Sameh Elmihi v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.

SAMEH ELMIHI,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
§
§
§
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00025
§
PAYPAL HOLDINGS, INC., 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Julie 	K. 	Hampton's 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation ("M&R"). (D.E. 45). The M&R recommends that the Court grant Defendant's
motion to compel arbitration, (D.E. 39), stay this case pending the outcome of arbitration, and
deny all of Plaintiffs pending motions, (D.E. 14; D.E. 18; D.E. 27), as moot. (D .E. 45 , p. 27).
Plaintiff filed written objections to the M&R. (D.E. 47).
I. Legal Standard
When a party objects to the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, the
district judge "sha ll make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A
party must point out with particularity any alleged errors in the magistrate judge's analysis. Pelko
v. Perales, No. 2:23-CV-00339, 2024 WL 1972896, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2024) (Ramos, J.). As
to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual
findings and conclusions oflaw. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam). "Where the objecting party simply reiterates its original arguments, review of the
memorandum and recommendation may permissibly be for clear error only." Arceneaux v. City of
Houston, 4:23-cv-904, 2024 WL 5247204, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2024) (Eskridge, J.). When a
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 13, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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party raises a new argument in their objections that was not presented to the magistrate judge in
the first instance, that argument is not properly before the Court. United States v. Armstrong, 951
F.2d 626,630 (5th Cir. 1992).
II. Analysis
Petitioner raises numerous objections to the M&R. (D.E. 47). Although these objections
are interwoven, with the same objections appearing multiple times at various points in Plaintiffs
filing, 1 the Court distills eight unique objections and addresses each in tum. 2
A. Plaintifrs objection that the scope of the arbitration agreement is narrow.
First, Plaintiff objects that " [b ]ecause the [arbitration agreement] lacks any explicit
reference to statutory whistleblower claims or ERISA interference claims, those claims fall outside
its scope." (D.E. 47, p. 3); see also id. at 5 (arguing the arbitration agreement "does not explicitly
cover statutory whistleblower claims" (emphasis omitted)). Plaintiffs objection lacks merit.
The M&R correctly found that "because the parties have 'clearly and unmistakably ' agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability, the issue of whether [Plaintiffs] claim[s] fall[] within the scope of
arbitration is one for the arbitrator, not the [C]ourt." (D.E. 45, p. 15). The arbitration agreement
states that "[t]he arbitrator shall have the authority to determine if an issue or claim is subject to
this arbitration obligation[.]" (D.E. 39-1, p. 6). That language is sufficient to grant the arbitrator
power to determine arbitrability. See Haus. Re.fin. , L.P. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber,
Mfg , 765 F.3d 396, 410 n.28 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[A]n arbitration agreement need not recite verbatim
that the 'parties agree to arbitrate arbitrability' in order to manifest ' clear and unmistakable'
1 Aside from Plaintiff's occasional repetition, and considering Plaintiffs prose status, the Court commends
Plaintiff for providing well-researched objections. The Court is particularly impressed with Plaintiff's
ability to properly cite cases and other authorities in accordance with Bluebook citation rules.
2 The Court OVERRULES any other objections as lacking sufficient particularity. Pelko, 2024 WL
1972896, at * 1.
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agreement.") (citing Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations, 687 F.3d 671 , 675
(5th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff did not specifically object to this finding.
"Additionally, the adoption of specific arbitration rules-such as JAMS-shows that a
party knowingly intended to arbitrate gateway issues of arbitrability." Maravilla v. Gruma Corp.,
783 Fed. App'x 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (first citing Rent-A-Ctr. , W, Inc. v. Jackson,
561 U.S . 63 , 79 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); and then citing Cooper v. WestEnd Cap. Mgmt. ,
L.C.C., 832 F.3d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 2016)). The arbitration agreement Plaintiff signed references
JAMS several times throughout. (D .E. 39-1 , p. 6- 7) ("The parties understand and agree that the
arbitration shall be confidential and shall be conducted by a single neutral arbitrator through JAMS
in accordance with the then current JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures
provided.")
Finally, because the arbitration agreement Plaintiff signed is written broadly, its scope
should be interpreted broadly:
An arbitration clause that mandates arbitration of "any dispute, controversy or
claim arising out of or in relation to or in connection with (an] (a]greement" is a
broad arbitration clause capable of expansive reach .. . . embrac[ing] all disputes
between the parties having a significant relationship to the contract regardless of
the label attached to the dispute.
