Wilson v. Williams et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
LARRY D. WILSON JR.,
Institutional ID No. 02357491,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants,
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No. s:2s.cv.021-Bv
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Proceeding prose and informa pauperis, Plaintiff Larry D. Wilson Jr. filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights while
incarcerated at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Smith Unit. Dkt. No. I.
After careful review, the undersigned recommends that Wilson's claims be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and his claims for ittjunctive relief be
denied as moot.
1. 	Wilson alleges that his civil rights were violated in the Smith Unit.
Wilson's claims are based on events that occurred in July 2024 while he was
incarcerated in the Smith Unit. Dkt. No. 1 at 8-13. 1 His version of events, fully accepted
at this stage of the proceedings, are as follows:
Around 3 :00 a.m. on July 13, 2024, other inmates attacked Wilson while he slept,
causing injuries to his nose, face, eye, neck, and ribs. 	Id. at 8-10. The inmates also took
1 Page citations to the complaint refer to the page number assigned by the Court's electronic filing system.
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his property. Id. at 9. After the assault, a bloodied Wilson ran out of his cell and
requested surrounding inmates to call for medical help. Id. 	About ten minutes later,
Officer Morales arrived, but he laughed and instructed Wilson to return to his cell to
clean up. Id.; Dkt. No. 11 at 2. 	Wilson requested medical care, but Morales refused and
walked away. Dkt. No. 1 at 9.
A few minutes later, Lieutenant Lopez and other officers arrived and tried to
handcuff Wilson, who refused. Id. 	Lopez and the other officers escorted Wilson to an
administrative segregation dayroom to await the opening of the Smith Unit Medical
Department. Id.; Dkt. No. 11 at 3. Around 5 :00 a.m., Wilson called his father and sister
to inform them of the incident. Dkt. No. 1 at 9.
An unidentified female sergeant escorted Wilson to the medical department when
it opened around 5 :30 a.m. Id.; Dkt. No. 11 at 3. An unidentified male nurse took
Wilson to another room and "tried to stop the bleeding." Dkt. No. 1 at 10. The sergeant
reported that Wilson had been attacked by other inmates, and Wilson noted his injuries.
Id. 	While cleaning the injuries, the nurse called another staff member and explained
Wilson's condition. Id. 	After that conversation, the nurse told the sergeant that Wilson
should be sent to a hospital by van or ambulance. Id. 	The sergeant confirmed that officer
would take Wilson to the hospital by van and then esc01ted him back to administrative
segregation to await transport, even though his wounds were not adequately bandaged
and were still bleeding. Id.; Dkt. No. 11 at 4.
Wilson again called his father between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. because he was
wondering ifhe would be transported to the hospital. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. Fifteen minutes
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later, Captain Miller came to Wilson's cell and told him to stop calling his family because
the wing was short-staffed, and officers would soon be taking Wilson to the hospital. Id.
at 10- 11. Wilson "did not believe Captain Miller because it had already been about five
hours since the assault and robbery and [he was] still bleeding." Id. at 11 (cleaned up).
Wilson called his father again, and Miller returned to warn Wilson against calling
"because all the hospital [was] going to do [was] give [Wilson] some pain pills and put
two rods in [his] nose to fix the problem." Id. 	Wilson asked for his "asthma pump"
because he was "having breathing problems." Id. 	Miller refused to provide it. Id.
Around 10:45 a.m., Miller, Officer Ramirez, and two unnamed male officers
transported Wilson to the hospital. Id. 	They reached the hospital in ten to fifteen
minutes. Id. 	The officers ordered Wilson to walk inside while wearing restraints. Id.
Three nurses asked what happened. Id. 	Wilson tried to explain, "but [Officer Ramirez
and two other unidentified officers] started talking over [Wilson] and told [him] to be
quiet." Id. 	The officers began telling the nurses a false story and would not allow
Wilson to speak. Id. at 11-12; Dkt. No. 11 at 9-10. A nurse advised the officers that
Wilson needed to answer the questions because he was the victim of the assault. Dkt.
No. 1 at 12. Wilson informed the nurse that his ribs, neck, and face hurt. Id. 	The nurse
then began cleaning Wilson's wounds and asked, "Where's this blood coming from?" Id.
(cleaned up). Wilson responded, "I do not know." Id.
The nurse asked officers to remove Wilson's hand restraints so she could
"continue her assessment of [Wilson's] injuries." Id. 	The officers responded that they
needed approval, but they never removed the restraints. Id.; Dkt. No. 9-10. 	Wilson was
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"then escorted to a room for X-rays," and records indicate that he was given a CT scan.
Dkt. No. I at 12. He was also given an MRI scan. Dkt. No. 11 at 5. 	Wilson alleges that
these scans were deficient because his hand restraints had not been removed. Id. at 5-6,
9-10. 	Wilson was escorted back to the examination room where he "waited for an hour
or more for the results to come back." Dkt. No. I at 12. He received pain medication
and was referred for a follow-up at the Smith Unit Medical Department. Id.
Officers returned Wilson to the Smith Unit and placed him in administrative
segregation. Id. 	Wilson "still could not see out of [his] right eye," and he continued to
feel pain in his ribs and face. 	Id. 	Wilson sought pain medication and his inhaler in the
days following the hospital visit but did not receive them. Id. 	Specifically, when Wilson
asked two unidentified female medical staff members for acetaminophen, they refused.
