Jones-MacDonald v. Harris County et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DEBORAH JONES-MACDONALD,
Plaintiff.
V.
HARRIS COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-cv-02871
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Deborah Jones-MacDonald brings this civil rights action against
Defendants, Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) Deputies Ronaldo Delgado
and Charles Ribbe (collectively, “the Deputies”), alleging that she suffered personal
injuries as a result of an August 13, 2021 encounter with the Deputies. There are
five motions pending that are ripe for ruling. The first two motions are dueling
motions for summary judgment. See Dkts. 91, 99. In the third motion, Plaintiff
seeks leave to file an amended complaint or, alternatively, for reconsideration of
my prior dismissal of Harris County (“the County”) from this lawsuit. See Dkt. 100.
In the fourth motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint to add a
new defendant: retired HCSO Sergeant Stephen Willis. See Dkt. 101. The fifth
motion is Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Defendants’ Expert Michael Dirden. See
Dkt. 119.
Having considered the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I deny
both motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure and
excessive force claims, finding that a factual dispute exists that only a jury can
resolve. I also deny both motions for leave to amend. I grant the Deputies’ motion
for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim, finding that the
Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Finally, I grant Plaintiff’s
motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert, Michael Dirden.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 09, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case stems from the repossession of Plaintiff’s vehicle on the morning
of August 13, 2021. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is the operative pleading.
See Dkt. 21. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims
against the Deputies and the County for alleged violations of her constitutional
rights to be free from unreasonable seizure, excessive force, and wrongful arrest. I
have already discussed the factual background of this case extensively in ruling on
earlier motions to dismiss. See Dkt. 49 at 1–4.
In January 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss. See Dkts. 22, 24. On
September 30, 2024, I granted the County’s motion to dismiss and denied the
Deputies’ motion to dismiss. See Jones-MacDonald v. Harris County, No. 4:23-
cv-02871, 2024 WL 4354704, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2024). As to the County, I
held that Plaintiff failed “to allege a pattern of constitutional violations that would
establish the County’s municipal liability.” Id. at *11. Accordingly, I dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims against the County. The Deputies’ motion to dismiss included an
assertion of qualified immunity. As to the Deputies’ motion, I held that Plaintiff’s
allegations and the Deputies’ bodycam videos made it plausible that the Deputies
violated 	Plaintiff’s 	clearly 	established 	constitutional 	rights 	to 	be 	free 	from
unreasonable seizure, excessive force, and wrongful arrest. In ruling on the
Deputies’ motion to dismiss, I observed that only a jury could resolve the disputed
fact of whether Plaintiff was attempting to drive her vehicle off the tow truck and
thus posed a safety risk. See id. at *7. The jury’s resolution of this disputed fact
would determine whether “the Deputies’ actions fall within the ‘community
caretaking’ exception to the requirement that officers have reasonable suspicion or
a warrant before seizing a person.” Id. This disputed question of fact affects
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, too. See id. at *8.
On October 7, 2024, I ordered the parties to submit a proposed Docket
Control 	Order. 	On 	October 	11, 	2024, 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel 	filed 	an 	“Agreed
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PROPOSED ORDER” that listed the deadlines to amend pleadings and to add new
parties as “N/A.” Dkt. 51 at 1.
Plaintiff and the Deputies conducted discovery, which concluded on May 7,
2025. Both Plaintiff and the Deputies now move for summary judgment, with the
Deputies reasserting qualified immunity. See Dkts. 91, 99. Additionally, Plaintiff
seeks leave to amend her complaint to revive her claims against the County—or,
alternatively, for me to reconsider my earlier dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against
the County—and to add Sergeant Willis as a new defendant. Finally, Plaintiff seeks
to exclude the testimony of the Deputies’ expert, Michael Dirden. I will address
each of these motions in turn, beginning with the dueling motions for summary
judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
1. 	Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is evidence
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Schnell v.
