Reeves v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KIMBERLY R.,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-3226
COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Kimberly R. (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendant
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) seeking
review of the denial of benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (ECF
Nos. 1, 12). 	Pending before the Court1 are the Parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. 	(ECF Nos. 12–13).2 	Based on a review of the motions,
arguments, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary 	Judgment 	(ECF 	No. 	13) 	and 	DENIES 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for
1 The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge for all proceedings under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 7).
2 Plaintiff filed a “Brief” in support of their suit. 	(ECF No. 12). 	Because the filing
provides 	a 	statement 	of 	undisputed 	material 	facts 	and 	argues 	for 	reversal 	of 	the
Commissioner’s administrative decision, the Court construes the filing as a motion for
summary judgment (id.).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 29, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12). The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s
decision, and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on November 2,
2021, alleging disability starting on October 11, 2021. 	(ECF No. 10-1 at 24).3
Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied by the Social Security Administration on
August 9, 2022, and again on reconsideration on July 5, 2023. 	(Id.). 	On July
12, 2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
(Id.). 	On December 7, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Daniel Whitney (the
“ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff was represented by counsel
at the hearing. 	(Id.). 	Jessica Earl, a vocational expert (“VE”), appeared and
testified at the hearing. (Id.).
On February 1, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled at Step Five.4 	(Id. at 26–37). 	At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff
engaged in substantial gainful activity during the fourth quarter of 2021. (Id.
at 26). 	At 	Step 	Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff 	has 	the following severe
3 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 10.
4 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
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impairments: “morbid obesity; spinal fusion; Ehlers-Danlos syndrome; anxiety;
and depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” 	(Id. at 27). 	At Step Three, the ALJ
found Plaintiff: “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and
404.1526).” 	(Id.). 	The 	ALJ 	determined 	that 	Plaintiff 	has 	the 	Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to: “perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except should be limited to simple non-production rate pace jobs
with only occasional interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.”
(Id. at 29). 	At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff “is unable to perform any
past relevant work.” 	(Id. at 36). 	At Step Five, the ALJ found there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform—such 	as 	a 	merchandise 	marker, 	housekeeper, 	and 	router—and
therefore Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under the Social Security Act.
(Id. at 36–37).
Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on May 23, 2024. 	(Id. at 8). 	Thus, the ALJ’s
decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
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II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
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supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). 	Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
A. The RFC is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial
evidence because it fails to properly account for moderate limitations in
adapting/managing 	and 	fails 	to 	adequately 	reflect 	all 	social 	interaction
limitations. 	(ECF 	No. 	12 	at 	6). 	Commissioner 	argues 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
assessment is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ correctly found
Plaintiff not disabled. (See ECF No. 13).
1. Limitations in Adapting/Managing
First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed a reversible error because the
RFC does not adequately account for moderate limitations in the domain of
adapting and managing oneself. (ECF No. 12 at 8). Commissioner argues the
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ALJ properly considered the medical evidence and nonmedical evidence in
determining Plaintiff’s physical and mental RFC. (ECF No. 13 at 9).
“The ALJ makes an RFC determination based on all the relevant medical
and other evidence in the record.” 	Gonzales v. Colvin, No. 3:15-cv-0685, 2016
WL 107843, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)).
The determination of RFC is the sole responsibility of the ALJ. 	Taylor, 706
F.3d at 602–03. 	‘“There is no requirement that an ALJ’s RFC finding must
mirror or match a medical opinion.’” Donna A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-
cv-111, 	2023 	WL 	5004867, 	at 	*4 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	July 	17, 	2023), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Donna A. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:22-cv-111, 2023
WL 5004073 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2023) (quoting Nic R. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-cv-
00106, 2023 WL 2529930, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023)). 	“[E]xperienced
ALJs can draw their own conclusions based on accurate medical information.”
Barrett v. Berryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff, however, argues that the RFC assessment does not account for
any limitations in the domain of adapting and managing oneself. (ECF No. 12
at 8–9). 	Plaintiff specifically argues that although the RFC “limitation to
simple works” relates primarily to the domain of understanding, remembering,
and applying information, and to the domain of sustaining concentration,
persistence, 	or 	pace, 	it 	does 	not, 	however, 	“account 	for 	limitations 	in
responding to demands, adapting to changes, managing psychiatric symptoms,
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distinguishing 	between 	acceptable 	and 	unacceptable 	work 	performance,
setting realistic goals, making plans independently, maintaining basic hygiene
and 	appropriate 	attire, 	and 	being 	aware 	of 	normal 	hazards 	and 	taking
precautions against them.” 	(Id. at 9). 	Plaintiff therefore argues the ALJ was
“required to explain how the limitation to simple work would in fact account
for the limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to adapt and manage, but he did not.”