Id. at 14; Dkt. No. 11 at 10. Wilson admits he received medication but not what he
requested. Dkt. Nos. I at 14; 11 at 6. Wilson also submitted an I-60 request for a
medical appointment with a female medical staff member who ignored him. Dkt. No. 11
at 10. Wilson did not receive follow-up care until he left the Smith Unit and arrived at
the Robertson Unit. Dkt. No. I at 14.
Based on these events, Wilson filed suit, asserting claims against: (I) Warden
Williams for failure to train staff and follow TDCJ policy requiring a lockdown while
understaffed; (2) Officers Hernandes 2 and Morales for allowing the cell doors to be open,
thus allowing the assault to occur; (3) Officer Morales for denial or delay of medical care
2 Wilson spells Defendant Hernandes's surname inconsistently. The Court uses the spelling that Wilson
uses the most in his pleadings, including his questionnaire responses. Dkt. Nos. I, 11.
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because he ignored Wilson's request for medical assistance; (4) Lieutenant Lopez for
placing Wilson in administrative segregation rather than immediately calling for an
ambulance; (5) an unidentified male nurse for failing to properly bandage and treat
Wilson before he was taken to the hospital; ( 6) Captain Miller for waiting for staff to
become available to transport Wilson to the hospital by van rather than calling for an
ambulance; (7) Officer Ramirez and two other unidentified correctional officers for
ttying to prevent Wilson from speaking during his hospital examination and for not
removing his restraints; (8) two unidentified female medical staff members and Captain
Miller for delays in providing Wilson pain medication, his inhaler, and a medical
appointment; and (9) the Smith Unit Medical Department for denial or delay of adequate
medical care. 	Wilson seeks "monetary damages" and "punitive damages" and asks the
Court to order Defendants to "protect [him] from unconstitutional conditions and
treatment." Id. at 8,
The United States District Judge transferred this case to the undersigned United
States Magistrate Judge for judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Dkt.
Nos. 1, 6. The undersigned reviewed Wilson's complaint, authenticated records from
TDCJ, and Wilson's responses to a questionnaire pursuant to Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d
886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976). Dkt. Nos. l, 9, 11. Because not all parties consented to a
magistrate judge, the undersigned makes these findings, conclusions, and a
recommendation in accordance with the order of transfer. Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 8.
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2. 	The Court must dismiss claims that fail to meet certain pleading standards.
A court must dismiss a complaint filed informa pauperis by a prisoner against a
gove1:nment entity or employee if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
(2017); see also§ 1915A(b) (applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain
governmental entities, regardless of whether the prisoner is proceeding informa
pauperis). An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either fact or law.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it embraces indisputably meritless legal theories. See id. at 327. It lacks an
arguable basis in fact if it rests on clearly fanciful or baseless factual contentions. Id. at
328; see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
When analyzing a prisoner's complaint, the court may consider reliable evidence
such as the plaintiff's allegations, responses to a questionnaire, and authenticated prison
records. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504,507 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that responses
to a questionnaire are incorporated into the plaintiff's pleadings); Banuelos v.
McFarland, 41 F.3d 232,234 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts may dismiss prisoners'
informa pauperis claims as frivolous based on "medical and other prison records if they
are adequately identified or authenticated" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts
should accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and should not credit conclusory
allegations or assertions that merely restate the legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467,469 (5th Cir. 2016). Although prose pleadings are held
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to less stringent standards than those prepared by lawyers, plaintiffs must still plead
factual allegations "that raise the right to relief above the speculative level." Id.; see also
Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that
conclusory allegations will not suffice).
3. 	Wilson's claims should be dismissed,
A. Sovereign immunity bars claims against the Smith Unit's medical
department.
"The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state entity ... regardless of
whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought." 	Voisin 's Oyster House, Inc. v.
Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91
(1982)). The medical department-a department within the Smith Unit-is within the
purview ofTDCJ, which possesses sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Cox v. Texas, 354 F. App'x 901, 903 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (explaining that certain
"state law and§ 1983 claims are barred unless ... TDCJ has waved its immunity"); see
also, e.g., Sowell v. TDCJ, No. CV H-20-1492, 2020 WL 2113603, at* l (S.D. Tex. May
4, 2020) (finding that a claim against the Estelle Unit Medical Department, a department
of the TDCJ Estelle Unit, was barred by sovereign immunity). There is no indication that
TDCJ has waived immunity. The undersigned thus recommends dismissal without
prejudice of Wilson's claims against the Smith Unit Medical Department based on
sovereign immunity.
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B. Official-capacity claims for money damages are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Wilson does not indicate whether he intends to sue the individual Defendants in
their official or individual capacities. See generally Dkt. Nos. I, 10. It is well-settled
that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for monetary damages against a state or state
agency., Aguilar v. Tex. Dep 't of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). It is
also clear that a suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a
suit against that state official's office. 	Will v. Michigan Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989). Thus, an action for monetary damages against a state official in his or her
official capacity is one against the state itself, which is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Based on these cases,
to the extent Wilson seeks to raise any official-capacity claim against a TDCJ official for
monetary damages, it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.
C. Wilson's claims for injunctive relief are moot.
Wilson also asks the Court to "make [Defendants] protect [him] from
unconstitutional conditions and treatment." Dkt. No. 1 at 8. This is a request for
injunctive relief. "[T]o establish eligibility for an injunction, the inmate must
demonstrate the continuance of[a] disregard [ofan objectively intolerable risk of harm]
during the remainder of the litigation and into the future." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825,846 (1994). Transfer ofa prisoner out ofan institution will often render the
prisoner's claims for injunctive relief moot. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty.,
929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that prisoner's transfer to
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another prison rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d
736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The transfer of a prisoner out of an [offending] institution
often will render his claims for injunctive relief moot."); Blackmon v. Kukua, 758
F. Supp. 2d 398,406,414 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (dismissing prisoner's claims for injunctive
relief as moot when he was transferred to a different TDCJ unit and he gave "no
indication that he [would] be transferred back to [the original facility where the alleged
constitutional violation occurred] and once again be exposed to [the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement]").
