Basic Energy Services, Inc.

INRE:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
BASIC ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
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PEDRO DE LA ROSA, et al.
Claimants
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-02910
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ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Litigation Trustee David Dunn's ("Defendant")
Second Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining claims asserted by Plaintiffs Pedro and
Angelina De La Rosa ("Claimants" or "Plaintiffs") against Basic Energy Services, LP ("Basic
Energy"). (Doc. No. 21). Plaintiffs did not file a response and the time for doing so has passed.
Having considered the motion and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 21).
BACKGROUND
This case concerns a non-fatal, single-vehicle accident in which Plaintiff Pedro De La Rosa
was injured during the course of his employment with Basic Energy. (Doc. No. 21 at 1). Plaintiff
was employed by Basic Energy as a vacuum truck operator, which consisted of loading and
unloading water from oil wells and transporting it to other wells. (Id. at 3) ; (Doc. No. 21-1 at 6) .1
1 Plaintiffs are Pedro De La Rosa and his wife, Angelina De La Rosa. Whi le the Court recognizes that
both plaintiffs have separate claims, Angelina's claims are contingent on Pedro ' s claims regarding the
accident. The Court, therefore, uses the singular "P laintiff," referring to Pedro, in discussing the incident.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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On or about June 2, 2015, Plaintiff was injured while transporting water from the "Endeavor Well"
in Pecos County when he attempted to "maneuver" over a pothole and then avoid a "large animal"
that came into his path on the road. (Doc. No. 21-1 at 10). Plaintiff's truck ultimately rolled over,
resulting in injuries to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was then taken by helicopter to the Odessa Medical Center, where he stayed for
two 	days. 2 (Doc. 	No. 	21-2 	at 	20) 	(77:18- 78:8). 	Freddie 	Garcia, 	Basic 	Energy's 	Area
Superintendent or manager for the Pecos office, was also at the Center at the same time. (Id. at 20)
(78: 11 - 82:9). Plaintiff was in need of stitches for his left eye cavity after the accident. (Id.) (78: 17-
21; 80:12- 18). Garcia, however, allegedly instructed the doctor not to perform the medical
procedure. (Id.). The doctor ultimately performed the procedure and inserted stitches on Plaintiff's
left eye. (Id. at 21) (82:25- 83:3). Additionally, while Plaintiff was at the hospital, Garcia allegedly
told the doctor on repeated occasions not to perform further medical care on Plaintiff and asked
the hospital to release Plaintiff from the hospital by the next day. (Id. at 20 - 21) (80:12- 81:21).
Plaintiff was released from the hospital the following day. (Id. at 21) (81 :18 - 19 ; 83:6- 8).
Prior to this motion, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
Plaintiffs' tort claims based on the accident were barred by the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act's statutory scheme. (Doc. No. 12). Additionally, Defendant argued that to the extent Plaintiffs
attempted to allege an intentional tort claim, it was precluded by the "Election of Remedies"
doctrine. (Doc. No. 12 at 14). This Court granted Defendant's motion in part, dismissing all claims
against Basic Energy relating to the rollover accident. (Doc. No. 15). The Court, however, denied
2 In Defendant's Motion, Defendant states that "[s]olely for the purposes of this Motion, the Liquidation
Trustee concedes the factual accuracy" of the following facts. (Doc. No. 21 at 4 n.2).
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Defendant's motion to the extent Defendant intended to move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs'
claims against Basic Energy relating to conduct after the rollover incident. (Id.) .
Now, Defendant seeks summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs' remaining claims against
Basic Energy relating to conduct after the vehicle accident. Defendant contends that "there is an
absence of proof in the record that the actions of Freddie Garcia, or any other employee, agent or
representative of Basic Energy, proximately caused the Plaintiffs' injuries and, assuming arguendo
that there is such proof, there is no proof that Basic Energy is liable under respondeat superior for
the alleged consequences of any such actions." (Doc. No. 21 at 2). As noted, Plaintiffs failed to
respond to Defendant's motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted " if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). "The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.,
485 F.3d 253 , 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322- 25 (1986)).
Once a movant submits a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-movant
to show that the court should not grant the motion. Celotex, 477 U. S. at 321 - 25. The non-movant
then must provide specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute. Id. at 324; Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co . v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S . 574, 587 (1986). A dispute about a material fact
is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in deciding a summary
judgment motion. Id. at 255. The key question on summary judgment is whether there is evidence
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raising an issue of material fact upon which a hypothetical, reasonable factfinder could find in
favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 248. It is the responsibility of the parties to specifically point
the Court to the pertinent evidence, and its location, in the record that the party thinks are relevant.