SDB Trade Int '!, L.P. v. E&E Grp., LL C, No. H-08-226, 2008 WL 11397907, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
May 15 , 2008) (Hittner, J.) (quoting Pennzoil Exp!. & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd. , 139 F.3d
1061 , 1067 (5th Cir. 	1998)). The arbitration agreement Plaintiff signed uses exceptionally
inclusive language when describing the types of claims subject to the arbitration agreement. See
(D.E. 39-1 , p. 5). Therefore, the scope of the arbitration clause must be read expansively. See SDB
Trade Int '!, L.P. , 2008 WL 11397907, at *5.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's first objection.
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B. Plaintiff's objection that Defendant waived arbitration.
Second, 	Plaintiff objects that Defendant "has 	clearly 	waived any right to 	compel
arbitration." (D.E. 47, p. 8) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs objection, however, merely rehashes
arguments the M&R already considered and rejected. Compare id. at 5- 8, 13 (arguing Defendant's
litigation conduct indicates waiver), with (D.E. 42, p. 5-9 , 11) (arguing same); see also (D.E. 45 ,
p. 23 - 24) (M&R considering and rejecting Plaintiffs waiver argument). The Court therefore need
only review this portion of the M&R for clear error. Arceneaux, 2024 WL 5247204, at* 1. Finding
none ,3 the Court OVERRULES Plainti ffs second objection.
C. Plaintiff's objection that Defendant's counsel made an unauthorized appearance.
Third, Plaintiff objects that Defendant "permitted an attorney with no notice of appearance
to argue on its behalf ' in violation of the Court' s Local Rules. (D.E. 47, p. 6). Plaintiff correctly
points out that Defendant's Counsel argued at a status conference before Magistrate Judge
Hampton prior to filing a notice of appearance. August 28 , 2025 Minute Entry. However, at that
status conference, Magistrate Judge Hampton directed Defendant's Counsel to file a notice of
appearance, id., which he did the very next day, (D.E. 41). Although compliance with the Court's
Local Rules is of paramount importance, the fact that the motion was argued by an attorney who
had not yet filed a notice of appearance has no impact on the Court 's review of the M&R' s analysis.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff s third objection.
3 Given Plaintiff' s pro se status, the Court has also conducted a de novo review of Plaintiff's seco nd
objection. "Wa iver will be found when the party seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial
process to the detriment or prejudice of the other party." Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d
324, 326 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant sought to compel
arbitration at the outset of this litigation, (D.E. 9), and Defendant's only filings unrelated to arbitration are
responsive to Plaintiffs other motions. In other words, Defendant has only invoked the judicial process
when necessary to switch this case into the arbitral forum . That conduct falls well short of the standard for
waiver. Cf Walker v. J C Bradford & Co., 938 F.2d 575, 577- 79 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant
had not waived its ri ght to compel arbitration despite a thirteen-month delay and some participation in
discovery).
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D. Plaintiff's objection that his ERISA claim is non-arbitrable.
Fourth, Plaintiff objects that his ERISA claim4 "falls squarely within the narrow but critical
exception where arbitration cannot apply." (D.E. 47 , p. 9) . That is because, Plaintiff contends,
Plaintiff "seeks injunctive and prospective relief," which an arbitrator lacks authority to enforce,
thereby preventing Plaintiff from "effectively vindicat[ing] the statutory right in the arbitral
forum." Id. at 9-10. Plaintiffs objection lacks merit.
Whether a party can effectively vindicate their rights through arbitration turns on whether
"the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation[.]"
Coronado v. D. N W Haus., Inc., No. H-13-2179, 2015 WL 5781375, at *7 (S .D. Tex. Sept. 30 ,
2015) (Rosenthal, J.) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has provided no reason that the arbitral forum is
inaccessible, and, to the extent Plaintiff is concerned about the ability to obtain injunctive relief,
the arbitration agreement here specifically grants the arbitrator with "the authority ... to award
any legal or equitable relief authoriz ed by law in connection with the asserted claim." (D .E. 3 9-1 ,
p. 6) ; see also A m. Cent. E. Tex. Gas Co. v. Union Pac. R es. Grp ., Inc. , 93 Fed. App 'x 1, * 12 (5th
Cir. 2004) (affirming an arbitrator's award of injunctive relief). Along similar lines, to the extent
Plaintiff is worried about ongoing enforcement of a potential future injunction, several circuit
courts have recognized the authority of district courts to "confirm and enforce" an arbitrator's
award of temporary equitable relief. Arrowhe ad Glob. Sols ., Inc. v. Datapath, Inc., 166 Fed. App 'x
39 , 44 (4th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); 29 U.S .C. 	§ 1401(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court
OVERRULES Plaintiffs fourth objection.
