USA v. Ramirez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
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Plaintiff-Respondent
CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 2:20-CR-00889-001
V.
JASON ERIC RAMIREZ, HABEAS ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-110
Defendant-Movant
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
On April 28, 2025, Defendant Jason Eric Ramirez filed his Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence (D.E. 180) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, complaining of
vindictive prosecution (superseding indictment), four instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and insufficient evidence to support conviction on constructive possession. The
Court ordered Defendant to file a more definite statement with respect to his “failure to file
direct appeal” claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and he did so. D.E. 200, 208.
There being an issue of fact regarding whether Defendant requested his attorney to
file an appeal, the Court heard evidence on that issue on September 24, 2025. D.E. 210. On
October 9, 2025, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order (D.E. 212), finding
that Defendant had not sustained his burden of proof to show that he had, in fact, instructed
his attorney to file a direct appeal of his conviction.
The Government was then ordered to file its response to the 2255 motion within 60
days and the Government did so. D.E. 216, 217. In turn, Defendant had 30 days to file a
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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response. D.E. 212. Defendant obtained an extension of his deadline to respond to March
6, 2026. D.E. 219. On March 24, 2026, Defendant filed his response together with a request
for leave to file late, based on his late receipt of the order setting his new deadline. D.E.
221. The Court GRANTS LEAVE and considers his response (D.E. 221-1, pp. 4-9).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A § 2255 motion does not substitute for a direct appeal. United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 165 (1982). There are four cognizable grounds upon which a federal prisoner
may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence: (1) constitutional issues, (2)
challenges to the district court’s jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) challenges to the
length of a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, and (4) claims that the sentence
is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Placente, 81
F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions
of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised
on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
DISCUSSION
A. Vindictive Prosecution
Defendant’s first habeas complaint is that he was subject to vindictive prosecution
for remaining silent, refusing to cooperate, and exercising his right to trial by jury. D.E.
180, p. 4. This, he claims, prompted the Government to seek and obtain a superseding
indictment that subjected him to a greater range of punishment. Id. The Government
challenges this claim on the basis that (1) it is procedurally barred and (2) the superseding
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indictment was based on new evidence, and the threat it posed was a proper negotiating
tactic.
Vindictive prosecution based on pretrial conduct related to a prosecutor threatening
and obtaining a superseding indictment in the course of plea negotiations is a claim that
can be raised in a direct appeal. Failure to do so bars later consideration absent appropriate
explanation. As the Fifth Circuit states:
Usually, after a conviction and exhaustion or waiver of any
right to appeal, this Court is entitled to presume that the
defendant stands fairly and finally convicted. A defendant can
challenge a final conviction, but only on issues of
constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude. The Supreme Court
has stated that, in a § 2255 proceeding, “to obtain collateral
relief based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous
objection was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1)
‘cause’ excusing his double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual
prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he complains.”
United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Ross
v. United States, No. 3:08-CR-167-B-BH (3), 2017 WL 3328120, at *6 (N.D. Tex. June
22, 2017) (malicious prosecution claim procedurally barred), report and recommendation
adopted, 2017 WL 3314195 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017).
On the issue of cause, it would appear that Defendant relies on his complaint that
he asked his attorney to appeal his conviction and the attorney did not do so. However,
after a hearing, the Court determined that Defendant had not sustained his burden on that
issue of fact. D.E. 212. Therefore, Defendant has not sustained his burden on the “cause”
prong. The Court HOLDS that the vindictive prosecution claim is procedurally barred and
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the motion (D.E. 180) may be denied with respect to the vindictive prosecution claim on
that basis.
Moreover, proof of prosecutorial vindictiveness on the merits requires that the
defendant show (1) actual vindictiveness through objective evidence that the prosecutor’s
actions were designed to punish a defendant for asserting his legal rights, or (2) sufficient
facts to create a presumption of vindictiveness. United States v. Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353,
359 (5th Cir. 2008). The basis for Defendant’s argument—chronology in which the
superseding indictment followed his rejection of a plea deal—does not support a vindictive
prosecution claim.
