery v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 459 F. App’x 424, 428–29 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012); Perry v.
Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). A mortgage
lender or servicer may be a debt collector for purposes of the
FDCPA if it becomes a mortgage lender or servicer after the debt
was in default. Smith v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., No. 20-CV-
00321, 	2020 	WL 	5759967, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	Sept. 	28, 	2020).
Defendants Deutsche Bank and New Century do not fall within
the definition of “debt collector” based on the pleadings before the
court, as the debt was assigned to Deutsche Bank from New
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Century prior to Plaintiff’s default. As to the other defendants,
Plaintiff fails to provide any facts sufficient to demonstrate that
Defendants’ principal business is collecting debts or that they
regularly collect debts or attempt to collect debts for someone else.
For these reasons, the court recommends that Defendants’
Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	be 	GRANTED 	as 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	for
violations of the FDCPA.
D. TILA Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendants 	violated 	TILA
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23, “by failing to disclose key loan
information.” ECF No. 1-1 at 7. TILA specifies the “disclosures that
must be made in certain consumer credit transactions.” Schieroni
v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 10-0663, 2011 WL 3652194,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2011). If disclosure obligations are not
satisfied, a consumer may have the right to rescind the transaction
under Regulation Z. Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23. “There is no right of
recission, 	however, 	with 	respect 	to 	‘residential 	mortgage
transactions.’” 	Id. 	(citing 	15 	U.S.C. 	§ 1635(e)(1); 	12 	C.F.R.
§ 226.23(f)(1); Perkins v. Cent. Mortg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 487, 489
(E.D. Pa. 2006)). “A ‘residential mortgage transaction’ means ‘a
transaction in which a mortgage . . . is created or retained against
the 	consumer’s 	dwelling 	to 	finance 	the 	acquisition 	or 	initial
construction of such dwelling.’” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w)).
Under Plaintiff’s heading for “Violation of The Truth in
Lending Act,” he states:
The defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act,
Regulation Z, 12 CFR §226.23, which states that the
security 	agreement 	signed 	with 	a 	lender 	can 	be
rescinded 	if 	they 	have 	not 	provided 	the 	proper
disclosures. 	The 	original 	debt 	was 	actually 	zero
because the Plaintiff’s financial assets were exchanged
for FED’s promissory notes in an even exchange. The
defendant misled the State Court when they executed
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the 	unlawful 	foreclosure 	and 	case 	against 	the
plaintiff’s property. . . .
. . . The attorney does not have a license to practice law
and therefore is not qualified to represent a fictious
corporation in court. . . .
ECF No. 1-1 at 11 (citing ECF No. 1-1 at 32–41). From this, it is
difficult to decipher the basis of Plaintiff’s TILA claim. But it is
clear that Plaintiff’s allegations pertain to a “residential mortgage
transaction.” As such, the right to recission does not apply.
The court has already rejected Plaintiff’s assertions that
Defendants lacked standing, that the original debt was reduced to
zero, 	and 	that 	the 	unidentified 	attorney 	lacks 	appropriate
licensure. These arguments do not impact the court’s analysis on
this claim.
Plaintiff has not stated a claim under TILA. Accordingly, the
court 	recommends 	that 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	be
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for violations of TILA.
E. RESPA Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated RESPA by failing
to review Plaintiff’s request for loan modification. ECF No. 1-1
at 7. Under RESPA, mortgage lenders and servicers are prohibited
from engaging in “dual tracking,” which is the practice of “actively
pursu[ing] 	foreclosure 	while 	simultaneously 	considering 	the
borrower for loss mitigation options.” Gresham v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 642 F. App’x 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing 12 C.F.R.
§ 1024.41(g)). “However, Section 1024.41(g) only applies where ‘a
servicer receives a complete loss mitigation application more than
37 	days 	before 	a 	foreclosure 	sale.’” 	Id. 	(citing 	12 	C.F.R.
§ 1024.41(c)). Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, a plaintiff must plead—or provide evidence to
show—that he submitted a complete loss mitigation application
more than 37 days before the foreclosure sale. Id.