State Farm Lloyds, 98 F.4th 150, 156 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).
“The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). If the movant
makes such a showing, “the burden shifts to the non-movant to produce evidence
of the existence of such an issue for trial.” Brandon v. Sage Corp., 808 F.3d 266,
270 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). The nonmoving party “must go beyond
the pleadings and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for
trial to avoid summary judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In the summary
judgment context, a government official need only plead qualified immunity,
which then shifts the burden to the plaintiff.” Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2008).
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I “may not . . . evaluate the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or
resolve factual disputes.” In re Green, 968 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). Rather, I “view all facts, and the inferences to be drawn from them, in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Brandon, 808 F.3d at 269 (quotation
omitted). I “assign greater weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the
video recording taken at the scene.” Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 582 (5th Cir.
2022) (cleaned up). I “need not rely on [a party]’s description of the facts where
the record discredits that description but should instead consider ‘the facts in the
light depicted by the videotape.’” Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)). “Cross-motions
must be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538–
39 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. Qualified Immunity
Government officials sued in their individual capacity under § 1983 are
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity, which is “an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). “Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability in
their individual capacity to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d
721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016). It is a judicially created doctrine designed to avoid “the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The doctrine arises from “the danger that
fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” Id.
(cleaned up). “Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability
based on his performance of discretionary functions.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d
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500, 	505 	(5th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	“Qualified 	immunity 	gives
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments
about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 743 (2011) (quotation omitted).
“A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary
judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not
available.” King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotations
omitted). 	“To 	negate 	a 	defense 	of 	qualified 	immunity 	and 	avoid 	summary
judgment, the plaintiff need not present absolute proof, but must offer more than
mere allegations.” Id. at 654 (quotation omitted). “There are two aspects to
qualified immunity: whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional
right and whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
alleged violation.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The first prong of the qualified
immunity inquiry asks whether the facts “show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a plaintiff’s
evidence, viewed favorably, does not establish a constitutional violation, no further
inquiry is necessary. See id.
The second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry “asks whether the right
in question was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quotation omitted). Governmental actors are “shielded
from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted). “[T]he salient
question . . . is whether the state of the law” at the time of the incident provided the
defendants “fair warning that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.” Id. at
741. A plaintiff bears a heavy burden on this prong because a right is clearly
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established only if relevant precedent “ha[s] placed the . . . constitutional question
beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
Fifth Circuit “precedent makes clear that [a district court must] examine
each individual’s entitlement to qualified immunity separately.” 	Ramirez v.
Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 137 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
B. 	A NALYSIS
Both sides move for summary judgment on all claims. I will address each of
Plaintiff’s claims in turn.
1. 	Unreasonable Seizure
Plaintiff 	advances 	two 	distinct 	unreasonable 	seizure 	claims: 	the
unreasonable seizure of her vehicle and the unreasonable seizure of her person.
These claims are inextricably intertwined, however, because the Deputies’ seizure
of Plaintiff’s person is what made the seizure of her vehicle possible.
In ruling on the motion to dismiss, I rejected the Deputies’ argument that
their seizure of Plaintiff was reasonable due to her failure to follow a deputy’s
instruction, 	because 	Ribbe’s 	video 	clearly 	shows 	that 	he 	gave 	Plaintiff 	no
instructions before removing her from her vehicle. To the extent the Deputies
argued for the “community caretaking” exception to the reasonable suspicion
requirement, I found that a disputed fact exists that only a jury can resolve:
whether Plaintiff was attempting to drive her vehicle off the tow truck when the
Deputies seized her. See Jones-MacDonald, 2024 WL 4354704, at *7–8.
Because “Plaintiff references both Deputies’ bodycam videos throughout her
pleading, even attaching images from both bodycams . . . , I consider[ed] the
bodycam videos in ruling on the motions to dismiss.” Id. at *3. The facts depicted
in the video have not changed between the motion to dismiss and now. Neither
party has introduced anything new into the record to resolve that disputed fact.
Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise to Plaintiff that summary judgment
on her unreasonable seizure claim is no more appropriate now than dismissal of
her claim was then.
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Although neither party has introduced any facts changing my analysis, the
Deputies have introduced a new argument: Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim
fails because there was no state action. The Deputies argue that “Plaintiff must
show that the Deputies provided the tow truck driver with intervention or aid that
goes beyond the peacekeeping actions of the police officers in Menchaca.” Dkt. 91
at 18; see also Menchaca v. Chrystler Grp., 613 F.2d 507, 511–13 (5th Cir. 1980).
Menchaca is easily distinguishable from this case.
In Menchaca, “two men arrived in a pickup truck equipped with a winch and
proceeded to ready the Menchacas’ car for towing” off a public street in Laredo,
Texas. 613 F.2d at 510. “Mr. Menchaca rushed out to try and prevent the
repossession,” using “some rather loud and abusive language . . . , which eventually
resulted in the defendant police officers being summoned to check out the
disturbance.” Id. The officers informed the Menchacas “that repossession was a
civil matter and that the only reason the police were there was to quiet a reported
disturbance. Mr. Menchaca was informed that he could be arrested if he continued
to use loud and abusive language and create a breach of the peace.” Id. The officers
left after everyone calmed down. No one was arrested. Only after the officers left—
and after the repo men allowed Mr. Menchaca to remove some belongings from
the car—was the repossession finally completed. Afterwards, the Menchacas sued
their creditor, the creditor’s agent, the city of Laredo, and the police officers under
§ 1983. After hearing testimony and taking evidence, the trial court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Menchacas failed to show
“that the defendant police officers had acted in concert with defendant Chrysler’s
agents.” Id. at 512. Hence, there was no state action—a requirement for any § 1983
action. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case.
Menchaca bears little resemblance to this case. In this case, the vehicle in
question was parked in a private apartment complex, not on a public street. The
Deputies here responded to a call from the repo man seeking assistance from law
enforcement. See Dkt. 91-1 at 5 (showing that the Deputies “responded to a
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disturbance call” from a “Reportee” who “is doing a repo . . . and the owner of the
vehicle is on top of his tow- truck”). Unlike Menchaca, the Deputies here did much
more than merely threaten an arrest to prevent a disturbance—they forcefully
arrested both Plaintiff and her ex-husband. I will assume, for the sake of argument,
that the Deputies were simply exercising their peacekeeping duties when they
removed Plaintiff’s ex-husband from the tow truck and arrested him. The same
cannot be said, however, for Plaintiff, who was arrested while sitting in her own
vehicle in a private parking lot.
Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, as I must, the video suggests that
Plaintiff entered her own vehicle in a private parking lot while it was disconnected
from the tow truck—an entirely lawful action. 1 Jones-MacDonald, 2024 WL
4354704, at *2 & n.2. Both Deputies admit that they observed Plaintiff enter her
vehicle.2 See Dkt. 91-1 at 5, 8. The Deputies then physically removed Plaintiff from
her vehicle, making completion of the repossession possible. That chain of events
is intervention and aid constituting state action. See Richard v. City of Harahan,
6 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. La. 1998) (finding state action where an officer “acted
in a more significant way than merely ‘standing-by’” because the officer “abruptly
reached in and pulled [the plaintiff] out of his house” without warning or
discussion).
The Deputies’ newfound “state action” argument is the only difference in this
case from the motion to dismiss stage until now. Having found that the Deputies’
actions constitute state action, I deny both motions for summary judgment on
1 Whether Plaintiff’s vehicle was connected to the tow truck when Plaintiff entered it and
whether Plaintiff attempted to drive her vehicle while it was connected to the tow truck
are fact issues for a jury to decide.