The Saltzman court applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978), writing, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
d[oes] not prohibit a prosecutor from carrying out a threat, made during plea negotiations,
to bring additional charges against an accused who refused to plead guilty to the offense
with which he was originally charged.” Saltzman, 537 F.3d at 360. In Bordenkircher, “[i]t
was not disputed that the additional charge was justified by the evidence, that the
prosecutor was in possession of this evidence at the time the original indictment was
obtained, and that the prosecutor sought the additional charge because of the accused's
refusal to plead guilty to the original charge.” Id.
The only difference here is that the evidence was being processed at the time the
original indictment was obtained and the report was made available at the end of the plea
negotiations, justifying the superseding indictment. See D.E. 216-1 (forensic chemist’s
report, the authenticity of which is not challenged). This is objective evidence to indicate
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to a reasonable mind that the superseding indictment was based on a purpose other than a
vindictive desire to punish or deter. See Saltzman, 537 F.3d at 360 (quoting United States
v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 466–67 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Defendant’s claim is procedurally barred and he has not sustained his burden to
show vindictive prosecution. The motion (D.E. 180) is DENIED with respect to vindictive
prosecution.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Rubric
An ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) allegation presented in a § 2255 motion
is analyzed under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689 (1984); Willis, 273 F.3d at 598. To prevail on an IAC claim, a movant must
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. Willis, 273
F.3d at 598. This means that a movant must show that counsel’s performance was outside
the broad range of what is considered reasonable assistance and that this deficient
performance led to an unfair and unreliable conviction and sentence. United States v.
Dovalina, 262 F.3d 472, 474-75 (5th Cir. 2001).
In reviewing ineffectiveness claims, “judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance
must be highly deferential,” and every effort must be made to eliminate “the distorting
effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. An ineffective assistance claim focuses
on “counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time
of counsel’s conduct[,]” because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.” Id. at 689-90.
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With regard to the prejudice requirement, a movant must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. If the movant fails to prove one prong,
it is not necessary to analyze the other. Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“A court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one.”); Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“Failure to prove either deficient performance or actual prejudice is fatal to an ineffective
assistance claim.”).
2. Discussion
Defendant listed four ineffective assistance of counsel complaints: (1) failure to
properly communicate the charges and sentencing guidelines; (2) failure to file motions
that counsel deemed “frivolous;” (3) allowing the judge to coerce him into withdrawing
his plea; and (4) failure to file a direct appeal. Pursuant to the Court’s prior Memorandum
Opinion and Order (D.E. 212), Defendant’s fourth IAC claim has been denied and will not
be further addressed. Discussion of the first three follows.
a. Communication of Charges and Sentencing Guidelines
The Government challenges the first complaint because it is conclusory. D.E. 216,
p. 9 (citing United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993)). Defendant does not
allege which of several attorneys representing him failed to provide the explanation of his
charges and range of punishment. Id. The Court notes that Defendant also fails to allege
when that failure took place or what difference it made. Moreover, the record is clear that
counsel discussed with Defendant the Second Amended Presentence Report, containing a
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disclosure of the charges he faced and the potential sentences they carried. Id. (citing D.E.
196, pp. 3-4). And Defendant does not demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice, as
required by Strickland. Id., p. 10. The Court rejects Defendant’s first IAC claim.
b. Motions
The Government challenges the second complaint because it is improperly
conclusory and fails to state any supporting facts. D.E. 216, p. 10. In full, Defendant states,
“Did not file the motions I asked for stating they are frivolous.” D.E. 180, p. 5. Defendant
does not state what motions he asked for, does not show that any motions had any merit or
were part of a proper defense strategy, and does not indicate how failure to file any motion
had a material effect on the outcome or was prejudicial. “Mere conclusory allegations in
support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a
constitutional issue.” Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal
citation omitted).
