Ramirez v. Marquez et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
MARIO ALBERTO RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
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Case No. 2:26-cv-00163
YOLANDA MARQUEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Mario Alberto Ramirez, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against defendants
Yolanda Marquez, Jeffrey Kane, and Kim Cox. (Doc. No. 1, p. 3.) The district court should
DISMISS Plaintiff’s lawsuit without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).1
A. Plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff’s factual allegations are brief. He alleges that Yolanda Marquez “recorded a
warranty deed with vendors lien” to him in April 2020, and he “continued payments on a fake
deed until June 10, 2026.” (Doc. No. 1, p. 5.) He claims that his attorney, Jeffrey Kane,
“with[h]eld the recorded warranty deed until” Plaintiff paid Marquez “for a fake deed.” Id. at 6.2
Plaintiff further alleges that Kim Cox, who allegedly was Marquez’s lawyer, “was also involved”
in this “fake deed contract,” which led to Plaintiff’s paying $53,000 on that contract. Id. Finally,
Plaintiff alleges that attorney Kane was aware of this “illegal fraud” as early as April 2020,
1 This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and recommendations on
dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
2 Plaintiff does not specify the nature of the matter in which attorney Kane was representing him.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 26, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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before Plaintiff signed the contract. Id. He is seeking compensation for his “bankruptcy file of
overpayment,” attorney fees, interest on the principal sum of his home, damages to his home,
missed vacations with his children, and jewelry that he allegedly sold in 2019 to cover his fees.
Id. at 7.
Plaintiff contends that this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because the defendants allegedly violated the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. (Doc.
No. 1, p. 4.) Defendants’ alleged violation of § 1341 is Plaintiff’s lone asserted basis for
jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff does not attempt to invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction,
and indeed he alleges that all parties reside in Texas. Id. at 1, 3. Plaintiff also recently filed a
“Disclosure of Interested Parties” which confirms the Texas residency of the named parties.
(Doc. No. 5.)
B. Applicable law.
District courts may, for appropriate reasons, dismiss cases sua sponte. See Carver v.
Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2021). Such dismissal “‘is mandatory when a court
discovers that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.’” Berrocal v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 25-
50259, 2025 WL 3488842, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Carver, 18 F.4th
at 497); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). It is the plaintiff’s “burden at all times to establish federal
jurisdiction.” Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1026 (5th Cir. 2022)
(citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
C. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
Plaintiff attempts to invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. (Doc. No. 1, p. 4.) Federal question jurisdiction exists, Plaintiff alleges, because
defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341, a statute that criminalizes mail fraud. Id. But this
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“federal criminal statute[] do[es] not provide a private cause of action.” Thompson v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. H-15-598, 2016 WL 164114, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2016)
(Rosenthal, J.), aff'd, 684 F. App'x 464 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Napper v. Anderson, Hensley,
Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974)). Indeed, district courts have
routinely recognized that “the Fifth Circuit has held that no private cause of action is permitted
under the mail and wire fraud statutes.” Brown v. Anderson, No. 3:16-CV-0620, 2016 WL
6903730, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 6893723 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016)
(citing Napper, 500 F.2d at 636); see also Capers v. Newrez, LLC, Civ. No. H-25-5480, 2026
WL 1180008, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2026) (Hittner, J.) (dismissing mail and wire fraud
claims brought under § 1341). Section 1341 alone thus does not provide Plaintiff with a proper
vehicle to invoke the district court’s federal question jurisdiction.3
Plaintiff’s only theory for federal question jurisdiction is meritless, and he offers no
alternative basis for subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Accordingly, the district court
should DISMISS Plaintiff’s lawsuit without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
D. Notice.
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to each
party or counsel. The Clerk will send this Memorandum and Recommendation to Plaintiff by
certified mail with return receipt requested. Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the
Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the United
3 Violations of § 1341 can give rise to federal question jurisdiction if they are leveled under the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. But Plaintiff has not alleged that
defendants “‘knowingly cause[d] to be delivered by mail anything for the purpose of executing any scheme or
artifice to defraud.’” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Benhamou, 190 F. Supp. 3d 631, 657 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting United
States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 355 (5th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff has not alleged a RICO claim here, so subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist on that basis either.
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States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
A failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being
served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on
appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District
Court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED on June 26, 2026.
_____________________________
MITCHEL NEUROCK
United States Magistrate Judge
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