Cantrell v. Westerman et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANGELO DIVISION
WILLIE J. CANTRELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN WESTERMAN, et al.,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 6:23-CV-00055-H-BU
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff WILLIE J. CANTRELL brings this action against Defendants John Wester-
man, Matthew Walts, Tom Green County Sheriff’s Department (TGCSD) Detective Gary
Cole, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), the Texas Highway Patrol, and the
TGCSD (collectively, “the Defendants”), alleging that they violated his constitutional
rights. Cantrell’s claims are subject to judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because
he has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Dkt. No. 13. For the reasons
below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Cantrell’s claims be DISMISSED with prej-
udice as time-barred and for failure to state a claim.
I. JURISDICTION
Cantrell brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing the Court with subject-
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3). Dkt. No. 1. Venue is proper in the
Northern District of Texas, San Angelo Division, because Cantrell’s claims arise from his
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 1 of 38 PageID <pageID>

2
arrest and detention in Tom Green County, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The under-
signed has the authority to enter these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations after
the case was automatically referred to the undesigned for preliminary screening pursuant
to Special Order 3-251. Dkt. No. 8; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Cantrell has not consented to
the undersigned exercising the full jurisdiction of this Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of screening a plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
or 1915A, a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them
in a way that most favor the plaintiff. Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d
415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017). A court may look to the plaintiff’s allegations in their complaint,
responses to a questionnaire, authenticated prison or jail records, and testimony provided
at a Spears hearing. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Banue-
los v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts may consider au-
thenticated medical and prison records).
A. Arrest
Cantrell’s claims originate from a traffic stop that occurred on May 2, 2020. Dkt.
No. 18 at 2. Cantrell was driving from Christoval to San Angelo when he was pulled over
by Trooper Westerman for driving eight miles per hour above the speed limit. Dkt. Nos. 1
at 3; 18 at 2. During the stop, Westerman made disparaging and insulting remarks about
Cantrell, demanding to know what gave Cantrell “the right to be speeding.” Id. Westerman
also questioned where he was going and why he was traveling during covid-19, before then
requesting Cantrell’s driver’s license and proof of insurance. Dkt. No. 24 at 6. When
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 2 of 38 PageID <pageID>

3
Cantrell explained that his car insurance was stored on his phone, Westerman asked
Cantrell to exit the vehicle and called a K-9 unit to the scene. Dkt. Nos. 18 at 7; 24 at 7.
The call was placed around ten minutes into the stop, and fifteen minutes later Walts arrived
with the K-9. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 24 at 1.
Walts rounded the vehicle with the K-9, then told Cantrell that they needed to con-
duct a further search inside the vehicle. Dkt. No. 18 at 3, 10. Cantrell alleges that the offic-
ers lied about the K-9 detecting an odor. Id. Nonetheless, the officers searched inside his
vehicle; Westerman commented to the officers that they would “find something to charge
[him] with.” Id. at 12. Cantrell did not consent to the search. Id. at 3, 10.
Inside, the officers found an empty CBD vape pen, along with packaging in the
center console confirming that the pen contained CBD. Dkt. Nos. 18 at 4; 24 at 10. The
officers also found various prop items used for Cantrell’s music group, PLANTATIONS;
these items included an empty gas can, matches, paper towels, a hammer, a box cutter, and
six empty bottles.1 Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 18 at 4. Lasty, the officers found personal items, in-
cluding Cantrell’s wallet and cellphone, a phone charger, black skinny jeans, a black
hoodie, and tan boots. Id. Most of these items were found packed neatly inside a black
duffle bag. Dkt. No. 24 at 7.
After completing the search, the officers made comments about “riot materials” and
“George Floyd.” Dkt. No. 18 at 12. They arranged the items on the hood of Cantrell’s car,
1 The bottles were “prop molotov cocktails,” each labeled with a large “P” in the font used by PLANTA-
TIONS. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 24 at 8. The authenticated police report also notes that the paper towels were
stuffed into the necks of the glass bottles.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 3 of 38 PageID <pageID>

4
and Westerman took photographs of the items for evidence. Id. at 4. The officers then re-
turned all of the items, except for Cantrell’s phone, to the car. Id. at 5. Westerman then
placed Cantrell under arrest for possession of the CBD vape pen, claiming that it was a
controlled substance. Id. at 8.
After arresting Cantrell and while still on the scene, Westerman performed a search
of Cantrell’s phone. Dkt. No. 18 at 7. Westerman did not have a warrant, and Cantrell did
not consent to this search. Dkt. Nos. 18 at 6–7; 24 at 11. Westerman was able to access the
contents of Cantrell’s phone because it was not locked with a password. Dkt. No. 24 at 11.
Westerman found MP3 music files and videos of the items they had found, along with
various notes, text files, emails, and pictures. Dkt. No. 18 at 7. Westerman added a charge
for unlawful use of criminal instruments—the alleged criminal instruments included the
empty gas can, empty glass bottles, paper napkins, and black hoodie and jeans. Dkt. Nos.
1 at 3; 18 at 7. Cantrell was also charged for driving more than ten percent above the posted
speed limit.2 Dkt. No. 1 at 3.
Cantrell was then taken to Tom Green County Jail; Westerman retained possession
of Cantrell’s phone as evidence, and Cantrell’s car was towed and impounded at Home
Motors. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Cantrell remained in jail overnight before posting bail on May 3,
2020. Id. at 4. After his release, Cantrell recovered his car from Home Motors; he found
that his vehicle “appeared to have been ransacked,” with his belongings scattered
2 Cantrell alleges that the officers lacked probable cause for the criminal instruments and controlled sub-
stances charges, Dkt. No. 18 at 10–11, but concedes that he was driving more than ten percent above the
speed limit when pulled over. Id. at 1–2.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 4 of 38 PageID <pageID>

5
throughout the vehicle. Id. Cantrell alleges that the defendants “scattered and planted items
of accused criminal nature” in the vehicle because they were not properly re-packaged in
his duffle bag. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 4–5; 18 at 5; 24 at 14.
On or around May 12, 2020, Detective Cole downloaded and searched the contents
of Cantrell’s phone’s. Dkt. No. 21 at 19. Cantrell did not recover his phone until June 10,
2020, more than a month after his May 2 arrest. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Cantrell met with Wester-
man at a TDPS field office; while there, Westerman attempted to interrogate Cantrell. Id.
When Cantrell refused to answer questions, Westerman made malicious remarks about
Cantrell’s upbringing in foster care before finally releasing the phone to him. Id.
B. Detention
Cantrell also brings claims arising from three periods of pre-trial detention at Tom
Green County Jail (TGCJ). The first detention (the 2020 Detention) occurred on May 2,
2020, the day of Cantrell’s initial arrest. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. When Cantrell was detained, the
magistrate set his bond at $15,000.00.3 Id. Cantrell was held overnight before posting bail
and being released. Id. His second detention (the 2021 Detention) began on February 24,
2021, when he was rebooked for his criminal instruments charge following his extradition
from Grand Junction, Colorado.4 Dkt. Nos. 1 at 5; 18 at 15–16. A second bond was set for
$7,500; Cantrell posted bail on March 15, 2021, and was released. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. His third
3 Half of this bond was for his controlled substance charge, and the other half was for his criminal instru-
ments charge. Dkt. No. 1 at 4.
4 Cantrell was arrested in Colorado for trespassing at Colorado Mesa University. Dkt. No. 21 at 12. He was
strip-searched at the airport before boarding the flight to Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. The officers supervising
him denied him access to the bathroom until they had landed. Dkt. No. 18 at 14. As a result, he urinated
himself during the flight; the supervising officers did not notice until the plane landed, and he was then
taken to a restroom. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 18 at 15.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 5 of 38 PageID <pageID>

