Ford v. Brown et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
WICHITA FALLS DIVISION
RICHARD FORD, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 7:25-cv-0015-O-BP
§
MIKE BROWN, et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss that Dusty Bryant filed on October 15, 2025
(ECF No. 20); City of Crowell and Gary Whitley filed on October 16, 2025 (ECF No. 22); Shawn
Scarborough filed on October 20, 2025 (ECF No. 26); and Mike Brown, Foard County Sheriff’s
Office, Anthony Hinsley, and Perry Shaw filed on October 16, 2025 (ECF No. 30). Pro se Plaintiff
Richard Ford did not file a response. After reviewing the pleadings and applicable legal authorities,
the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief United States District Judge Reed O’Connor
GRANT the Motions (ECF Nos. 20, 22, 26, 30) and DISMISS Ford’s claims under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Ford sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for various constitutional violations. ECF No. 1. He
claims officers unlawfully arrested him for criminal trespass at his own home and illegally detained
him. Id. at 2. He asserts officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and
his First Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against him for reporting officer misconduct,
through serving him a notice regarding a hearing for a dangerous dog on his property and
fabricating testimony at the hearing. Id. at 1-2. Ford argues officers committed misconduct because
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 1 of 10 PageID <pageID>

2
they did not investigate when under an obligation to do so and selectively enforced laws against
him. Id. at 4. Ford also claims officers trespassed on his property and did not provide him with a
copy of the warrant to seize his dog. Id.
Ford sues Foard County Sheriff’s Office, Constable Anthony Hinsley, Deputy Sheriff
Perry Shaw, and Sheriff Mike Brown. ECF No. 9 at 6-7. Ford also sues the City of Crowell and its
Chiefs of Police Shawn Scarborough and Dusty Bryant, and the City’s municipal judge, Gary
Whitley. Id. at 5-7. He seeks $640,000.00 in damages. Id. at 15.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of complaints that fail to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a viable claim for relief,
a complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, courts must “take all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff . . . and ask whether the pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174
(5th Cir. 2016) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider
documents outside the complaint when they are: (1) attached to the motion to dismiss; (2)
referenced in the complaint; and (3) central to the plaintiff’s claims. In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 2 of 10 PageID <pageID>

3
B. 	Pro se parties
The Court subjects a pro se party's pleadings to less rigid analysis than those of a party
represented by counsel. “[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). However, “even a liberally-construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving
rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221,
224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires
“whether within the universe of theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a
cause of action under [the] complaint, indulgently read.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370
(5th Cir. 1976). However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to state a claim for relief.” Masika Brown Ray v. Anthony Boone, No.
24-40169, 2024 WL 4372692, *1 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Coleman v. Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858
F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017)).
C. 	Qualified immunity
“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from
liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). To overcome the defense of qualified
immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citations omitted). “[A] good-faith assertion of qualified
immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show
that the defense is not available.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020).
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 3 of 10 PageID <pageID>

4
“[T]he immunity issue must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation since
it entails an entitlement to immunity from suit and not merely a defense to liability.” Gibson v.
Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991)).
Qualified immunity can be decided at the motion to dismiss stage as it is the earliest possible stage
in litigation. Carswell v. Camp, 37 F.4th 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 2022).
D. 	Dismissal with or without leave to amend
It is a “well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state a claim.”
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The decision to allow amendment
of the pleadings is within the sound discretion of the Court. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d
1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). In determining whether to allow an amendment of the pleadings, the
Court considers: undue delay in the proceedings, undue prejudice to the opposing parties,
timeliness of the amendment, and futility of the amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962); Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir.
1982). “At some point, a court must decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make [his]
case; if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss
the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986); Schiller v. Physicians
Resource Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2003).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	The Court should dismiss Ford’s claims against the City of Crowell.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under color
of any [law] subjects [] any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements: (1) a policymaker; (2)
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 4 of 10 PageID <pageID>

5
an official policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy
or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell v. Dep't.
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). While courts in this circuit are split on the level of
specificity required for pleading municipal liability claims, several courts follow a “common-sense
approach” that requires “only minimal factual allegations . . . at the motion to dismiss stage.” E.G.
by Gonzalez v. Bond, No. 1:16-cv-0068-BL, 2016 WL 8672774, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016),
rec. adopted as modified sub nom. E.G. v. Bond, No. 1:16-cv-068-C, 2017 WL 129019 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 13, 2017) (citing Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 842-44 (S.D. Tex.
2011)). This approach relies on Iqbal’s instruction that courts draw on their judicial experience
and common sense, and on the fact that, in the municipal liability context, “it is exceedingly rare
that a plaintiff will have access to (or personal knowledge of) specific details regarding the
existence or absence of internal policies or training procedures prior to discovery. . . .” Id.
Here, 	Ford 	does not 	provide even 	“minimal factual 	allegations” that 	the alleged
constitutional violations he suffered were anything more than a series of isolated incidents. E.G.
by Gonzalez, 2016 WL 8672774, at *5. Ford does not provide any factual basis that a policymaker
promulgated an official policy or that the moving force of the violation of his constitutional rights
was the policy or custom. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. The Court should dismiss Ford’s claims
against the City of Crowell because he has not pleaded any facts to show any of the required
elements of municipal liability under § 1983.
B. 	The Court also should dismiss Ford’s claims against Scarborough, Whitley,
and Bryant in their official capacities.
Ford next sues City of Crowell employees Scarborough, Whitley, and Bryant in their
official capacities. “A claim brought against a government employee in his official capacity,
however, is a claim against the government itself.” Blackledge v. City of Hattiesburg, No. 2:24-
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 5 of 10 PageID <pageID>