2 Both Deputies also claim that Ribbe “repeatedly told [Plaintiff] to get out of the vehicle.”
Dkt. 91-1 at 5; see also id. at 8 (“I approached [Plaintiff] while giving verbal commands to
exit the vehicle.”). In the video, however, Ribbe said nothing to Plaintiff as he approached
her sitting in her vehicle, and Ribbe’s first words to Plaintiff were not an instruction but
simply a statement: “Now it’s your turn.” Jones-MacDonald, 2024 WL 4354704, at *2.
The fact that the Deputies’ statements are so at odds with the video calls into question
nearly every fact about their encounter with Plaintiff.
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Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claims. Summary judgment is denied now for the
same reason that I denied the Deputies’ motion to dismiss: only a jury can
determine the disputed fact that would answer whether “the Deputies’ actions fall
within the ‘community caretaking’ exception to the requirement that officers have
reasonable suspicion or a warrant before seizing a person.” Jones-MacDonald,
2024 WL 4354704, at *7.
2. 	Excessive Force
Plaintiff claims that the Deputies used excessive force in physically removing
her from her vehicle. The Deputies argue that they “are entitled to qualified
immunity on this conduct because it certainly can’t be said on these facts that
‘every reasonable offic[ial] would have understood’ that the pertinent actions were
unlawful.” Dkt. 91 at 22 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). In
making this argument, the Deputies curiously neglect to address the analogous and
precedential case of Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009), which I
cited in denying the Deputies’ motion to dismiss, see Jones-MacDonald, 2024 WL
4354704, at *8, and which Plaintiff cited in her response to the Deputies’ motion
for summary judgment.
In Deville, the Fifth Circuit denied qualified immunity to officers who
removed a grandmother from her vehicle after she passively resisted an unlawful
arrest. Here, as in Deville, “[a] reasonable jury could infer from [the video] that
[Ribbe] engaged in very little, if any, negotiation with [Plaintiff]—and find that he
instead quickly resorted to [grabbing her wrist] and dragging her out of the
vehicle.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 168. The Deputies are no more entitled to qualified
immunity now than they were at the motion to dismiss stage. 3
3 I am cognizant of the need to conduct an individualized inquiry as to each Deputy’s
assertion of qualified immunity. See Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 137 n.4. If Delgado had used
force on Plaintiff only after seeing her engaged in a struggle with Ribbe, then I might find
Delgado entitled to qualified immunity. According to Delgado’s own report, however, he
observed 	the 	entirety 	of 	Ribbe’s 	interaction 	with 	Plaintiff, 	including 	her 	passive
resistance. See Dkt. 91-1 at 5 (stating that he heard Ribbe tell Plaintiff to exit her vehicle,
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As for whether summary judgment is proper, there remains a genuine
dispute of material fact affecting Plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, the Deputies’
seizure, use of force, and arrest of Plaintiff begin to look reasonable if Plaintiff was
attempting to drive her vehicle off the tow truck. And if Plaintiff attempted to drive
her vehicle off the tow truck, then the Deputies’ actions may fall within the
“community 	caretaking” 	exception 	to 	the 	requirement 	that 	officers 	have
reasonable suspicion before seizing a person. See Jones-MacDonald, 2024 WL
4354704, at *7. Because only a jury can determine this fact, both motions for
summary judgment must be denied.
3. 	Wrongful Arrest
Plaintiff contends that the Deputies’ arrest of her was unlawful. As I noted
in 	ruling 	on 	the 	motions 	to 	dismiss, 	“facts 	supporting 	probable 	cause
for any crime—not just the crime for which Plaintiff was arrested—would entitle
the Deputies to qualified immunity.” Jones-MacDonald, 2024 WL 4354704, at
*10. The Deputies argue, among other things, that “a reasonable officer could have
believed that the Plaintiff resisted arrest” when she bit Delgado. Dkt. 91 at 23. In
ruling on the Deputies’ motion to dismiss, I held that the Deputies were not
entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	wrongful 	arrest 	claim 	because
“Plaintiff’s use of force was justified” and therefore, “the Deputies should have
known they did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for resisting arrest.”
