Hagger v. Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
RENDELL H., §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No.: 4:24-cv-4382
§
COMMISSIONER OF THE §
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, §
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Rendell H. filed the present action under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) for review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying his
request for disability insurance benefits.1 Plaintiff and the Commissioner filed cross-
motions for summary judgment. Having considered the parties’ filings, the record,
and the law, the Court Recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF 12) be DENIED,
the Commissioner’s Motion (ECF 19) be GRANTED, and the final decision of the
Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
1 The District Judge referred the case to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)
and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act, and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 3.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. Background
Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits on May
10, 2022 alleging disability beginning November 16, 2020. Tr. 39. After Plaintiff’s
application for benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Id. The ALJ
conducted a telephone hearing on May 14, 2024, at which Plaintiff chose to appear
without counsel and testified. Tr. 59-72. An impartial vocational expert, Jessica
Earl, also testified. Tr. 72-73. The ALJ issued a decision on June 5, 2024 finding
that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any
time from his date of onset through the date of the decision. Tr. 39-49. The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff request for review on September 5, 2024 and the ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 29-33.
Plaintiff was 61 years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 60. He has a college
degree in social work. Tr. 60-61. From 2008 until he stopped working in 2020,
Plaintiff worked for the Veteran’s Administration (VA) doing a job in logistics that
involved multiple duties. Tr. 61-63. In an eight-hour workday he typically was
seated for 5-6 hours. Tr. 64. He did not have to lift more than 10 pounds on a regular
basis. Id.
Plaintiff had shoulder surgeries in 2017 and 2018, after which he worked for
approximately two more years. Tr. 69. He stopped working because of pain in his
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shoulders, back, and hips. Tr. 66. He also was suffering from headaches and lack
of concentration. Id. He did not take his medication on the job because it made him
fall asleep. Id. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was seeing a psychiatrist for
depression and anxiety, a liver specialist, and an orthopedics specialist regarding his
need for a hip replacement. Tr. 68. He testified that he cannot sit or stand for very
long and mostly naps during the day. Tr. 73. Plaintiff receives VA disability
payments because of a service-connected disability incurred during his military
service. Tr. 65-66.
The vocational expert, Jessica Earl, testified that Plaintiff’s past work is best
described as logistics specialist, which is a sedentary position with SVP 8, but it was
performed by Plaintiff at the light level. Tr. 71. In response to the ALJ’s
hypothetical, Earl testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s limitations could
perform Plaintiff’s past work as defined by the DOT as performed in the national
economy, but not as Plaintiff described performing it. Tr. 72.
The medical records before the ALJ and admitted into evidence at the hearing
include: office treatment records dated 11/13/2017 to 02/26/2018 from ROC of
Houston Oorthopedics (Tr. 296-302, 322-26); outpatient hospital records dated
09/18/2019 to 01/17/2020 from Houston, Tx VA (Tr. 303-313); EMG results dated
02/14/2020 (Tr. 314-15); outpatient hospital records from St. Joseph Medical Center
dated 2012-2021 (Tr. 316-321, 327, 333-35, 346-59); records from 2016-2017 from
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Diagnostic MRI (Tr. 328-32); records from the Department of the Army dated June
1990 regarding his service injury (Tr. 341-45); Health Information Technology
(HIT) Medical Report for date ranges 11/16/2019 to 06/24/2022, 07/09/2022 to
08/23/2023, 09/01/2023-12/07/2023 received from Federal JHIE (Tr. 360-656,
1639-2069); hospital records dated 02/24/2021 to 08/18/2023 from Michael
E.DeBakey VA Medical (Tr. 664-803, 849-1638); office treatment records dated
04/17/2023 from Dr. Lisa Joseph (Tr. 812-14); outpatient hospital records dated
07/06/2015 to 05/05/2023 from VA (Tr. 815-48); office treatment records dated
03/22/2024 from various providers (2070-2223); undated office treatment records
from Dr. Mariette Pierre (Tr. 2224-2232); and medical records dated 04/15/2024
from MRI Centers of Texas (Tr. 2233-2239).
The record also contains medical opinions from State Agency Medical
Consultant Dr. Daryl K. Daniel (Tr. 804-811) and from State Agency Psychological
Consultant Dr. Richard A. Hardaway (Tr. 657-63). Dr. Mariette Peirre provided a
Medical Necessity Letter stating that Plaintiff needs disability benefits but the letter
is not a medical source opinion. Tr. 2224.
II. Standard of Review of the Commissioner’s Decision
Federal court review of the Commissioner’s final decision to deny Social
Security benefits is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the Commissioner applied
the proper legal standard and (2) whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported
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by substantial evidence. Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018);
Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). A
decision is supported by substantial evidence if “credible evidentiary choices or
medical findings support the decision.” Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817
(5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). When reviewing the Commissioner’s decision,
the court does not reweigh the evidence, try the questions de novo, or substitute its
own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267,
272 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. Id.
