Cooper v. Almanza

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
J ASON D ERRELL COOPER ,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-1100-P
(Consolidated with
No. 4:25-cv-1200-P)
E RIC G UERRERO, D IRECTOR ,
T EXAS DEPARTMENT O F
CRIMINAL J USTICE -CORRECTIONAL
I NSTITUTIONS D IVISION,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the petitions of Jason Derrell Cooper
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court, having considered the petitions, the
response, the reply, the record, and applicable authorities, concludes
that the petitions must be DISMISSED as untimely.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving an 18-year sentence of imprisonment following
his conviction pursuant to a guilty plea entered December 13, 2023,
under Case No. 18286C in the 29th District Court, Palo Pinto County,
Texas, for engaging in organized criminal activity. ECF No. 16-2 at 6–8.
Petitioner did not appeal. Id. at 11.
On June 14, 2024, Petitioner signed his state habeas application.
ECF No. 16-2 at 24. (The application was received and file-marked on
June 25, 2024. Id. at 9.) On August 14, 2024, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas (“CCA”) denied the application without written order.
ECF No. 16-1.
Petitioner did not date the federal habeas petition filed under Case
No. 4:25-cv-1100-P. The envelope in which it arrived in the Clerk’s office
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reflects that it was mailed October 4, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 11. The petition
filed under Case No. 4:25-cv-1200-P reflects that it was signed October
7, 2025. No. 4:25-cv-1200-P, ECF No. 1 at 10.
LIMITATIONS
A one-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.
The period runs from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Typically, the time begins to run on the date the
judgment of conviction becomes final. United States v. Thomas, 203 F.3d
350, 351 (5th Cir. 2000). A criminal judgment becomes final when the
time for seeking direct appeal expires or when the direct appeals have
been exhausted. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987).
The time during which a properly filed application for state post-
conviction 	relief 	is 	pending 	does 	not 	count 	toward 	the 	period 	of
limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state habeas petition is pending on
the 	day 	it 	is 	filed 	through 	the 	day 	it 	is 	resolved. 	Windland 	v.
Quarterman, 	578 	F.3d 	314, 	317 	(5th 	Cir. 	2009). 	A 	properly-filed
subsequent state petition, even though dismissed as successive, counts
to toll the applicable limitations period. Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d
467, 470 (5th Cir. 1999). And, a motion for reconsideration of the denial
of a state petition also counts to toll limitations. Emerson v. Johnson,
243 F.3d 931, 935 (5th Cir. 2001). A state habeas application filed after
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limitations has expired does not entitle the petitioner to statutory
tolling. Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000).
Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy available only where
strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.
United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 2000). The
doctrine 	is 	applied 	restrictively 	and 	only 	in 	rare 	and 	exceptional
circumstances. In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2006). The
petitioner bears the burden to show that equitable tolling should apply.
Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002). To do so, the
petitioner must show that he was pursuing his rights diligently and that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented the
timely filing of his motion. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010).
Whether the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling depends upon his
diligence both before and after the extraordinary circumstance occurs.
Jackson 	v. 	Davis, 	933 	F.3d 	408, 	411 	(5th 	Cir. 	2019); 	Hardy 	v.
Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2009).
The failure to satisfy the statute of limitations must result from
factors beyond the petitioner’s control; delays of his own making do not
meet the test. In re Wilson, 442 F.3d at 875. Equitable tolling applies
principally where the petitioner is actively misled by the government or
is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights. Fierro
v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2002); Patterson, 211 F.3d at 930.
Neither excusable neglect nor ignorance of the law is sufficient to justify
equitable tolling. Fierro, 294 F.3d at 682. Lack of legal acumen and
unfamiliarity with legal process are not sufficient justification to toll
limitations. United States v. Petty, 530 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2008);
Alexander, 294 F.3d at 629. Ineffective assistance is irrelevant to the
determination of a right to equitable tolling because a prisoner has no
right to counsel during post-conviction proceedings. Petty, 530 F.3d at
366. Transfers and delays in receiving paperwork are parts of prison life
and are not rare and extraordinary. Wallace v. United States, 981 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (N.D. Ala. 2013); United States v. Cockerham, No.
SA-12-CA-714-WRF, 2012 WL 12867870, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27,
2012). Equitable tolling applies to limitations of prison library access
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only when those limitations actually prevented the timely filing of a
petition. Krause v. Thaler, 637 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2011).
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized actual innocence as an
equitable exception to the statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). To meet the actual innocence exception to
limitations, the petitioner must show that, in light of new evidence, no
juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 386–87. “Actual innocence” means factual
innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Moreover, such a claim requires the petitioner to
support 	his 	allegations 	with 	new 	reliable 	evidence 	that 	was 	not
presented at trial. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner did not appeal the underlying conviction; therefore, his
judgment became final on January 12, 2024, thirty days after it was
entered. T EX . R. APP . P. 68.2(a). Absent tolling, he had until January 13,
2025, in which to file his federal habeas petition.1 Because Petitioner’s
state habeas application was pending from June 14, 2024, through
August 14, 2024, when it was denied, 62 days are added to the
limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Since March 16, 2025, was a
Sunday, the deadline for filing the federal habeas petition became
March 17, 2025. Giving Petitioner the benefit of the October 4, 2025 date
stamp on the envelope transmitting his first federal petition, the filing
was still over 200 days late.
In the section of the form petition titled “Timeliness of Petition,”
providing space for an explanation why limitations does not bar the
petition, Petitioner makes the conclusory allegation that from early
2024 until mid-December 2024 he could not withdraw money from his
account. No. 4:25-cv-1200-P, ECF No. 1 at 9. (In No. 4:25-cv-1100-P,
Petitioner alleges that he was not permitted to withdraw funds from
“somewhere between March until December 2, 2024.” ECF No. 1 at 9.)
He fails to explain what relevance that has to the running of limitations.
1 January 12, 2025, was a Sunday. See FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a).
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The Court is not aware of a filing fee for a state habeas application.2
That Petitioner did file his state habeas application in June 2024,
conflicts with the allegation that inability to withdraw funds somehow
impeded him. And, although there is a nominal filing fee for a federal
habeas petition, there is no requirement that the fee be paid up front.
Instead, most habeas petitions are filed without a filing fee being
submitted. In any event, the alleged freezing of the account in 2024 has
no relevance to the late filing in 2025. Petitioner has not shown that
anything but his own inattention prevented his timely filing. Holland,
560 U.S. at 653–54 (burden on petitioner to present facts sufficient to
show extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling). He has
not shown diligence both before and after the filing of his state habeas
application. See Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278, 287–88 (5th Cir.
2007) (a petitioner cannot squander the one-year grace period); Stroman
v. Thaler, 603 F.3d 299, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2010) (filing state habeas
application with only five months of the limitations period remaining
indicated a lack of diligence).
To 	the 	extent 	Petitioner 	is 	claiming 	entitlement 	to 	the 	actual
innocence gateway to overcome the limitations bar, ECF No. 18, he has
not shown with new reliable evidence that he is factually innocent.
McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386–87; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. At best, he
appears to be arguing a new legal theory. But theory without evidence
does not meet the test.3 See Forbes v. Davis, No. 4:16-cv-0006-A, 2017
WL 244856, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2017).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the petition is DISMISSED as untimely.
The Court need not reach the merits of the claims.
Further, for the reasons discussed herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2 Article 11.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits clerks from
requiring a filing fee for habeas applications.
3 Given Petitioner’s guilty plea, it seems highly unlikely that he could meet the test in
any event.
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§ 2553(c), a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 25th day of February 2026.
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