Blackwood-Head v. Head et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
ERICK SCOTT BLACKWOOD-HEAD,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:26-CV-00090
ERIC HEAD, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Erick Scott Blackwood-Head, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint and
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on March 27, 2026. (D.E.s 1, 3). The
case was referred to the undersigned to handle all pretrial matters and to make
recommendations to the District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (D.E. 8). Plaintiff
seeks to sue seven Defendants for various alleged statutory violations relating to his claims
that he has been the victim of peonage, trafficking, and forced labor. The undersigned has
considered Plaintiff’s IFP application (D.E. 3) and it is GRANTED.
Additionally, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully
recommends Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it is legally and factually frivolous.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. BACKGROUND
In his lengthy complaint, attached exhibits, and appendix, Plaintiff raises claims
against seven named defendants, including three named individuals (Eric Head, Kimberly
Fowler Head, and Linda Walker) and four non-individual defendants (Trellis Foundation,
H-E-B Grocery Company, L.P., Bill & Melida Gates Foundation, and ExxonMobil
Corporation). (D.E. 1). The individually named defendants are alleged by Plaintiff to be
“direct perpetrators of the trafficking venture.” (Id. at 1). The four non-individual
defendants are alleged by Plaintiff to be “institutional actors who knowingly benefited from
participation in the venture.” (Id.).
Plaintiff states he is a former licensed nurse, musician, and environmental activist
who has been engaged in “constitutionally protected expression” since 2010. (Id at 6).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s status as a nurse, musician, and
activist. Plaintiff was arrested in Houston, Texas, in July 2024 for aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, despite informing the officers that he was a victim of human trafficking.
Plaintiff alleges that the arrest was intended, in part, to serve as a justification to revoke his
nursing license, which occurred in August 2025. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that, in September 2024, Eric Head demanded that he “work to
satisfy a bond debt associated with his July 2024 arrest under threat of reincarceration,”
constituting peonage. (Id. at 4, 7). Plaintiff alleges that Eric Head assaulted Plaintiff in
September and October 2024 in retaliation of “Plaintiff’s refusal to submit to forced labor.”
(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, in October 2024, Kimberly Fowler Head sent Plaintiff a text
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message terminating his vehicle access and withdrawing all support for Plaintiff. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Kimberly Fowler Head “participated in the trafficking venture by
coordinating with law enforcement to deprive Plaintiff of housing, transportation, and
support” after Plaintiff refused Eric Head’s “peonage demands.” (Id.).
Plaintiff states that Trellis Foundation committed $350,000 to Kimberly Fowler
Head’s employer in September 2024. (Id at 4). Plaintiff contends that this payment was a
coordinated response to Plaintiff’s July 2024 Houston arrest. (Id. at 9-10). Plaintiff states
that “Trellis Foundation knew or should have known” that Kimberly Fowler Head’s
employer was connected to a documented trafficking disclosure to law enforcement. (Id.
at 10).
Plaintiff alleges that H-E-B Grocery Company, L.P. employee Jennifer Ramon
serves on the board of the Purple Door domestic violence shelter in Corpus Christi, Texas.
(Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that H-E-B’s grocery delivery application known as “Favor”
declined Plaintiff’s payment cards in May 2025, although the same payment cards worked
through other vendors. (Id.). Plaintiff states that this is a “denial of basic food access.”
(Id. at 10). Plaintiff alleges that in June 2025, H-E-B donated $30,000 to Kimberly Fowler
Head’s employer. (Id. at 5). According to Plaintiff, this payment constituted a “financial
reward to venture-connected entity employing direct perpetrator.” (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff alleges that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation committed $100,000 to
Kimberly Fowler Head’s employer in November 2025. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation did not execute due diligence practices in giving monies
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to Kimberly Fowler Head’s employer. (Id. at 11-13). According to Plaintiff, the
Foundation should have known the connection with human trafficking. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Linda Walker was an ExxonMobil community affairs
representative affiliated with ExxonMobil’s “governance network,” and was a board chair
at The Purple Door domestic violence shelter. (Id. at 13-14). Plaintiff alleges that Linda
Walker and ExxonMobil had some control over The Purple Door shelter, “the organization
where Plaintiff sought refuge and made abuse disclosures.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges also
that ExxonMobil is “simultaneously documented as the corporate beneficiary of
the…hacking and disinformation operation targeting Plaintiff’s activist community.” (Id.).
Plaintiff claims this is known as the “White Knight Strategy,” where there is a “suppression
operation against a critic or target of the corporate actor.” (Id at 5-6). Plaintiff alleges that
“the same corporate interests exposed by Plaintiff’s environmental activism…are
represented in the governance of The Purple Door…where Plaintiff was forced to seek
refuge.” (Id. at 13-14).
Plaintiff sues all Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, a federal civil remedy
provision under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). It
allows victims of human trafficking and forced labor to sue their traffickers and
beneficiaries in federal court for financial damages and attorney fees.
Further, Plaintiff sues Eric Head under 18 U.S.C. § 1581, the federal statute that
criminalizes peonage, making it a federal crime to hold, return, or arrest any person to
compel them to work off a debt. Finally, Plaintiff sues Eric Head and Kimberly Fowler
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Head under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590. Section 1589 is a federal law that makes forced
labor a crime, targeting those who knowingly force people to work through threats of
physical harm, abuse of the legal process, or psychological coercion. 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
Section 1590 is the federal statute that makes it a crime to knowingly recruit, harbor,
transport, provide, or obtain a person for forced labor or services. 18 U.S.C. § 1590.