(Id.).
But here, the ALJ adequately accounted for moderate limitations in the
domain of adapting and managing oneself. The ALJ explicitly explained:
As 	for 	adapting 	or 	managing 	oneself, 	the 	claimant 	has
experienced a moderate limitation. 	The claimant stated in a
function report that she does not handle stress well and is only
somewhat 	OK 	with 	changes 	in 	routine 	(Exhibit 	6E/7). 	The
claimant also reported trouble adjusting to changes brought about
by the COVID-19 pandemic (Exhibit 4F/7). 	However, records
indicate that the claimant’s primary treating psychiatrist, Jason
Boley, M.D., departed from the Baylor Scott & White Clinic on
June 30, 2022, with no noted trouble transitioning to new treating
psychiatrist Phillip Antunes, M.D. (Exhibit 7F/14).
(ECF No. 10-1 at 29). 	Further, the ALJ determined “paragraph B” criteria
were not satisfied. 	As explained by the ALJ, “[t]o satisfy the ‘paragraph B’
criteria, the mental impairments must result in one extreme limitation or two
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marked limitations in a broad area of functioning.”5 (Id. at 28). However, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had only a moderate limitation with respect to (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with
others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or
managing oneself, as evidenced by medical records and function reports. 	(Id.
at 28–29). 	In short, the ALJ concluded that, because Plaintiff’s mental
impairments did not cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “extreme”
limitation, the “paragraph B” criteria was not satisfied. (Id. at 29).
The ALJ also determined the evidence failed to establish the presence of
“paragraph C” criteria because the record did not establish that Plaintiff had
a minimal capacity to adapt to changes in her environment or to demands that
were not already part of her daily life.6 	(Id.). 	The ALJ found there was no
5 An extreme limitation is the inability to function independently, appropriately, or
effectively, and on a sustained basis. 	A marked limitation is a seriously limited ability to
function independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis. (ECF No. 10-
1 at 28). 	See also Acosta v. Astrue, 865 F. Supp. 2d 767, 790 n.34 (W.D. Tex. 2012)
(“’Paragraph B’ criteria refer to the degree of functional limitations resulting from an
individual’s mental disorders in four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2)
social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.”
citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 12.00 et seq.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3)).
6 “Paragraph C requires a showing of a ‘serious and persistent’ mental disorder, i.e.,
‘medically documented history of the existence of the disorder over a period of at least 2 years’
plus evidence of both (1) medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support, or
a highly structured setting that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of
the disorder; and (2) marginal adjustment, i.e., minimal capacity to adapt to changes in one’s
environment or to demands that are not already part of daily life.” Laird v. O’Malley, No. 24-
cv-00059, 2025 WL 2492980, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Laird v. Colvin, No. 24-cv-59, 2025 WL 540526 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2025)
(citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 12.04).
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indication Plaintiff had only a minimal capacity to adapt to any changes in her
routine and cited, as an example, records where there was no indication
Plaintiff experienced trouble transitioning from her primary psychiatrist to
her new treating psychiatrist. 	(Id.). 	Additionally, the ALJ evaluated the
medical 	opinion 	evidence 	and 	the 	findings 	of 	the 	state 	agency 	medical
consultants, and the ALJ found they were only “partially persuasive.” 	(Id. at
32–36). In that regard, the ALJ found certain physician opinions unpersuasive
and 	inconclusive 	because 	they 	were 	delineated 	by 	check-mark 	forms,
inconsistent with prior records, or undeserving of controlling weight under
federal regulations. 	(Id. at 34–35); see also Daigle v. Kijakazi, No. 22-30721,
2023 WL 4501865, at *2 (5th Cir. July 12, 2023) (‘“ALJs are no longer required
to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, as was mandated
by federal regulations and our caselaw in the past.”’ (quoting Webster v.
Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 718–19 (5th Cir. 2021))).
Accordingly, in finding Plaintiff’s impairments are not severe enough to
meet the criteria of a listing under Step Three of the sequential evaluation, the
ALJ supported his determination with a discussion of the relevant evidence.
See Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448–49 (5th Cir. 2007). 	That is, he
explained that the medical opinions and other evidence of record did not
establish 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	symptoms 	were 	sufficiently 	severe 	to 	meet 	or
medically 	equal 	one 	of 	the 	impairments 	listed 	in 	the 	Social 	Security
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regulations.7 (See ECF No. 10-1 at 32–34). 	An ALJ’s findings “‘regarding the
debilitating effect of the subjective complaints are entitled to considerable
judicial deference.’” Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1470 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting James v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1986)). 	As such, the
Court concludes the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence
because it properly accommodates for Plaintiff’s limitations in adapting and
managing.
2. Social Interaction Limitations
Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by
substantial evidence because it fails to adequately reflect all social interaction
limitations. 	(ECF 	No. 	12 	at 	12). 	Plaintiff 	takes 	issue 	with 	the 	ALJ
acknowledging that the prior administrative findings determined Plaintiff
“would fare best with only incidental contact with public and avoidance of
prolonged 	interpersonal 	contacts” 	but 	formulating 	an 	RFC 	that 	limited
Plaintiff 	to 	“occasional 	interaction 	with 	the 	public, 	coworkers, 	and
supervisors.” (Id. at 13–15) (emphasis added).
7 See, e.g., ECF 10-1 at 32–34 (finding the prior administrative medical findings at
both initial and reconsideration levels only “partially persuasive” because they did not
account for additional severe impairments such as obesity and Ehlers–Danlos syndrome;
finding Dr. Karen Maness’s opinion unpersuasive where her limitations conflicted with her
own treatment notes and 	the consultative findings of Dr. Dave showing only mild
degenerative changes; and finding the mental assessments of state agency consultants only
partially persuasive because their recommended social and concentration limitations were
inconsistent with treatment notes showing normal sustained attention and cooperative,
appropriate behavior).
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But as discussed above, the ALJ evaluated the medical opinion evidence
and the findings of the state agency medical consultants and found the findings
of the state agency medical consultants “only partially persuasive.” (ECF No.
10-1 at 33–34). In reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ explained:
Overall, 	the 	record 	supports 	an 	ability 	to 	perform 	simple
nonproduction pace jobs with occasional interaction with the
general 	public, 	coworkers, 	and 	supervisors. 	For 	instance,
[Plaintiff], though she reported severe memory and concentration
issues at mental health visits, was noted to have normal sustained
concentration and attention at medical examinations (Exhibits
1F/13 and 7F pp. 3 and 15). Additionally, the determination that
[Plaintiff] should have only incidental contact with the public and
avoidance of prolonged interpersonal contacts is also inconsistent
with the medical evidence of record. 	While [Plaintiff] did report
periods of self-isolation and avoidance of social situations and
interactions, all reports from medical providers showed [Plaintiff]
to be cooperative, attentive, cheerful, and friendly (Exhibits 19F
pp. 7, 40, 71, and 104).
(Id. at 34). The ALJ therefore appropriately assessed Plaintiff’s RFC based on
all the relevant evidence in the record and it properly accommodates for
Plaintiff’s 	social 	interaction 	limitations. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1545(a)(3)
(assessing RFC “based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence”). The
ALJ was also not required to give any specific evidentiary weight to any
administrative medical finding. 	Id. at § 404.1520c(a) (providing ALJ will not
defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to
any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s)).
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The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work. 	(ECF No.
10-1 at 29, 36–37). 	The ALJ limited Plaintiff’s RFC, stating “[she] should be
limited to simple non-production rate pace jobs with only occasional interaction
with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.” (Id. at 29). The ALJ then found
Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. 	(Id. at 36). 	However,
the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including merchandise marker,
housekeeper, and router. 	(Id. at 36–37). 	Therefore, the ALJ concluded
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 	(Id.
at 37).
Based on this review, the Court concludes the ALJ’s decision generally
reflects the protocol established in the Social Security Act, the ALJ’s own
regulations, internal policies articulated in Social Security Rulings, and the
ALJ’s critical fact findings were made in compliance with applicable law. 	See
Thomas, 2013 WL 6869652, at *4.
B. The ALJ’s Rejection of Certain Medical Opinions
Next, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	the 	Commissioner’s 	rejection 	of 	the 	medical
opinions 	of 	the 	state 	agency 	psychological 	consultants 	and 	of 	Plaintiff’s
treating psychologist is based on the ALJ’s impermissible lay opinion and not
supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 12 at 18).