Wilson's suit relates to events that occurred in the Smith Unit in July 2024.
Wilson affirms that he was transferred to the Robertson Unit in August 2024 and received
care there. See Dkt. Nos. 11 at 1 (providing that he was housed in the Smith Unit from
December 2023 to August 2024), 8-9 (stating that at his follow-up visit at the Robertson
Unit on August 19, 2024, he advised medical staff of his issues and received medication
for PTSD); see also Dkt. No. 12 (change of address reflecting that Wilson was transferred
to the TDCJ Hughes Unit). 	Wilson alleges no facts indicating that he may return to the
Smith Unit or that any repeated or ongoing violation will occur. Thus, Wilson's claims
for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot.
D. Wilson fails to state a claim against Warden Williams for failure to train
staff and failure to follow TDCJ policy regarding lockdown and staffing.
Wilson claims that Warden Williams failed to adequately train Officers Hernandes
and Morales. Wilson also alleges that Warden Williams failed to follow TDCJ policy
requiring that the unit be locked down due to understaffing.
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Failure to train
Wilson alleges that Warden Williams failed to adequately train Officers
Hernandes and Morales, as evidenced by their leaving cell doors open, which Wilson
claims led to the assault. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 5; 11 at 10-11. But Wilson does not allege any
pattern of similar violations, and he fails to offer facts showing that Williams was
responsible for training, so this claim should be dismissed.
Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under§ 1983 for their subordinates'
actions on a theory of vicarious or respondeat superior liability. Est. of Davis ex rel.
McCully v. City ofN. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375,381 (5th Cir. 2005). Instead, a
plaintiff must show that a supervisor ( 1) affirmatively participated in an act that caused a
constitutional deprivation or (2) implemented an unconstitutional policy that caused
injury to the plaintiff. Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Failing to train subordinates may support a policy claim. 	A supervisor may be
held liable under § 1983 for failing to train or supervise subordinates if a plaintiff can
prove that ( 1) the official failed to train or supervise the correctional officers, (2) a causal
link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the alleged violation of the
inmate's rights, and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounted to deliberate
indifference. 	Walker v. Upshaw, 515 F. App'x 334,339 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). "[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring
proof that a [prison official] disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action."
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). lfan official's actions "are merely inept,
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erroneous, ineffective, or negligent," then they "do not amount to deliberate indifference
and do not divest officials of qualified immunity." Id. at 339-40 (citation omitted).
"Proof of more than a single instance of the lack of training or supervision causing
a violation of constitutional rights is normally required before such lack of training or
supervision constitutes deliberate indifference." Id. at 340 (citation omitted). "The
plaintiff must generally demonstrate at least a pattern of similar violations ... [and] the
inadequacy of training must be obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional
violation." Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
In narrow circumstances, however, a single incident may be sufficient for liability
ifa plaintiff"prove[s] that the 'highly predictable' consequence ofa failure to train
would result in the specific injury suffered, and that the failure to train represents the
'moving force' behind the constitutional violation." Est. of Davis, 406 F.3d at 386
( citation omitted). But the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that the single-incident exception
is rare because "[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular
respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program
that will cause violations of constitutional rights." 	Walker, 515 F. App'x at 340-41
(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Moreover, "mere proof that the
injury could have been prevented if the officer had received better or additional training
cannot, without more, support liability." Id. at 340 (citation omitted).
Wilson fails to provide sufficient facts to support his failure-to-train claim. He
asserts that "Warden Williams is responsible for all TDCJ staff on his unit," and that
Williams "train[s] them [based on] how [Williams] want[s his] unit r[u]n." Dkt. No. 11
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at 10. But Wilson provides no information about the training the officers receive and
instead asserts that Williams "allow[ed] officers at night to roll doors from the picket
without a[n] officer on the floor." Id. at 11. Thus, Wilson seem to simply attribute
liability to Williams based on his role as the warden and not based on any facts related to
Williams's involvement in developing policies or training subordinates. This is
insufficient to state a failure to train claim. See Speck v. Wiginton, 606 F. App'x 733, 736
(5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (providing that inferring "a single alleged incident of
misconduct means officers are inadequately trained ... is at odds with the law against
respondeat superior liability in section 1983 cases").
Wilson also makes no attempt to show a pattern of similar violations, nor has he
shown that any training that Officers Hernandes and Morales received was deficient in
that it was "obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation." 	Walker, 515 F. App'x
at 340. Further, Wilson has not explained how the alleged lack of training led to a
"highly predictable" consequence that he would be assaulted, and thus he fails to show
that the single-incident exception should apply. See id. (reversing where "[p]laintiffs
ma[d]e no attempt to show a pattern of[defendant's] employees failing to protect
inmates" and failed to show that the rare single-incident exception applied). Because
Wilson fails to offer any support for his conclusory allegations, he has not stated a
failure-to-train claim. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Davis, No. 5:17-CV-291-BQ, 2018 WL
11251905, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2018) (finding that prisoner "ha[ d] not pleaded
sufficient facts to raise a viable failure to train claim against [official]" because the
prisoner's "allegations focus[ ed] on the harm caused to him from a single incident" and
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"he ha[ d] not alleged a pattern of harm caused by officer misconduct").
