Keng v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GUY M. K.,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-4384
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Guy K. (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendant Frank
Bisignano1 (“Commissioner”) seeking review of the denial of benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act. (ECF Nos. 1, 14). Pending before the Court2
are the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 	(ECF Nos. 14, 18).
Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and relevant law, the Court
RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
18) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14)
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. F ED . R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
2 On November 25, 2024, this case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF
No. 4).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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be DENIED. 	The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s
decision be AFFIRMED and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on July 19, 2021,
alleging disability starting on March 1, 2021. (ECF No. 7-1 at 20).3 Plaintiff’s
claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration on March 7,
2022, and again on reconsideration on August 21, 2023. 	(Id.). 	On September
20, 2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
(Id.). On April 23, 2024, Administrative Law Judge Caroline Beers (the “ALJ”)
held a telephonic hearing. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the
hearing. 	(Id.). 	Thomas W. King, a vocational expert (“VE”), appeared and
testified at the hearing. (Id.).
On June 14, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled at Step Four.4 (Id. at 20–30). 	At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2021, the alleged
onset date. (Id. at 22). At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following
3 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 7.
4 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
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severe impairments: “hypertension and glaucoma (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” 	(Id.
at 23). At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff: “does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20
CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” 	(Id. at 25). 	The ALJ determined
that Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: the claimant can occasionally
climb stairs and ramps, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. 	The
claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant
can 	never 	work 	around 	dangerous, 	moving 	machinery 	or
unprotected 	heights. 	The 	claimant 	can 	never 	engage 	in
commercial 	driving. 	The 	claimant 	can 	never 	work 	in 	direct
sunlight. 	The claimant can never work around loud noise. 	The
claimant 	must 	have 	ready 	access 	(physical 	proximity) 	to 	a
restroom, though there are no restrictions on the frequency of
visits or length of time in the restroom.
(Id. at 25). At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff “is capable of performing past
relevant work as a Travel Agent. This work does not require the performance
of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity
(20 CFR 404.1565).” 	(Id. at 28). 	The ALJ therefore found Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. (Id. at 30).
Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on September 27, 2024. (Id. at 6). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
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II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
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supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff argues (1) the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial
evidence because it fails to include all of Plaintiff’s limitations caused by his
vision impairments; (2) the finding that Plaintiff could perform his past
relevant work as a travel agent is erroneous because the ALJ failed to present
a hypothetical question to the VE that included all of Plaintiff’s limitations;
and (3) the ALJ erred by finding that the June 2022 medical opinion of Dr.
Michael Allen Hansen (“Dr. Hansen”) was unpersuasive. (ECF No. 14 at 7, 22,
26; ECF No. 19). 	Commissioner argues the ALJ’s RFC assessment and
hypothetical is supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ was within her
discretion in finding Dr. Hansen’s medical form unpersuasive. 	(See ECF No.
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18). 	Because the first two issues that Plaintiff raises overlap, they will be
addressed together.
A. 	The ALJ’s RFC and Hypothetical is Supported by Substantial
Evidence
1. The RFC Finding
First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to recognize multiple limitations,
particularly those related to his vision. (ECF No. 14 at 15–22). However, the
Court finds the ALJ’s RFC determination identified the functional limitations
supported by the record and the extent of their severity. 	“Although Plaintiff
frames the issue as one of substantial evidence, the Court considers whether
the failure of the ALJ to attribute any specific limitation to a severe visual
impairment constitutes reversible error.” See Linward Charles M. v. Kijakazi,
No. 3:21-cv-2300, 2022 WL 17182077, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2022) (“Finding
impairments severe at Step Two ‘does not mandate additional limitations in
the 	RFC.’ 	‘The 	ALJ 	must 	clearly 	consider 	the 	severe 	impairments 	in
determining the claimant’s RFC, not necessarily assess limitations for each
severe impairment.’”) (citations omitted).
