Villar Castellanos et al v. Noem et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
HUGO ADRIAN VILLAR 	§
CASTELLANOS, et al., 	§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-080
§
KRISTI NOEM, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. No. 41)
I. 	Synopsis
Plaintiffs are international students studying in the United States on F-1 visas. Due to a
policy change, 	Defendants called into question Plaintiffs’ international student status by
terminating their SEVIS record which is required for F-1 visa compliance. Shortly thereafter, the
Defendants canceled the SEVIS terminations. There are two issues before the Court. First, whether
there is an actual controversy left for this Court to review since Plaintiffs’ rights were restored;
and second, whether Plaintiffs face future harm which warrants enjoining the Defendants from
terminating the records again. The Defendants claim Plaintiffs’ rights have been restored and
therefore this lawsuit is moot. This Court agrees the litigation is moot. Plaintiffs argue there is
continued harm to them as their visas could be canceled again. This Court finds their argument
speculative.
II. 	Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs Hugo Adrian Villar Castellanos, Shishir Timilsena, Amir Gholami, Julio Dylan
Sanchez Wong, and Mayra Alejandra Varela Varga (collectively “Plaintiffs”) claim this Court has
jurisdiction over this action because (1) the case presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. §1331;
(2) the case involves a federal defendant under 28 U.S.C. §1346(b); (3) federal courts have the
right to review agency action where no statute precludes judicial review or where agency action is
not committed to agency discretion by law under 5 U.S.C. §701, et seq.; and (4) the Court has the
authority to issue a declaratory judgment in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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under 28 U.S.C. §2201-2.
Defendants Kristi Noem in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Department of Homeland Security, and Todd Lyons in his official capacity as Acting Director of
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants argue
this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
As a threshold matter, the Court must consider its power to decide Plaintiffs’ case because
“[j]urisdiction is always first.” Louisiana v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir.
2024). Additionally, the “federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own
jurisdiction.” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); see also United States v. Pedroza-Rocha,
933 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Bass v. Denney, 171 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Further, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); People's Nat'l Bank v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency of the
U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004). Federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims unless
jurisdiction 	is 	conferred 	through 	statute 	or 	the 	Constitution. Exxon 	Mobile, 	545 	U.S. 	at
552; People's Nat'l Bank, 362 F.3d at 336.
Whether Plaintiffs have presented an actual case or controversy concerns determining the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In its analysis below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not
presented an actual case or controversy. Accordingly, the Court finds it does not have the subject
matter jurisdiction necessary to entertain Plaintiffs’ complaint.
III. 	Venue
Venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division because a
substantial portion of alleged events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in this geographical
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2) (noting that a civil action may be brought in the judicial district
where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated”). All Plaintiffs were enrolled
at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (“UTRGV”), an institution with campuses in
Brownsville, Harlingen and Edinburg, Texas. Dkt. No. 5, p. 1.
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IV. 	Background
a. 	Factual History
This case involves an attempt to change the legal status of a group nonimmigrant students
studying in the United States. Plaintiffs are permitted to enroll in government approved academic
institutions as noncitizens, gaining access to the United States through an F-1 non-immigrant
student visa issued by the U. S. Department of State. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). Upon
gaining entry with an F-1 visa, Plaintiffs as international students are permitted to remain in the
United States for a specific period if they continue to meet the requirements governing their visa
classification. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f). Plaintiffs must follow the visa regulations and are subject
to termination by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Termination of the F-1 visa is
governed by 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d) when a previously granted waiver is revoked, a private bill to
confer lawful permanent residence is introduced in Congress or DHS publishes a notification in
the Federal Register identifying national security, diplomatic or public safety reasons for
termination.
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1372, the Attorney General has the congressional mandate to
“develop and conduct a program to collect from approved institution of higher education . . .
information . . . with respect to aliens who . . . have the status, or are applying for the status, of
nonimmigrants under subparagraph (F). . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1)(A). The information collected
includes information such as the alien’s “identity and current address in the United States. . . .” 8
U.S.C. § 1372(c)(1)(A). The statute provides for more information to be collected “in the case of
a student at an approved institution of higher education,” such as the current academic status of
the alien, and any disciplinary action taken by the institution, and the date of enrollment “in . . . a
designated exchange visitor program.” 8 U.S.C. § 1372(c)(1)(A)-(F).