Because Wilson has not alleged facts sufficient to state a failure-to-train claim
against Williams, the undersigned recommends dismissal of this claim.
Understaffing
Wilson alleges that Williams failed to follow a TDCJ policy requiring a
"lockdown" of the unit due to understaffing. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 5; 11 at 11. But Fifth Circuit
"case law is clear ... that a prison official's failure to follow the prison's own policies,
procedures or regulations does not," standing alone, amount to a constitutional violation.
Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Guillot ex rel. T.A.G.
v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 753 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that "a failure to follow prison
policies, procedures, or regulations-without more-does not give rise to a constitutional
violation" (citation omitted)); see also Armour v. Davis, No. 6:18CV535, 2020 WL
2850140, at *17 (E.D. Tex. June l, 2020) (observing "that there are fewer guards on the
wing than [plaintiff] believes appropriate is not itself a constitutional violation"). Thus,
Wilson cannot state a claim against Williams for the purported failure to follow a TDCJ
staffing policy without alleging more.
To the extent that Wilson alleges that Williams is responsible for an
unconstitutional practice of understaffing, such a claim still fails because "understaffing,
without more, is not proof of official policy," Armour, 2020 WL 2850140, at * 17
(citations omitted); cf Gagne v. City of Galveston, 671 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Tex.
1987) (finding that pretrial detainees' "general and conclusory allegations of inadequate
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funding and inadequate staffing support a section 1983 action against the City"), aff'd,
851 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1988).
Wilson has not alleged any facts suggesting that Williams was aware of and
consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm based on understaffing. Thus,
Wilson's claim fails. See Hinojosa v. Johnson, 277 F. App'x 370,379 (5th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam) (finding that the district court correctly denied discovery and granted
summary judgment for defendants on prisoner's understaffing claim because prisoner
failed to provide any evidence that the supervisory defendants affirmatively participated
in any unconstitutional acts or implemented a policy of understaffing; were aware that the
understaffing produced a substantial risk of harm; or could have and failed to take
reasonable steps to rectify the issue); Kopatz v. Doe, No. 5:22CV156-RWS-JBB, 2024
WL 2106572, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2024) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim
against TDCJ official when he "failed to show that [supervisor] affirmatively
implemented a policy ofunderstaffing or ... failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate
the problem"), R. & R. adopted by 2024 WL 1597748 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2024);
Armour, 2020 WL 2850140, at* 17 ("[Plaintiff] has offered nothing to suggest that the
[d]efendants could have but intentionally did not adequately fund and staff the prison.").
In sum, Wilson has not alleged any facts showing that Williams is liable for failing
to train Hernandes and Morales based on the single incident of assault. 	Wilson has also
not provided any facts showing that Williams implemented a policy ofunderstaffing or
that he was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm due to understaffing. The
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undersigned thus recommends that the district judge dismiss Wilson's claims against
Warden Williams.
E. Wilson has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Officers Hernandes
and Morales were deliberately indifferent to Wilson's need for protection.
Wilson alleges that Officers Hernandes and Morales allowed the cell doors in his
area to be open, which permitted inmates to assault him. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. The Court
understands Wilson to be asserting a failure-to-protect claim. This claim fails because
Wilson has not alleged facts showing that there was a substantial risk of harm and that the
officers knew of and disregarded such a risk.
Under the Eighth Amendment, "prison officials have a constitutional duty to
protect prisoners from violence at the hands of their fellow inmates." Longoria v. Texas,
473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33). 	However, not
"every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another ... translates into
constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety." Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834. An Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim consists of both
objective and subjective components. Id. at 839. To satisfy the objective component, a
plaintiff must show that he was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 834.
On the subjective component, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent because they were aware of an excessive risk to the plaintiffs
safety yet consciously disregarded that risk. Id. at 840-41. Importantly, "[m]ere
negligence or a failure to act reasonably is not enough." Mace v. City ofPalestine,
333 F.3d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Wilson has not alleged facts demonstrating that there was a substantial risk of
serious harm before the assault-that is, he has not shown that he was vulnerable or
susceptible to risk of assault by the attacking inmates such that leaving the cell doors
open was unreasonably dangerous. See Mosley v. Anderson, 503 F. App'x 272, 274 (5th
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("[Plaintiff inmate] has not alleged any particular establishing
that the defendants knew that [attacking inmate] presented a risk of serious harm [to
plaintiff! and purposefully exposed [plaintiff! to that risk."). In addition, Wilson has not
pleaded facts suggesting that Hernandes or Morales were aware of a substantial risk of
serious harm. See, e.g., Dixon v. Valdez, No. 3:1 l-CV-1139-D-BK, 2011 WL 4398305,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2011) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff's failure to protect
claim because his "pleadings fail[ed] to allege that [d]efendant and her staff were aware
of any risk to [p ]laintiff's safety prior to the ... assault, or that they inferred any risk to
[p]laintiff's safety"), R. & R. adopted by 2011 WL 4398280 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 21, 2011);
Zweifel v. Jefferson Par. Corr. Ctr., No. 09-2997, 2009 WL 1459696, at *7 (E.D. La.
May 26, 2009) (dismissing prisoner's failure to protect claim against female guard who
briefly left her post because "even accept[ing plaintiff's testimony and allegations] as true
in [their] entirety," plaintiff stated a negligence claim at best, which is not cognizable
under§ 1983).
In sum, Wilson's claim fails to satisfy either the subjective or objective
component. Even accepting Wilson's allegations as true, he has at most asserted a
negligence claim against Hernandes and Morales, which is insufficient to show that they
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were deliberately indifferent. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 641-42, 646 (5th Cir.