The ALJ first found Plaintiff’s hypertension and glaucoma were “severe
impairments.” 	(ECF No. 7-1 at 23). 	Next, the ALJ determined several of
Plaintiff’s 	impairments 	required 	“minimal 	medical 	intervention 	or 	only
episodic treatment,” including his gastroesophageal reflux disease, headaches,
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skin cancer, kidney stones, ulcerative colitis, left shoulder capsulitis, and left
foot plantar fasciitis.5 (Id. at 23–24). To that end, the ALJ determined “these
impairments singly or in combination [were] not severe because [they] do not
pose more than such minimal effect on [Plaintiff] such that they would not be
expected to interfere with his ability to do basic work activities.” 	(Id. at 24
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1))); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1) (outlining
technique to evaluate mental impairments whereby if the ALJ rates the
degrees of a claimant’s limitation as “none” or “mild,” the ALJ will generally
conclude the impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence indicates that
there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic
work activities). 	Indeed, the ALJ stated she “considered all of [Plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe,
when assessing [his] [RFC].” (ECF No. 7-1 at 24).
More 	specific 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	visual 	limitations, 	the 	ALJ 	discussed
Plaintiff’s glaucoma at Step Three, finding that his condition did not meet or
medically equal the severity of Listings 2.02 or 2.04.6 	(Id. at 25). 	The ALJ
5 The ALJ also noted “history of a stroke” “was assessed in the record with treatment
notes showing there were no medical records showing any testing to confirm such
allegations;” nonetheless, the ALJ “provided limitations for [] work around dangerous moving
machinery, unprotected heights and no commercial driving.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 23).
6 Listing 2.02 pertains to loss of visual acuity and is satisfied when the remaining
vision in the claimant’s better eye, after best correction, is 20/200 or less. 	See Hamilton-
Provost v. Colvin, 605 F. App’x 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1, § 2.02 (defining loss of central visual acuity as “[r]emaining vision in the better
eye after best correction is 20/200 or less”)). “Under Listing 2.04, a claimant is presumptively
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noted that Plaintiff’s remaining vision in his better eye after best correction
was not 20/200 or less, as required by Listing 2.02, and that the medical record
did not indicate a visual efficiency percentage of 20 or less, or a visual
impairment value of 1.00 or greater after best correction, as required by Listing
2.04. (Id.). For support, the ALJ cited an April 2021 treatment summary note
from 	Dr. 	Caroline 	Schmidt 	from 	the 	Houston 	Eye 	Associates 	following
Plaintiff’s 	cataract 	surgery, 	reflecting 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	vision 	was 	20/25
bilaterally with full peripheral vision and no defects. (Id. (citing ECF No. 7-2
at 50)). 	The ALJ therefore concluded Plaintiff’s glaucoma, while a severe
impairment, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. 	(Id.). 	See
Snoe v. Saul, No. 19-cv-1173, 2020 WL 4369498, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2020),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-cv-1173, 2020 WL 4368084 (S.D.
Tex. July 29, 2020) (concluding substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
findings where the ALJ found that plaintiff’s visual impairments did not meet
the criteria of Listings 2.02, 2.03, or 2.04 after reviewing eye examinations and
finding no evidence that the vision in his “better” eye showed the loss of visual
acuity, contraction of the visual field, or loss of visual efficiency).
disabled when his visual efficiency in the better eye is 20% or less.” Walton v. Astrue, No.
3:10-cv-0815, 2011 WL 195975, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2011) (“As the ALJ found, although
[claimant’s] vision in his left eye is severely impaired, there is no evidence of serious problems
with the right eye.”).
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The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s hypertension was controlled with
medication and produced no side effects. (ECF No. 7-1 at 25). Accordingly, the
ALJ 	accounted 	for 	Plaintiff’s 	vision-related 	and 	other 	nonexertional
limitations by restricting him from work involving exposure to dangerous
moving machinery, unprotected heights, direct sunlight, or loud noise, and
from 	engaging 	in 	commercial 	driving. 	(Id.). 	Thus, 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence. 	See also Hamilton-
Provost, 605 F. App’x at 238 (holding substantial evidence in the record
supported the ALJ’s conclusion where the RFC accounted for the claimant’s
visual problems by restricting work requiring driving, climbing, unprotected
heights, or good depth perception).