6
and final detention (the 2022 Detention) began on December 30, 2021, following his arrest
in Austin, Texas on December 23 and subsequent rebooking in TGCJ. Id. at 7. Cantrell was
refused bond by the magistrate and remained at TGCJ until his trial. Id.
When initially booked for each detention, Cantrell was forced to sleep on the floor.
Dkt. No. 19 at 1. In all, he was kept on the floor for six hours at the start of the 2020
Detention, twenty-four hours at the start of the 2021 Detention, and twenty-four hours at
the start of the 2022 Detention. Id. Cantrell was told that he had to wait for a dorm to
become available, or that he was required to sleep on the floor for Covid-19 quarantine. Id.
at 2. However, he was provided bedding halfway through the first and third booking. Dkt.
Id. Sleeping on the floor caused him sore joints and sore muscles, and exposed him to a
“cold climate.” Id. The floor during his third detention was also rat-infested; he observed
rats every twenty-four hours by the cell doors and in the hallways. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 7; 19 at
2. TDCJ did nothing except tell him to keep his cell clean. Dkt. No. 19 at 3. Cantrell suf-
fered from nausea and loss of appetite as a result of the rats. Id.
Cantrell was also subjected to repeated work-related strip searches during his 2021
and 2022 Detentions. While detained at TDCJ, Cantrell was assigned to work on kitchen
duty. Dkt. No. 18 at 17. Before each work assignment, Cantrell was subjected to a thirty to
sixty second strip search conducted by unnamed male officers. Id. at 18. Cantrell was also
subjected to some random strip searches. Id. at 17. In all, Cantrell was searched more than
thirty times; no contraband was ever found during these searches. Id. at 17–18.
Cantrell was also exposed to sickness during his detentions. Cantrell was exposed
to Covid-19, HIV, Hepatitis B, and the common cold. Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6–7. He suffered
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 6 of 38 PageID <pageID>

7
symptoms including coughing, sneezing, itchy eyes, runny nose, sore throat, headaches,
drowsiness, stomach pains, nausea, and hair loss. Dkt. No. 18 at 19. He contracted these
symptoms twice; once in March 2021, and once in January 2022. Dkt. No. 18 at 20. He
received only pills and cough drops as treatment, and neither were effective. Id. at 22.
Cantrell was also exposed to inmate violence during his 2021 and 2022 Detentions.
During his 2021 Detention, he was housed in a dormitory with West Texas gang members.
Dkt. No. 19 at 4. The gang members pressured Cantrell to do various tasks for them, in-
cluding cleaning for them, washing their clothes, or giving them food from his tray. Id.
Cantrell refused; sometime in February 2021 they retaliated by surrounding him and push-
ing him around in an attempt to start a fight. Id. Prison officers intervened, calling for
backup and moving Cantrell to a different unit. Id. at 5–6.
When Cantrell was rebooked for his 2022 Detention, he notified the officers about
the prior incident with the West Texas gang and requested placement in a different cell
block. Dkt. No. 19 at 6. Instead, the officer booking him placed him in the same dormitory
as before, stating that the gang members most likely were not there anymore. Dkt. No. 19
at 6. However, there were still West Texas gang members present, and Cantrell was in-
volved in a second fight in February 2022. Dkt. No. 19 at 4. Officers again intervened,
moving him to a different unit. Dkt. No. 19 at 5–6. Cantrell was not injured during either
altercation with the West Texas gang. Dkt. No. 19 at 5.
Lastly, Cantrell was forced to perform unpaid labor during his detentions. He was
assigned cleaning duties to keep cells sanitary during the pandemic, including sweeping,
mopping, and scrubbing jail cells. Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6–7. During his 2021 Detention, he was
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 7 of 38 PageID <pageID>

8
also assigned to dorm and kitchen duties for eight hour shifts each day. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6;
19 at 7. This work was assigned when he was moved to a different unit following his alter-
cations with the West Texas gang members; he was told that the only other available unit
was the Quarantine unit. Dkt. No. 19 at 7–8. The forced labor caused Cantrell to suffer
from back cramps and pain in his joints and muscles. Id.
C. Prosecution
Before Cantrell went to trial, the speeding and possession charges were dismissed;
Cantrell was tried only for the unlawful use of criminal instruments. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 7; 18 at
9. On February 18, 2022, two weeks before trial, the assistant district attorney enhanced
the criminal instruments charge from a state jail felony to a third degree felony; this in-
creased the maximum sentence from two years to ten years. Dkt. Nos. 18 at 16–17; 24 at
19. The charge was enhanced to reflect the prosecution’s new argument at trial that the prop
items were used for “arson.” Dkt. No. 24 at 16.
Cantrell’s trial lasted two days, from April 18 to April 19, 2022. Dkt. No. 24 at 16.
During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses: Officer Walts, Detective Cole,
and Jamie Cantrell, the plaintiff’s uncle. Id. at 13. On cross examination, Walts was ques-
tioned about the uncollected prop items. Id. He answered by referencing “riots” and
“George Floyd.” Id. This was despite George Floyd’s death occurring on May 25, 2020,
weeks after Cantrell was first arrested. Id. Walts also admitted to not collecting Cantrell’s
prop items as evidence. Id.
Because none of the prop items from Cantrell’s car were retained for evidence, the
only other evidence the prosecution could provide was from Cantrell’s phone. Id. at 12.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 8 of 38 PageID <pageID>

9
Said evidence included images of Cantrell with the prop items in a party scene, a video of
the same party scene, and notes from his phone relating to personal family disputes. Id. at
14–15. The defense also used evidence from Cantrell’s phone, including videos of his mu-
sic group performing with the prop items. Id. at 15.
Cantrell alleges that the defendants failed to disclose exonerating information prior
to the trial. Id. at 16. Specifically, he alleges that district attorney Allison Palmer omitted
information collected by the state’s investigation that indicated Cantrell was sexually
abused while in the foster care system. Id. at 16–17. The concealed information included
Westerman’s June 2020 conversation with Cantrell—in which Westerman admitted to con-
tacting Cantrell’s foster family—and Westerman’s conversations with the foster family. Id.
On April 19, 2022, the jury found Cantrell not guilty of his criminal instruments
charge. Id. at 17. Rather than being immediately released, Cantrell was handcuffed and
taken back to TGCJ for an additional three hours before being released from jail. Id. at 18–
19. Cantrell alleges that each of his detentions at TGCJ caused emotional distress, pain and
suffering, mental anguish, exposure to disease, and damage to his professional accounting
and physical health. Dkt. No. 1 at 9.
III. THE PARTIES
Cantrell brings his constitutional claims against the following defendants: (1)
Trooper John Westerman, (2) DPS Officer Matthew Walts, (3) TGCSD Detective Gary
Cole, (4) the Texas DPS, (5) the Texas Highway Patrol, and (6) TGCSD. Dkt. No. 1 at 2.
Each defendant is sued individually and in his official capacity. Id. Cantrell alleges that
these defendants violated his rights under various constitutional amendments, including the
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 9 of 38 PageID <pageID>