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Plaintiff asserts only that he “requested loan modification or
other loss mitigation options . . . .” ECF No. 1-1 at 7. Plaintiff
pleads 	no 	additional 	facts 	related 	to 	the 	method, 	timing, 	or
completeness 	of 	his 	requests 	for 	loan 	modification 	or 	loss
mitigation. For these reasons, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded
his 	claim 	for 	violation 	of 	RESPA 	Regulation 	X. 	The 	court
recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED
as to this claim.
F. Slander of Title
“‘Slander 	of 	title’ 	is 	defined 	as 	a 	false 	and 	malicious
statement made in disparagement of a person’s title to property
which causes special damages.” Elijah Ragira/VIP Lodging Grp.,
Inc. v. VIP Lodging Grp., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2009, no pet.) (citations omitted). To state a claim for slander
of 	title, 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	show: 	(1) defendant 	uttered 	and
published the disparaging words; (2) that the words were false and
malicious; (3) that plaintiff sustained special damages; (4) that the
plaintiff possessed an interest in the disparaged property; and
(5) that the plaintiff lost a specific sale as a result of defendant’s
actions. Id. at 759 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that any of the
Defendants made a false or malicious statement regarding the
authority to foreclose. See Storm Assocs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
645 S.W.2d 579, 588 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982) (“A claim of
title does not constitute malice where the claim is made under color
of title or upon reasonable belief that parties have title to the
property acquired.”), aff’d sub nom., Friedman v. Texaco, Inc.,
691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985). Plaintiff also failed to plead that he
sustained special damages and that he lost a specific sale of his
home. Accordingly, the court recommends that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for slander of title.
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G. Slander of Credit and Fair Credit Reporting Act
Plaintiff asserts a claim for “slander of credit.” ECF No. 1-1
at 28. There is some dispute over the recognition of this claim, and
if it is a recognized claim, what elements are required. See ECF
No. 24 at 29–31. However, the Fifth Circuit has construed a claim
for slander of credit, in the context of a wrongful foreclosure, as a
claim for defamation of the plaintiff’s credit. Payne v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 637 F. App’x. 833, 838 (5th Cir. 2016). “Under Texas
law, ‘[d]efamation is a false statement about a person, published
to a third party, without legal excuse, which damages the person’s
reputation.” Id. (citing Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d
1150, 1161 (5th Cir. 2006)). In support of this claim, Plaintiff
merely pleads “that the actions and inactions of the defendants
have impaired their credit.” Id. Plaintiff did not assert that any of
the Defendants provided false information about him to a credit
reporting agency or otherwise.
Defendants 	argue 	that 	slander 	of 	credit 	claims 	“are
preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C
§ 1681s-2(b), unless a plaintiff shows that the defendant acted
‘with 	malice 	or 	willful 	intent 	to 	injure’ 	in 	furnishing 	false
information to a credit reporting agency.” ECF No. 24 at 29–30
(citing Sheets v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-4534, 2013 WL
5914404, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2013)). Plaintiff did not plead
facts sufficient to show that Defendants acted with malice or with
willful intent to injure Plaintiff’s credit.
To the extent that Plaintiff intended to assert a claim for
violation of the FCRA, that claim would also fail. “Liability under
the FCRA attaches only after the furnisher of credit information
has received notice of a dispute from a credit reporting agency[.]”
Schultz v. HomeBridge Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 24-50193, 2025 WL
1467431 (5th Cir. May 22, 2025). Plaintiff has not pleaded facts
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sufficient to establish if, when, or how he notified a credit reporting
agency of any dispute.
For these reasons, the court recommends that Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for slander
of credit and any claim Plaintiff may have intended to assert under
the FCRA.