6
cv-136-TBM-RPM, 2025 WL 3252404, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 31, 2025) (citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, (1985)). Therefore, because Ford has not stated a municipal
liability claim for relief against the City of Crowell under § 1983, dismissal of his claims against
Scarborough, Whitley, and Bryant also is appropriate.
C. 	The Court should dismiss Ford’s claims against the Foard County Sheriff’s
Office.
Ford next sues the Foard County Sherriff’s office. Suing a county’s sheriff office is
equivalent to suing the county itself. See Sheffield v. Doe, No. A-11-CA-300-LY, 2012 WL
5198089, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2012), rec. adopted, No. A-11-CA-300-LY, 2012 WL
12882857 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2012) (holding that the Sheriff’s office was an arm of the county,
and the claims against the Sherriff’s office were equivalent to existing claims against the county).
[A] county “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Furthermore, a county
“may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the
body’s official decisionmaking channels.” To succeed on this type of claim—called
a Monell claim—the plaintiff must show that “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated
by a municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a
constitutional right.”
Thornton v. Dallas Cnty., No. 3:23-cv-1945-D, 2024 WL 3357840, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2024)
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), Webb v. Town of
St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019)).
Here, Ford does not state any facts to show that Foard County or its Sheriff’s Office
officially adopted or promulgated any policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision.
Thornton, 2024 WL 3357840, at *3. Ford also does not plead facts to make out a Monell claim
because he does not plead any factual basis that an official policy promulgated by a municipal
policymaker was the moving force behind the violation of his constitutional rights. Id. In fact, he
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 6 of 10 PageID <pageID>

7
points to no policy statement, ordinance, regulation, decision, or official policy at all. Again, he
pleads what appears to be only isolated incidents that led to the alleged constitutional violations.
As a result, Ford has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Foard County,
and the Court should dismiss his claims.
D. 	The Court also should dismiss Ford’s claims against Hinsley, Shaw, and
Brown in their official capacities.
Ford next sues Hinsley, Shaw, and Brown in their official capacities. These claims are
equivalent to suing Foard County itself. Blackledge, 2025 WL 3252404, at *8. As a result, the
Court should dismiss his claims against Hinsley, Shaw, and Brown in their official capacities
because Ford has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Foard County.
E. 	Qualified immunity bars Ford’s remaining claims against Scarborough and
Brown in their individual capacities.
Ford also sues Scarborough and Brown in their individual capacities. “Claims under § 1983
may be brought against persons in their individual or official capacity, or against a governmental
entity.” Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). A
plaintiff’s complaint must “state with precision and specificity” the basis for the claim which
necessarily includes why the defendant official cannot successfully maintain the defense of
immunity. Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth
Circuit adheres to a “heightened pleading” standard in civil rights cases against government
officials. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming the
continuing validity of Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his constitutional rights through unlawful arrests,
retaliation, and harassment. See ECF No. 1. However, Ford does not provide adequate factual
support for such claims. And his allegations do not demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right
or that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 7 of 10 PageID <pageID>

8
Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Merely stating so is not enough to establish a violation of any of Ford’s
constitutional rights. Instead of stating facts that support his claims, Ford makes “cursory and
unsupported allegations,” which the Court need not accept as true. Harmon v. City of Arlington,
Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021).
Thus, Ford has not pleaded facts that overcome qualified immunity. Accordingly,
Scarborough and Brown are entitled to qualified immunity from Ford’s claims against them in
their individual capacity, and dismissal is appropriate.
F. 	Whether dismissals should be with or without leave to amend.
The decision to allow amendment of the pleadings is within the sound discretion of the
Court. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). In determining whether to
allow an amendment of the pleadings, the Court considers: undue delay in the proceedings, undue
prejudice to the opposing parties, timeliness of the amendment, and futility of the amendment. See
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc.,
690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982). “At some point, a court must decide that a plaintiff has had
fair opportunity to make her case; if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the
court should finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986);
Schiller v. Physicians Resource Group Inc., 342 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2003).
Although Ford does not state a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted,
he has not amended his complaint, and the Court does not conclude that he has pleaded his best
case or that further amendment would be futile. Accordingly, the Court should grant Ford leave to
file a First Amended Complaint that addresses the deficiencies noted in these findings,
conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen days after Chief Judge O’Connor enters his
order on the findings, conclusions, and recommendation or such other time that he sets.
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 8 of 10 PageID <pageID>

9
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Ford has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Therefore, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge O’Connor GRANT
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 20, 22, 26, 30) and DISMISS Ford’s claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), with leave to file a First Amended Complaint that
addresses the deficiencies noted in these findings, conclusions, and recommendation within
fourteen days after Chief Judge O’Connor enters his order on the findings, conclusions, and
recommendation or such other time that he sets.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with
a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). To be specific, an objection
must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis
for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except
upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 9 of 10 PageID <pageID>

10
SIGNED on February 19, 2026.
______________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 7:25-cv-00015-O-BP Document 37 Filed 02/19/26 Page 10 of 10 PageID <pageID>