Jones-MacDonald, 	2024 	WL 	4354704, 	at 	*10. 	Upon 	further 	consideration,
however, I find that ruling was in error.
In Texas, “[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally prevents or
obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest, search,
or transportation of the actor . . . by using force against the peace officer.” Tex. Pen.
Code Ann. § 38.03(a). Crucially, as the Deputies highlight in their motion for
summary judgment, “[i]t is no defense to prosecution under this section that the
in contradiction to the video, and acknowledging that Plaintiff passively resisted by
holding on to her steering wheel). Thus, Delgado is not entitled to qualified immunity.
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arrest or search was unlawful.” Id. § 38.03(b). Thus, under Texas law, even if I
assume 	arguendo 	that 	the 	Deputies 	used 	excessive 	force 	in 	causing 	the
unreasonable seizure of Plaintiff and her vehicle, those unreasonable seizures and
excessive force still would not affect the analysis of whether the Deputies had
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for resisting arrest. Considering § 38.03(b), and
in the absence of any analogous case law clearly establishing that Plaintiff’s arrest
was wrongful, I am compelled to hold that the Deputies are entitled to qualified
immunity on the wrongful arrest claim.
If Plaintiff can establish unreasonable seizure and excessive force at trial,
then her arrest was almost certainly wrongful in the literal sense. But even if the
Deputies violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from wrongful arrest,
they are still entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent places that
“constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(cleaned up). Existing precedent places statutory or constitutional questions
beyond debate “only when [the district court] can ‘identify a case where an
[official] 	acting 	under 	similar 	circumstances 	was 	held 	to 	have 	violated’” 	a
constitutional right. Surratt v. McClarin, 851 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2017)
(emphasis added) (cleaned up) (citing Pauly, 580 U.S. at 552). “It is the plaintiff’s
burden to find a case in his favor that does not define the law at a ‘high level of
generality.’” Vann v. City of Southaven, 884 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Cass, 814 F.3d at 732–33). Plaintiff has offered no such case law. Accordingly, the
Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim.
* * *
Having established that this case will proceed to a jury trial on Plaintiff’s
unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims, I turn to Plaintiff’s remaining
motions for leave to amend and her motion to exclude the Deputies’ expert.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint or, alternatively, for
reconsideration of my prior dismissal of the County. See Dkt. 100. Plaintiff also
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seeks leave to file an amended complaint to add a new defendant: retired HCSO
Sergeant Stephen Willis. See Dkt. 101. Because it would be futile to add the County
back into this lawsuit or to name Willis as a defendant, both motions are denied.
A. 	THE COUNTY
Plaintiff argues that she has “uncovered previously unavailable evidence—
including 	testimony 	and 	internal 	communications—indicating 	that 	Harris
County’s policies, procedures, customs, practices, or protocols expressly permitted
the conduct that proximately caused the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.” Dkt. 100 at 1.
As I noted in granting the County’s earlier motion to dismiss, “municipal
liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an
official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the
policy 	or 	custom.” 	Jones-MacDonald, 	2024 	WL 	4354704, 	at 	*10 	(quoting
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). Official policy
exists in two forms: “a policy statement formally announced by an official
policymaker” or “a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Jones-MacDonald,
2024 WL 4354704, at *10 (quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s theory of her case rests
on the latter of these forms of official policy—practice or custom.
“Proof of a custom or policy can be shown by a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct on the part of municipal actors or employees, or where a final policymaker
took a single unconstitutional action.” Id. at 11 (quotation omitted). “It has long
been recognized that, in Texas, the county sheriff is the county’s final policymaker
in the area of law enforcement.” Turner v. Upton County, 915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1990). Plaintiff does not allege a single unconstitutional action by Harris
County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez. Rather, Plaintiff has staked her case on a establishing
a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct.