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393 , 405 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not the duty of the Court to search
the record for evidence that might establish an issue of material fact. Id.
This Court's Local Rules state that "[f]ailure to respond to a motion will be taken as a
representation of no opposition." S. Dist. Tex. L.R. 7.4; see also Hanen L.R. 7(D). As stated above,
Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendant' s motion by the Court's October 9, 2025, deadline.
Therefore, the local rules would allow the Court to grant Defendant's motion as it should be
considered unopposed.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has explained that "a lthough we have endorsed the adoption
of local rules that require parties to file responses to opposed motions, we have not approved the
automatic grant, upon failure to comply with such rules, of motions that are dispositive of the
litigation." Se e Johnson v. 	Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson v.
Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 707- 09 (5th Cir. 1985); Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., 631 F.2d 1210,
1213- 14 (5th Cir. 1980)). In other words, where a party does not respond to a summary judgment
motion, such failure does not permit the court to enter a "default" summary judgment. Eversley v.
MBank Dall. , 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). Thus, the Court will consider the merits of
Defendant 's motion.
ANALYSIS
Under the summary judgment framework, once the movant (in this case, Defendant) carries
its initial summary judgment burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant (Plaintiffs) to persuade
the Court that the motion should not be granted by showing the existence of a genuine issue of
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material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321 - 25; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Here, Defendant has
provided sufficient evidence to meet its initial summary judgment burden regarding Plaintiffs'
post-accident claims against Basic Energy.
Whether Plaintiffs' 	claims concerning Garcia's post-accident actions are framed as
negligence or intentional tort claims, both require that Plaintiffs raise an issue of material fact
supporting the allegations that Defendant's alleged attempts to interfere with Plaintiffs medical
treatment caused Plaintiffs' injuries. See Garcia v. United State s, 2024 WL 4438773 at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 7, 2024); Mclaurin v. Waffle H , Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 536, 557 (S .D. Tex. 2016). In its
motion, Defendant contends there is no evidence that Garcia' s actions resulted in "any of the
following: (a) the hospital and doctors withholding medical care to Mr. De la Rosa; (b) the hospital
and doctors prematurely releasing Mr. De la Rosa from the hospital; and (c) Mr. De la Rosa's
injuries that are independent and separate from the injuries Mr. De la Rosa incurred as a result of
the vehicle accident." (Doc. No. 21 at 8). The only medical procedure that Plaintiff testified as
being interfered with by Garcia was the stitches needed for his left eye. Notably, Plaintiff also
confirmed that he still received said stitches. (Doc. No. 21-2 at 21) (82:25- 83:5). Additionally,
while Plaintiff testified that Garcia instructed the doctor to release him the next day, he did not
provide evidence that such instruction caused his ultimate release or that the release was
inappropriate. (Id. at 20 - 21) (78:21 - 23; 81 :15 - 21).
Further, Defendant contends that, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have evidence
that Defendant' s actions proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries, "there is no evidence supporting
liability of Basic Energy for any alleged damages under respondeat superior." (Doc. No. 21 at 8).
"Under the theory of respondeat superior ... an employer may be vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of its employee if the employee's actions are within the course and scope of his
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employment." Berry v. Golla, 2018 WL 1453275 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 23 , 2018), affd sub nom. Berry
v. Missionaries of Co. of Mary, Inc. , 770 F. App'x 716 (5th Cir. 2019). Defendant asserts that
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Garcia was "acting in the scope of his employment with
Basic Energy by performing any actions at the Odessa Medical Center, or that Basic Energy had
the right to direct and control Freddie Garcia at the time." (Doc. No. 21 at 9).
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs have not provided evidence to support any
genuine factual dispute regarding their remaining claims. First, Plaintiffs did not provide evidence
that Garcia' s actions proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries. There is no evidence in the record
that Garcia's actions resulted in Plaintiff not receiving medical treatment or being released from
the hospital prematurely. Second, even if Plaintiffs produced such evidence, they also did not
provide any specific facts identifying a factual dispute regarding Basic Energy's liability for
Garcia's actions under respondeat superior. Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Garcia was acting
within the scope of his employment at the hospital or that Basic Energy had the right to control
him while he was there. Plaintiffs, therefore, have not met their summary judgment burden
regarding their remaining claims against Basic Energy.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' post-accident
claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant' s Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. No. 21).
/ 	)(-
Signed on this i::,_ day of January, 2026. ~ ~
Andrew S. Harren 	-=
United States District Judge
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