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 252(a)(4), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is
“responsible for administering the program to collect information relating to nonimmigrant foreign
students . . . including the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System established under
that section. . . .” The Department of Homeland Security, through the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services and the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), use the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) to track international student’s compliance with
their F-1 visa status.
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Plaintiff Hugo Adrian Villar Castellanos is an international student from Mexico enrolled
in a doctoral program in physics at UTGRV. Dkt. No. 5, p. 6.
Plaintiff Shishir Timilsena is an international student from India enrolled in a doctoral
program in physics at UTGRV. Id. at 6-7.
Plaintiff Amir Gholami is an international student from Iran enrolled in a doctoral program
in finance at UTRGV. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff Julio Dylan Sanchez Wong is an international student from Mexico enrolled in a
bachelor’s program in computer sciences at UTRGV. Id.
Plaintiff Mayra Alejandra Varela Vargas is an international student from Mexico enrolled
in a bachelor’s program at UTGRV. Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiffs have F-1 student visa status. Id. at 1.
Defendants terminated Plaintiffs’ SEVIS record (the record required to be active to track
their visa compliance) between April 7 and 10, 2025. Id. at 6-8. DHS marked Plaintiffs’ SEVIS
record as “OTHER-Individual identified in criminal records and/or has had their VISA revoked.”
Id. at 2.
Defendants restored Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records retroactively as active between April 24 and
26, 2025. Dkt No. 30, p. 2.
b. 	Procedural History
On April 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Defendants alleging
unlawful termination of their status to remain in the United States as international students. Dkt.
No. 1. The complaint was subsequently amended but remained largely the same in form and
substance. Dkt. No. 5. Plaintiffs also pursued emergency injunctive relief with the District Court.
Dkt. No. 11.
After the Government informed the Court that Plaintiffs’ SEVIS status was restored, on
May 12, 2025, United States District Judge Fernando Rodriguez Jr. ordered SEVP, the Student
Exchange Visitor Program, to “add a notation into the SEVIS record for each Plaintiff, indicating
that each Plaintiff’s SEVIS record has been restored to ‘Active,’ retroactive to the date of the
termination.” Id. Defendants were also ordered to file under seal “a Notice confirming compliance
with this Order, attaching screen shots of the SEVIS records with the required notation.” Id.
Defendants timely complied with the Court order. Dkt. No. 30.
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On June 16, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint. Dkt. No. 41. In that Motion, Defendants argue that “most of the relief sought by
Plaintiffs has already been addressed by the Court.” Id. at 1, 4. Defendants also argue that
“Plaintiffs lack standing to seek additional relief, due to lack of redressability.” Id. at 1. Lastly,
Defendants request the Court “exercise its discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s declaratory claim.” Id.
In “Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,” Plaintiffs argue the Court
retains jurisdiction to review Plaintiffs’ claims of an unlawful agency action, due process
violations and needed declaratory relief. Dkt. No. 43. Defendants replied and maintained that
Plaintiffs received the relief sought or that the requested relief is not redressable by the Court. Dkt.
No. 44.
The Court stayed discovery until resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No.
45.
c. 	Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action
Plaintiffs assert five causes of action in their amended complaint. Dkt. No. 5. The first four
are:
(1) the unauthorized termination of their SEVIS status violates the Sec. 706(a)(2)(A), (C-
D) of the APA, id. at 23-24;
(2) “The failure to provide notice of the facts that formed the basis for the SEVIS
termination is a violation of [procedural] due process under the Fifth Amendment[,]” id. at 24-25;
(3) Defendants violated Sec. 706(a) of the APA because Defendants failed to provide
notice of the facts that formed the basis for the SEVIS termination which is a violation of due
process under the Fifth Amendment, and, therefore, contrary to a constitutional right, id. at 25; and
(4) Defendants violated Sec. 706(a)(2)(A) of the APA because Defendants’ actions are
arbitrary and capricious, id. at 25-26.