10
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth amendments. Dkt. No. 24 at 18. Before
discussing the sufficiency of Cantrell’s pleadings, the undersigned first evaluates whether
the proper defendants have been named in Cantrell’s civil action.
It is well settled that a plaintiff may not bring a civil rights action against a servient
political agency or department unless such agency or department enjoys a separate and
distinct legal existence. Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313‒14 (5th Cir.
1991). This Court has routinely held that this class of “non-jural entities” includes county
jails. See, e.g., Lindley v. Bowles, No. 3:02-CV-595-P, 2002 WL 1315466, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
June 12, 2002) (finding Dallas County Jail is not a proper defendant with a jural existence);
Rambo v. Valdez, No. 3:16-CV-002-O, 2016 WL 4398969, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2016)
(finding Dallas County Sheriff’s Office is a non-legal entity). The undersigned concludes
that the Tom Green County Sheriff’s Department is a non-jural entity, and Cantrell’s claims
cannot proceed against it. Instead, the undersigned construes these claims as being brought
against Tom Green County Sheriff J. Nick Hanna in his official capacity. The Clerk is
directed to conform the docket to reflect this change.
Next, Cantrell’s claims against the state of Texas are barred by Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. The State of Texas is shielded from suits brought against it in federal
court by the Eleventh Amendment. Cox v. Texas, 354 F. App'x 901, 902 (5th Cir. 2009).
This immunity extends to state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity.5
5 Counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 512–13
(5th Cir. 2022) (sovereign immunity does not apply to counties and county officials). Thus, Cantrell’s con-
strued claims against Tom Green County and its officials are not barred.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 10 of 38 PageID <pageID>

11
Moore v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir.
2014). The Texas Department of Public Safety and Texas Highway Patrol are Texas agen-
cies; Cantrell cannot sue them—or sue Westerman and Walts in their official capacities—
unless sovereign immunity has been waived.
Here, no waiver of immunity applies. Section 1983 does not abrogate Texas’s Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. Moore, 743 F.3d at 963. Thus, neither TDPS nor THP has
waived its sovereign immunity. Cantrell also cannot rely on the Ex parte Young exception
to sue Westerman and Walts in their official capacities, as the exception applies only when
the plaintiff seeks prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). Cantrell does not seek prospective relief,6 and the allegedly unlawful
searches, arrests, detentions, and prosecution raise only past violations of his rights. James
v. Hegar, 86 F.4th 1076, 1082–83 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that allegations solely of past
harm do not constitute ongoing violations under Ex parte Young). Because sovereign im-
munity has not been waived, Cantrell cannot sue the TDPS or the THP. Cantrell also cannot
sue Westerman or Walts in their official capacities, but may sue them in their individual
capacities. The Clerk is directed to conform the docket to reflect this change.
Lastly, the undersigned notes that Cantrell raises claims that are properly asserted
against defendants not named in his Complaint. Where these unnamed defendants are im-
plicated solely by events occurring outside of this Court’s jurisdiction, it is improper to join
6 He requests that Westerman and Walts “immediately and permanently restrain all racial profiling and
criminal contempt” against him, but does not allege that they have continued to profile him. Dkt. No. 1 at
19.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 11 of 38 PageID <pageID>

12
said defendants to this civil action. These includes Cantrell’s claims arising from: (1) his
arrest and detention in Grand Junction, Colorado; (2) his extradition from Colorado to
Texas; and (3) his arrest and detention in Austin, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 5–7. The Court lacks
jurisdiction over the claims brought against the police officers and jail officials identified
in these allegations, and will not examine the plausibility of these claims.
Cantrell also asserts claims against unnamed defendants based on events occurring
within this district. Cantrell alleges that the state engaged in malicious prosecution and
Brady violations when prosecuting him. Dkt. No. 24 at 16–17. The proper defendant for
such claims is the prosecutor, not the arresting officers or the county. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (noting that the prosecution has a duty to disclose material excul-
patory evidence). Here, Cantrell identifies District Attorney (DA) Allison Palmer as the
prosecutor. Dkt. No. 24 at 16–17. The Clerk is directed to conform the docket to add
District Attorney Allison Palmer as a defendant.
In short, the undersigned liberally construes Cantrell’s pleadings as raising the fol-
lowing claims: (1) Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising from Cantrell’s arrest
against Westerman and Walts in their individual capacities; (2) Fifth Amendment claims
arising from the search and seizure of Cantrell’s phone against Detective Cole and Sheriff
Hanna; (3) Fifth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendment claims arising from Cantrell’s pretrial
detention against Sheriff Hanna; and (4) Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims and Brady
claims arising from Cantrell’s prosecution against Westerman, Walts, DA Palmer, and Sher-
iff Hanna.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 12 of 38 PageID <pageID>

13
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the court determines the
complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either in fact or in law, for the wrong
alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis
in fact if it rests upon clearly baseless factual contentions, and similarly, it lacks an arguable
basis in law if it contains indisputably meritless legal theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v.
Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim—whether under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or
Rule 12(b)(6)—“turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations’ in the complaint.”
Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App’x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam)). Thus, if a plaintiff
“plead[s] facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility”
by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief,
the claims should not be dismissed merely because the plaintiff fails to articulate the proper
legal theory that otherwise makes those facts actionable in court. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11–
12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3), (d)(1), (e)).
Courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). This means the factual allegations, while not
required to be detailed, must amount to more than mere labels, conclusions, or a statement
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 13 of 38 PageID <pageID>

14
of the legal elements of a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469.
For claims to be substantively plausible, a plaintiff need not establish that the
pleaded facts probably occurred as alleged, but the facts must allow the court “to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc.,
634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–679). Even pro se plain-
tiffs must plead facts that raise the right to relief above a speculative level. Chhim, 836 F.3d
at 469 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)). And
when plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
When evaluating a complaint under these standards, courts liberally construe the
pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, holding their complaints to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). But
“liberal construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there
are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8
(N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013). “To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff’” and would “‘transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’” Jones v. Mangrum,
No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Ultimately, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 14 of 38 PageID <pageID>

