Nguyen v. Mizell et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
ALEX NGUYEN,
Plaintiff.
V.
A.C. MIZELL, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00204
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants Kenneth Brown, Jr. and Wesley Devine have each filed a motion
to dismiss. See Dkts. 28, 29. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the
applicable law, I recommend that both motions be granted. I also recommend that
the court sua sponte dismiss the remaining individual defendants for failure to
timely effectuate service and dismiss the Board of Trustees of the Galveston
Wharves (the “Board”) and the Doe defendants for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
BACKGROUND
This civil rights lawsuit arises from events concerning the July 4, 2023 arrest
of Plaintiff Alex Nguyen. Nguyen alleges that “[o]n July 4, 2023,” he “was
approached, forcibly seized, and seriously injured by officers of the Port of
Galveston Police Department – without cause[ and] without warning.” Dkt. 18 at
1.
On July 1, 2025, Nguyen instituted this civil rights lawsuit against seven
named defendants: A.C. Mizell, Fernando Herrera, Devine, Brown, Jennifer
Matlage, the Port of Galveston Police Department, and the City of Galveston. See
Dkt. 1. Nguyen also named 10 Doe defendants.
On October 16, 2025—three and a half months after Nguyen filed this
lawsuit—Judge Jeffrey V. Brown entered an order observing that there had been
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 25, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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“no indication that the plaintiff has served or attempted to serve the defendants.”
Dkt. 7 at 1. Judge Brown gave Nguyen until December 15, 2025, to “either serve the
defendants or show cause, in writing, as to why [his] claims against the defendants
should not be dismissed for failure to timely serve them.” Id. at 2. Judge Brown
warned Nguyen: “Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action.” Id.
On October 20, 2025, Nguyen filed an affidavit executed by process server
Jacqueline M. Williams. Williams swore under penalty of perjury that Devine was
served with a summons and complaint on July 1, 2025. See Dkt. 8.
On October 22, 2025, the Clerk’s office filed a docket entry showing that
summonses were issued to Brown, Devine, and the Port of Galveston Police
Department that same day. This October 22, 2025 docket entry is the first
indication of the Clerk’s office issuing any summonses in this matter.
On November 3, 2025, Nguyen filed returns of service of summons for
Brown and the Port of Galveston Police Department. See Dkts. 9, 10.
On November 14, 2025, Brown and the Port of Galveston Police Department
each filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Dkts. 11, 12. The Port of
Galveston Police Department moved to dismiss because it “is not a separate legal
entity” from the Galveston Wharves, “and is not subject to suit.” Dkt. 12 at 4.
On January 14, 2026, Nguyen filed Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified
Complaint for Damages. See Dkt. 18. Nguyen dropped the Port of Galveston Police
Department and the City of Galveston from his amended complaint, naming only
Mizell, Herrera, Devine, Brown, Matlage, the Board, and 10 Does as defendants.
At a hearing held that same day, I expressed concern that Devine had not been
served with a proper summons issued by the Clerk’s office (as opposed to a
summons request completed by Nguyen). I ordered Nguyen to file a copy of the
summons that was purportedly served on Devine by Friday, January 16, 2026. See
Dkt. 19.
On January 16, 2026—in response to my order at the January 14, 2026
hearing—Nguyen filed a summons that was issued by the Clerk of Court on October
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22, 2025, which is nearly four months after Williams swore that she served Devine
with a summons and complaint. See Dkt. 21 at 2.
On January 29, 2026, I held a show-cause hearing at which Williams
admitted that her affidavit of service incorrectly reflected that she had served
Devine with a summons and complaint. In truth, Williams served Devine with only
the complaint. I admonished Williams to ensure that she files accurate affidavits
of service in the future.
On January 29, 2026, Devine filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient
service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), and for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). See Dkt. 28. On January 30, 2026, Brown filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. See Dkt. 29. Nguyen has responded to both motions. See Dkts. 31, 32.
For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that: (i) both motions to
dismiss be granted; (ii) that the court sua sponte dismiss the remaining individual
defendants because Nguyen has never served them; and (iii) that the court sua
sponte dismiss the Board and the Doe defendants because Nguyen cannot establish
a constitutional violation.
DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS
A. 	L EGAL S TANDARDS
“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the
court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In addition to the court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint for lack of service, a defendant may also move to dismiss
a complaint for “insufficient service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).
In either circumstance, “[w]hen service of process is challenged, the serving
party bears the burden of proving its validity or good cause for failure to effect
timely service.” Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th
Cir. 1990). “Proof of good cause requires at least as much as would be required to
show excusable neglect, as to which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or
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ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice.” Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709
F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Additionally, some showing of
good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable
basis for noncompliance within the time specified is normally required.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “Pro se status does not excuse a litigant’s complete failure to
effect service.” Sys. Signs, 903 F.2d at 1013.
