Tanner v. Frenzei, Commissioner et al Filing Restrictions Imposed re: DE 16

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
BRADRICK GERLMAINE TANNER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:26-CV-00063
DOUGLAS FRENZEI, COMMISSIONER
ET AL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS CASE
Plaintiff Bradrick Gerlmaine Tanner is a Texas inmate appearing pro se in this
prisoner civil rights action. Plaintiff’s case is subject to screening pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
For purposes of screening, the undersigned recommends this case be DISMISSED
with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently assigned to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Ramsey
Unit in Rosharon, Texas, although this case relates to Plaintiff’s underlying state criminal
proceedings in Jackson County, Texas. Plaintiff filed this action on March 2, 2026. (D.E.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 03, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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1). Plaintiff signed the complaint, but he also listed the following persons as Plaintiffs: (1)
Cherry Miles; (2) Tyteana Miles, (3) Aleecia Robinson, and (4) Henry Edwards. Because
Plaintiff is not a lawyer and has no authority to represent other persons, the other Plaintiffs
were dismissed from this action without prejudice. (D.E. 5). Plaintiff’s Original Complaint
contained general legal principles or citations with no statement of facts. Plaintiff’s
Original Complaint was nonsensical and indecipherable. On March 6, 2026, Plaintiff was
ordered to either pay the filing fee or properly move to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.E.
5). On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff paid the filing fee. On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff appeared
by video at a Spears1 hearing where he was given an opportunity to explain his claims.
Plaintiff testified at the Spears hearing that this case has been removed from state
court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1443.2 (D.E. 11, p. 9). Plaintiff explained he filed an action in
state court entitled, In re: Realtor, Bradrick Gerlmaine Tanner, No. 2101-10789,
24thDistrict Court, Jackson Co., Texas. He further testified that in the instant action he was
trying to remove the action he filed in Jackson County to this Court. (D.E. 11, p. 13).
However, upon further explanation from Plaintiff, it became apparent that in the present
action, Plaintiff is seeking to raise claims about his state court criminal prosecution and
appeal. Plaintiff was convicted in state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and
he is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for that conviction. He testified at the
1 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The purpose of a Spears hearing is to determine whether a prisoner
alleging a constitutional deprivation should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Spears, 766 F.2d at 181–82. The evidentiary hearing is “in the nature of a motion for more definite statement.” Id.
2 Section 1443 concerns removal of certain civil rights cases, is narrowly construed, and is inapplicable in the instant
case. State of Ga. v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966).
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Spears hearing that those proceedings were fraudulent or were otherwise unfair. (D.E. 11,
p. 15-17). Plaintiff brings this action because he believes his rights were violated in
connection with the state criminal prosecution. (D.E. 11, p. 20). Plaintiff testified he is not
seeking to file a writ of habeas corpus in the instant action. (D.E. 11, p. 18).
In his Original Complaint, Plaintiff named Doug Frenzei as a defendant because he
is a Commissioner of Jackson County and Plaintiff believes Mr. Frenzei knew the judge
who presided over Plaintiff’s criminal case and was aware of the judge’s wrongdoings.
Plaintiff named Sharon Mathis as a defendant because she is the District Clerk of Jackson
County and also knew of the judge’s wrongdoings. He named Kathy Mills because she is
the Clerk of Court for the Texas 13th Court of Appeals and did not perform appropriate
checks and balances of persons under her control. Plaintiff named Ken Paxton, the former
Texas Attorney General, because he compelled Plaintiff to pay child support after being
wrongly convicted. (D.E. 1; D.E. 11, pp. 24-25).