4 The M&R noted that Plaintiffs amended complaint "removes all references to ERJSA." (D .E. 45 , p. 15
n.2). Plaintiff objects to this finding, arguing that "[a]t no point did Plaintiff intend to, or actually, remove
his ERJSA claim ." (D.E. 47 , p. 8). As the M&R addressed the arbitrability of Plaintiffs ERJSA claim
anyway, (D.E. 45 , p. 15 - 16), the Court need not resolve the question of whether Plaintiff removed the
ERJSA claim.
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F. Plaintiff's objection that his claims are statutorily exempt from arbitration.
Fifth, 	Plaintiff objects that his 	whistleblower retaliation claim implicates the non-
arbitration provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (D.E. 47 , p. 	10-13). Plaintiffs amended
complaint 	alleges 	a 	whistleblower 	retaliation 	claim 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Dodd-Frank 	Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l). (D .E. 35, p. 5). Plaintiff does not allege a whistleblower retaliation claim
under the related Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. See (D.E. 35).
Although 	both 	the 	Dodd-Frank 	Act 	and 	the 	Sarbanes-Oxley 	Act 	contain 	similar
whistleblower protections, only Sarbanes-Oxley features an express anti-arbitration provision
insofar as whistleblower protections are concerned. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) ("No predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a
dispute arising under this section."); see 15 U.S .C. § 78u-6 (lacking an anti-arbitration provision
in Dodd-Frank's whistleblower section). 5 Neither party objected to the M&R's specific finding
that Congress's omission of the anti-arbitration provision from 	Dodd-Frank whistleblower
protections was intentional and, therefore, the anti-arbitration provision applies exclusively to
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims, not Dodd-Frank whistleblower claims. (D.E. 45, p. 18- 20).
At the heart of this objection, then, is Plaintiffs request that the Court liberally construe Plaintiffs
amended complaint to include a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim.
Plaintiff argues that his "factual allegations plainly implicate [the Sarbanes -O xley Act]"
5 To be clear, Dodd Frank does include several distinct anti-arbitration provisions, but those provisions are
cabined within separate, non-whistleblower, sections. 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) ("No predispute arbitration
agreement shall be va lid or enforceab le , if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this
section." (emphasis added)); 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2) (" [N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable to the extent that it requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section." (emphasis
added)). When the Court references Dodd Frank's lack of an anti-arbitration provision, then, it refers
specifically to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, Dodd Frank' s whistleblower-protection section.
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and, therefore, "as a pro se litigant," the Court should liberally construe his amended complaint to
include a Sarbanes-Oxley claim. (D .E. 47, p. 12). Courts must liberally construe prose litigants'
filings . Weathers v. Haus. Methodist Hosp., 116 F.4th 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2024). After reviewing
both the private right of action contained within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)-
(b), and the factual allegations underpinning Plaintiffs amended complaint, (D.E. 35, p. 2-5), the
Court construes Plaintiffs amended complaint as bringing a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim.
As such, Plaintiffs Sarbanes-Oxley claim is non-arbitrable pursuant to the anti-arbitration
provision. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs fifth objection
insofar as it relates to his construed Sarbanes-Oxley claim.
G. Plaintifrs objection that his claims are exempt as a matter of public policy.
Sixth, Plaintiff objects at several points that public policy considerations underlying his
claims preclude arbitration. See (D.E. 47 , p. 11-12, 14-19). In essence, Plaintiff argues that a
"federal statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable." Dealer Comp. Servs., Inc. v. Old
Colony Motors, Inc., 588 F.3d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "Parties should be held
to an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims 'unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory right at issue. "' Edwards v. Experian Info.
Sols., Inc. , No. DR-24-CV-00021-AM-MHW, 2024 WL 4328773 , at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2024)
(Watters, Mag. J.) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. , 500 U.S. 20 , 26 (1991)),
adopted, No. DR-24-CV-00021-AM, 2024 WL 4329034 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30 , 2024) (Moses, J.).
