Tomasso v. Peddle et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
LUDOVICO TOMASSO,
Plaintiff.
V.
BONNIE PEDDLE, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-00280
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
There are five motions pending in this case, which concerns maritime liens
asserted against a yacht, the Southern Bell: (1) Plaintiff Ludovico Tomasso’s
motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant Bonnie Peddle (Dkt. 34);
(2) Tomasso’s motion for partial summary judgment against Defendants 9371893
Canada Inc. and Forza 5 Energie Inc. (Dkt. 35); (3) Peddle’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings (Dkt. 39); (4) 9371893 Canada and Forza 5’s motion to dismiss
(Dkt. 40); and (5) Peddle’s motion to strike and exclude Dkt. 50-2 or, in the
alternative, for leave to file a sur-reply to Tomasso’s motion for partial summary
judgment against Peddle (Dkt. 53).
Having 	reviewed 	the 	briefing, 	the 	record, 	and 	the 	applicable 	law, 	I
recommend that the court sua sponte dismiss Tomasso as the plaintiff, because he
lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of the Southern Bell. I further recommend
that, before the court dismisses this matter entirely for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court afford the real party in interest—the owner of the Southern
Bell—21 days to move for substitution as the plaintiff in this action.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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BACKGROUND1
This dispute concerns the validity of two maritime liens asserted against the
Southern Bell. See Dkt. 1-2. Tomasso and Peddle—both Canadian citizens—were
married from 1999 until 2022. During their marriage, Peddle became the president
of two Canadian corporations, 9371893 Canada and Forza 5.
In 2014, Tomasso purchased the Southern Bell. See Dkt. 1-3 at 7. It appears
as if Tomasso sold the Southern Bell to Forza Yacht Sales & Marine Services, LLC,
a Florida limited liability company, which then transferred ownership of the vessel
to 	B.E.L.L. 	Marine 	LLC, 	a 	Texas 	limited 	liability 	company. 	The 	corporate
formation document for Forza Yacht lists Linda Lee Krantz, Tomasso, and Peddle
as members. See Dkt. 40-1 at 3. The corporate formation document for B.E.L.L.
lists Tomasso and Peddle as governing persons. See Dkt. 40-3 at 2–3. At present,
the Southern Bell appears to be registered to B.E.L.L. See Dkt. 40-5 at 2.
Importantly, it is undisputed that Tomasso, individually, does not currently own
the Southern Bell.
On August 8, 2018, Krantz executed a Notice of Claim of Lien against the
Southern Bell. Krantz claimed that the Southern Bell owed her $21,625 for work
performed as a project manager and consultant. See Dkt. 1-1 at 3.
Tomasso filed for divorce in July 2020. On December 5, 2020, Peddle, acting
in her role as president of 9371893 Canada, executed a Notice of Claim of Lien
against the Southern Bell. Peddle claimed that 9371893 Canada had loaned
$318,307.87 USD for work on the Southern Bell, including ship repairs, painting,
and mechanical services, plus interest. See Dkt. 1-2 at 4. That same day, Peddle,
acting as president of Forza 5, executed a second, nearly identical lien claiming
$198,882.72 USD for similar work on the Southern Bell. See id. at 8. Both liens list
the mortgagee as “Ludovico Tomasso & B.E.L.L. Marine LLC.” Id. at 5, 9.
1 These facts are taken from Tomasso’s “complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
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At the time of the divorce, the Southern Bell was included in the family
patrimony.2 See Dkt. 1-3 at 6. 9371893 Canada’s bank accounts and Peddle’s share
capital of 9371893 Canada were included in the partnership of acquests. 3 On
November 8, 2022, the couple finalized their divorce and were issued a judgment
in the Superior Court of Montreal, Quebec, Canada (the “Divorce Decree”).
In the Divorce Decree, the Southern Bell was appraised at a value of
$265,525.70 CDN, and Tomasso was ordered to pay Peddle for half of the
appraised value of the Southern Bell. See Dkt. 1-3 at 7. The Divorce Decree did not
mention the parties’ interests in B.E.L.L., Forza Yacht, or either entity’s purported
ownership of the Southern Bell.
On September 24, 2024, Tomasso instituted this lawsuit against Peddle,
9371893 Canada, Forza 5, and Krantz. Tomasso seeks to invalidate the maritime
liens that 9371893 Canada, Forza 5, and Krantz assert against the Southern Bell on
the 	grounds 	that 	the 	liens 	are 	improperly 	asserted 	as 	maritime 	liens 	or,
alternatively, that the liens are barred by res judicata.