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“[A]n ALJ’s RFC determination is improperly based on his lay opinion
when substantial evidence does not support the RFC.” 	Moreira v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 24-cv-00021, 2025 WL 1090895, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv-21, 2025 WL 943413
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2025) (citing Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602). 	‘“There is no
requirement that an ALJ’s RFC finding must mirror or match a medical
opinion.’” Donna A., No. 5:22-cv-111, 2023 WL 5004867, at *4 (quoting Nic R.
v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-cv-00106, 2023 WL 2529930, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2023)).
To support her position that the ALJ substituted his lay opinion, Plaintiff
cites the opinions of state agency consultants and of Dr. Emily Worthy (“Dr.
Worthy”). (ECF No. 12 at 19). As such, the Court will address each opinion.
At both initial and reconsideration level administrative reviews, the
state agency consultants opined Plaintiff had “moderate limitations to all
mental functioning areas.”8 	(ECF No. 10-1 at 33). 	The ALJ noted the initial
state agency consultant, Dr. Sylvia Chen, opined that Plaintiff “would function
best in an environment that that requires only occasional interactions with co-
workers, supervisors, and the public in a familiar, low stress setting that has
8 The parties clarify in their briefing, and the administrative record shows, that these
medical evaluations were conducted by state agency medical consultants. (See ECF No. 12
at 9, 13, 18–19; ECF No. 13 at 4–5, 10–12).
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no significant changes in task expectations or require high production rate or
pace.” 	(Id. at 34). 	The ALJ also noted that, on reconsideration, the state
agency medical consultant, Dr. Jacob Tendler, opined Plaintiff “should not be
required to memorize or understand detailed or complex instructions and could
concentrate and maintain persistence on simple tasks consisting of 1-2 step
instructions. . . . [and] would fare best with only incidental contact with public
and avoidance of prolonged interpersonal contacts.” (Id.).
However, 	as previously mentioned, the ALJ determined 	the record
overall supported Plaintiff had “an ability to perform simple nonproduction
pace jobs with occasional interaction with the general public, coworkers, and
supervisors,” in part because Plaintiff “was noted to have normal sustained
concentration and attention at medical examinations.” 	(Id.; see also ECF No.
10-1 at 284 (Ex. 1F), 480–496 (Ex. 7F)).9 	In that respect, the “ALJ properly
used mental status examinations as part of his decision-making process.”
Daigle, 2023 WL 4501865, at *3. 	Moreover, the ALJ found that Dr. Tendler’s
opinion that Plaintiff “should have only incidental contact with the public and
avoidance of prolonged interpersonal contacts [was] also inconsistent with the
medical evidence of record” because “all reports from medical providers showed
9 The ALJ specifically cited the mental status examinations conducted by Dr. Worthy
in July 2020 (ECF No. 10-1 at 284 (Ex. 1F)), by Dr. Jason Boley in December 2021 (Id. at 482
(Ex. 7F)) and by Dr. Phillip Antunes in July 2022 (Id. at 494 (Ex. 7F)).
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the claimant to be cooperative, attentive, cheerful, and friendly.” (ECF No. 10-
1 at 34; ECF No. 10-2 at 7, 40, 71, 104 (Ex. 19F)).10
Next, Dr. Worthy opined Plaintiff’s “symptoms affect her ability to
attend work, communicate effectively with co-workers, and concentrate on
work-related tasks.” 	(Id.). 	However, the ALJ noted that Dr. Worthy “did not
render an opinion discussing what [Plaintiff] could or could not do in a
vocational setting.” 	(Id.). 	As such, the ALJ found Dr. Worthy’s opinion was
limited 	because, 	under 	the 	federal 	regulations, 	a 	medical 	opinion 	is 	a
statement from a medical source about what a claimant can still do despite
their impairment(s) and whether the claimant has one or more impairment-
related limitations or restrictions. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2) (emphasis
added). 	The ALJ therefore reasoned Dr. Worthy’s statements that Plaintiff
was “disabled,” “unable to work,” or the like, were not medical opinions but
were administrative findings dispositive of a case, requiring familiarity with
the Regulations and legal standards. 	(ECF No. 10-1 at 34). 	In other words,
the ultimate issue of disability was reserved to the Commissioner and further
evaluation of Dr. Worthy’s statement was not warranted. (Id.).
10 The ALJ specifically cited medical appointments with Nurse Practitioner Stephanie
Page in November 2023 (ECF No. 10-2 at 7 (Ex. 19F)), with Physician’s Assistant Natalie
Newman in October 2023 (Id. at 40 (Ex. 19F)), with Nurse Practitioner Sunday Jennette in
August 2023 (Id. at 71 (Ex. 19F)), and with Nurse Practitioner Keri Tatum in August 2023
(Id. at 104 (Ex. 19F)).