Plaintiff claims the following damages: (1) economic damages from lost income,
etc., (2) physical damages from assaults in 2024, (3) non-economic damages of emotional
distress, etc., (4) punitive damages for willful conduct of Defendants, and (5) attorney’s
fees and costs. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees
and costs, orders directing Defendants to produce or preserve certain listed matters, and
consolidation of this case with two of Plaintiff’s other Southern District of Texas cases.1
1 Plaintiff has filed several recent lawsuits IFP, including: (1) USDC SDTX, 2:25-
cv-121, Blackwood-Head v. United States (sued the United States of America for various
alleged constitutional violations relating to his claims he has been subjected to “illegal
neural monitoring and broadcasting”); (2) USDC SDTX, 4: 25-cv-703, Blackwood-Head
v. Harris County Sheriff’s Office, et al. (sued numerous Harris County officials and entities
for alleged unconstitutional conduct arising out of his July 2024 arrest for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon); (3) USDC District of Columbia, Blackwood-Head v.
Democratic National Committee, et al. (sued the Democratic and the Republican National
Committees alleging manipulation of election outcomes, conspiracy to assist Jeffrey
Epstein, and influence over state bar associations); (4) Erick Scott Blackwood-Head v.
Texas Board of Nursing, D-1-GN-25-009663, Travis County, Texas; (5) USDC SDTX,
2:25-cv-252, Blackwood-Head v. Comcast Corporation, et al. (sued Comcast Corporation,
The Walt Disney Company, News Corporation, Paramount Global, Warner Bros.
Discovery, Inc, and Amazon.com, Inc. because they allegedly control “approximately 90%
of U.S. media content distribution” and have “partnerships with federal law enforcement
and intelligence agencies to systematically suppress independent journalism and creative
content that questions official narratives”).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may dismiss sua sponte a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it
determines that the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals on these grounds are often made sua
sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the
inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989) (citation omitted). “[D]ismissals as frivolous or malicious should be
deemed to be dismissals with prejudice unless the district court specifically dismisses
without prejudice.” Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997). An action is
frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Henson–El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d
51, 53 (5th Cir. 1991). A complaint is without an arguable basis in law if it is grounded
upon a discredited or untenable legal theory. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A claim is factually
frivolous when “the facts alleged are ‘fantastic or delusional scenarios' or the legal theory
upon which a complaint relies is ‘indisputably meritless.’” Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d
153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
In evaluating whether a complaint states a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court
applies the same standards governing dismissals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(6). Newsome v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). To avoid
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a
plaintiff has stated an actionable claim for relief, the complaint must be liberally construed
in favor of the plaintiff and the allegations contained therein must be taken as true. Martin
K. Eby Constr. Co. v. DART, 369 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2004). However, a plaintiff's pro
se status does not offer him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to
harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse already
overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir.
1986). District courts possess broad discretion when determining whether an IFP
proceeding is frivolous. Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint raises both factually and legally frivolous claims based
on allegations that describe fantastical or delusional scenarios. First, to the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to raise claims directly under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1589, and 1590, these
claims are legally frivolous because the criminal statutes at issue do not provide an
independent civil remedy. A private plaintiff cannot force a criminal prosecution because
the authority to initiate criminal charges lies only with state and federal prosecutors. See
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1733 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“the decision whether to institute criminal charges is one our
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Constitution vests in state and federal executive officials”); United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before
a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion”). “[D]ecisions
whether to prosecute or file criminal charges are generally within the prosecutor's
discretion, and, as a private citizen, [the plaintiff] has no standing to institute a federal
criminal prosecution and no power to enforce a criminal statute.” Gill v. Texas, 153 F.
App'x 261, 262-63 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, for a private right of action to exist under a
criminal statute, there must be “a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of
some sort lay in favor of someone.” Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975), overruled in part
by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (concluding that the party seeking to imply a private right of action
bears the burden to show that Congress intended to create one). Plaintiff has not alleged a
statutory basis to raise claims directly under any of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1589, or 1590, nor
would the language of these statutes support such an allegation.
Instead, the civil remedy for claims associated with those statutory sections is in 18
U.S.C. § 1595. Plaintiff has raised claims under § 1595, however, the factual allegations
supporting these claims are frivolous, fantastical or delusional, and wholly insufficient to
support the claims. In his complaint, Plaintiff summarily and broadly claims that the seven
Defendants, three individual persons and four corporate defendants, have conspired
without explanation to subject Plaintiff to criminal acts of peonage, forced labor, and
human trafficking. (See generally D.E. 1). All of Plaintiff’s claims rely entirely on his
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contention that all seven Defendants are part of a wide-ranging conspiracy to perpetrate a
human trafficking and forced labor venture and/or to benefit from participation in such
venture. (D.E. 1 at 1). However, parsing the complaint reveals only fantastical or
delusional factual allegations that do not support the alleged conspiracy. Most importantly,
at no point in his lengthy complaint does Plaintiff allege how he was trafficked, and the
closest connection drawn between the various non-individual Defendants and the alleged
conspiracy is donations to Kimberly Fowler Head’s employer, which is a charity. (D.E. 1
at 4-5). Plaintiff’s factual contentions are clearly baseless and woefully inadequate to
support any cognizable claim, and his allegations border on the irrational and incredible.
See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
In whole, Plaintiff’s complaint and attached exhibits present an unintelligible
conspiracy, fantastic, and/or delusional allegations, and as such, this action should be
dismissed as frivolous.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it is legally and factually frivolous.
Respectfully submitted on July 24, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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