B. 	A NALYSIS
Nguyen has served only one of the defendants that he names in his operative
pleading: Brown. Nguyen claims to have served Devine, but for the reasons
discussed below, that service was insufficient. I recommend that Mizell, Herrera,
Devine, and Matlage all be dismissed for insufficient service of process. Because
Nguyen claims to have served Devine, and because Devine has filed a Rule 12(b)(5)
motion, I will address Devine separately.
1. 	Failure to Serve Mizell, Herrera, and Matlage
Judge Brown gave Nguyen until December 15, 2025, to “either serve the
defendants or show cause, in writing, as to why [his] claims against the defendants
should not be dismissed for failure to timely serve them.” Dkt. 7 at 2. Judge Brown
warned Nguyen in no uncertain terms: “Failure to do so may result in dismissal of
this action.” Id. Nguyen did not serve Mizell, Herrera, or Matlage by December 15,
2025. Nor did Nguyen request an extension of time to serve Mizell, Herrera, or
Matlage by December 15, 2025. In fact, according to the docket sheet, Nguyen has
never even requested summonses for Mizell, Herrera, or Matlage. Because Nguyen
has made no attempt serve Mizell, Herrera, or Matlage, as ordered by Judge
Brown, his claims against these defendants should be dismissed.
2. 	Failure to Serve Devine
In connection with his motion to dismiss, Devine has submitted an unsworn
declaration in which he admits that he “was served with a copy of the Plaintiff’s
Complaint” on July 1, 2025. Dkt. 28-1 at 2. Devine also declares, however, under
penalty of perjury, that he has never been personally served with a summons, has
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never received a summons in the mail, and has never had a summons left at his
dwelling or usual place of abode. See id. Devine’s declaration comports with the
record, which shows that the Clerk’s office never issued a summons for any
defendant in this case until October 2025. Devine’s declaration also comports with
Williams’s representations at the January 29, 2026 hearing, in which she admitted
that she did not serve Devine with a summons. In response to the overwhelming
evidence that Devine still has not received a summons in this matter, Nguyen
argues that whether Devine received a summons involves “factual disputes
inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage” and that, in any event, Devine
had actual notice of this proceeding. Dkt. 32 at 1. Nguyen’s arguments are
unavailing.
Nguyen “bears the burden of proving [the] validity [of service of process] or
good cause for failure to effect timely service.” Sys. Signs, 903 F.2d at 1013. That
means that Nguyen should have provided this court with a copy of a summons
issued by the Clerk’s office on or before July 1, 2025, to establish that Devine
received a summons on July 1, 2025, as Nguyen claims. Despite having ample
opportunity to provide such proof, Nguyen has never done so.
In System Signs, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing a complaint for insufficient service of process even though
the pro se litigant had “attempted service on the . . . defendants more than once
within the statutory period and each defendant apparently had actual notice of the
suit.” 903 F.2d at 1013–14. The court found it significant that, as here, the court
had advised the defendant “that service was defective.” Id. at 1014. As with the
plaintiff in System Signs, Nguyen “chose to dispute the validity of service”
“[i]nstead of looking at the rules more closely.” Id. Because Nguyen “had ample
notice of a defect, but did not attempt correction,” his case against Devine should
be dismissed for failure to effect service. Id.
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Nguyen’s claims should be dismissed as to Mizell, Herrera, Devine, and
Matlage for failure to effect service of process. I turn now to Nguyen’s claims
against Brown and the Board.
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Nguyen asserts two § 1983 claims against Brown in his individual and
official capacities: (1) unlawful seizure and false imprisonment in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and (2) accusation absent crime in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Brown is the Chief of Police for the Port of Galveston Police
Department. As such, claims against Brown in his official capacity are really claims
against the Board. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“Official-
capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” (quotation omitted)). Nguyen also
seeks to hold the Board liable for the actions of Brown and the other individual
defendants based on a theory of ratification.
Brown, the only defendant who has been served, moves to dismiss Nguyen’s
claims against him, arguing that Nguyen fails to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted against him in either his official or individual capacities and, in
any event, that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity for claims against him in
his individual capacity. As explained below, Brown is unquestionably entitled to
qualified immunity, and thus the dismissal of Nguyen’s claims against him in his
individual capacity. Because Nguyen cannot establish a constitutional violation,
Brown (in his official capacity), the Board, and the Doe defendants are also entitled
to have Nguyen’s claims dismissed. 1
1 The Fifth Circuit has held that a district court does not err in allowing non-appearing
defendants “to benefit from the appearing defendants’ favorable [dispositive] motion.”
Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001). “The policy rationale for this rule is that
it would be incongruous and unfair to allow some defendants to prevail, while not
providing the same benefit to similarly situated defendants.” Id. (cleaned up).
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A. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
1. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point
of 	minimum 	expenditure 	of 	time 	and 	money 	by 	the 	parties 	and 	the
court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). 	I 	“do 	not, 	however, 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions, 	conclusory
statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield
v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a
more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se
plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the
speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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2. 	Section 1983
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but
merely 	provides 	a 	method 	for 	vindicating 	federal 	rights 	elsewhere
conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quotation omitted).
To 	establish § 1983 liability 	against 	Brown 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity,
Nguyen “must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States” and (2) demonstrate that each defendant was “acting under
color of state law.” Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.
2000). Even if Nguyen establishes that a constitutional right was violated, Brown
is entitled to qualified immunity unless Nguyen can show that the constitutional
right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of Brown’s alleged
conduct.
3. 	Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability in their
individual capacity to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d
721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016). It is a judicially created doctrine designed to avoid “the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The doctrine arises from “the danger that
fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible 	public 	officials, 	in 	the 	unflinching 	discharge 	of 	their
duties.” Id. (cleaned up).
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“Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d
209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must
show: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quotation omitted). “These steps may be
considered in either order.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th
Cir. 2018).
The first step asks whether the alleged facts “show the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If
Nguyen’s allegations, viewed favorably, do not establish a constitutional violation,
no further inquiry is necessary. See id. The second step “asks whether the right in
question was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quotation omitted). Brown is “shielded from liability for civil
damages 	if 	[his] 	actions 	did 	not 	violate 	clearly 	established 	statutory 	or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v.
Pelzer, 	536 	U.S. 	730, 	739 	(2002) (quotation 	omitted). 	“A 	right 	is 	clearly
established 	only 	if 	the 	right’s 	contours 	were 	sufficiently 	definite 	that 	any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating it.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation
omitted). “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law” at the time of
the incident provided Brown with “fair warning that [his] alleged treatment of
[Nguyen] was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Nguyen bears a heavy
burden on this prong because a right is clearly established only if relevant
precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific
facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense
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with 	equal 	specificity.” Arnold 	v. 	Williams, 	979 	F.3d 	262, 	267 	(5th 	Cir.
2020) (quotation omitted).
* * *
With these principles in mind, I will address Nguyen’s claims against Brown.
B. 	A NALYSIS
1. 	Nguyen’s Allegations
I will assume for the sake of argument that Brown (and each of the other
individual defendants) was acting under color of state law. Even so, Nguyen cannot
show that Brown “violated a . . . constitutional right.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
Nguyen’s complaint is heavy on legal conclusions and light on factual details.
I accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Unfortunately, these are the
only factual allegations that I can discern from the First Amended Complaint:
x 	Nguyen was arrested by unidentified officers of the Port of Galveston
Police Department on July 4, 2023.
x 	Mizell, Herrera, Devine, Brown, and Matlage are all officers, agents, or
employees of the Port of Galveston Police Department.
x 	Nguyen did not “injure, threaten, or attempt to injure” anyone.
x 	Nguyen did not have a warrant out for his arrest.
x 	“Defendants issued commands and restricted [Nguyen]’s freedom of
movement.”
x 	“Defendants physically seized [Nguyen] and placed him under custodial
arrest.”
x 	Nguyen “did not consent to the seizure or detention.”
x 	“No Defendant articulated the existence of a warrant, an ongoing crime,
or any immediate necessity.”
x 	Nguyen “was transported against his will to a detention facility.”
x 	Nguyen “was booked, processed, and confined.”
x 	Nguyen “was released without any . . . adjudication.”
x 	Nguyen “experienced physical pain and injury as a result of being forcibly
seized and restrained.”
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x 	Nguyen 	“sought 	medical 	evaluation 	and 	treatment 	following 	the
detention.
Dkt. 18 at 1–5. Again, these are the only facts alleged in Nguyen’s operative
pleading.
The rest of Nguyen’s complaint is filled with legal conclusions. For example,
Nguyen’s allegation that he “was not committing, had not committed, and was not
about to commit any crime” is a legal conclusion. Id. at 4. So too is: “Plaintiff
suffered loss of liberty, emotional distress, reputation harm, and other injuries as
a direct result of Defendants’ actions.” Id. at 5. I do not “accept as true legal
conclusions, conclusory statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Benfield, 945 F.3d at 336–37 (cleaned up).