15
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experi-
ence and common sense.’” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
V. ANALYSIS
Many of Cantrell’s claims arise from events that occurred in early 2020 and through-
out 2021. Because his Complaint was filed in 2023, it is necessary to address whether the
statute of limitations bars Cantrell’s claims. The undersigned will then screen any remain-
ing claims chronologically, starting with the claims arising from his arrest, then turning to
the claims arising from his pretrial detainment, and concluding with the claims arising from
his prosecution.
A. Statute of Limitations
Cantrell brings his claims under § 1983, which does not include a statute of limita-
tions. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the general statute of
limitations of the forum state for personal injuries governs § 1983 claims. Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989). In Texas, a plaintiff has two years from the time his claims
accrue to file a personal injury claim, including a claim filed under § 1983. Balle v. Nueces
Cty., Texas, 952 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing T EX. C IV. P RAC . & R EM . C ODE A NN.
§ 16.003(a)).
Federal courts also apply the forum state’s equitable tolling principles. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) And equitable tolling is sparingly applied by Texas courts.
Myers v. Nash, 464 F. App’x 348, 349 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). To be entitled to equi-
table tolling under Texas law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he “actively pursued his
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 15 of 38 PageID <pageID>

16
judicial remedies but filed a defective pleading during the statutory period” or “was in-
duced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing filing deadlines to pass.”
Bailey v. Gardner, 154 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2005).
However, the accrual of a plaintiff’s claims is a question of Federal law, not state
law. Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F.App’x 368, 375 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (holding that while the forum state’s statute of limitations are
used in a § 1983 claim, federal law governs when the cause of action accrues). “Under
federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run ‘the moment the plaintiff becomes aware
that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been in-
jured.’” Russell v. Bd. of Trustees, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Helton v.
Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir.1987)).
A plaintiff is aware of an injury once he gains “possession of two critical facts: (1)
an injury has occurred; and (2) the identity of the person who inflicted the injury.” Stewart
v. Par. of Jefferson, 951 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992). This
standard is satisfied through either actual or constructive knowledge; the plaintiff is aware
of an injury if he has “facts which, in the exercise of due diligence, would have led to actual
knowledge.” Vigman v. Community Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir.
1981). Likewise, a plaintiff need not realize that a legal cause of action exists, so long as
he knows of facts that would lead a reasonable person to either conclude that the defend-
ant’s actions produced his injury or, at minimum, seek professional advice leading to the
same conclusion. Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir.1983); see also
Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391–92 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that ignorance of the law
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 16 of 38 PageID <pageID>

17
and illiteracy are not grounds for equitable tolling (citing Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n,
932 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir.1991))).
Here, Cantrell filed his Complaint on September 8, 2023. Dkt. No. 1. Under Texas’
two-year statute of limitations, any claims that accrued prior to September 8, 2021, are
barred by the statute of limitations unless equitable tolling applies. Thus, the claims arising
from the following events fall outside the limitations period and are potentially barred: (1)
the traffic stop, search, and arrest on May 2, 2020; (2) the search of his phone on May 12,
2020; (3) the 2020 Detention, which ended on May 3, 2020; and (4) the 2021 Detention,
which ended on March 15, 2021. Dkt. No. 1 at 1–6. Because Cantrell was present for each
of these events, it is implausible that he was not immediately aware of facts permitting a
reasonable inference that his constitutional rights were presently being violated. It is like-
wise implausible that Cantrell did not know of the relevant defendants—Westerman, Walts,
Cole, and the Green County Sheriff’s Department—who were responsible for the conduct
or policies that caused his injury. Because Cantrell had enough facts to infer that a violation
occurred and which defendants were responsible, his claims accrued at or near the time the
events occurred. The claims therefore accrued outside the limitations period and are barred.
The undersigned finds it implausible that equitable tolling applies to any of
Cantrell’s untimely claims. Cantrell does not allege that he filed a defective complaint prior
to this case, nor does he claim that the defendants sought to prevent him from filing a timely
claim either through force or deceit. The facts further indicate that Cantrell was free on
bond from May 3 to November 5, 2020, and from March 15 to December 23, 2021. Dkt.
No. 1 at 4–7. During these periods, the defendants had no control over Cantrell, and a
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 17 of 38 PageID <pageID>

18
timely claim could have been filed during either interval. Thus, none of these claims are
equitably tolled; each of them are barred by the statute of limitations.
Conversely, claims that arose after September 8, 2021, are not barred by the statute
of limitations. This includes claims arising from the 2022 Detention, which began on De-
cember 30, 2021, and his prosecution, which accrued upon his acquittal on April 19, 2022.7
Dkt. No. 1 at 7–8. Thus, only the following claims are analyzed below: (1) claims arising
from Cantrell’s 2022 Detention, including his Fourth Amendment search claims, Eighth
Amendment conditions claims, Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim, and Thirteenth
Amendment involuntary servitude claim; and (2) claims arising from Cantrell’s prosecu-
tion, including his Brady violation claim, Malicious Prosecution claim, Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause claim, and Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claim. All other claims are
barred by the statute of limitations.
B. Claims Arising from 2022 Detention
Cantrell’s first series of claims arise from allegations that the defendants violated
his constitutional rights during his 2022 Detention at TGCJ. He claims that he was sub-
jected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when he was forced to sleep on the floor during initial booking, exposed to various
diseases while detained, and put at risk of inmate violence. He also claims that he was
7 Although Cantrell’s prosecution claims may implicate events that occurred prior to September 8, 2023,
accrual for these claims requires either acquittal or conviction for the underlying offense. See United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (Brady claim requires finding that suppression of evidence “undermines
confidence in the outcome of trial” (emphasis added)); Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir.
2023) (malicious prosecution claim requires favorable termination of prosecution against plaintiff); Currier
v. Virginia, 585 U.S. 493, 498 (2018) (double jeopardy shields against second prosecution for same offense).
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 18 of 38 PageID <pageID>

19
subjected to unreasonable strip searches in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In addition,
he claims that the bail set by the magistrate was excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
Lastly, he claims that he was pressed into involuntary servitude in violation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment when forced to perform kitchen and cell duty as a pretrial detainee.
1. 	Condition of Confinement Claims
First, Cantrell alleges that he was subjected to constitutionally inadequate conditions
of confinement. While convicted inmates are protected by the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition on cruel and unusual punishment, pretrial detainees are protected by the due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639
(5th Cir. 1996). Pretrial detainees may bring Fourteenth Amendment claims under two al-
ternative theories: (1) an episodic-act-or-omission claim or (2) a condition-of-confinement
claim. Hare, 74 F.3d at 644–45; see also Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th
Cir. 2009).
A condition-of-confinement claim alleges that a general condition of confinement
within a jail operates as an unconstitutional pattern or policy. See Shepard, 591 F.3d at 452.
In “true jail condition cases,” the policy or practice that allows the condition to exist is
presumptive evidence of subjective intent on the part of the state or the officials who im-
plement it. Hare, 74 F.3d at 644. Thus, the official’s state of mind is not in question. The
inquiry instead focuses on whether the detainee can establish: (1) a rule, policy, or suffi-
ciently pervasive pattern or practice, (2) that was not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, and (3) that caused a violation of the detainee’s constitutional
rights. Duvall v. Dallas County, Texas, 631 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2011).
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 19 of 38 PageID <pageID>