2. The Hypothetical
Next, and relatedly, Plaintiff argues that, because the hypothetical
question that was presented to the VE did not include all of Plaintiff’s
limitations, the VE’s subsequent testimony—that the ALJ relied on to find
Plaintiff can perform his past relevant work as a travel agent—is not supported
by substantial evidence. 	(ECF No. 14 at 22–25). 	Additionally, Plaintiff
contends the ALJ failed to properly compare the requirements of Plaintiff’s
past work with all his limitations. 	(Id. at 25). 	The Commissioner responds
that the ALJ’s RFC hypothetical question included all of Plaintiff’s functional
limitations as supported by the record, and that these limitations did not
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preclude Plaintiff from performing the work of a travel agent according to the
regulations. (ECF No. 18 at 10–12).
A claimant bears the burden of proving that he suffers from a disability,
which the Social Security Act defines as a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant
from engaging 	in 	substantial gainful 	activity. 	42 	U.S.C. § 	423(d)(1)(A);
Newton, 209 F.3d at 452. 	If the claimant satisfies the first four steps with
sufficient proof, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that
the claimant can perform other substantial work in the national economy.
Masterson, 309 F.3d 271–72 (citing Newton, 209 F.3d at 453; Chaparro v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987)). The burden of proof then returns
to the claimant to rebut the Commissioner’s showing. 	Id. 	At Step Four, the
ALJ was required to determine whether Plaintiff could perform his past
relevant work either as actually performed or as generally performed in the
national economy, based on a hypothetical that reasonably incorporated all
limitations supported by the record. 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2); see Villa v.
Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990) (“This determination may rest
on descriptions of past work as actually performed or as generally performed
in the national economy. ALJs may take notice of job data in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (‘DOT’), which reflects the exertional requirements of a job
as performed in the national economy.”) (citations omitted). 	An ALJ is not
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required to include limitations that are not supported by substantial evidence,
and a hypothetical question is sufficient if “it reasonably incorporates the
disabilities of the claimant recognized by the ALJ.” 	Faulkner v. Astrue, No.
7:10-cv-081, 2011 WL 2669139, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2011) (citing Bowling
v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Here, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a travel agent
under DOT § 252.152-010, 1991 WL 672372 (“Dictionary of Occupational Titles
– Travel Agent”) and found that Plaintiff performed this work at substantial
gainful activity levels during the relevant period. (ECF No. 7-1 at 28–29). The
ALJ then posed hypothetical questions to the VE that mirrored the RFC
determination, including nonexertional limitations restricting exposure to
dangerous moving machinery, unprotected heights, direct sunlight, loud noise,
commercial driving, and requiring ready access to a restroom defined as
physical proximity. (Id.). In response, the VE testified that an individual with
these limitations could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a travel agent
as generally performed under the DOT and as actually performed by Plaintiff.
(Id.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reliance on that testimony. The
DOT 	description 	for 	travel 	agent 	does 	not 	require 	exposure 	to 	hazards,
climbing, driving, unprotected heights, or adverse environmental conditions,
and it requires near acuity only on a frequent basis (from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time),
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with no requirements for far acuity, depth perception, accommodation, or field
of vision. 	See DOT § 252.152-010. 	These visual demands are consistent with
the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff’s corrected vision was 20/25 bilaterally with
full peripheral vision and no defects, and with the RFC’s environmental- and
hazard-based limitations. 	See Hamilton-Provost, 605 F. App’x at 237–38
(finding substantial evidence where the RFC and VE testimony accounted for
visual impairments through environmental and hazard restrictions).7 	The
ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s glaucoma, evaluated the condition under
the 	visual 	listings, 	and 	incorporated 	functional 	limitations 	supported 	by
objective findings. 	Because the hypothetical reflected all limitations the ALJ
found credible and supported by substantial evidence, the VE’s testimony
constitutes substantial evidence supporting the Step Four determination. See
Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 145 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he the ALJ may rely upon
the vocational expert’s testimony provided that the record reflects an adequate
basis for doing so.”). 	Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ properly
compared Plaintiff’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of his past
7 The ALJ also addressed and reasonably resolved any perceived inconsistencies
between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. The VE explained that limitations not expressly
addressed in the DOT—such as restroom proximity and specific climbing restrictions—were
based on professional experience, job placement history, and labor market analysis. 	(ECF
No. 7-1 at 29). The ALJ accepted this explanation and articulated a reasoned basis for doing
so, including clarification that “ready access to a restroom” referred to “proximity” rather
than 	“frequency” 	or 	“duration,” 	which 	was 	supported 	by 	Plaintiff’s 	testimony 	and
conservative treatment history. (Id.).