H. Fraud
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Defendants 	committed 	fraudulent
conduct during the foreclosure proceedings. ECF No. 1-1 at 8. To
allege a claim of fraud under Texas law, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) a material misrepresentation; (2) the representation was false;
(3) the defendant either knew the representation was false or
recklessly 	asserted 	it 	without 	knowledge 	of 	its 	truth; 	(4) the
defendant 	intended 	that 	the 	plaintiff 	should 	act 	upon
the 	representation; 	(5) the 	plaintiff 	acted 	in 	reliance 	on 	the
representation; and (6) the plaintiff was injured as a result. Harris
Cnty. v. MERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 558 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011)). A plaintiff’s fraud claim
must 	meet 	the 	heightened 	level 	of 	pleading 	required 	under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities,
Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2008). The Fifth Circuit
“interprets Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring a plaintiff pleading fraud
to specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the
speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and
explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Id. at 39 (citing
Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 564–
65 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff failed to meet the pleading standard required under
Rule 9(b). Plaintiff pleads that:
Defendants 	engaged 	in 	fraudulent 	conduct 	by
submitting 	false 	documents, 	misrepresenting 	the
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ownership of the loan, and failing to properly assign
the mortgage to the appropriate entity. Defendants
knew or should have known that their actions were
fraudulent and intended to mislead Plaintiff and the
court into having the foreclosure to proceed.
ECF No. 1-1 at 8. Plaintiff does not specify what “false documents”
were submitted, who is alleged to have misrepresented the Loan’s
ownership, or when that alleged misrepresentation occurred. And
the court has already explained why it rejects Plaintiff’s assertion
that the assignment of the Loan to Deutsche Bank was improper.
It will not repeat that analysis here.
Because Plaintiff has not met the pleading requirements
under Rule 9(b), the court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for fraud.
I. 	Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress 	(IIED) 	and 	negligent 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress
(NIED). ECF No. 1-1 at 28. To state a claim for IIED under Texas
law, 	a 	plaintiff 	“must 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	defendant
intentionally 	or 	recklessly 	engaged 	in 	extreme 	or 	outrageous
conduct 	that 	resulted 	in 	severe 	emotional 	distress.” 	Stelly 	v.
Duriso, 982 F.3d 403, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Standard
Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Tex. 1998)).
“Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct ‘so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.’” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)). The plaintiff must also
demonstrate that there is no alternative cause of action available
to redress the alleged misconduct. Stelly, 982 F.3d at 408 (citing
Hoffmann-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 447). That is because “IIED is
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a ‘gap-filler’ tort reserved for ‘those rare instances in which a
defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a
manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory
of redress.’” Id. (quoting Hoffman-La Roche, 144 S.W.3d at 447).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating “extreme or
outrageous conduct” by any of the Defendants. Plaintiff also has
not 	alleged 	that 	he 	suffered 	“severe 	emotional 	distress.”
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for IIED.
NIED is not generally recognized as a cause of action in
Texas. 	Chapa 	v. 	Traciers 	& 	Assocs., 	287 	S.W.3d 	388, 	398
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Boyles v.
Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993)). “[T]here is no general duty
in Texas not to negligently inflict emotional distress.” Boyles,
855 S.W.2d at 594. Because of this, instead of pursuing an NIED
claim, “[a] claimant may recover mental anguish damages only in
connection with defendant’s breach of some other legal duty.” Id.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for NIED fails.
For these reasons, the court recommends that Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for IIED
and NIED.
J. Conspiracy 	to 	Deprive 	of 	Civil 	Rights 	under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
deprive him of property, in violation of due process under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. ECF No. 1-1 at 15. “Section 1983 is not
itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Section 1983 provides redress for those who have been
injured 	or 	deprived 	of 	their 	rights 	under 	color 	of 	state 	law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Moody v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir.
2017).
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Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	he 	was 	deprived 	of 	his 	property,
through the foreclosure proceedings, without due process. ECF
No. 1-1 at 15. “[F]oreclosure procedures implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment 	only 	where 	there 	is 	at 	least 	some 	direct 	state
involvement in the execution of the foreclosure or seizure.” Pease
v. First Nat’l Bank, 335 F. App’x. 412, 414 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth
Circuit “has held that ‘no significant state action is involved in non-
judicial foreclosures under a deed of trust.’” Id. (quoting Barrera v.