In granting the County’s earlier motion to dismiss, I held that Plaintiff had
not alleged a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. All Plaintiff offered was “an
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amalgamation of bad and unwise acts totally divorced from the constitutional
violations 	that 	she 	alleges 	the 	Deputies 	committed 	against 	her.” 	Jones-
MacDonald, 2024 WL 4354704, at *11. In moving for leave to amend (or for
reconsideration), Plaintiff has mostly abandoned these unrelated allegations. 4
Rather, Plaintiff primarily focuses on newly discovered evidence concerning the
August 13, 2021 incident. For example, Plaintiff argues that “Harris County
[Internal Affairs Department] should have found at least 26 policy violations”
when it evaluated the August 13, 2021 incident. Dkt. 100 at 10. That may very well
be true, but as I explained before, “proof of random acts or isolated incidents is not
sufficient to show the existence of a custom or policy.” Jones-MacDonald, 2024
WL 4354704, at *11 (quotation omitted).
The one “new” unwritten policy that Plaintiff identifies that is not entirely
about the August 13, 2021 incident, is her contention that the County has a policy
of providing no supervision or correction for officer misconduct. See Dkt. 100 at
23. 	Specifically, 	Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	the 	County’s 	unwritten 	policy 	of
(non)supervision “consists merely of silent, self-reflection” without any review,
much less meaningful review. Id. In other words, Plaintiff claims that the County’s
unwritten policy is to let the foxes guard the henhouse. I will assume, without
deciding, that Plaintiff can identify a sufficient pattern or practice to establish a
policy that rises to the level of custom. I will also assume, without deciding, that
this custom was a moving force behind the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Even so, Plaintiff must “identify a municipal policymaker
who could be held responsible, through actual or constructive knowledge, for
enforcing a policy that caused [her] injuries.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578–79.
4 Plaintiff could not help but “remind this Court of County-wide patterns previously pled
that support Monell liability.” Dkt. 100 at 18. As I told Plaintiff already, allegations about
death rates in Harris County jails and general use of force statistics are too attenuated to
constitute a custom or policy that was the moving force behind the alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
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Plaintiff has not identified a policymaker in her motion for leave to amend, 5 much
less shown how that policymaker had notice of an unwritten policy of letting
officers supervise themselves.
Plaintiff uses the word “policymaker” only twice in her motion for leave, both
times in conclusory fashion. First, Plaintiff says that “[t]he policymaker has long
been aware of these deficiencies yet has taken no corrective action.” Dkt. 100 at 5
(citing Dkt. 21 at 44). In making this conclusory statement, Plaintiff cites to her
amended complaint, where she states that “the policymaker, Sheriff Ed Gonzalez
has extensively claimed the HCSO’s lack of funding has caused understaffing issues
preventing his ability to change the culture of violence.” Dkt. 21 at 44. Yet, Plaintiff
offers no facts that would establish Sheriff Gonzalez’s actual or constructive
knowledge of an unwritten policy of providing no supervision or correction for
officer misconduct.
Plaintiff’s only other mention of a “policymaker” is to state—again, in
conclusory fashion—that the County has “a policymaker condoned policy, practice,
custom, procedure, and protocol that falls grossly below constitutional muster that
led to [Plaintiff]’s injuries.” Dkt. 100 at 10. This allegation does not give rise to a
claim. Because Plaintiff has not identified a policymaker who can be held
responsible for enforcing a policy of (non)supervision, allowing her to amend her
complaint to add the County back as a defendant—or reconsidering my dismissal
of the County—would be futile. For this reason, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
amend, or for reconsideration, is denied.