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;
Schofield v. Saul, 950 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 2020). “The claimant bears the burden
of satisfying the first four steps of the analysis; the Commissioner bears the burden
of establishing the fifth by demonstrating that other work the claimant can perform
is in the national economy.” Wilson v. Kijakazi, No. 21-60663, 2022 WL 2339471,
at *2 (5th Cir. June 29, 2022) (citation omitted). A finding that the claimant is
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disabled at any point in the five-step review terminates the analysis. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
III. Analysis
The ALJ performed the standard five-step sequential analysis and concluded
that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any
time from his alleged onset date of November 16, 2020 through the date of the June
5, 2024 decision. Tr. 49. The Court addresses the ALJ’s decision at each step of the
sequential analysis.
1. Step One
At the first step, the ALJ decides whether the claimant is currently working or
“doing substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. No party challenges the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November
16, 2020. Tr. 41. The Court finds no reversible error at Step 1 of the analysis.
2. Step Two
At the second step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe
impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Social Security
regulations provide that “[i]f you do not have any impairment or combination of
impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,
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therefore, not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A plaintiff bears
the burden of showing not only the existence of an impairment, but its severity.
Randall v. Astrue, 570 F.3d 651, 657 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute and
regulations “separate the question of the impairment’s existence from the question
of its severity”).
In this case, the ALJ cited and applied the severity standard articulated in SSR
85-28. Tr. 42. The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of
“degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; left above knee
amputation by history; degenerative joint disease of the hips, spine, foot, ankle, arm,
knee, and leg; and disorders of the shoulders with remote surgery bilaterally.” Tr.
42. Plaintiff contends that ALJ’s unfavorable disability finding is not supported by
substantial evidence because he did not find Plaintiff’s “cirrhosis of the liver,”
“major depressive disorder sever with psychosis,” “panic disorder paroxysmal,”
“canal stenosis,” “moderate contact on Left L5 nerve root,” “indents in thecal sac,”
and “CT of left femoral head with avascular necrosis,” to be severe impairments.
ECF 12 at 14-15.
It is the Plaintiff’s burden to prove both the severity and durational
components of the severity requirement. Todd C. v. Saul, No. 4:19-CV-1811, 2021
WL 2651166, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2021) (citing Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d
1099, 1105 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has done nothing more than present a list of
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diagnosis and test findings without any corresponding evidence of functional
limitations. ECF 12 at 14-15. A diagnosis alone does not establish disability. Hames
v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d
457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the mere presence of an impairment is not
enough to establish a disability).
Furthermore, the ALJ did not commit reversible error at step 2 of the
sequential analysis because he did not end his analysis there and proceeded to the
next step. See Todd C., 2021 WL 2651166, at *5 (recognizing that under Fifth
Circuit case law, failure to find an impairment severe constitutes harmless error
where the ALJ proceeded past step two, citing Herrera v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 406
F. App'x 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2010)).
3. Step Three
The third step of the sequential analysis requires the ALJ to determine whether
the claimant’s severe impairment meets or medically equals one of the listings in the
regulation known as Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. p, app. 1. “For a claimant to show that
[her] impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria.
An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely,
does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in
original). For a claimant to show that an impairment “medically equals” a listed
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impairment, the claimant “must present medical findings equal in severity to all the
criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.” Id. at 531 (emphasis in original).
The ALJ determined that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in
combination, met or equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in
Appendix 1. Tr. 44. The ALJ specifically “considered the 4.00H(1) cardiac
preamble as well as the 1.15, 1.16, 1.17, 1.18, 1.2-, and 1.22 listings in light of the
clinical signs and diagnostic findings in the medical evidence.” Tr. 44. Plaintiff
does not allege, and the Court does not find, any error in the ALJ’s Step Three
findings.
4. Step Four
Between steps three and four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s Residual
Functional Capacity (RFC). “The RFC is the individual’s ability to do physical and
mental tasks on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments.” Giles
v. Astrue, 433 F. App’x 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2011). At step four, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant’s RFC permits him to perform his past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
A. Residual Functional Capacity
In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considers the limiting effects of all
a claimant’s impairments, even those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e),
416.945(e). In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC:
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to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except
the work is limited to occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, stopping,
and kneeling. The work may not include crouching, crawling, or
climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. Additionally, the work may not
be at unprotected heights or in the presence of dangerous machinery
and is limited to occasional overhead reaching bilaterally.
Tr. 44-45 (footnote omitted). In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s hearing testimony (Tr. 45-46), longitudinal treatment records (Tr. 46-47),
the opinions of State Agency Medical Consultants (Tr. 43, 48), the opinion of
psychological consultative examiner Dr. Richard Hardaway (Tr. 43), and the
Medical Necessity Letter submitted by Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Pierre (Tr.