20
Conditions of confinement, “alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. But this applies only when the condi-
tions have a “mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifia-
ble human need such as food, warmth, or exercise[.]” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304
(1991). Examples provided by the Supreme Court include a cold cell combined with a
failure to provide blankets, or denial of outdoor exercise combined with confinement to
small cells for almost twenty-four hours a day. Id. at 304–05. The duration of confinement
is also a relevant factor. “A filthy, overcrowded cell ... might be tolerable for a few days
and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1978), abrogated on other grounds by
Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024)).
Here, Cantrell alleges claims based on two conditions of confinement—the condi-
tions in the holding cell during initial booking, and the presence of sickness in TGCJ. Be-
cause these claims do not involve misconduct by specific jail officials, they are properly
characterized as conditions-of-confinement claims. He also alleges an episodic act or omis-
sion based on the prison violence he experienced.
i. 	Holding Cell Conditions
The first condition Cantrell complains of is the holding cell he was kept in during
initial booking. When Cantrell was booked at TGCJ on December 30, 2021, he was kept
in a cell without any bedding. Dkt. No. 19 at 1. Cantrell was forced to sleep on the floor in
what he described as a “cold climate,” and also saw rats near the door of his cell. Id. at 1–
2. This initial booking lasted for twenty-four hours before he was moved to another cell;
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 20 of 38 PageID <pageID>

21
however, he was provided bedding after twelve hours. Id. at 1.
Here, Cantrell fails to allege a constitutionally inadequate condition. Regardless of
whether the conditions were related to a legitimate government interest or arose as part of
a pervasive practice or pattern, none of these conditions in isolation amounted to a consti-
tutional violation. Young v. McCain, 760 F. App'x 251, 256–577 (5th Cir. 2019) (no viola-
tion when housed without bedding); Waller La. v. Ward, 2016 WL 7235832, at *3 (W.D.
La. Oct. 19, 2016) (no violation from “the mere presence of pests”). Neither did these con-
ditions violate Cantrell’s rights in combination, because they did not deprive him of a “sin-
gle, identifiable human need[.]” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. For comparison, the Fifth Circuit
determined that conditions were constitutionally inadequate when a prisoner was kept in
an “extremely cold” cell for fifteen days and “forced to sleep on the floor where rats
crawled over him.” Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 53–54 (5th Cir. 1987). But in this case,
Cantrell’s treatment was less severe in every way: he was exposed only to a “cold climate”
rather than extreme cold, was housed for at most one day rather than Foulds’ fifteen days,
merely saw rats on occasion rather than have them crawling over him, and was provided
bedding for the latter twelve hours of his stay in the booking cell. Dkt. No. 19 at 1–3. Given
the lack of severity or duration of the conditions, the undersigned does not find it plausible
that Cantrell was deprived of a single human need such as sleep or warmth.
ii. Exposure to Disease
The second condition Cantrell complains of is the exposure to disease in the jail.
Neither “isolated examples of illness” nor the mere “incidence of diseases or infections” in
prison imply unconstitutional conditions, as “any densely populated residence may be
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 21 of 38 PageID <pageID>

22
subject to outbreaks.” Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009). Instead,
a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of “serious, extensive and extended” violations
to allege a plausible claim. Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 631 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2011)
(finding that conditions were unconstitutional when jail had “bizarrely high” MRSA infec-
tion rate of two hundred per month for three years, compared to two a month at other jails).
Here, Cantrell fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation because his claim
rests solely on the general presence of diseases in jail and his own symptoms. He describes
exposure to Covid-19, HIV, Hepatitis B, and the common cold. Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6–7. He
also notes that he twice suffered various symptoms, including coughing and sneezing, itchy
eyes, a runny nose and a sore throat, among others. Dkt. No. 18 at 19–20. Cantrell’s isolated
examples of illness and the unsurprising claim that the densely populated jail contains dis-
eases fail to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantrell also takes issue with TGCJ’s health policies; in particular, he blames polices
related to covid-19 quarantine and mask mandates. Dkt. No. 18 at 21. Cantrell also alleges
that TGCJ and the Sheriff’s Department should have issued PR bonds for inmates with
minor charges. Id. The undersigned is unpersuaded by either argument. Cantrell does not
explain how the policies in place caused his injury or in what way they were defective.
Cantrell also does not allege that the policies were improperly enforced—on the contrary,
he clarifies that he does not claim his illness was caused by the “acts or omissions of TGCJ
officials.” Id. at 21. And even assuming that low-level offenders should be released to re-
duce exposure to disease, Cantrell had at this point been arrested three times, and was de-
nied bond entirely by the magistrate. Dkt. No. 1 at 7.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 22 of 38 PageID <pageID>

23
Regardless, inadequate quarantine enforcement or draconian bond policies are only
relevant if they result in an exposure to a serious risk of substantial harm—as discussed,
the exposure to illness described above falls short of this standard. The undersigned there-
fore finds it implausible that the presence of disease in the jail was sufficiently pervasive
to violate Cantrell’s rights.8
iii. Inmate Violence
Third, Cantrell alleges a claim based on his exposure to risk of harm from the West
Texas Gang. Here, Cantrell concedes that the jail officials did not know about the risk of
harm before the initial attack. Dkt. No. 19 at 5. Instead, he argues that when he was re-
booked in December 2021, he informed an unnamed TGCJ official of the prior attacks, but
that said official ignored his request. Id. at 5–6. Because Cantrell does not presume TGCJ’s
intent to incarcerate him in the face of a known condition, but instead that a particular jail
official failed to “tend to [his] basic human needs,” this claim is properly characterized as
an episodic act or omission claim rather than a condition of confinement claim.9 Hare, 74
F.3d at 644–45.
Prison officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence from
other inmates. Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v.
8 The undersigned also notes that these facts do not raise a claim based on deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. Cantrell only notes that the treatment he was provided was ineffective, which is insufficient
to allege deliberate indifference. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Disagreement
with medical treatment does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs.”).
9 If construed as a conditions claim, Cantrell still fails to state a plausible claim because he does not allege
that a rule, policy, or pervasive pattern existed. Cantrell makes no allegations about rules or policies that
exposed him to harm from the West Texas gang members. Furthermore, he describes only two incidents
where an altercation occurred, which is insufficient to meet the “heavy burden” of proving a pervasive
pattern. Dkt. No. 19 at 4; Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 f.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 23 of 38 PageID <pageID>