Plaintiff advances 	three 	sets 	of policy 	arguments- 	the 	first 	concerns 	Plaintiffs
whistleblower claims (Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley), the second concerns Plaintiffs Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim, and the third concerns Plaintiffs Sabine Pilot
claim.
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First, Plaintiff argues that because his "allegations involve global cybersecurity risks and
[personally identifiable information] exposure," (D.E. 47, p. 11), as well as "issues of public safety,
consumer privacy, investor protection, and national security," id. at 18, compelling Plaintiff to
arbitrate his whistleblower claims "would force such matters into secrecy, precisely contrary to
the 	transparency 	and 	accountability 	Congress 	mandated 	when 	enacting 	whistleblower
protections," id. This argument is misguided. The Court has already exempted Plaintiffs Sarbanes-
Oxley claim from arbitration pursuant to the statute's anti-arbitration provision. Supra II.H. And,
as the M&R rightfully pointed out, Congress intentionally omitted any anti-arbitration provision
from Dodd-Frank claims. (D.E. 45, p. 18- 20); see also supra II .F. Presumably, Congress already
accounted for Plaintiffs cited policy concerns when drafting its whistleblower protection statutes,
chose to prohibit arbitration for 	one 	class 	of whistleblower claims (Sarbanes-Oxley), yet
simultaneously chose to allow arbitration for another class of whistle blower claims (Dodd-Frank).
Given this signal of congressional intent, the Court will not bar arbitration of Plaintiffs Dodd-
Frank claims for Plaintiffs cited policy concerns.
Second, Plaintiff argues that "[f]orcing arbitration [of ADEA claims] would improperly
privatize enforcement of rights Congress intended to protect through both individual and public
mechanisms." (D.E. 47, p. 14). Plaintiff also raises concerns that ADEA, as a civil rights law, "may
[not] be effectively enforced through arbitration." Id. 	As another district court recognized,
however, these "argument[s] ha[ve] been soundly rejected." Bessan v. Taco-Cabana L.P. , No.
3:17-CV-1753-M-BK, 2018 WL 1611398, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2018) (Toliver, Mag. J.) (first
citing Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); and then citing
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27 ("We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between [important social
policies 	furthered 	by 	the 	ADEA ], 	however, 	and 	enforcing 	agreements 	to 	arbitrate 	age
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discrimination claims." (alteration in original))), adopted, 2018 WL 1609677 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3,
2018) (Lynn, J.).
Third, Plaintiff argues that his Sabine-Pilot claim should be exempt from arbitration
because "it is a public policy safeguard protecting employees from being forced into crime."
(D.E. 47, p. 17). Sabine Pilot is "a Texas common law exception to the employment at will
doctrine." Zachary v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. H-08-0214, 2008 WL 11490471, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 7, 2008) (Smith, Mag. J.), adopted, 2008 WL 11490468 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2008)
(Hughes, J.). As the M&R already highlighted, "[a]rbitration of claims under Sabine Pilot violates
no federal law or policy. (D.E. 45, p. 22) (first citing Zachary, 2008 WL 11490471, at *3; and then
citing Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001)). Plaintiff attempts to distinguish
Zachary, 	arguing that his claims "involve illegal access to global 	[personally identifiable
information] data and security violations, [therefore] raising issues of federal law and national
security." (D.E. 47, p. 16) . That distinction makes no difference; Plaintiff's Sabine Pilot claim is
based on state common law, even if the action Plaintiff was asked to perform would allegedly
violate federal law. There is, therefore, still no federal policy implicated under Sabine Pilot.
Zachary, 2008 WL 11490471, at *3.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's sixth objection.
H. Plaintifrs objection requesting limited discovery.
Seventh, Plaintiff objects by requesting "limited discovery to clarify the scope, intent, and
enforceability of the arbitration agreement." (D.E. 47, p. 20). Discovery is unnecessary as to scope
and intent because, as the Court found above, the question of arbitrability in this case is one for
the arbitrator. Supra II.A. Nor is discovery needed as to enforceability because the Court can
conclude based on the M&R and briefs alone that "a valid agreement to arbitrate exists." Lopez de
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Leon v. Sanderson Farms Inc., 632 F. Supp. 3d 726, 732-33 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (Eskridge, J.);
Edwards v. Doordash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th Cir. 2018). 6 Accordingly, the Court
OVERRULES Plaintiffs seventh objection.
