Ruland v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
LINDA R., 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§
§ 	No. 4:25-CV-1003-O-BW
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Reverse with Remand
and Enter Judgment filed on March 9, 2026. (Dkt. No. 20 (“Mot.”).) Defendant
seeks a remand pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Id. at 1.) The
undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the Court grant the motion.
In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1991), the Supreme Court made
clear that there are only two types of remand orders permitted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The first method arises under “[t]he fourth sentence of § 405(g) [that]
authorizes a court to enter ‘a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing.’” Id. at 98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). A sentence four remand “requires
the district court to enter a decision on the merits before remanding a case to the
Commissioner.” Schriner v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:08-CV-2042-N, 2010 WL
2941120, at *15 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2010) (citing Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98),
adopted, 2010 WL 2944782 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2010).
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The second method arises under the sixth sentence of § 405(g) and “may be
ordered in only two situations: where the [Commissioner] requests a remand before
answering the complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for
good cause not presented before the agency.” Shalala v. Shaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297
n.2 (1993) (citing § 405(g) and Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 99-100). Under sentence six,
“[t]he district court does not . . . rule in any way as to the correctness of the
administrative determination. Rather, the court remands” the case for
reconsideration if the “new evidence might have changed the outcome of the prior
proceeding.” Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98; see also McKenzie v. Astrue, 442 F. App’x
161, 162 (5th Cir. 2011). The “[i]mmediate entry of judgment (as opposed to entry
of judgment after post-remand agency proceedings have been completed and their
results filed with the court) is the principal feature that distinguishes a sentence-four
remand from a sentence-six remand.” Chelette v. United States Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:11-CV-1860, 2012 WL 2870842, at *2 (W.D. La. June 12, 2012) (citing Shaefer, 509
U.S. at 296-97 and Istre v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2000)), adopted, 2012 WL
2873635 (W.D. La. July 12, 2012).
Here, Defendant seeks remand pursuant to the fourth sentence of § 405(g), and
his motion is unopposed. (See Mot. at 2-3.) Having considered the Defendant’s
motion and noting that it is unopposed, the undersigned magistrate judge
RECOMMENDS that the Court grant the motion, reverse the Commissioner’s
decision, and remand it to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
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SO RECOMMENDED on March 11, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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