48).2
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to give proper consideration to
the opinions of Dr. Hardaway and Dr. Pierre and failing to fully develop the record
on Plaintiff’s impairments.
i. The ALJ did not err in analyzing the medical opinions of Drs.
Hardaway and Pierre.
Pursuant to the revised rules for evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ
considers five factors when determining the degree of persuasiveness of a medical
opinion: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4)
specialization; and (5) other factors which “tend[s] to support or contradict the
2 The ALJ considered the VA’s 100% disability finding in 2014 but gave it little probative value
because the VA applies different standards and Plaintiff worked until 2020. Id.
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opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). The most important factors in this
analysis are supportability and consistency. See id. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), (c)(1)-
(2). The ALJ must “explain how [he] considered the supportability and consistency
factors for a medical source's medical opinions or prior administrative medical
findings in [his] determination or decision[,]” but is not required to explain how he
considered the remaining factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); Stephens v. Saul,
No. 3:20-CV-823-BH, 2020 WL 7122860, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2020).
As to Dr. Hardaway, the ALJ summarized the opinion and noted that it was
inconsistent with Hardaway’s clinical findings of “intact” social function, “sound”
concentration and attention, and ability to manage finances. Tr. 43. The ALJ further
stated the opinion was not supported by other mental status examinations in the
record or Hardaway’s findings during the consultative exam, which were cited and
relied upon in the State Agency Psychological Consultants reports. Id. For example,
the Disability Determination Explanation at the Reconsideration level cited the
mental status examination on June 17, 2023 reporting that Plaintiff was calm,
cooperative, logical and goal-directed, alert and oriented, with intact memory. Tr.
88. For these reasons, the ALJ did not find Hardaway’s opinion persuasive. Id.
As to Dr. Pierre, the ALJ found that the Medical Necessity Letter was not a
medical opinion but only a statement on the ultimate issue of disability. Tr. 48. A
medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about what a plaintiff can still
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do despite the plaintiff’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. Pierre’s undated letter
does not assess any of Plaintiff’s functional limitations. Tr. 2224. The ALJ
correctly noted that ultimate finding of disability is reserved to him as a
representative of the Commissioner. Tr. 48; See Thompson v. O'Malley, No. 6:24-
CV-00010, 2025 WL 1270303, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 6:24-CV-00010, 2025 WL 1266955 (S.D. Tex. May
1, 2025) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) and Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618,
620 (5th Cir. 2003) ( “Among the opinions by treating doctors that have no special
significance are determinations that an applicant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’
[as] [t]hese determinations are legal conclusions that the regulation describes as
‘reserved to the Commissioner.’”). Further, the ALJ nonetheless considered and
reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and found Pierre’s opinion unpersuasive
because it is inconsistent with State Agency Consultants’ function-by-function
analysis and not supported by Plaintiff’s medical history, as summarized extensively
in the ALJ’s decision. Tr. 48.
As to both Hardaway and Pierre, the ALJ considered the opinions and
complied with regulations requiring him to explain the factors of supportability and
consistency when determining the opinions were not persuasive. The ALJ did not
err in his consideration of the medical source opinions in the record.
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ii. The ALJ did not err by failing to develop the record.
“A court will reverse the ALJ's decision as not supported by substantial
evidence if the claimant shows that (1) the ALJ failed to fulfill his duty to develop
the record adequately and (2) that failure prejudiced the plaintiff. Jones v. Astrue,
691 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728 (5th
Cir.1996)). An ALJ’s duty to develop the record is heightened when a claimant is
unrepresented at the hearing. Castillo v. Barnhart, 325 F.3d 550, 552–53 (5th Cir.
2003). However, an ALJ is required to request more documentation only where the
record does not contain enough relevant evidence to reach a decision on disability.
Jones, 691 F.3d at 733.
In this case, the ALJ had before him an extensive medical history from treating
and consulting physicians. The ALJ thoroughly considered and summarized these
records, as well as Plaintiff’s hearing testimony regarding his symptoms and
limitations. See generally Tr. 39-49. The ALJ questioned Plaintiff regarding all the
relevant facts and gave Plaintiff an opportunity to say “anything you’d like to help
[the ALJ] understand why you meet the definition of disability.” Tr. 60. Thus, the
ALJ did not fail in his duty to fully develop the record. See Castillo, 325 F.3d at 553
(holding that “the ALJ's questions and [the plaintiff’s] opportunities to add
additional information into the record satisfied the ALJ's heightened duty to develop
the record”).