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relevant work, relied on VE testimony that was consistent with the DOT, and
supported her Step Four determination with substantial evidence.
B. 	The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Dr. Hansen’s Medical Opinion
Unpersuasive
Finally, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	the 	ALJ 	failed 	to 	properly 	consider 	and
articulate the persuasiveness of Dr. Hansen’s June 2022 medical opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s physical residual functional capacity. (ECF No. 14 at 26–
28). 	The Commissioner argues the ALJ adequately assessed the factors
necessitated by the regulations under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c to find Dr.
Hansen’s opinion unpersuasive. (ECF No. 18 at 12–14).
According 	to 	Dr. 	Hansen’s 	“Physical 	Residual 	Functional 	Capacity
Questionnaire,” he stated he has treated Plaintiff every four months for the
past 15 years for Crohn’s Disease, a stroke, multifactorial vision loss (cataracts,
glaucoma, stroke), and hypertension. (ECF No. 7-7 at 342). Dr. Hansen opined
that Plaintiff, among other things, could sit for one hour at a time before
needing to get up; could stand/walk less than two hours an eight-hour workday;
would need a break about six times per day, for 15 to 30 minutes each break;
could frequently lift less than 10 pounds;8 and would be absent from work four
8 The ALJ and Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Dr. Hansen noted Plaintiff could
“frequently lift less than 15 pounds” (ECF Nos. 7-1 at 27; 7-7 at 341); however, on the form
Dr. Hansen checked off that Plaintiff could frequently lift “[l]ess than 10 pounds” (ECF No.
7-7 at 344).
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days or more per month. (Id. at 343–45). The ALJ, however, found this opinion
unpersuasive because it was “not well supported, [and,] overall, it [was]
inconsistent with the evidence throughout the record.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 27).
For 	considering 	medical 	opinions 	and 	prior 	administrative 	medical
findings, and articulating their persuasiveness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)–(b)
provides in part:
(a) We 	will 	not defer or give any 	specific evidentiary weight,
including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative 	medical 	finding(s), 	including 	those 	from 	your
medical sources. 	When a medical source provides one or more
medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings, we will
consider those medical opinions or prior administrative medical
findings from that medical source together using the factors listed
in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.
The most important factors we consider when we evaluate [their]
persuasiveness . . . are supportability . . . and consistency . . . We
will articulate how we considered [them] according to paragraph
(b) of this section.
(b) We will articulate . . . how persuasive we find all of the medical
opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in
your case record. Our articulation requirements are as follows . . .
(1) we will articulate how we considered the medical opinions
or prior administrative medical findings from that medical
source together in a single analysis using the factors listed
in 	paragraphs 	(c)(1) 	through 	(c)(5) 	of 	this 	section, 	as
appropriate. 	We are not required to articulate how we
considered each medical opinion or prior administrative
medical finding from one medical source individually.
(2) The factors of supportability . . . and consistency . . . are
the most important factors we consider when we determine
how persuasive we find a medical source’s medical opinions
or prior administrative medical findings to be. . . . We may,
but are not required to, explain how we considered the factors
in 	paragraphs 	(c)(3) 	through 	(c)(5) 	of 	this 	section, 	as
appropriate, when we articulate how we consider medical
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opinions and prior administrative medical findings in your
case record. . . .
(emphasis 	added). 	The 	factors 	listed 	in 	subsection 	404.1520c(c) 	are 	(1)
supportability; 	(2) 	consistency; 	(3) 	relationship 	with 	the 	claimant; 	(4)
specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical
opinion or prior administrative medical finding.