24
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994)). To bring an episodic claim based on inmate vio-
lence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the risk of violence
faced by the plaintiff and disregarded it. Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“Prison officials are not, however, expected to prevent all inmate-on-inmate violence . . .
[and] can be held liable for their failure to protect an inmate only when they are deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm.”). To demonstrate deliberate indifference,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant was (1) aware of facts permitting inference of
risk, (2) subjectively drew that inference, and (3) disregarded the risk. Spikes v. Wheat, 141
F.4th 662, 668 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)).
Here, Cantrell fails to plausibly allege that TGCJ officials deliberately disregarded
the risk of inmate violence. Even assuming that Cantrell’s notice to the officer about the
February 2021 altercation provided sufficient facts to infer a risk of serious harm existed,
Dkt. No. 19 at 5–6, he does not allege that the officer subjectively drew that inference and
disregarded it. Instead, he alleges that the TGCJ officials should have been aware of the
risk after he informed them. Id. at 5. An official’s failure to perceive a substantial risk that
he should have is “no cause for commendation,” but nonetheless cannot be considered de-
liberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). The officer’s re-
sponse—that the gang members most likely were not in the dorm anymore—further sup-
ports a finding that the officer acted with negligence rather than deliberate indifference.
Dkt. No. 19 at 6; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence.” (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (1976))). The
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 24 of 38 PageID <pageID>

25
undersigned therefore finds it implausible that TGCJ allowed a sufficiently pervasive pat-
tern of officials disregarding a substantial risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.
In summary, Cantrell fails to allege a plausible conditions-of-confinement claim
arising from his detention in the booking cell or his exposure to disease at TGCJ. Cantrell
also fails to plausibly allege an episodic act or omission arising from his exposure to inmate
violence. Each of these claims should be dismissed.
2. 	Strip Search Claim
Next, Cantrell alleges that he was subjected to unreasonable strip searches while
detained at TGCJ. A prisoner retains his Fourth Amendment rights in prison, although those
rights are “diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institution in which he is incar-
cerated.” Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1994). Searches and seizures of
prisoners must be “reasonable under all the facts and circumstances in which they are per-
formed.” Id. at 191 (quoting United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978)).
The burden of proving reasonableness is a light one, and prison administrators are given
“great deference from the courts.” Id.
When balancing the “need for the particular search against the invasion of the pris-
oner’s personal rights[,]” courts consider the “scope of the particular intrusion, the manner
in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is con-
ducted.” Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999) (first citing Elliott, 38 F.3d
at 191; then quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). The Fifth Circuit has in-
terpreted this standard as favoring “deference to prison authorities’ views of institutional
safety requirements,” even while acknowledging that inmates have a legitimate claim to
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 25 of 38 PageID <pageID>

26
“not be searched in a humiliating and degrading manner.” Elliott, 38 F.3d at 191 (quoting
Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep't., 849 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir.1988)).
Here, the undersigned finds it implausible that the searches Cantrell describes were
unreasonable. The searches involved only exposing his “genitals” and “butt cheeks” to in-
specting officers; he does not allege that any cavity searches were performed. Dkt. No 18
at 17. The searches were less than one minute each, and always performed by a male of-
ficer. Id. at 17–18. While Cantrell was searched upwards of thirty times, most of these
searches were performed just before his kitchen duty shift. Dkt. No. 18 at 17–18. Common
sense dictates that prison officials ought to perform a search for contraband before allowing
detainees to prepare food for other detainees. While some of the searches were random, Id.
at 17, the Supreme Court has recognized that “wholly random searches are essential to the
effective security of penal institutions.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529 (1984).
From these facts, the undersigned concludes that Cantrell’s allegations regarding
the scope, manner, and justification underlying the searches make it implausible that they
were unreasonable. And while Cantrell does not describe where the searches occurred, they
would be permissible even if performed in the presence of other inmates.10 In addition, no
facts are alleged that suggest the searches were performed in a “humiliating and degrading
manner.” Elliott, 38 F.3d at 191. Thus, it is implausible that the searches were unreasonable
such that they violated Cantrell’s Fourth Amendment rights.
10 See, e.g., Bernhart v. Gusman, No. CV 15-1800, 2015 WL 9581319, at *14 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2015), re-
port and recommendation adopted, No. CV 15-1800, 2015 WL 9480453 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2015) (“Simi-
larly, the mere possibility that other inmates could have seen [plaintiff] naked in the OPP outdoor recreation
area where the subject search occurred . . . does not establish a constitutional violation.”).
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 26 of 38 PageID <pageID>

27
3. 	Excessive Bail Claim
Next, Cantrell alleges that the bail set while he was detained at TGCJ was excessive.
Bail is excessive “when set in an amount greater than that required for reasonable assurance
of the presence of the defendant.” United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir.
1988) (first citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), then citing Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)). Bail is not excessive merely because a defendant cannot afford
to pay it. Id. Setting bail is committed to the discretion of the district court, and is reviewed
only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 107–08. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of exces-
sive bail does not confer an obligation to offer bail to pretrial detainees. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (“[The Excessive Bail Clause], of course, says nothing
about whether bail shall be available at all.”).
Here, Cantrell fails to plausibly allege that the bail set by the magistrate was exces-
sive. He alleges only that the magistrate refused to grant bail for his 2022 Detention. Id. at
7. However, discretion to withhold bail does not implicate the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition against excessive bail. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752. The undersigned therefore con-
cludes that Cantrell has not plausibly alleged that he was subjected to excessive bail.11
4. 	Involuntary Servitude Claim
Lastly, Cantrell alleges that he was subjected to involuntary servitude while being
held as a pretrial detainee at TGCJ. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary
11 Even considering the bail set for his 2020 and 2021 Detentions—which cannot be challenged due to the
statute of limitations—Cantrell alleges that he was able to make bail both times. Dkt. No. 1 at 4–6. This
alone is sufficient to demonstrate that his bail was not excessive. Roberts v. City of Booneville, Mississippi,
No. 	1:23-CV-00154-GHD-RP, 	2024 	WL 	3035188 	(N.D. 	Miss. 	June 	17, 	2024) 	(citing
Granger v. Slade, 361 F. Supp. 2d 588, 596–97 (S.D. Miss. 2005)).
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 27 of 38 PageID <pageID>

28
servitude, “except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed.” U.S. C ONST ., Thirteenth Am. § 1. Thus, inmates who have been “tried, convicted,
and sentenced in accordance with the law” cannot raise a colorable claim of involuntary
servitude. Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317. 318 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Draper v. Rhay, 315
F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963)). However, pretrial detainees who have not been convicted
of a crime may be able to assert a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit defines involuntary servitude as “an action by the master causing
the servant to have, or to believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confine-
ment.” Brooks v. George Cnty., Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Watson v.
Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir.1990)). Compulsion is a necessary element: “[w]hen
the employee has a choice, even though it is a painful one, there is no involuntary servi-
tude[.]” Id. For example, pretrial detainees who agree to work as a trusty in exchange for
the privilege of leaving jail pending trial are not subject to involuntary servitude; because
pretrial confinement is not punishment, the “choice between this confinement and work as
a trusty cannot be considered coercive[.]” Id. at 162–63.
Even when a court finds that a pretrial detainee was coerced into performing work,
the plaintiff’s Thirteenth Amendment rights are not violated in two judicially-created ex-
ceptions. First, the “civic duty” exception allows the government to compel citizens to
perform certain duties, such as jury duty and military service. Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d
214, 218 (5th Cir. 1997). Second, the government may still compel labor under “excep-
tional cases well established in the common law,” such as prohibition of desertion by sail-
ors. Id. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted the civic duty exception to permit compelled
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 28 of 38 PageID <pageID>