Plaintiffs’ last cause of action is subtitled “Fifth Cause of Action,” “Administrative
Procedure Act (Injunctive Relief).” Id. at 26. Plaintiffs state:
“Under §705 of the APA, ‘an agency may postpone the effective date of action
taken by it. ‘The reviewing Court to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable
injury’ ‘may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective
date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the
review proceedings.’”
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Id. 26. The Court construes this as a claim alleging that the agency could review its decision
restoring Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records to “Active” in the future, or that the agency could terminate
Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records again. Additionally, given Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief in its
subtitle, the Court construes this claim more specifically as a declaratory request to enjoin
Defendants from making a policy change affecting Plaintiffs’ F-1 status.
V. 	Standard of Review
Article III of the U.S. Constitution extends “[t]he judicial Power” to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III. For this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court has “repeatedly held
that an ‘actual controversy’ must exist not only ‘at the time the complaint is filed,’ but through ‘all
stages’ of the litigation.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (citation omitted).
Changes in circumstances throughout the litigation can “eliminate[] the ‘actual controversy’.” Ctr.
for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 2006). If the actual controversy
is eliminated, then “the case becomes moot.” Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has described
the mootness doctrine as follows:
[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
496 (1969). In other words, mootness occurs only when it is “impossible for the
court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing party.” Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, (1992) (citation omitted).
“Thus, when ‘a complaining party manages to secure outside of litigation all the
relief he might have won in it,’ the case is moot.” But “[a]s long as the parties have
a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.”
A defendant, however, “cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its
unlawful conduct once sued.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91. The
“voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of
power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.” United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). “[A] defendant claiming that
its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that
it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 142 F. 4 th 819, 824-25 (5th Cir.
2025).
A court must dismiss a cause for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks
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the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). (If…at any
time…it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss.)
Further, the Constitution’s limitation to “Cases” or “Controversies” requires a plaintiff to
have constitutional standing. U.S. Const. art. III; See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289,
295-96 (2022). For this reason, “standing is a threshold issue that we consider before examining
the merits.” Williams v. Parker, 843 F.3d 617, 620 (5 th Cir. 2016). Constitutional standing has
three parts: (1) an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent;
(2) a causal connection between the injury incurred and the conduct alleged; and (3) the likelihood
that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
61 (1992).
Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the claim. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286
(5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th
Cir. 1998)). The Plaintiff bears the burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 286.
Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to
plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ferguson v. Bank of
New York Mellon Corp., 802 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).
To determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims present an actual controversy, the Court considers
(1) whether the relief already awarded to Plaintiffs has rendered Plaintiffs’ case moot and (2)
whether Plaintiffs’ request for relief is too speculative in nature to establish constitutional standing.
VI. 	Analysis
a. 	Plaintiffs received their requested relief in their first four causes of action;
their case no longer presents an actual controversy and is, therefore, moot.
After filing their First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 5), Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records were
reinstated. See Minute Entry dated April 28, 2025. 	The Government advised the Court that the
policy for SEVIS termination was a developing issue so that in the interim all SEVIS records for
all Plaintiffs would be reactivated. Dkt. No. 14. Therefore, Plaintiffs received their requested relief.
Dkt. No. 17. Specifically, the Government agreed that the SEVIS records for each named Plaintiff
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in this litigation was reverted to active status, thereby restoring the record to the same status it was
before the Government’s actions which necessitated Plaintiffs’ filing of their First Amended
Complaint. The Government detailed the restoration of the Plaintiffs’ complained of violations in
Dkt. Nos. 14 and 17. Thereafter during hearings on the Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction in front of U.S. District Judge Rodriguez, Plaintiffs
admitted to the restoration of their records which was memorialized by the Government in Dkt.
No. 22. “For each Plaintiff in this ligation, their SEVIS record was set back to ‘active’ with no
‘gaps’ or ‘lapses’ with the record restoration retroactive to the original date of termination.” Id. at
2. To further clarify that Plaintiffs’ records were fully restored, Judge Rodriguez entered an Order
requiring the Government to “add a notation into the SEVIS record for each Plaintiff, indicating
that each Plaintiff’s SEVIS record has been restored to ‘Active,’ retroactive to the date of the
termination.” Dkt. No. 28, p. 2. The Government complied by adding the required notation, making
Plaintiffs whole. Dkt. No. 30.