1996) (en bane); Mace, 333 F.3d at 626. The claims against them should be dismissed.
F. 	Wilson has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for deliberate
indifference related to medical needs.
Wilson claims that several officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs. 	He alleges that some officials-Officer Morales, Lieutenant Lopez, the
unidentified male nurse in the Smith Unit Medical Department, and Captain Miller-
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs before he was taken to a hospital.
Wilson claims that other officials-Officer Ramirez and two unidentified officers-
delayed or denied medical care by trying to prevent Wilson from speaking during his
hospital visit and by failing to remove his hand restraints. Finally, Wilson asserts that
after he returned to the Smith Unit, two unidentified female medical staff members and
Captain Miller failed to provide pain medication and an inhaler. One of the female staff
members also denied Wilson's request to be seen.
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must show that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Morris v. Livingston,
739 F.3d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,297 (1991)).
Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the prisoner was exposed to a substantial
risk of serious harm, and the official knew of and consciously disregarded that risk.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-41; Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (stating that a prison official is not liable for the denial of medical treatment
unless he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate's health or safety).
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Deliberate indifference is "an extremely high standard to meet." Domino v. Tex. Dep't of
Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
An official's "failure to alleviate a significant risk that [he or she] should have
perceived, but did not[,] is insufficient to show deliberate indifference." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Likewise, "deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely
from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious
harm." Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447,459 (5th Cir. 2001). Instead, an
official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Brewster v.
Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257,262 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that deliberate
indifference is a "subjective inquiry," and the inmate must show that the prison official
was actually aware of the risk of harm and consciously ignored it). Allegations of
malpractice, negligence, or unsuccessful treatment fail to establish deliberate
indifference. 	Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). And a prisoner's
disagreement with a medical provider's course of treatment does not give rise to a
constitutional claim. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286,292 (5th Cir. 1997).
A claim based on a delay in the provision of medical care also arises under the
Eighth Amendment. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403,409 (5th Cir. 2013). Deliberate
indifference can be "manifested ... by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed."
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). 	In addition to showing deliberate
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indifference related to the delay in care, an inmate must show that the delay resulted in
substantial harm. Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717,732 (5th Cir. 2021). Additional
pain suffered during the delay that could have been otherwise alleviated can constitute
substantial harm. Id. at 732, 733. An increased risk of bodily harm or death can also
constitute substantial harm. Id. at 733.
Wilson's initial request for medical assistance
Wilson alleges that Officer Morales was deliberately indifferent to Wilson's need
for medical care because when Wilson first requested assistance, Morales only laughed
and told Wilson to return to his cell while Morales closed the cell doors. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 9;
11 at 2. While Morales's conduct "w[as] clearly insensitive, being callous or rude in the
context of medical care does not an Eighth Amendment violation make." Beard v.
Gusman, No. 13-6633, 2015 WL 422999, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2015) (citation omitted).
Wilson admits that moments after his interaction with Morales, "many officers ... came
into the wing" to take Wilson to administrative segregation to wait for the Smith Unit
Medical Department to open. Dkt. No. 1 at 9. 	Wilson also states that, once the medical
department opened at 5:30 a.m., officials promptly had him seen. 	Dkt. No. 11 at 3.
Thus, Wilson does not allege sufficient facts showing that, by ignoring Wilson's request
for assistance for a few minutes, Morales caused a delay in medical treatment. 	Wilson
also fails to allege any substantial harm that resulted from the temporary delay. Thus,
Wilson fails to state a claim for delay in care against Morales.
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Delay while waiting for the medical department to open
Wilson claims that Lieutenant Lopez delayed medical care because, rather than
immediately calling an ambulance, she required Wilson to wait in administrative
segregation until the Smith Unit Medical Department opened at 5:30 a.m. Dkt. Nos. 1 at
6, 9; 11 at 3.
While Wilson states that he had visible injuries and that he reported his symptoms
to Lopez, Wilson has alleged no facts his injuries constituted an emergency or required
care beyond what the Smith Unit Medical Department could provide once it opened
within an hour or two, much less that Lopez discerned as much. See Dkt. Nos. 1 at 9; 11
at 3. Indeed, despite Wilson's visible wounds, he also reports he was able to walk to and
from the administrative segregation and medical units, converse with officials, and make
phone calls to his family members while waiting. See Dkt. No. 1 at 9-10. 	Wilson alleges
no facts showing that there was a substantial risk of hann associated with waiting to see a
provider in the medical unit rather than pursuing offsite care or that Lopez knew of, and
ignored, that risk. See, e.g., Rogers, 709 F.3d at 410 (affirming dismissal ofa prisoner's
claim that officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition when they
transported him to the prison medical department instead of taking him to the emergency
room for immediate evaluation); Chesnut v. Horton, No. 2:08-CV-0023, 2009 WL
1269992, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim that a defendant
was deliberately indifferent by not arranging for emergency medical care because there
were no facts alleged to show that the defendant knew the emergency medical care was
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needed or that the plaintiff suffered any substantial harm as a result of waiting until the
unit infirmary opened the next morning).
Moreover, Wilson's allegations show that Lopez was not deliberately indifferent.