Plaintiff’s claims were still unclear even after considering Plaintiff’s Spears hearing
testimony. The undersigned explained to Plaintiff that his Original Complaint was
defective for a number of reasons, but that he would be given an opportunity to file an
amended complaint. (D.E. 11, p. 30). On April 30, 2026, the undersigned entered an order
for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. (D.E. 9). Plaintiff was cautioned the Court does
not fully understand his claims and Plaintiff was further warned:
[H]is case is subject to dismissal because his claims are either frivolous,
malicious, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and/or
are raised against defendants who are immune from suit. Further, Plaintiff’s
claims in this action may be subject to dismissal on screening pursuant to the
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Heck v. Humphrey doctrine because “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Additionally, Plaintiff has not
stated sufficient facts to state a claim. Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in
support of his legal conclusions that give rise to a reasonable inference that
a defendant is liable. The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for
relief above the level of mere speculation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
(D.E. 9, p. 2).
Plaintiff was ordered to file his Amended Complaint by June 1, 2026, and to comply
with the following instructions:
1. Plaintiff shall title this amended pleading as “Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint” with his name, the name of each defendant, and case number
2:26-cv-00063 included on the top of the first page;
2. Plaintiff shall mail his complaint to the United States Courthouse, Attn:
District Clerk, 1133 North Shoreline Blvd., Corpus Christi, Texas 78401;
3. Plaintiff must clearly list in the Amended Complaint each Defendant he
seeks to sue in this action;
4. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff shall separately list each defendant and
explain in a short, factual statement what the defendant did to violate
Plaintiff’s rights and explain why the person is named as a defendant;
5. Plaintiff shall describe his injuries in more detail and shall state the specific
relief he is seeking in this civil action (i.e. money damages, injunctive relief,
or both);
6. Plaintiff shall not reference or incorporate by reference his original
complaint or any other document filed with the Court. His Amended
Complaint will take the place of the original complaint and will become the
only operative pleading in this case. When conducting its frivolity review
and deciding whether Plaintiff’s claims should be retained or dismissed, the
Court will not consider any matter raised in the original complaint or any
other pleading, motion or filing. The Court will only consider claims raised
in the Amended Complaint. Any defendant not specifically named in the
Amended complaint will be considered voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff.
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(D.E. 9, p. 3).
On May 22, 2026, the Court received a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Petition to Commence Suit.” (D.E. 13). The undersigned construes this document as
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Other than including his name, the case number, and
mailing the document to the correct address, Plaintiff failed to follow any of the instructions
regarding his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes no facts or
factual summary. He continues to reference inapplicable legal authorities or statutes that
have no application in the present case. To the extent his citations may be applicable to a
civil rights cause of action, he provides no factual context for the citations. Plaintiff also
fails to describe any injuries or the damages that he seeks. Further, despite being instructed
that his Amended Complaint shall not reference or incorporate by reference his original
complaint or any other document filed with the Court, he files it as a “supplement” and
states that “this is NOT an amended complaint but a supplemented addition to the original
petition…” (D.E. 13, p. 3). Additionally, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add
as defendants Jackson County, Texas, Judge Bobby Bell, and District Attorney Stephen
Tyler.
The Court also received four nearly identical copies of Plaintiff’s “Supplemental
Petition.” (D.E. 14). These documents all contain Plaintiff’s signature block, purport to be
signed electronically by Plaintiff, but were each also signed separately by the following
persons: (1) Tyteana Miles; (2) Henry Edwards; (3) Aleecia Robinson; and (4) Cherry
Miles Edwards. It is unclear if these persons merely signed the Amended Complaint on
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behalf of Plaintiff to ensure it is received by the Court, or if they are seeking to enter the
case as Plaintiffs. In either case, none of these documents signed by these individuals state
who they are or why their signatures are on copies of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
When a prisoner files an action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer,
or employee, the Court shall review the complaint as soon as practicable. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. The Court shall dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, without service of
process if the Court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law
or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if
it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003,
1005 (5th Cir. 1998). A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff
the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly
baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
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or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law
if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the
improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya,
291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s allegations presented in his original complaint, his amended complaint,
and his Spears hearing testimony, present no facts that would support any claim against
any defendant. All his written pleadings cite general principles of law without any
explanation of how any defendant violated his rights. His allegations that his rights were
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violated in unspecified ways are deficient because they are threadbare recitals of causes of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has
alleged nothing that would support a reasonable inference that any defendant is liable.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Despite having been given the opportunity to amend his
complaint and to explain his complaint in oral testimony at the evidentiary hearing,
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would indicate his rights were violated by any
defendant. Plaintiff’s entire case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and for
being frivolous.