Sec. Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1170 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Because this case involves a non-judicial foreclosure under a Deed
of Trust, there is no significant state action that would implicate
the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment. 	Thus, 	there 	was 	no 	violation 	of
Section 1983. And without an actual violation of Section 1983, “a
conspiracy claim [under Section 1985] is not actionable.” Hale v.
Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995). Similarly, without a
conspiracy under Section 1985, the alleged co-conspirators cannot
be held liable under Section 1986.
Accordingly, the court recommends that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to
deprive him of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
and 1986.
K. 	Conspiracy 	to 	Violate 	Civil 	Rights 	under
18 U.S.C. § 241
Plaintiff attempts to assert a civil claim under a federal
criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241. ECF No. 1-1 at 15. “[A] private
right of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). The criminal
statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 241, “do[es] not display any indication
of Congressional intent to create a private right and a private
remedy[.]” Deramus v. Shapiro Schwartz, LLP, No. 19-4683, 2020
WL 3494558, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2020
WL 34919160 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2020). Accordingly, the court
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recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED
as to Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to violate his civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 241.
5. Leave to Amend is Denied
“Dismissing an action after giving the plaintiff only one
opportunity to state his case is ordinarily unjustified.” Davoodi v.
Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986)). If the
plaintiff seeks leave to amend, he “must give the court at least
some notice of what . . . her amendments would be and how those
amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects.” Scott v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). The court may deny leave “[i]f the plaintiff does not
provide a copy of the amended complaint [or] explain how the
defects could be cured[.]” Id. (citation omitted). The court may also
deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile or when the
plaintiff chooses to stand on her complaint and argues that it
satisfies 	the 	pleading 	requirements. 	See 	Khoury 	v. 	Thota,
No. 20-20578, 2021 WL 3919248, at *4 (5th Cir. Sep. 1, 2021)
(affirming the district court’s denial of leave to amend when the
plaintiff 	chose 	to 	stand 	on 	his 	complaint 	and 	argued 	that 	it
satisfied the pleading requirements); Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp.,
3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing futility of amendment
as justification for denying leave to amend).
In early April 2025, the court granted Plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint within twenty-one days. ECF No. 20. The
court warned that it was not likely to grant future leave to amend.
Id. Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s order. Defendants
then filed the instant motion. Plaintiff did not respond. Five weeks
after Defendants filed their Notice of No Response, ECF No. 26,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint.
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ECF No. 27 (Second Motion for Leave to Amend). This Second
Motion for Leave to Amend was filed more than four months after
the court initially granted Plaintiff leave to amend.
The court struck Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Leave to
Amend for failure to comply with the Southern District of Texas’s
Local Rules. ECF No. 46. Since then, Plaintiff has not made any
additional requests for leave to amend.
Based on the amendments that Plaintiff proposed in his
Second Motion for Leave to Amend, as well as the nature of the
defects in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the court has no reason to believe
that Plaintiff could amend his Complaint to remedy its defects.
Therefore, the court concludes that amendment would be futile.
Any request for leave to amend is denied.
6. Remaining Motions
Plaintiff’s 	remaining 	motions—the 	various 	Motions 	for
Leave, ECF Nos. 38, 41, 42, 49, 50; and the Motion to Declare
Conveyance, 	ECF 	No. 	51—do 	not 	affect 	the 	court’s 	analysis.
Because the court finds that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed, these remaining motions are DENIED as MOOT.
7. Conclusion
Because Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendants,
the court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 24, be GRANTED, and that all of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to Refile Stricken
Motions, ECF Nos. 38, 41, 42; Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Conduct Limited Discovery, ECF No. 49; Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File a Jurisdictional Notice and a Motion Addressing
Standing, 	ECF 	No. 	50; 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Declare
Conveyance, ECF No. 51, are DENIED as MOOT.
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The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th
Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on February 19, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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