Wilson admits he was segregated from other prisoners and that he waited for no more
•
than two hours before being taken to the medical unit when it opened, establishing that
his complaints were not ignored. Dkt. No. 11 at 3. While Wilson implies that Lopez
should have known that Wilson required more care because the medical unit staff
subsequently reached a decision to send him to the hospital, Wilson provides no facts
showing that Lopez, as a non-medical official, should have known that a walking,
talking, lucid Wilson needed immediate hospital care. Dkt. No. 11 at 3. And the
relatively brief delay between Wilson's placement in administrative segregation and his
arrival at the medical unit is not indicative of deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Williams
v. Collier, No. 6:22CV359, 2024 WL 1152592, at* 10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2024)
(observing that "[w]hile the record confirms some delays between [p]laintiffs complaints
and the care provided, brief delays in the provision of care alone do not amount to
deliberate indifference."), R. & R. adopted by 2024 WL 1149298 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14,
2024); White v. Rader, No. 09-0696-JJB-CN, 2010 WL 1744652, at *4 (M.D. La. Mar.
29, 2010) (dismissing prisoner's deliberate-indifference claim based on delay in care
because he "concede[ d] that he was seen by medical personnel within approximately
eight hours after reporting his fall, and this relatively brief delay is not indicative of
deliberate indifference" (citing cases in support)), R. & R. adopted by 2010 WL 1737139
(M.D. La. Apr. 28, 2010).
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Because Wilson has not alleged facts demonstrating that Lopez was subjectively
aware of a substantial risk of harm, his deliberate-indifference claim against Lopez fails.
Insufficient treatment of injuries
Wilson alleges that the unidentified male nurse who saw Wilson at the Smith Unit
Medical Department was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Dkt. Nos. I at 10;
11 at 4. Because Wilson concedes that the nurse provided treatment and only disagrees
with the type of treatment provided, Wilson has failed to state a claim.
Wilson avers that the nurse "tried to clean blood off [Wilson's] face" and stop the
bleeding, but he did not give Wilson pain medication and "did not bandage [Wilson] up."
Dkt. Nos. 1 at 10; 11 at 4. Wilson also states that the nurse called another medical staff
member to consult regarding Wilson's injuries. Dkt. No. I at 10. Then, the nurse "told
th[e] unknown female sergeant that [Wilson] either be sent to the hospital by van or call
an ambulance." Id. ( cleaned up). 	Wilson's concession that the nurse contacted medical
staff and relayed the recommendation that Wilson be transfen-ed to a hospital undermines
Wilson's claim that the nurse was deliberately indifferent. See Williams v. Certain
Individual Emps. of Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just.-lnstitutional Div. at Jester Ill Unit, 480 F.
App'x 251,257 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the fact prison official's efforts to
facilitate treatment were unsuccessful did not mean that he was deliberately indifferent).
Moreover, Wilson acknowledges the nurse attempted to stop his bleeding and clean his
face, and although Wilson feels more should have been done, his disagreement with the
care he received is insufficient to show deliberate indifference. Carlucci v. Chapa, 884
F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018); Norton, 122 F.3d at 292. Even if the care provided proved
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inadequate-and Wilson has not made that showing-he has at most stated a claim for
negligence, which does not establish a constitutional violation. This claim against the
nurse should be dismissed.
Delay between medical department visit and transportation to the hospital
Wilson alleges that Captain Miller was deliberately indifferent "by refusing to call
for an ambulance knowing that" there were "no officers to transport [Wilson] to the
hospital to receive emergency medical treatment." Dkt. No. 1 at 6. As discussed below,
Wilson does not show that emergency treatment was recommended or that Captain Miller
should have independently discerned that there was an emergency. And, as previously
discussed, a mere delay in receiving medical care is not, by itself, a constitutional
violation. See Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Mendoza
v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993). Rather, "[d]elays in medical treatment are
unconstitutional only if they result from a prison official's deliberate indifference and
cause 'substantial harm."' Magee v. Rivera, No. 2:24-CV-00309, 2025 WL 1920524, at
*8 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2025) (citation omitted), R. & R. adopted by 2025 WL 1918851
(S.D. Tex. July 11, 2025). Based on the facts alleged, Wilson has not sufficiently stated a
claim for deliberate indifference against Miller.
First, regarding deliberate indifference, Wilson has not sufficiently alleged that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed. 	Wilson alleges that medical staff determined that
he needed to "be sent to the hospital by van or ... an ambulance." Dkt. No. 1 at 10. But
Wilson alleges no facts demonstrating that the medical staff communicated to Miller that
Wilson's condition presented an emergency or risk of serious harm. See id. 	Wilson
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states he was in pain, but he does not indicate that the medical staff informed Miller that
no pain medication was administered or that Wilson would be subject to severe pain
pending transport. 	Id. at 11-12,
"There is ample case law in [the Fifth Circuit] indicating that denying or
unreasonably delaying medical treatment to someone in need of immediate medical
assistance constitutes deliberate indifference." Ford v. Anderson Cnty., 102 F .4th 292,
312 (5th Cir. 2024). For example, where a nurse learned of critical blood test results and
failed to act in response to those results for over six hours, there was at least a question of
fact as to whether the nurse acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 312-13, Here,
however, Wilson does not allege that Miller knew anything more than that Wilson needed
to be seen at the hospital for care the onsite clinic could not provide and that the onsite
medical staff said Wilson's transport could take place by van or ambulance. Wilson
makes no allegation regarding there being any specified timeline. 	Without more,
Wilson's claim of a substantial risk of harm falls shmt.
Furthermore, even if Wilson objectively established a substantial risk of harm, he
fails to allege facts demonstrating that Miller was subjectively aware of that risk. Wilson
states that Miller knew that Wilson needed to be seen at the hospital and could be
transported by prison van. Id. at 10. Wilson does not allege that Miller knew or should
have known that Wilson's condition constituted an emergency or that Miller was made
aware of facts showing that Wilson would suffer serious harm ifhe were not transported
immediately.