If, considering his pro se status, I look to Nguyen’s original complaint, I can
glean a few additional facts:
x 	On the morning of July 4, 2023, Nguyen was parked in his truck in a
public parking area adjacent to the Galveston docks.
x 	An unidentified woman asked Nguyen to move his truck, claiming that
he was blocking a parking space. When Nguyen declined, the woman
called the police.
x 	“Mizell, Herrera, Devine, and other officers” arrived in response.
x 	Mizell and Herrera ordered Nguyen to move his vehicle and threatened
arrest.
x 	Unidentified officers ultimately arrested Nguyen and charged him with
unidentified criminal offenses.
x 	The arrest injured Nguyen’s right wrist, and that injury caused and
continues to cause Nguyen great pain.
x 	Nguyen was later released from custody and the charges against him were
dropped in August 2023.
Dkt. 1 at 4–5.
The only factual allegation specific to Brown in either Nguyen’s original or
amended complaint is this:
Defendant KENNETH BROWN JR. (“Brown”) is, upon information
and belief, a man of the age of majority, who at all relevant times was
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acting as an officer, agent, or employee of the Port of Galveston Police
Department, within the boundaries of the Texas republic, under color
of law. Brown identified himself to Plaintiff as Chief of Police, who is
responsible for the supervision, training, and discipline of officers
under him. Sued in both individual and official capacities.
Dkt. 1 at 3; Dkt. 18 at 3.
Given the paucity of these allegations, Nguyen cannot plausibly establish a
constitutional violation by Brown (or any other defendant).
2. 	Nguyen Does Not State a Claim Against Brown
Nguyen does not state a claim against Brown because Nguyen does not allege
any affirmative action by Brown other than the fact that “Brown identified himself
to [Nguyen] as Chief of Police.” Dkt. 18 at 3. In his response to Brown’s motion to
dismiss, Nguyen states that his First Amended Complaint (1) “alleges that Chief
Brown . . . personally reviewed body-worn camera footage and surveillance of the
incident;” (2) that Brown “issued a written determination finding the arrest
‘justified’ despite the absence of probable cause and the subsequent dismissal of
all charges:”; and (3) that Brown’s “findings served to ratify and approve the
unconstitutional conduct of subordinate officers.” Dkt. 31 at 2. To start, only the
first allegation and part of the second allegation are factual allegations. Nguyen’s
assertions that there was an absence of probable cause for his arrest and that
Brown’s actions ratified the subordinate officers’ conduct are legal conclusions, not
factual allegations. Additionally, Nguyen did not allege anywhere in his original or
amended complaint that Brown “personally reviewed body-worn camera footage
and surveillance of the incident.” Id. In fact, the words “camera,” “footage,” and
“surveillance” do not appear in either document. See Dkt. 1; Dkt. 18. That is not to
say, however, that if Nguyen had made such an allegation, that it would make a
difference. It would not.
Because Nguyen does not allege that Brown was personally involved in
Nguyen’s arrest, Brown can only be liable in his individual capacity if Nguyen
alleges that Brown “personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that
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there is a sufficient causal connection between the [Brown]’s conduct and the
constitutional violation.” Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted). This test presumes that Nguyen can establish a constitutional
violation. He cannot.
“[W]hen a plaintiff sues a public official under § 1983, the district court must
insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff.” Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th
Cir.1996). “Heightened pleading requires allegations of fact focusing specifically
on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiffs’ injury.” Reyes v. Sazan,
168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.1999). “The case should not be allowed to proceed unless
plaintiffs can assert specific facts that, if true, would overcome the defense.” Fisher
v. Dallas County, 299 F.R.D. 527, 532 (N.D. Tex. 2014). Nguyen does not identify
which officers arrested him, what he was arrested for, or which officers injured
him. Nguyen’s “failure to attribute conduct to any of the Individual Defendants or
to separate out the allegations against the various Individual Defendants makes it
impossible to determine whether the defendant in question acted in an objectively
unreasonable manner in light of clearly established constitutional standards.” Id.
at 532–33. Accordingly, Nguyen has failed to establish a constitutional violation
by Brown or any other defendant.
Because Nguyen has not established a constitutional violation, his claims
against Brown (in both his individual and official capacities), the Board, and the
Doe defendants must be dismissed. See Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d
170, 178 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that claims against a municipality “cannot
survive” where the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate” a constitutional violation);
Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013) (“All of Whitley’s inadequate
supervision, failure to train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an
underlying constitutional violation.”); Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 425
(5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff must show either the supervisor personally was
involved 	in 	the 	constitutional 	violation 	or 	that 	there 	is 	a 	sufficient 	causal
connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation. It is
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facially evident that this test cannot be met if there is no underlying constitutional
violation.” (cleaned up)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the two pending motions
to dismiss (Dkts. 28, 29) be granted, that the court sua sponte dismiss the
remaining individual defendants for failure to effect service of process, and that
the court sua sponte dismiss the Board and the Doe defendants for failure to state
a claim.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of March 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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