Given that Plaintiffs’ active SEVIS status is restored, Plaintiffs received their request relief.
Plaintiffs’ first and fourth causes of action, requesting relief from the agency decision terminating
their SEVIS record is resolved. Plaintiffs’ second and third causes of action claiming a due process
violation for termination of their SEVIS records is resolved as their record is restored retroactively.
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address Plaintiffs’ complaints about their SEVIS
record termination because the Plaintiffs lack the required case in controversy that limits this
Court’s federal power. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 338, 395 (1980).
Plaintiffs no longer have any live issues to present to the Court on their SEVIS termination as it
was completely restored. Id. at 396 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The
Plaintiffs’ dispute over the termination of their SEVIS record is resolved, therefore it is moot.
American Med. Ass’n v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 267, 270 (5 th Cir. 1988). There is no relief this Court can
award Plaintiffs on these four causes of action. The Court finds Defendants have effectively
demonstrated that they cannot provide Plaintiffs with further relief.
Defendants provided a declaration from the Division Chief of External Operations at the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program within Homeland Security Investigations at Immigration
and Customs Enforcement setting Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records back to a status as if the termination
never happened. Dkt. No. 22. In this declaration, Division Chief Hicks states that “due to technical
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limitations of the SEVIS system, which cannot be overridden, the event history for a given record
cannot be altered or deleted from the system.” Id. at 2. The Division Chief further stated that
pursuant to a court order SEVP could “add[] a notation into the SEVIS record, indicating that the
record has been restored retroactively to the original date of the termination.” Id. However, the
Division Chief states that “these notations are not viewable by end-users outside of SEVP, such as
Designated School Officials.” Id. Still, the Division Chief conceded that the notations are part of
the official SEVIS record. Id. Defendants have added this notation. Dkt. No. 30.
Additionally, Defendants, through SEVP, provided Plaintiffs with a letter “[t]o address the
issue of individuals outside of SEVP being unable to see the correction.” Dkt. No. 41, p. 3; Dkt.
No. 41-1. In this letter, Defendants assure that “Although the event history will memorialize all
modifications that are made to the SEVIS record (including the prior termination and its restoration
to ‘active’), the effect of this retroactive activation is as though the termination did not happen,
and there are no ‘gaps’ or ‘lapses’ in your SEVIS record.” Id. No justiciable case or controversy
is presented when the question to be decided has been mooted by subsequent developments. Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
However, a case is not moot simply because a defendant ends its unlawful conduct once
sued. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. at 91. The Defendants should not be able to evade
judicial review by temporarily altering questionable behavior. City New and Novelty, Inc. v City
of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n. 1 (2001).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ actions do not moot the controversy because “[t]he
termination history remains in the event log accessible to adjudicators and background check
systems and continues to taint Plaintiffs’ record.” Dkt. No. 43, p. 12. Plaintiffs argue this
constitutes a residual effect or a collateral consequence. However, as discussed above, Defendants
have provided Plaintiffs with letters that can be used to explain the situation and demonstrate the
effect of the retroactive activation is as though the termination did not happen at all. Plaintiffs’
claims of collateral consequences are merely speculative in nature. Plaintiffs fail to put forth any
evidence of current collateral consequence stemming from their record termination and restoration.
Purely speculative collateral consequences cannot overcome a finding of mootness. See Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) and Allied Home Mortg. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development, 618 Fed. Appx. 781 (5th Cir. 2015).
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While Plaintiffs request a declaration that their terminations were unlawful, the Court finds
such a determination unnecessary. Plaintiffs also request “a court order compelling DHS to amend
its recordkeeping policies to prevent future unlawful status terminations without process.” Dkt.
No. 43, p. 14. The Defendants’ retroactive restoration of Plaintiffs’ active status effectively
functions as though the termination did not occur, and Defendants’ recordkeeping polices already
appear to work in a manner which can prevent future unlawful terminations without process.