Applying 	these 	standards, 	the 	ALJ 	adequately 	articulated 	her
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors and did not err in
finding Dr. Hansen’s opinion unpersuasive. The ALJ expressly acknowledged
Dr. Hansen’s long treatment relationship with Plaintiff and summarized the
physical limitations he assessed, including restricted standing and walking,
excessive breaks, and frequent absenteeism. 	(ECF No. 7-1 at 27). 	The ALJ
then 	explained 	that 	these 	limitations 	were 	“not 	well 	supported” 	by 	Dr.
Hansen’s own clinical findings and were “inconsistent with the evidence
throughout the record.” 	(Id.). This articulation satisfies the regulations’
requirement to explain how the most important factors—supportability and
consistency—were considered. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Regarding supportability, the ALJ reasonably relied on the lack of
objective findings accompanying Dr. Hansen’s restrictive assessment. 	The
ALJ cited another physical examination performed by Dr. Hansen on April 7,
2022, which showed Plaintiff was in no acute distress and had unremarkable
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examinations 	of 	the 	eyes, 	neck, 	back, 	lungs, 	heart, 	extremities,
musculoskeletal, and psychiatric systems. (ECF No. 7-1 at 28 (citing ECF No.
7-4 at 87–90)). 	See Heck, 674 F. App’x at 415 (finding no error in ALJ’s
explanation that she considered doctor’s responses to a questionnaire but did
not accord them controlling weight because they were completely inconsistent
with the doctor’s own internal records). 	The ALJ found that these benign
examination findings from April 2022 did not support the physical limitations
checked off in Dr. Hansen’s June 2022 questionnaire. See DeJohnette v.
Berryhill, 681 F. App’x 320, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding ALJ was well
within their discretion to conclude that doctor’s checking a single box on a
single form without any supporting medical evidence did not outweigh the
other substantial record evidence supporting a finding of no disability); Foster
v. Astrue, 410 F. App’x 831, 833 (5th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the conclusion
that “due to its brevity and conclusory nature, lack of explanatory notes, or
supporting objective tests and examinations,” a doctor’s opinion was to be given
little weight where, inter alia, the doctor’s “questionnaire” format typified
“brief or conclusory” testimony).
As to consistency, the ALJ identified conflicts between Dr. Hansen’s
opinion and the record, as she noted that although Plaintiff had a history of
ocular hypertension and glaucoma, there was “no evidence showing Plaintiff
would require such significant limitations.” 	(ECF No. 7-1 at 27). 	The ALJ
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noted that Plaintiff continued to drive and use a computer, which were
activities inconsistent with the degree of visual and physical restrictions
suggested by Dr. Hansen’s questionnaire. 	(Id. at 28). 	Moreover, the ALJ
emphasized that Plaintiff’s orthopedic issues had resolved, most of his physical
impairments were nonsevere, and his severe impairments were treated and
stabilized 	with 	surgery 	and 	medication. 	(Id.). 	These 	record-based
inconsistencies 	constitute 	substantial 	evidence 	supporting 	the 	ALJ’s
persuasive finding. 	See McBride v. O'Malley, No. 4:22-cv-985, 2024 WL
1505745, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 4:22-cv-985, 2024 WL 1308001 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2024) (“ALJ found [the
doctor’s] opinion unsupported because it was based upon a check-box format
that led to conclusions that were contradicted by evidence within [his] own
treatment notes. The ALJ also found that the medical opinion was inconsistent
with other medical evidence in the record, emphasizing that [the doctor] did
not properly consider the effect of medicine in treating the degree of limitations
found in his medical opinion. Given the supportability and consistency issues
discussed by [the ALJ], the Court finds that the ALJ’s persuasiveness finding
was supported by substantial evidence.”) (citation modified). Accordingly, the
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ALJ did not err in not giving weight to the degree of limitation found in Dr.
Hansen’s June 2022 medical opinion.9
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) be 	DENIED. 	The Court
FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED
and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on January 29, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
9 In any event, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Hansen’s opinion in a vacuum. Rather, the
ALJ explained that she incorporated physical limitations into the RFC to account for
Plaintiff’s impairments and symptoms, even while declining to adopt the significant
limitations assessed by Dr. Hansen. (ECF No. 7-1 at 28 (“Regardless, the [ALJ] has provided
the claimant physical limitations to account for the combination of his impairments and their
associated symptoms . . . .”)).
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