Duve v. Forrest et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
SUSAN ELIZABETH DUVE,
Plaintiff.
V.
WILLIAM CHARLES FORREST, et
al.,
Defendants.
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3:26-cv-158
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On May 21, 2026, all pretrial matters in this case were referred to United
States Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Dkt. 16.
Judge Edison filed a memorandum opinion, order, and recommendation on May
26, 	2026, 	recommending 	that 	the 	plaintiff’s 	application 	for 	a 	temporary
restraining order, Dkt. 4, be denied. Dkt. 19.
On June 3, 2026, the plaintiff filed her objections to the memorandum and
recommendation. Dkt. 31. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this court
is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate
judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection [has been] made.” After conducting this de novo review, the court may
“accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The court has carefully considered the objections; the memorandum and
recommendation; the pleadings; and the record. The court accepts Judge Edison’s
memorandum and recommendation and adopts it as the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff objects that Judge Edison erred in recommending denial of her
application for a temporary restraining order against a state court proceeding due
to the Anti-Injunction Act. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) provides a statutory exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act. As the plaintiff notes, some courts have held that RICO
provides 	a statutory 	exception 	to 	the 	Anti-Injunction 	Act “in 	extraordinary
circumstances where the state court is itself an instrument of the racketeering
enterprise.” Dkt. 31 at 1; see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY
Med. Practice P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 97 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[W]here multiple meritless
proceedings are a part of a scheme to violate the relevant federal law in order to
give that law its intended scope, an injunction of state-court proceedings could fall
within the ‘expressly-authorized’ exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act.). This,
however, is not one of those extraordinary circumstances because the plaintiff has
not established a racketeering enterprise.
An enterprise is “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “A RICO enterprise can be either a legal
entity or an association-in-fact.” Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 204 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Because the defendants in this case are dozens of individuals across multiple states
and various industries, the plaintiff must allege an association-in-fact enterprise.
“An association-in-fact enterprise . . . must function as a continuing unit as
shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure.” Delta Truck &
Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1988). There is nothing
in the record to indicate that the state court judge whose proceedings the plaintiff
seeks to enjoin is part of any “continuing unit” as required to establish a RICO
enterprise. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 948 (2009). Thus, it matters not
whether RICO provides a statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, because
an injunction is not warranted here. The plaintiff’s objections are overruled.
It is therefore ordered that:
(1) 	Judge 	Edison’s 	memorandum 	and 	recommendation, 	Dkt. 	19, 	is
approved and adopted in its entirety as the holding of the court; and
(2) 	The plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order, Dkt. 4, is
denied.
SIGNED on Galveston Island this 17th day of June 2026.
______________________________
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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