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Moreover, Miller's conduct does not evince "wanton disregard" for Wilson's
medical needs. According to Wilson, after the medical department visit, Miller returned
to administrative segregation twice and advised that he was waiting for staff to become
available to transport Wilson to the hospital. See id. at 10-11. Miller's efforts to find
staff to transport Wilson, along with his checking on Wilson twice, show that he was not
ignoring Wilson's medical needs. In other words, Wilson's allegations show Miller was
not refusing, interfering with, or disregarding the recommendation to send Wilson to the
hospital; Miller was simply trying to arrange van transport-which the medical staff
indicated would be sufficient-by securing appropriate staff, which apparently led to
some delay. See id. 	That delay was a matter of hours, such that Wilson was taken to the
hospital around 10:45 a.m. on the same morning that the prison medical department
recommended that he be seen at the hospital. Id. 	While that delay may be longer than
Wilson-or the Court for that matter-would have preferred, Wilson alleges no facts
showing that delay was the result of Miller's wanton disregard for Wilson's serious
medical needs.
Finally, Wilson fails to show that substantial harm actually resulted from Miller's
conduct. See Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 733; Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 195. Wilson claims that
the delay in transport caused him to suffer "mental trauma," "[his] nose [is] still not
fixed," and his "vision still goes blurry in [his] right eye at times." Dkt. No. 11 at 5. But
Wilson alleges no facts to show that these injuries were attributable to the delay in care
rather than the assault itself. See, e.g., Drake v. MS Dep 't of Corr., No. 4:24-CV-00041-
DAS, 2024 WL 2852211, at *3 (N.D. Miss. June 5, 2024) ("Moreover, [plaintiffs]
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allegations fail to set forth a substantial harm resulting fi'om the delay in care provided
nor do they indicate that the delay exacerbated or worsened the alleged injury."
(emphasis added)). 	Wilson also states that when he arrived at the hospital, he was in
"serious pain." Dkt. No. 1 at 11; see also Dkt. No. 11 at 3 (stating that during the alleged
delay, his ribs, head, and neck "hurt," and he couldn't see out of his right eye). "[S]evere
pain caused by the refusal to immediately treat pain can support a claim of deliberate
indifference grounded in delayed treatment." 	Williams, 480 F. App'x at 257; Alderson v.
Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415,422 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (same).
But Wilson's own account of being able to walk, talk, stand, sit, and make phone calls to
his family suggests that his pain may not have been of the type and quality of that needed
to constitute "substantial harm." See Dkt. No. 1 at 9-11. And even ifit were, he does not
show that Miller was aware that Wilson had not received adequate pain management
from the prison medical staff.
Wilson also asked Captain Miller to get Wilson's asthma pump due to difficulties
breathing. Id. at 11. However, Wilson has alleged no facts demonstrating that his
medical need for the asthma pump was sufficiently serious such that Miller was
deliberately indifferent. See id.; Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F Jd 521, 527
(5th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for officers because "[n]one of the[]
alleged facts indicate[d] [an asthmatic woman's] medical needs were serious while [the
officers] were responsible for her," even though she informed the officers that she had
asthma, requested her inhaler, and "was experiencing shortness of breath"); Murray v.
Miller, No. 5:23-CV-188-BV, 2024 WL 6901585, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2024)
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("While [plaintiff] claims that he requested that [defendants] provide him with his inhaler
because he could not breathe, [plaintiff] has not demonstrated that they appreciated that
[plaintiff] was suffering from an emergent medical issue that they then ignored."),
R. & R. adopted by 2025 WL 2990232 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025). Accordingly, Wilson
has not stated a claim of deliberate indifference against Miller based on the denial to
provide the asthma pump.
In sum, although there was some delay between the recommendation from the
medical staff that Wilson be seen at the hospital and his actual transport to the hospital,
Wilson has not shown that Miller was deliberately indifferent to Wilson's serious medical
needs, so the undersigned recommends dismissal of this claim.
Wilson's hospital visit
Wilson also sues Officer Ramirez and two other unidentified officers who took
Wilson to the hospital. He alleges that during the hospital visit, the officers interfered
with his care when they ordered him to be quiet. Dkt. No. 1 at 7, 10-11. Wilson also
sues these officers for "refus[ing] to call [their] supervisor to obtain permission to remove
the restraints to get a full evaluation." Id. at 7; Dkt. No. 11 at 9-10. Liberally construing
his pleadings, Wilson asserts that the officers delayed and denied him care. Because
Wilson fails to show that the officers delayed any care, and he provides no facts
supporting his assertion that he was unable to receive a full evaluation due to the officers'
conduct, these claims should be dismissed.
Wilson states the hospital nurse told the officers that Wilson needed to advise of
his injuries so that she could treat his wounds. Dkt. No. 1 at 12. Wilson then admits that
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he told her about his injuries, which she immediately triaged. Id. 	Wilson's medical
records from the hospital reflect this. Thus, Wilson's pleadings demonstrate that the
officers did not cause any delay in care when they initially spoke for Wilson.
Wilson also alleges that the officers refused to remove Wilson's hand restraints,
which prevented him from "get[ting] a full evaluation." Dkt. No. 11 at 9-10. But Wilson
admits, and his medical records corroborate, that he received X-rays, an MRI scan, and a
CT scan. 	Dkt. Nos. 1 at 12; 11 at 5. 	Wilson's medical records reflect that he had testing
done, and the hospital medical personnel determined no additional procedures were
needed based on the results of that testing. See Dkt. No. 1 at 12 (noting that he received
pain medication and was referred for a follow-up in the Smith Unit Medical Department).