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It is the ALJ’s responsibility as factfinder to incorporate limitations into the
RFC determination based on his assessment of the evidence. Ripley v. Chater, 67
F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court finds the ALJ satisfied his responsibility
as the factfinder in this case and his RFC determination is not the result of legal error
and is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Past Work
Based on his RFC determination, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable
of performing his past relevant work as a logistics specialist manager as generally
performed in the national economy. Tr. 48-49. “Where an ALJ determines that a
claimant retains the RFC to perform a past relevant job, the decision must contain
the following specific findings: (1) a finding of fact as to the individual's RFC; (2) a
finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job or occupation;
and (3) a finding of fact that the individual's RFC would permit a return to the
individual's past job or occupation.” Morfin v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-814-P, 2021 WL
3533460, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2021) (citing SSR 82–62, 1982 WL 31386, at *4
(S.S.A. 1982), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:20-CV-00814-P-BP,
2021 WL 2820445 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2021).
Here the ALJ specifically found (1) Plaintiff had the RFC for sedentary work,
with additional limitations (Tr. 44-48); (2) Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a
logistics specialist manager was sedentary and skilled with a specific vocational
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preparation (SVP) of eight (Tr. 49); and (3) while Plaintiff performed the job at the
light level, based on the vocational expert’s testimony, Plaintiff’s RFC made him
capable of performing his past job as it is generally performed in the national
economy. Id. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision satisfies the mandate of SSR 82-62 to
make specific findings of fact regarding Plaintiff’s ability to do his past work.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to classify Plaintiff’s past relevant
work as a “composite job” and then analyzing his ability to do each aspect of the
job. “[C]omposite jobs have significant elements of two or more occupations and,
as such, have no counterpart in the DOT. Such situations will be evaluated according
to the particular facts of each individual case.” SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387 at *2
(S.S.A. 1982). “If a claimant's past relevant work is a composite job, then the ALJ
must consider each job within the composite job and find that the claimant is able to
meet the demands of each position.” Taylor v. O'Malley, No. 1:23-CV-960-ML,
2024 WL 3220731, at *5 (W.D. Tex. June 27, 2024) (citations omitted).
The ALJ did not err is failing to analyze Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a
composite job. Plaintiff testified that he had “one job” that had several
responsibilities. Tr. 63. He spent the majority of his time doing “Rep Tracks
Administrator” duties and also reviewed invoices and equipment requests as a
“Contract Officer Representative” (COR). Id. The vocational expert questioned
Plaintiff regarding all his responsibilities and how he performed them and concluded
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that his past work was best described by the DOT title logistics specialist, 019.167-
010, classified at the sedentary level with an SVP of 8. Tr. 63-64, 71. Plaintiff’s
representation that the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff’s past work was a
“composite job” is incorrect. ECF 12 at 20. The vocational expert acknowledged
Plaintiff’s multiple responsibilities and determined that they were part of one
position that he performed at a different level than described in the DOT. Tr. 71.
Because the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff’s past work has a counterpart in
the DOT, the ALJ did not err by not considering it as composite job under the
regulations.
The main thrust of Plaintiff’s argument is that he cannot perform his past
relevant work in the same way he previously performed it. However, SSR 82-61
provides that “a claimant will be found to be ‘not disabled’ when it is determined
that he or she retains the RFC to perform . . . [t]he functional demands and job duties
of the occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national
economy,” regardless of whether he can perform it in the same manner as he did
previously. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not commit reversible
error at Step Four of the sequential analysis.
5. Step Five
The ALJ determines at step five whether the claimant can perform other work
that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
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416.920(a)(4)(v); Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ’s Step Five disability finding is error because the ALJ did not
properly apply the Medical Vocational Guidelines (Grid Rules), 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2. ECF 12 at 15-16. According to Plaintiff, if the ALJ had
considered his advanced age, non-transferable skills, and RFC, the ALJ would have
found Plaintiff disabled under Grid Rules 201.06 or 202.06. Id.
“If a claimant can pursue his former occupation, he is not entitled to disability
benefits.” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983). An ALJ must determine
whether a claimant can perform other work in the national economy only if he cannot
perform his past work. Id. In such cases, the Grid Rules assist an ALJ in determining
whether a plaintiff is disabled at Step Five of the disability inquiry. Id. Because
here the ALJ made his decision at Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ did
err by failing to proceed to Step Five or to consider the Grid Rules. See Leggett v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the sequential analysis
“terminates if the Commissioner finds at any step that the claimant is or is not
disabled”); Ana S. v. Dudek, No. 4:24-CV-03228, 2025 WL 2483166, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. July 23, 2025) (not addressing plaintiff’s arguments regarding the Grid Rules
because the ALJ made his determination at Step Four), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 4:24-CV-03228, 2025 WL 2480929 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2025).
Therefore, the ALJ’s failure to consult the Grid Rules is not error.
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IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons discussed above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 12) be DENIED, the Commissioner’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF 19) be GRANTED, the Commissioner’s decision
denying Plaintiff benefits be AFFIRMED, and this case be DISMISSED with
prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of the memorandum and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written
objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking
the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on January 19, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
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