While further analysis is unnecessary, Plaintiff’s Spears hearing testimony makes it
clear that the instant federal case relates to his belief that his prosecution and conviction in
Jackson County was unfair. Plaintiff has not articulated how his prosecution was unfair,
but even if he were able to do so, his claims would be barred by the holding of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 486-87. Any ruling in Plaintiff’s favor on his claims would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his Jackson County felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Heck, 512
U.S. at 487. Since no court has reversed or otherwise invalidated Plaintiff’s conviction,
his claims seeking monetary relief are barred by Heck. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Because
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Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the named Defendants are barred by Heck as premature,
they should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous until such time as Plaintiff satisfies
the conditions set forth in Heck.3 Additionally, as Plaintiff’s conviction is currently on
direct appeal and because Plaintiff testified at the Spears hearing that Plaintiff is not
seeking to bring a habeas action in the instant action, the undersigned declines to construe
the case as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Bell are subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine
of judicial immunity. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993); See also Nat’l
Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Reeves, 677 F. Supp. 3d 479, 490 (S.D. Miss.
2023) (Judicial Immunity applies to complaints seeking both monetary damages and
complaints seeking injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s claims against former Texas Attorney
General Ken Paxton and District Attorney Stephen Tyler are subject to dismissal under the
doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Graves, at 18 (5th Cir. 1993). All of Plaintiff’s claims
against each of the defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
IV. Claims Not Specifically Addressed in this Memorandum
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
3 The Fifth Circuit has held that Heck-barred claims must be “dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again
until the Heck conditions are met.” Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
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claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); See also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se parties are normally accorded more
leniency in the construction of their pleadings).
The undersigned has liberally construed Plaintiff’s pleadings to give his claims fair
and meaningful consideration. Before entering this recommendation to dismiss, the
undersigned warned Plaintiff of his pleading deficiencies and allowed Plaintiff to amend
his pleadings. Plaintiff fully explained his claims to the undersigned during a Spears
hearing and also filed an amended complaint. The undersigned has attempted to articulate
and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate
leniency to pro se litigants while at the same time requiring compliance with applicable
pleading and screening standards. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim not
specifically addressed by the undersigned in this Memorandum and Recommendation,
Plaintiff has failed to state such claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the
claim to be identified or analyzed by the Court.
As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Again,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give rise to a
reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Further, the
factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that any claim not
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addressed in this Memorandum and Recommendation is not currently before this Court
because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
Additionally, because Plaintiff has been provided the opportunity to explain his claims at
the Spears hearing, has been granted leave to amend, has been warned of his pleading
deficiencies, has failed to follow the Court’s instructions in connection with his Amended
Complaint, and because any amendment would be futile, the undersigned recommends
Plaintiff not be granted further leave to amend.
V. ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS
As explained above, Tyteana Miles, Henry Edwards, Aleecia Robinson, and Cherry
Miles Edwards signed and filed copies of Plaintiff’s “Supplemental Petition.” (D.E. 14,
D.E. 14-1, D.E. 14-2, D.E. 14-3, D.E. 14-4). These documents all contain Plaintiff’s
signature block, purport to be signed by Plaintiff electronically, and were each signed
separately by the above persons. It is unclear who these persons are or why they signed and
filed copies of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. However, what is clear is that to the extent
these persons are seeking to be a party in the instant action, each of these persons should
be dismissed from this case because they have not stated a plausible claim, and any
amendment would be futile.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned recommends all of Plaintiff Bradrick Gerlmaine Tanner’s claims
be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1). It is further recommended that should Tyteana Miles, Henry Edwards,
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Aleecia Robinson and Cherry Miles Edwards be construed as additional Plaintiffs, their
claims be DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failing to allege a plausible
claim.
Respectfully submitted on June 3, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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