Wilson offers no factual support or explanation for why the tests were unreliable. See
Dkt. No. 11 at 5 (alleging that hospital staff could not perform the X-rays correctly and
had difficulty getting the MRI but providing no detail for why the tests were deficient).
Because Wilson admits that he received care addressing his injuries and fails to
provide any facts demonstrating why that care was insufficient, he has not stated a claim
for delay or denial of care based on the officers' conduct at the hospital.
Delay in obtaining pain medication, inhaler, and follow-up appointment
Wilson alleges that after he returned to the Smith Unit from the hospital, two
unidentified female medical staff members denied Wilson's requests for pain medication
and his inhaler. Dkt. No. I at 13-14. Wilson also alleges that Miller is responsible for
failing to respond to these requests. Dkt. No. 11 at 7-8. Based on the facts alleged, these
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claims should be dismissed because Wilson has not shown that these Defendants were
deliberately indifferent.
First, Wilson fails to allege any facts demonstrating that Miller was personally
involved in prescribing or administering medications or approving medical visits. In fact,
Wilson's pleadings do not indicate that he interacted with Miller at all after Wilson
returned from the hospital. See Dkt. Nos. 1 at 12-13; 11 at 7-8. 	Rather, Wilson implies
that Miller is responsible based on his supervisory role. See Dkt. No. 11 at 7-8. Because
Wilson does not allege that Miller was personally involved or implemented an
unconstitutional policy, Wilson's claim against Miller for a delay in receiving his pain
medication, his inhaler, and a medical appointment should be dismissed. Mouille,
977 F.2d at 929; see, e.g., Evans v. Santos, No. 4:15-CV-72-DMB-JMV, 2017 WL
590301, at *10 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 14, 2017) ("[Plaintiff] cannot otherwise demonstrate
supervisory liability against ... [d]efendants because he has not identified an
unconstitutional policy or practice implemented by a supervisory official.").
Wilson alleges that "[t]he Smith Unit Medical Department refused [him his] pain
medication [and his] inhaler." Dkt. No. 1 at 12. He states that he requested a specific
pain medication-acetaminophen-from a female medical staff member while he was in
administrative segregation on July 15, 2024, and again sometime in August, but he did
not receive it. Id. at 13. But Wilson also implies in his complaint that he received
aspirin, though he would have preferred acetaminophen. See id. (stating that he asked
"for some acetaminophen (non-aspirin)" and "was told no."); Dkt. No. 11 at 6 (indicating
that, depending on who did the pill call, "the only thing they gave [him] was non
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aspirin"). 	While Wilson's complaint and questionnaire responses are contradictory as to
whether he received aspirin or acetaminophen, it's clear that he received some
medication. His medical records also reflect this. To the extent that Wilson disagrees
with the type of pain medication he received, he has failed to state a claim. Domino, 239
F.3d at 756.
Wilson has also failed to allege substantial harm. That is, he has not shown or
explained how his condition worsened due to receiving a different pain medication or a
delay in his preferred medication. See Haddix v. Kerss, 203 F. App'x 551, 553 (5th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) ("[Prisoner] has not shown that he faced a 'substantial risk of serious
harm' from the occasional denial of pain medication .... The result of the defendants'
actions was unrelieved, pre-existing, back and shoulder pain, not a worsening of his
condition or other serious harm."); Williams v. Browning, No. 03-157, 2006 WL 83433,
'
at* 1, *3 (S.D, Tex. Jan, 11, 2006) (concluding inmate with diabetes, hypertension,
anxiety, and chronic knee ailment who alleged that he was unable to timely obtain his
medications did not establish any substantial harm from the delay and failed to state a
claim for deliberate indifference), 	Wilson has thus not stated a claim based on any
alleged delay of pain medication.
Wilson also alleges that the two female medical staff members delayed in
providing Wilson's inhaler for his asthma and that he has a "hard time sleeping at night
with breathing problems" as a result. Dkt. No. 11 at 8. 	Wilson admits that he eventually
received his inhaler but does not know when. Id 	Besides his own complaints, Wilson
has not pleaded any facts suggesting that the medical staff members were subjectively
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aware of a substantial risk of harm to Wilson. 	For example, he does not allege that he
was visibly experiencing any symptoms related to his asthma. See Rogers v. Jarrett,
63 F.4th 971, 976-77 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming the grant of summary judgment on
prisoner's deliberate-indifference claim, where despite the defendants' awareness that the
prisoner had been hit in the head, he did not have a visible injury and was acting normally
such that defendants did not have subjective knowledge of the severity of the prisoner's
condition).
Because Wilson has provided no facts suggesting that the medical staff members
"appreciated that [Wilson] was suffering from an emergent medical issue that [they] then
ignored," his claim for deliberate indifference based on the delay in providing his inhaler
fails. 	Murray, 2024 WL 6901585, at* 11.
Finally, Wilson indicates that one of the female staff members refused to see him
when he submitted a request. Dkt. No. 11 at l 0. However, he provides no context for the
request, nor does he specify what harm resulted from not receiving an appointment at that
time. Because Wilson has failed to factually develop this claim, it should be dismissed.
4. 	The undersigned recommends dismissal.
The undersigned recommends that the United States District Judge dismiss
without prejudice Wilson's claims against the Smith Unit Medical Department and for
injunctive relief as moot and dismiss with prejudice all other claims.
5. 	Wilson has the right to object.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all
parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
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findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within
fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) (2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b ). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding, conclusion,
or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge's Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the
district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
Dated: March --22., 2026.
~~AMA.ND 'AMY' R. BURCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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