B. 	WILLIS
Plaintiff seeks leave to add Willis as a defendant in this lawsuit, claiming that
“additional facts and testimony, previously unknown to Plaintiff and revealed to
her through Sgt. Willis’ Deposition, indicat[e] supervisory failures by Sgt. Willis
that caused [Plaintiff]’s injuries.” Dkt. 101 at 1. The Deputies argue that I should
5 Ideally, I would cite Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint, but Plaintiff did not
provide a proposed amended complaint in connection with her motion for leave to amend.
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deny Plaintiff’s motion as futile because “Plaintiff’s claims against Willis are barred
by the statute of limitations.” Dkt. 103 at 6. I agree with the Deputies.
The statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims expired two years after
the incident in question, on August 13, 2023. See Jenkins v. Tahmahkera, 151 F.4th
739, 747 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury claims governs § 1983 actions). Plaintiff seeks to add Willis more
than two years after the limitations period expired. Unless an exception to the
limitations period (estoppel, equitable tolling, or the relation back doctrine)
applies, an amendment adding Willis as a defendant would be futile. See Crostley
v. Lamar County, 717 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir. 2013). None of these exceptions are
available to Plaintiff.
The relation back doctrine allows a claim against a newly added defendant
to “relate back” to the date the complaint was originally filed. The doctrine applies
only if two conditions are met: (1) the new party must have “received such notice
of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits,” and (2) the
new party “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(C). Plaintiff makes “make no claim that there was ever any confusion as to
[Willis]’s identity; indeed, [Plaintiff] clearly knew [Willis]’s identity as early as the
[amended] pleadings, as he is included in that complaint’s factual allegations.”
Crostley, 717 F.3d at 421; see also Dkt. 21 at 18–19, 25 (referencing Willis’s role as
Delgado and Ribbe’s supervisor). Accordingly, the relation back doctrine could not
save Plaintiff’s claims against Willis from the statute of limitations.
“Similarly, estoppel only applies if the party in question misrepresents his
identity to the plaintiff, which [Willis] did not do.” Crostley, 717 F.3d at 421.
Finally, equitable tolling is not justified in this case. Equitable tolling
requires a showing “(1) that [Plaintiff] has been pursuing [her] rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and prevented
timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). Plaintiff’s “having
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been unaware of certain information before [Willis]’s deposition d[oes] not
amount to an extraordinary circumstance as the doctrine requires.” Crostley, 717
F.3d at 421 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied plaintiffs’ leave to amend their § 1983 complaint to add a defendant to the
litigation based on futility because the statute of limitations had expired). Thus,
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to add Willis as a defendant is denied. 6
MOTION TO EXCLUDE
Plaintiff seeks to exclude the report of the Deputies’ expert, Michael Dirden,
as “methodologically unsound, legally improper, and factually unreliable.” Dkt. 119
at 3. I need not address the soundness or reliability of Dirden’s opinion because
most of his opinions are plainly inadmissible as opinions that are either unhelpful
or invade the province of the jury and the court.
A. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
For expert testimony to be admissible, its proponent must demonstrate to
the court by a preponderance that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.
6 Plaintiff argues in her reply brief that “[t]he statute of limitations is a defense for Willis,
and is not properly asserted by Ribbe or Delgado in opposition to amendment.” Dkt. 105
at 3. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites a single, out-of-district opinion that never
so much as discusses the statute of limitations. See id. (citing Mailing & Shipping Sys.,
Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 369 (W.D. Tex. 2013)). Crostley—a precedential
opinion that is perfectly analogous to Plaintiff’s request to add Willis—demonstrates that
Plaintiff’s argument is wholly lacking in merit. See Crostley, 717 F.3d at 421 (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’ leave to amend
their § 1983 complaint to add a defendant to the litigation based on futility because the
statute of limitations had expired).
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Fed. R. Evid. 702. Trial courts act as the “gatekeeper” in making determinations as
to the admissibility of expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is
committed to the trial court’s discretion. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
B. 	A NALYSIS
Experts cannot “render conclusions of law” or provide opinions on legal
issues. 	Goodman 	v. 	Harris 	County, 	571 	F.3d 	388, 	399 	(5th 	Cir. 	2009).
“Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment or Due Process Clause is a legal
conclusion.” United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 435 (5th Cir. 2003). “It is
therefore error to allow expert testimony on whether an officer used unreasonable
force.” Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 2020). Many of Dirden’s
opinions impermissibly embrace the ultimate issue of reasonableness.
For example, Dirden opines that “Delgado’s action could be determined to
be reasonable.” Dkt. 91-9 at 12. “Whether [Delgado] was ‘acting reasonably’ [i]s,
for all practical purposes, the only issue for the jury in this case to decide.” Est. of
Sowell v. United States, 198 F.3d 169, 171–72 (5th Cir. 1999). So, Dirden’s opinion
on 	this 	point 	is 	inadmissible. 	Similarly, 	Dirden’s 	opinion 	that 	“[a]nother
reasonable and prudent officer could have acted in the same manner under the
same or similar circumstances” is just another way of saying that Dirden believes
the Deputies’ actions were reasonable. Dkt. 91-9 at 10. That is, however, another
question for the jury to answer. Dirden’s other inadmissible opinions include:
• 	“Further, 	even 	if 	the 	Defendants 	mistakenly 	relied 	on 	their
understanding of the law regarding []self-help repossession, the
misunderstanding could be considered reasonable.” Id. at 10.
• 	“Similarly, 	for 	purpose 	of 	repossession, 	it 	would 	not 	be
unreasonable for a peace officer to believe that the repossession
process was completed once the vehicle was hooked.” Id. at 13.
• 	“[T]he Defendants used minimal force.” Id.
• 	“The Defendants’ use of force was prudent.” Id. at 14 (cleaned up).
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All the above opinions are inadmissible because they invade the jury’s province.
But that is not all. Dirden’s other opinions are inadmissible because they invade
the Court’s province.
There can be “only one spokesman of the law, who of course is the judge.”
Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 673 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). “There is
a certain mystique about the word ‘expert’ and once the jury hears of the [expert]’s
experience and expertise, it might think the witness even more reliable than the
judge.” Id. Here, Dirden opines “[t]he fact that the use of force result in injury, as
alleged in this lawsuit, does not mean that the force was unreasonable or excessive.
Nor 	does 	the 	age 	or 	race 	of 	the 	subject 	play 	a 	role 	in 	determining 	the
reasonableness of the force.” Dkt. 91-9 at 15. Dirden continues: “Even if it is
subsequently determined that the Defendants’ reason for attempting to detain the
Plaintiff was in error, it still does not give the Plaintiff the right to resist the
detention by assaulting Deputy Delgado.” Id. at 15–16. Finally, Dirden “opines”
that “the fact that an officer could have made a different decision does not mean
the decision/activity he did make amounts to a violation of the injured person’s
rights or the expected standards in the profession.” Id. at 16–17. These are not
merely Dirden’s opinions. These are instructions on the law. Such instructions may
come only from the trial court. Dirden will not be allowed to instruct the jury on
the law through his “expert opinion.”
Finally, some of Dirden’s opinions are unhelpful and speculative. For
example, Dirden opines that “Plaintiff 	was not willing to comply with the
Defendants[] and in fact, escalated the situation.” Dkt. 91-9 at 16. This is not a
subject that requires expert testimony. It is for the jury—and only the jury—to
assess the Plaintiff’s and the Deputies’ actions and, to the extent it is necessary,
determine any of the parties’ intentions. Experts “may not speculate about a party’s
intent.” Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-492, 2017
WL 4173468, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2017).
For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude is granted.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I grant the Deputies’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim but deny the motion as to Plaintiff’s
unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims. See Dkt. 91. I deny Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and both of Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend.
See Dkts. 99–101. I grant Plaintiff’s motion to exclude. See Dkt. 119.
I will set a trial date by separate order.
SIGNED this 	day of December 2025.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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