29
housekeeping tasks, such as preparing meals and cleaning. Id. at 215, 218–19 (holding that
detainee’s Thirteenth Amendment rights were not violated when forced to work in Food
Services Department from 4:30am to 12:30pm daily).
Here, Cantrell has plausibly alleged that he was coerced into performing labor.
Cantrell alleges that he was forced to work on kitchen duty and dorm duty for eight hours
each day, seven days a week. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 19 at 7. These work assignments began after
he was assigned to a new unit following his altercations with the West Texas gang, and he
was told the only other available unit was the quarantine unit. Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Thus,
Cantrell was presented with, at most, three options: exposure to health risks in the quaran-
tine unit, exposure to risk of harm from inmates in his former unit, or forced servitude in
his new unit. Cantrell had a constitutional right to be free from punishment in the form of
a substantial risk of harm from disease or inmate violence, and could not be forced to
choose between involuntary labor and one of these alternatives. Hare, 74 F.3d at 639 (rec-
ognizing pretrial detainees’ right to “basic needs such as medical care and safety”). This
choice—if it was even offered—was coercive.
Nonetheless, Cantrell fails to state a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment because
his involuntary labor falls under the civic duty exception. As discussed in Channer v. Hall,
the government can compel detainees to perform housekeeping tasks, including food prep-
aration and cleaning duties. 112 F.3d at 218–19. This exception applies even when the de-
tainee is legally coerced into performing labor, such as by punishing uncooperative detain-
ees with solitary confinement. Id. at 218. Cantrell’s labor—service on kitchen duty and
dorm duty, Dkt. No. 19 at 6–7—consisted of similar types of housekeeping as those
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 29 of 38 PageID <pageID>

30
considered in Channer, where the court concluded that the civic duty exception to the Thir-
teenth Amendment applied.12 112 F.3d at 218–19. Thus, the civic duty exception also ap-
plies to and defeats Cantrell’s Thirteenth Amendment claims here.
Because Cantrell’s claims fall under the civic duty exception, the undersigned con-
cludes that it is implausible that Cantrell was subjected to involuntary servitude in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment.
C. Claims Arising from Prosecution
Cantrell’s second series of claims arise from allegations that the defendants violated
his constitutional rights when prosecuting him for use of criminal instruments. He claims
that DA Palmer committed a Brady violation when she failed to disclose knowledge of his
background in foster care. He also claims that the defendants engaged in malicious prose-
cution because they lacked probable cause to prosecute him for use of criminal instruments.
He further claims that the defendants violated the Takings Clause by using the data from
his cellphone to prosecute him. Lastly, he claims that he was subjected to Double Jeopardy
when he was returned to TGCJ following his acquittal.
1. 	Brady Violation Claim
First, Cantrell alleges that DA Palmer failed to uphold her obligation under Brady
to disclose exculpatory evidence. The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that
12 The undersigned notes that the detainee in Channer was provided compensation, Id. at 219, while Cantrell
was not. Dkt. No. 19 at 8. Cantrell highlights this fact, noting that “unpaid labor is slavery.” Id. at 9. How-
ever, compensation is relevant only to the extent it indicates that the detainee agreed to work voluntarily,
and it is ultimately involuntary servitude rather than unpaid labor that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits.
Channer, 112 F.3d at 218 n.7. The lack of compensation provides evidence that Cantrell’s labor was invol-
untary, but as discussed above the civic duty exception applies even to involuntary servitude.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 30 of 38 PageID <pageID>

31
prosecutors have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense that is material
either to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “[E]vidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability suf-
ficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (1985). Prosecutors have an affirmative duty to learn of “favorable evidence known to
the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81
(1999).
A plaintiff may bring a Brady claim only if the following elements are met: “[1]
[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State,
either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S.
at 281–82. And “suppression of evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it
deprives the defendant of a fair trial[;]” if a defendant is never tried, convicted, or sen-
tenced, there can be no Brady violation. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (holding that claimant
under Brady must establish that suppression of exculpatory evidence “undermines confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial”); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (“[S]trictly speaking,
there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless . . . there is a reasonable probability that the
suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.”).
Here, Cantrell fails to plausibly allege that the prosecution committed a Brady vio-
lation. The evidence he alleges was suppressed consists of conversations Westerman had
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 31 of 38 PageID <pageID>

32
with Cantrell’s foster family and Cantrell himself; these conversations revealed that
Cantrell was sexually abused by white officials while in Texas foster care. Dkt. No. 24 at
16–17. Cantrell claims that this evidence is exculpatory because it shows Cantrell was “of
no threat and innocent of the alleged crime.” Id. at 17. Because the entirety of the prosecu-
tion’s evidence consisted of the contents of Cantrell’s phone—which was returned to him
before litigation—his Brady claim hinges solely on these allegedly suppressed conversa-
tions. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 5; 24 at 12–15.
These allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege a Brady violation. The under-
signed is not persuaded that Cantrell’s history in foster care is exculpatory, material, or
even relevant. A history of childhood sexual abuse, while undoubtedly tragic, does not pro-
vide evidence that the victim does not pose a threat or is innocent of any particular offense
in the present. The undersigned also doubts that the evidence of these conversations was
suppressed; Westerman told Cantrell about his interviews with Cantrell’s foster family,
Dkt. No. 1 at 5, and Cantrell obviously knew about the conversations he had with Wester-
man.13 But even assuming that these conversations were withheld and contained relevant,
material, and exculpatory information, Cantrell was acquitted regardless. Dkt. No. 1 at 8.
Because Cantrell was acquitted even without disclosure of this hypothetical evidence, there
is no “reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different
verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281..
The undersigned therefore concludes that Cantrell has not plausibly alleged that the
13 Cantrell was also well aware of the events discussed in these conversations, as indicated by the notes on
his phone relating to his history as a victim of sexual abuse in foster care. Dkt. No. 24 at 15.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 32 of 38 PageID <pageID>

33
prosecution failed to uphold their duty under Brady.
2. 	Malicious Prosecution Claim
Next, Cantrell alleges that the defendants subjected him to an unlawful violation of
the Fourth Amendment by maliciously prosecuting him. A plaintiff may bring a malicious
prosecution claim against arresting officers if he is unreasonably seized pursuant to legal
process. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022). In the Fifth Circuit, this requires the
plaintiff to prove six elements: “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original crim-
inal proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was
defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present
plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) dam-
ages.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Gordy v. Burns, 294
F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff must also demonstrate the “threshold element
of an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure.” Id.; see also Id. at 279 n.2 (“[I]f the prosecu-
tion is supported by probable cause on at least one charge, then a malicious prosecution
claim cannot move forward.”).
Here, Cantrell’s malicious prosecution claim fails because he does not plausibly al-
lege this “threshold element.” As discussed above, the defendants had probable cause to at
minimum arrest Cantrell for speeding on May 2, 2020. His subsequent detentions and crim-
inal prosecution were only for the criminal instruments charge; thus, the sole issue is
whether probable cause existed to prosecute Cantrell for this offense.
Under Texas law, a defendant commits the offense of unlawful use of criminal in-
strument if they are in possession of a criminal instrument with intent to use it to commit
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 33 of 38 PageID <pageID>