Considering this, the Court finds it unnecessary to order further action. Defendants added a
notation to the SEVIS record for each Plaintiff reporting an active status retroactive to the date of
termination. Dkt. No. 30. Consequently, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ request has been addressed and
no further action from this Court is needed. Further, the Court notes that, as required, it assumes
Defendants, as state actors, acted in good faith. U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, 72 F.4th 666, 673–
74 (5th Cir. 2023).
Because the Court has already provided all possible relief, the Court finds that the “actual
controversy” in this case has been eliminated. Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 449 F.3d at 661. Given
that the Court provided further relief by requesting the notation to show that each Plaintiff had
continuous active status with no gap or lapses, the Cout finds it is now “impossible for the court
to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing party.” Church of Scientology of Cal., 506
U.S. at 12. For these reasons, the Court finds the case is moot. Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 449
F.3d at 661.
b. 	Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is speculative; Plaintiffs do not have standing
to bring this speculative claim.
Plaintiffs subtitle their “Fifth Cause of Action” as “Administrative Procedure Act
(Injunctive Relief).” Dkt. No. 5, p. 26. Plaintiffs proceed to quote Section 705 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), claiming “an agency may postpone the effective date of
action taken by it” and “[t]he reviewing Court to the ‘extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury’
‘may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action
or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.’” Id.
The Court construes this as a claim alleging the agency could review its decision restoring
Plaintiffs’ SEVIS record to ‘Active,’ or that the agency could terminate Plaintiffs’ SEVIS record
again. Considering this reading, the Court construes this fifth alleged cause of action to be a request
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to enjoin Defendants from making a future change affecting Plaintiffs’ F-1 visas or the process
including the active status of Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records.
Plaintiffs must have standing to bring this claim. Constitutional standing has three parts:
(1) an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent; (2) a causal
connection between the injury incurred and the conduct alleged; and (3) the likelihood that a
favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
Additionally, “[i]t is the responsibility of the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that
he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's
remedial powers.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n. 8 (1986).
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts showing that their record could be terminated again.
Bender, 475 U.S. at 546, n. 8. In fact, Plaintiffs appear to request relief over a situation which has
not yet occurred, and, therefore, Plaintiffs have not yet been injured. Thus, Plaintiffs do not
demonstrate an actual injury. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which suggest the
injury is imminent. The Court assumes that any policy change by Defendants would be lawfully
executed and so would guarantee due process protections. The Court cannot, now, when there is
no policy for the Court to review, enjoin Defendants from possibly making a policy change to the
F-1 visa process that would affect Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ speculation that a policy change may occur
or that the agency may review its decision restoring their ‘Active’ status shows neither that an
injury has either actually occurred nor that an injury is imminent. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated an “injury in fact” which is concrete and particularized and is
either actual or imminent that confers standing to Plaintiffs. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. at 560-61.
Even if Plaintiffs had constitutional standing, this claim for declaratory relief request is
moot as Plaintiffs fail to provide any facts that the dispute is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. Shemwell v City of McKinney, 63 4th 480, 484 (5th Cir. 2023). To overcome mootness in
their dispute over their F-1 visa status, the Plaintiffs must provide facts showing “the challenged
action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation,” and “there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”
Kingdomware Techs. Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 170 (2016). Plaintiffs fail to overcome
mootness in their request for any declaratory relief as they provide no facts that litigation in the
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future would be too short to adequately address their issues, or they will be subjected to the same
action. Libertarian Party v. Dardenne, 595 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2010).
VII. 	Recommendation
The Court finds Plaintiffs do not present an actual controversy as their claims have been
resolved and are moot. Consequently, the Court concludes it does not have the subject matter
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Additionally,
Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is speculative in nature and not subject to relief as required
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court finds Plaintiffs cannot establish
standing to bring this claim before the court because they have no injury.
Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court
(1) GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 41); and
(2) DISMISS Plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice.
VIII. 	Notice to Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report
and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with United States District Judge
Fernando Rodriguez Jr. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an objection, a party must object to
specific facts or legal findings in this Report and Recommendation. The District Judge is not
required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United States Parole
Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record
before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without
conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on appeal,
except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243,
248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on January 8, 2026.
__________________________
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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