Peddle and the Corporations have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
arguing, among other things, that Tomasso lacks capacity to challenge the validity
of maritime liens asserted against a vessel that he does not own. Although
Defendants bring their motions under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, Defendants’ capacity arguments are more
2 Like the common law concept of community property, “family patrimony” is a civil law
regime under which, “irrespective of which spouse holds title, both share the net increase
in value, during the marriage, of the family’s residences and their furnishings, motor
vehicles used by the family, and retirement plans.” Robert Leckey, Cohabitation Law in
Quebec: Confusing, Incoherent, and Unjust, 44 Hous. J. Int’l L. 331, 339 (2022).
3 The partnership of acquests is the default legal matrimonial regime that governs the
division of assets excluded from the family patrimony. See Claire L’Heureux-Dube, The
Quebec Experience: Codification of Family Law and A Proposal for the Creation of A
Family Court System, 44 La. L. Rev. 1575, 1593–96 (1984). Tomasso alleges that both
9371893 Canada and Forza 5 were in the family patrimony at the time of divorce. See
Dkt. 1 at 5. That allegation is contradicted by the Divorce Decree, which does not list either
corporation in the family patrimony. See Dkt. 1-3 at 7–8.
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accurately construed as a challenge to Tomasso’s standing and, consequently, this
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “Federal courts, both trial and
appellate, have a continuing obligation to examine the basis for their jurisdiction.
The issue may be raised by parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.” MCG,
Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
“Every party that comes before a federal court must establish that it has
standing to pursue its claims.” Cibolo Waste, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d
469, 473 (5th Cir. 2013). “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant
is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). “Standing jurisprudence contains two
strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s case-or-controversy
requirement, and prudential standing, which embodies judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (cleaned up), abrogated by Lexmark Intern., Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). Because Article III
standing is a prerequisite to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]he question
of Article III standing must be decided prior to [] prudential standing.” Ford v.
NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2002).
The “irreducible constitutional minimum of [Article III] standing contains
three elements”: (1) “an injury in fact”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of . . . fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant”; and (3) “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (cleaned up). “Failure to
establish any one [element] deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the
suit.” Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2002).
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“Prudential standing requirements exist in addition to the immutable
requirements of Article III as an integral part of judicial self-government.” St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Labuzan, 579 F.3d 533, 539 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted). “One principle of prudential standing requires that a plaintiff generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on
the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Superior MRI Servs., Inc. v. All.
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
Standing may be addressed facially or factually. See Paterson v. Weinberger,
644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). “An attack is ‘factual’ rather than ‘facial’ if the
defendant submits affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Superior
MRI, 778 F.3d at 504 (quotation omitted). “To defeat a factual attack, a plaintiff
must prove the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence and is obliged to submit facts through some evidentiary method to
sustain his burden of proof.” Id. (quotation omitted).
TOMASSO HAS NOT ESTABLISHED STANDING
In his complaint, Tomasso articulates the reasons why he believes that the
liens in question are invalid, but Tomasso does not articulate a cognizable injury
to himself. It is difficult to see how Tomasso could articulate such an injury given
that he does not own the Southern Bell. Although Tomasso is a manager of
B.E.L.L., “a member of an LLC . . . lacks standing to sue individually where the
cause of action belongs to the company, unless its alleged harm is distinct from
harm suffered by the company.” 4 Cruden Bay Holdings, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase
4 There is a dispute as to whether Peddle presently has an ownership interest in B.E.L.L.
Although B.E.L.L.’s 2017 Certificate of Formation shows that both Tomasso and Peddle
are managers, see Dkt. 40-3 at 2–3, Tomasso claims that “Peddle is simply no longer a
manager of [B.E.L.L.].” Dkt. 47 at 3. I need not wade into these waters. It makes no
difference to this court whether B.E.L.L. is controlled by Tomasso alone or Tomasso and
Peddle jointly. At this juncture, it matters only that Tomasso is not the Southern Bell’s
owner, and he can point to no legally cognizable possessory interest in the Southern Bell
that would give him standing to bring this lawsuit.
Assuming Peddle does have an interest in B.E.L.L., that raises a separate problem with
the liens. In addition to being expired, the relationship of the various corporate entities
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Bank N.A., No. 3:21-cv-1170, 2024 WL 3974724, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2024);
see also Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 101.106(b). (“A member of a limited liability
company or an assignee of a membership interest in a limited liability company
does not have an interest in any specific property of the company.”). Because
Tomasso does not allege harm to himself that is distinct from harm suffered by
B.E.L.L., Tomasso has not alleged an injury sufficient to establish Article III
standing.