I. Plaintifrs objection that his pending motions should be granted.
Eighth, Plaintiff objects that it was error for the M&R to recommend denying Plaintiffs
other pending motions, (D.E. 14); (D.E. 18) ; (D.E. 27), as moot, (D.E. 47 , p. 21 - 23). Plaintiffs
objection is general and conclusory, but, nevertheless, the Court analyzes each of Plaintiffs
pending motions individually and de novo.
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, (D .E. 14) , because
Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff alleges that he "has stated
viable ERISA claims," (D.E. 14, p. 2) , but Plaintiff must demonstrate "[m]ore than a mere
possibility of success on the merits" to warrant a preliminary injunction. Quintanilla v. United
States, 582 Fed. App 'x 412, 414 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to preserve evidence, (D.E. 18) , as unnecessary.
"The duty to preserve material evidence exists throughout the litigation." Duque v. Werner Enters .,
Inc., No. L-05-183 , 2007 WL 998156, at *3 (S .D. Tex. Mar. 30 , 2007) (Arce-Flores, Mag. J.). The
ability of the Court to impose sanctions for destruction of evidence, id. , obviates the need for a
separate order granting Plaintiffs motion to preserve evidence.
6 The M&R explains that Plaintiff "signed a 'Mutual Arbitration Agreement' ('Agreement' ) with
[Defendant] on July 6, 2022." (D.E. 45 , p. 2) (citing D.E. 39, p. 3). The M&R then goes on to reproduce
the pertinent sections of that agreement. Id. at 2--4. Plaintiff never contests the contractual validity of the
agreement itself. S ee generally (D .E. 47). And, as "[t]he Fifth Circuit observes, 'It is a widely accepted
principle of contracts that one who signs or accepts a written instrument will normally be bound in
accordance with its written terms." Lopez de Leon, 632 F. Supp. 3d at 733 (quoting Am. Heritage Life Ins.
Co. v. Lang, 321 F.Jd 533 , 538 (5th Cir. 2003)). Thu s, the Court finds that a valid arbitration agreement
exists.
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Finally, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to bar arbitration based on waiver, (D .E. 27),
as Plaintiffs motion features the same arguments contained within Plaintiffs objections to the
M&R, compare id. , with (D.E. 47), which the Court has already addressed.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs eighth objection.
J. Staying Plaintifrs non-arbitrable claims.
Because the Court construed Plaintiffs amended complaint to include a Sarbanes-Oxl ey
claim, supra II.F, Plaintiffs active complaint now includes a mix of arbitrable and non-arbitrable
claims. Historically, when faced with a mix of arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, the Fi ft h
Circuit denied arbitration and stayed the arbitrable claims pending resolution of the non-arbitrable
claims through litigation. Au s. Mun. Sec ., In c. v. N at '! Ass' n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 696-
97 (5th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court rejected that approach, holding that the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") "requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one
of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient
maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums ." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. By rd , 470
U.S. 213 , 217 (1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently bolstered that position, holding that
"[w]hen a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a
stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the FAA compels the court to stay the proceeding." Smith v.
Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 478 (2024). After considering the M&R' s recommendation, Plaintiffs pro
se status, the inconvenience of maintaining separate claims in different forums, and controlling
Supreme Court precedents, the Court STAYS all claims in this case, including Plaintiffs non-
arbitrable Sarbanes-Oxley claim.
III. Conclusion
Having reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions of the M&R, the record, the
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applicable law, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the M&R to which Petitioner' s
objections are directed, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l )(C), the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs first,
second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth objections, SUSTAINS Plaintiffs fifth objection,
and ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of the M&R, (D.E. 45). Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel arbitration except as to Plaintiffs Sarbanes-Oxley claim,
.
(D.E. 39), STAYS all claims in this case- 	including Plaintiffs non-arbitrable Sarbanes-Oxley
claim- 	pending the outcome of arbitration, and DENIES Plaintiffs pending motions, (D. E. 14) ;
(D.E. 18); (D.E. 27). The Court ORDERS the parties to file a joint status report no later than ten
(10) days after the conclusion of arbitration.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Corpus Christi, Texas
January ;3.;:-2026
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DAVID 	. 	ORALES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT ITJDGE
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