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The ALJ also considered an October 2023 Mental Residual Functional
Capacity Assessment submitted by Dr. Worthy, which mainly consisted of a
check-box form. 	(Id. at 35). 	According to the form, Dr. Worthy checked
Plaintiff 	was 	either 	moderately 	or 	markedly 	limited 	with 	regards 	to
understanding 	and 	memory 	as 	well 	as 	sustained 	concentration 	and
persistence, was not significantly limited or moderately limited with regards
to social interaction, and was primarily markedly limited with regards to
adaptation. 	(Id.). 	The ALJ, however, noted those designations were not
consistent with observations from Plaintiff’s other treating physicians, who
observed Plaintiff “to be neatly dressed, had good hygiene and grooming,
participated well during examinations, was calm, logical and goal directed with
good insight and judgment.”11 (Id.). The ALJ further noted that in visits from
October and November 2023, Plaintiff “was also observed to have normal mood
and affect, normal behavior, was noted to be neither anxious nor depressed,
and was seen to be smiling, pleasant, and talkative.” 	(Id.). 	In sum, the ALJ
found 	Dr. 	Worthy’s 	opinion 	“generally 	unpersuasive” 	because 	“it 	[was]
provided using a standard checkbox form, and although a statement was
attached 	to 	the 	form 	there 	were 	no 	actual 	clinical 	notes 	attached 	of 	a
11 The ALJ cited Exhibit 9F pp. 16 and 72; however, the Court notes those exhibits do
not appear to contain the ALJ’s stated observations. Instead, it appears the ALJ intended to
cite Exhibit 18F, pp. 28, 120, 145, 170, 187, which do contain the ALJ’s observations.
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contemporaneous examination. 	Additionally, the selections of moderate and
marked in all functional areas [was] not consistent with the totality of records
received.” (Id.). As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
Although 	the 	opinion 	of 	a 	claimant’s 	treating 	physician 	generally
deserves “considerable weight in determining disability,” this is not so
when the physician’s testimony is “brief and conclusory or otherwise
unsupported 	by 	the 	evidence.” 	We 	have 	previously 	characterized
responses to a “questionnaire format” as “typical ‘brief or conclusory’
testimony” and declined to accord these responses controlling weight
when they lack “explanatory notes” or “supporting objective tests and
examinations.”
Heck, 674 F. App’x at 415 (citation modified).
The ALJ explicitly found the state agency consultants’ and Dr. Worthy’s
opinions were not supported by their findings; instead, the ALJ chose to rely
upon the totality of records, including records and reports of other providers,
rather than the ALJ’s own medical opinion. 	(Id. at 34–35). 	This goes to the
ALJ’s analysis of the supportability of the state agency consultants’ and Dr.
Worthy’s opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) (“‘Supportability’ focuses on
how well the medical evidence and supporting explanations given by the
medical provider support the provider’s opinion.”).
Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC determination need not completely match or
mirror a medical opinion so long as his determination is supported with
substantial evidence. 	See Mendoza v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 5:24-cv-
055, 2025 WL 906225, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025) (“Given that an RFC
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determination is not required to match or mirror a medical opinion, the ALJ
was permitted to develop an RFC that differed from the medical opinions
provided while still being supported by substantial evidence.”). There is not a
lack 	of 	evidence 	or 	lack 	of 	medical 	findings 	to 	support 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination. 	See id. at *7 (“This is simply not a case where there are no
credible evidentiary sources or medical findings to support the decision.”).
Because 	the 	ALJ 	used 	all 	reports 	from 	medical 	providers, 	mental
examinations, 	and 	records 	from 	other 	physicians 	to 	support 	his 	RFC
determination, the ALJ did not substitute his lay opinion for medical opinions
and his RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Colvin,
No. 1:16-cv-271, 2017 WL 3896679, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2017) (holding the
RFC that plaintiff is capable of light duty work was supported by substantial
evidence as “the ALJ considered all the medical evidence and [plaintiff’s]
subjective complaints of pain.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary 	Judgment 	(ECF 	No. 	13) 	and 	DENIES 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for
Summary 	Judgment 	(ECF 	No. 	12). 	As 	such, 	the 	Court 	AFFIRMS 	the
Commissioner’s decision, and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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SIGNED in Houston, Texas on December 29, 2025.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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