To overcome this obvious hurdle, Tomasso offers an affidavit stating that he
has “a right of possession of the Southern Bell” because it “has been [his] residence
since January of 2020 and is currently [his] residence.” Dkt. 48-1 at 2. Yet,
Tomasso does not allege in his complaint that the liens affect his ability to reside
on the Southern Bell. As for Tomasso’s conclusory statement that he has a right of
possession, that is a legal question for this court to answer, not a fact that Tomasso
can simply assert.
The “right of possession” language comes from Supplemental Admiralty
Rule C, which states that an in rem proceeding may be brought by “a person who
asserts a right of possession or any ownership interest in the property that is the
subject of the action.” Supp. R. C(6)(1)(i). 5 This litigation, however, is not an in rem
proceeding. Although Tomasso alleges that the Southern Bell is in this district, the
to each other through Tomasso and Peddle implicates the “well-settled law that a vessel
owner, part owner, or joint venturer cannot hold a maritime lien on the vessel in which
he enjoys such an interest.” Cantieri Navali Riuniti v. M/V Skyptron, 621 F. Supp. 171,
186 (W.D. La. 1985), aff’d and remanded, 802 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1986). If this court had
jurisdiction to entertain this dispute, equity would likely demand that this court pierce
the corporate veil because “those who share responsibility for incurring the debts of the
vessel ought not to be reimbursed out of that vessel’s proceeds to the detriment of other
lienholders.” Id.
5 Rule C states that an action in rem may be brought “[w]henever a statute of the United
States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto.” Supp. R.
C(1)(b). The Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (CIMLA) is such a statute.
Under CIMLA, federal district courts have jurisdiction to “declare that a vessel is not
subject to a lien . . . or that the vessel is not subject to the notice of claim of lien, or both.”
46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2).
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Southern Bell is not named in Tomasso’s complaint, nor is it arrested or attached
in this jurisdiction.
“Courts often speak as though physical presence of the res within the
territorial jurisdiction of the district court, along with the attachment of the res, is
a hard-and-fast jurisdictional prerequisite for an action in rem, particularly in
admiralty.” Leopard Marine & Trading, Ltd. v. Easy St. Ltd., 896 F.3d 174, 183
(2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). The only exception to this hard-
and-fast jurisdictional requirement is “if the owner of the res voluntarily appears.”
Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, this court is without jurisdiction to hear
this dispute under Rule C unless the owner of the Southern Bell appears and waives
the requirement that the Southern Bell be arrested or attached in this jurisdiction.
Tomasso does not allege that he owns the Southern Bell. Accordingly, this court is
without jurisdiction to entertain this dispute.
Tomasso 	contends 	that 	under 	Supplemental 	Admiralty 	Rule 	C(6),
“ownership interest is not limited to the titular owner of the vessel” and “[i]t is
undisputed that Mr. Tomasso has a right of possession as he currently resides on
the vessel . . . and has resided on the vessel since 2020.” Dkt. 48 at 4. Yet, Tomasso
fails to provide any legal authority for his right of possession. Tomasso does not
allege that he has, for example, a bareboat charter or a bailment for the Southern
Bell.6 Rather, Tomasso’s only claim to ownership is that he lives on the Southern
Bell. But simply occupying the vessel, in the absence of some legal agreement, does
not give Tomasso a legal right of possession that would confer Article III standing
to challenge the liens on the Southern Bell.
6 See, e.g. Reed v. S. S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412 (1963) (“It has long been recognized in the
law of admiralty that for many, if not most, purposes the bareboat charterer is to be
treated as the owner, generally called owner pro hac vice.”); United States v. $746,198 in
U.S. Currency, more or less, 299 F. Supp. 2d 923, 931 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (“[A] bailee has
a possessory interest in bailed property sufficient to assert a claim against anyone, other
than the bailor, who interferes with that interest.”).
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Tomasso requests that, if this court finds “that only B.E.L.L. . . . has the right
to defend the [Southern Bell],” that he be given “the opportunity to amend to add
B.E.L.L. . . . as a party.” Dkt. 47 at 10. Tomasso supplies no legal support for the
notion that a party without standing can move to amend. Even so, Rule 17 states
that a “court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the
real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed
for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). Accordingly, this court should allow 21 days for the Southern
Bell’s owner—or anyone with a legally cognizable possessory interest in the
Southern Bell—to move to be substituted as the plaintiff in this action. Should the
owner appear and so move, “the action proceeds as if it had been originally
commenced by the real party in interest.” Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the court sua sponte
dismiss Tomasso as the plaintiff and give the real party in interest 21 days from the
date this memorandum and recommendation is adopted to move for substitution
as the plaintiff in this action. If no such motion is filed within 21 days, the court
should dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I also recommend
that all pending motions (Dkts. 34, 35, 39, 40, and 53) be denied as moot.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of April 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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