34
an offense. T EX. P ENAL C ODE § 16.01(a)(1). In turn, a “criminal instrument” is defined as
anything that is not otherwise unlawful to possess, manufacture, or sell, that is “specially
designed, made, or adapted for use in the commission of an offense.” § 16.01(b)(1). Items
that could be used to commit a crime but also have lawful uses are not criminal instruments.
Eodice v. State, 742 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. App. 1987) (finding that a “flashlight, pry bar,
circuit tester, cotter pin, and feeler gauge” were not criminal instruments, despite being
intended for use in a burglary, because they were “ordinary, commonly available tools”).
Here, most of the items the officers found in Cantrell’s bag could not reasonably be
considered criminal instruments. While a gas can, matches, hammer, and dark clothing
could be used for arson, they are also commonly available items that have lawful uses. Dkt.
Nos. 1 at 3; 18 at 4. However, the assessment is more complicated for the glass bottles and
paper towels. These items are also common objects with lawful uses, but the authenticated
arrest report indicates that they were not stored separately; instead, the paper towels were
inserted into the necks of the bottles. If the bottles were stored as Molotov cocktails during
transit, they could be said to be “adapted for use in the commission of an offense,” and thus
qualify as a criminal instrument. TEX. P ENAL C ODE § 16.01(b)(1).
This description aligns with Cantrell’s description of the articles, as he notes that
the bottles seen in his music videos were “fashioned as mere prop molotov cocktails.” Dkt.
No. 24 at 8. This makes it likely that the bottles were stored and transported in this form as
well, and were found in this condition during Westerman’s search. Westerman was not re-
quired to disregard the Molotovs merely because Cantrell claimed they were props. D.C.
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 60–61 (2018) (holding that an officer is not required to disregard a
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 34 of 38 PageID <pageID>

35
circumstance when evaluating probable cause merely because suspect offers an innocent
explanation). The undersigned therefore finds it implausible that the defendants lacked
probable cause to prosecute Cantrell for use of criminal instruments.
3. 	Takings Clause
Next, Cantrell alleges that the defendants violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by using data from his phone in his criminal prosecution. The Takings Clause
prohibits the government from seizing private property for public use without just com-
pensation. U.S. C ONST . amend. V. The Takings Clause does not apply to property seized
and retained for use in a criminal prosecution; the power to seize property as evidence
arises from the government’s police power, and “[p]roperty seized and retained pursuant
to the police power is not taken for a ‘public use’ in the context of the Takings Clause.”
AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (Fed.Cir. 2008); Rhaburn v.
United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 310, 313 (2009), aff'd, 390 F. App'x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Here, Cantrell fails to plausibly allege that the defendants violated the Takings
Clause. His phone and the data stored on it may have been property taken without com-
pensation, but they were not taken for a public use; it was instead taken pursuant to the
police power, which is not a public use. AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 153–54. Thus, the
seizure falls outside of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The undersigned concludes
that Cantrell has failed to plausibly allege a violation of the Takings Clause.
4. 	Double Jeopardy Claim
Lastly, Cantrell alleges that the defendants subjected him to double jeopardy even
after he was acquitted of his criminal instruments charge. The Fifth Amendment’s Double
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 35 of 38 PageID <pageID>

36
Jeopardy clause—applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—protects
defendants from a second prosecution for the same offense. Currier v. Virginia, 585 U.S.
493, 498 (2018); United States v. Jones, 733 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 2013). The constitu-
tional guarantee “recognizes the vast power of the sovereign, the ordeal of a criminal trial,
and the injustice our criminal justice system would invite if prosecutors could treat trials
as dress rehearsals until they secure the convictions they seek.” Currier v. Virginia, 585
U.S. 493, 498 (2018). But when such oppressive practices are not present, the clause should
not pose “an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice.” Id. (quoting Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688–689 (1949)).
Here, Cantrell fails to plausibly allege that he was subjected to double jeopardy be-
cause he was prosecuted only once, not twice. Cantrell was acquitted on April 19, 2022,
and released from TGCJ custody within hours. Dkt. No. 24 at 17–19. Cantrell does not
allege that he has been prosecuted for use of criminal instruments since his acquittal. In-
stead, he alleges that the defendants subjected him to double jeopardy by handcuffing him,
returning him to TGCJ, and then releasing him three hours later. Id. at 18–19. This incon-
venience does not implicate concerns surrounding the “ordeal of a criminal trial” or “dress
rehearsal” prosecutions. Currier, 585 U.S. at 498. And it appears obvious to the under-
signed that proper release of an acquitted defendant requires some procedural formalities;
a three-hour delay between acquittal and release is not unreasonable given this concession.
For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Cantrell has not plausibly alleged
that the defendants subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 36 of 38 PageID <pageID>

37
VI. LEAVE TO AMEND
Still, there is the issue of whether the Court must give Cantrell leave to amend his
complaint. Generally, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his com-
plaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009).
Leave to amend is not required, however, where an amendment would be futile, in other
words, the amended complaint would still fail to state a claim, Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014), or where a plaintiff has already
received an opportunity to amend his or her claims, Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Inte-
grated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).
Here, the undersigned concludes that Cantrell has pled his best case. He has been
given two opportunities to supplement his pleadings through his Questionnaire Responses.
Dkt. Nos. 18–19, 24. His Complaint and Responses both contain sufficient factual detail to
adequately screen his claims. Where his claims are time-barred, further amendment would
be futile because he has repeatedly confirmed the dates when his claims accrued. His re-
maining claims fail not for lack of detail, but because the facts alleged do not plausibly
support his claims. The undersigned finds no reason to further delay this civil action, which
was filed in late 2023 and has been in judicial screening for more than two years. Dkt. No.
1. The undersigned therefore concludes that leave to further amend would be futile.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Cantrell’s claims
against all defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred and for failure to state
a claim.
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 37 of 38 PageID <pageID>

38
VIII. RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these Find-
ings, Conclusions, and Recommendations must file specific written objections within four-
teen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
the objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magis-
trate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations where the disputed determina-
tion is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will
bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of
plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
IX. TRANSFER OF CASE
Having completed the preliminary screening of Cantrell’s claims, the undersigned
ORDERS that this case be TRANSFERRED back to the docket of the United States Dis-
trict Judge and designated as Civil Action No. 6:23-CV-00055-H.
ORDERED this 24th day of March 2026.
JOHN R. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 6:23-cv-00055-H Document 25 Filed 03/24/26 Page 38 of 38 PageID <pageID>