The Government also challenges this claim because Defendant cannot survive the
Strickland analysis of what conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or how he
was prejudiced. D.E. 216, p. 10. The Court agrees and rejects Defendant’s second IAC
claim.
c. Coercion to Withdraw Plea and Go to Trial
The Fifth Circuit has explained coercion in the context of criminal pleas as follows:
For a guilty plea to be voluntary, it must not be the product of
actual or threatened physical harm, or . . . mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant or of state-induced
emotions so intense that the defendant was rendered unable to
weigh rationally his options with the help of counsel.
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United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2014) (footnotes and quotation
marks omitted); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). Allegations of
a coerced plea usually are raised in the context of a defendant who has entered a plea of
guilty. Logically, the same standard should apply to a claim that a plea of “not guilty” was
coerced.
The record reflects that counsel and the Court properly advised Defendant of the
consequences of his plea and that he voluntarily entered his written “not guilty” plea.
Minute Entries, August 7, 2020 (initial appearance); February 18, 2021 (acknowledging
request for pre-plea PSR as a reason for continuance); February 23, 2022 (re-arraignment);
D.E. 21, 64 (approved written acknowledgments and entries of plea); D.E. 33
(continuance). Defendant offers no factual allegations to support any threat of physical
harm or mental overbearance. The Court rejects the third IAC claim.
Having rejected all of Defendant’s individual IAC claims, the Court DENIES the
§ 2255 motion (D.E. 180) with respect to the IAC challenge.
d. Additional Claims
In his newly-filed response, Defendant asserts that he is not making complaints
based on new grounds, but that he is simply documenting the facts of record and controlling
caselaw regarding his original complaints of IAC and insufficiency of the evidence. In that
regard, he argues that he has IAC claims based on:
• His counsel’s failure to challenge the chain of custody regarding the drug
evidence. D.E. 221-1, p. 4.
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• His counsel’s failure to investigate and present exculpatory possession
evidence. Id., p. 6.
• His counsel’s failure to object to misleading arguments and to capitalize
on favorable instructions. Id.
These state complaints that were waived for failure to file a direct appeal. Defendant cannot
bypass the Court’s prior decision that he failed to sustain his burden to show that he
requested an appeal by seeking to litigate the appellate issues in this § 2255 proceeding.
C. Insufficient Evidence to Convict
Defendant complains of insufficient evidence, stating that “constructive possession
was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that I had placed drugs or gun in car or known
anything was in it.” D.E. 180, p. 8. The Government responds that this claim is a matter
for direct appeal and cannot form the basis of a § 2255 motion. D.E. 216, p. 13. Further, a
substantially similar claim was denied in the Rule 29 motion previously presented to the
Court. Id. (citing United States v. Kalish, 780 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1986) (addressing
collateral estoppel)).
As the Government observed, the Fifth Circuit has stated, “The authorities
uniformly and without number hold that § 2255 may not be used as a substitute for an
appeal and that insufficiency or irrelevance of evidence is not ground for relief under this
section.” Kristiansand v. United States, 319 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing cases).
“The claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict might have been raised
on appeal but not on a Section 2255 motion.” Sears v. United States, 265 F.2d 301, 302
(5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (citing cases).
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Nonetheless, Defendant continues to present issues regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction. D.E. 221-1, p. 8. He claims that his counsel’s
deficiencies are cause to negate his procedural default and reopen these issues for full
consideration. Again, this argument is contrary to the Court’s prior determination that
Defendant did not seek a direct appeal and therefore waived these issues, regardless of how
compelling he may feel his arguments are. His additional discussion of the facts and record
references do not change the limitations of his § 2255 proceeding.
The § 2255 motion (D.E. 180) is DENIED with respect to its insufficient evidence
complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s § 2255 motion (D.E.
180) in its entirety.
ORDERED on May 5, 2026.
_______________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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