Morgan v. TopGolf International, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
O SCAR M ORGAN III,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-00206-P
T OPGOLF I NTERNATIONAL ,
I NC., ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On October 29, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge issued
Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendation (“FCR”) in this case,
recommending that Defendants Topgolf International, Inc., Top Golf
USA, Inc., Topgolf USA Ft. Worth, LLC, and Jane Doe, as an unnamed
employee (together, “Topgolf”), Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) be
denied in part and granted in part. ECF No. 25. Topgolf filed Objections
to the FCR on November 11, 2025. ECF No. 26. The Court accordingly
conducted a de novo review of the FCR. As detailed below, the Court will
ADOPT the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR and OVERRULE
Topgolf’s Objections.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Oscar Morgan III filed a complaint against Topgolf on May
6, 2025. ECF No. 25. at 1. Topgolf filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 6,
2025. ECF No. 25. at 1. Then, on May 27, 2025, Morgan filed an
Amended Complaint. ECF No. 25. at 1. On August 19, 2025, Morgan
filed a Second Amended complaint, which is now the live pleading. ECF
No. 25. at 1.
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In the Second Amended Complaint, Morgan alleges the following: (1)
claims pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) against the Topgolf for public accommodation discrimination
and, alternatively, for vicarious liability for Jane Doe’s discriminatory
conduct; (2) a claim for racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 in the making and enforcement of contracts against Topgolf; and
(3) a claim against all Defendants for tortious interference with a
prospective business. ECF No. 20 at 1, 13.
On September 2, 2025, Topgolf filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 22. Defendants argued that (1)
Morgan did not have standing to bring a claim under Title III of the
ADA, (2) Morgan failed to state a claim under Title III of the ADA, and
(3) Morgan failed to state facts showing the elements of a racial
discrimination claim under § 1981. ECF No. 22. at 2–3.
On October 29, 2025, Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton issued the
FCR in this case, recommending that Topgolf’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 22) be denied in part and granted in part. ECF No. 25. Topgolf filed
objections to the FCR on November 11, 2025. ECF No. 26. The Court
accordingly conducted a de novo review of the FCR.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s FCR
A Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations
for a dispositive matter are reviewed de novo if a party timely objects.
FED. R. CIV . P. 72(b)(3). The district court may then accept, reject, or
modify the recommendations or findings in whole or in part. Id. The
Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in objections
to the FCR. See United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir.
1992). When specific objections are filed as to part of the Magistrate
Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation, then the Court
reviews those parts de novo.
B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV . P. 12(b)(6).
This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim
for relief in federal court. Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement
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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV .
P. 8(a)(2); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002)
(holding that Rule 8(a)’s simplified standard applies to most civil
actions). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded, non-conclusory
allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale
Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff must, however, plead specific facts, not mere conclusory
allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278,
281 (5th Cir. 1992). Indeed, Plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id.
at 	555 	(cleaned 	up). 	The 	Court 	need 	not 	credit 	bare 	conclusory
allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only
the complaint and its proper attachments.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities,
Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
A. Review of Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge entered an FCR recommending that Topgolf’s
Motion to Dismiss be partially granted and partially denied. ECF No. 25
at 1. The Court adopts and accepts the reasoning in the Magistrate
Judge’s FCR and reviews Topgolf’s objections in the order they were
raised.
B. Defendant’s Objections
Topgolf raised the following objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that the Court deny: (1) Topgolf’s motion to dismiss
Morgan’s 	ADA 	claim on 	the basis that Morgan 	has 	standing; (2)
Topgolf’s motion to dismiss Morgan’s Title III of the ADA claim on the
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basis that Morgan sufficiently alleged facts; and (3) Topgolf’s motion to
dismiss Morgan’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 on the basis that Morgan sufficiently
alleged facts. ECF No. 26 at 2, 5–6. Topgolf’s objections are essentially
that the Magistrate 	Judge incorrectly concluded that Morgan has
standing and properly pleaded his Title III ADA and § 1981 claims. They
are largely a restatement of Topgolf’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 22.
1. 	Plaintiff has standing to bring a claim under Title III of the ADA.
Topgolf’s first objection states that the FCR errs in finding that
Morgan has standing to pursue an ADA claim. ECF No. 22 at 2. Topgolf
contends that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly found that Morgan was
deterred from returning to Topgolf after he alleged (1) he “genuinely
desires and intends to return to the Topgolf facility in Fort Worth” but
is deterred from doing so based on the “discriminatory treatment” and
“facility’s failure to reasonably accommodate his apparent disability”
and (2) he “frequently travels to Texas and other states where Topgolf
operates facilities, and he intends to return to the Fort Worth location”
but remains 	deterred 	because 	“Defendants 	have 	not addressed 	or
corrected the discriminatory practices . . . .” ECF No. 22 at 2.1
Topgolf asserts that Morgan’s unwillingness to return is insufficient
to demonstrate deterrence and thus confer standing. Topgolf tries to
distinguish two cases cited by the Magistrate Judge from this case,
Smith v. Bd. of Comm’rs of La. Stadium and Exposition Dist., 371 F.
Supp. 3d 313, 321 (E.D. La. 2019), and George v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 769 F. Supp. 3d 537, 545–46 (E.D. La. 2025). While these cases may
show clearer connections between deterrence and a failure to provide an
accommodation, these cases were used to establish the “deterrent effect”
test for claims under Title III of the ADA, not to analogize the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims. In both cases, the courts found that plaintiffs who
alleged disability discrimination and that discrimination deterred them
1Topgolf 	argues 	that 	the 	recommendation 	was 	based 	on 	conclusory
statements. The Court notes that Topgolf’s contention may be meritorious.
But, as the FCR correctly notes, Morgan’s pleading is sufficient to state a claim
at this stage. ECF No. 20. However, at this stage, the court draws all inferences
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Topgolf’s arguments are better presented at the
summary judgment stage.
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from returning were sufficient to grant standing. Smith, 371 F. Supp.
3d at 323–24; George, 769 F. Supp. 3d at 545–46.
“Title III of the ADA authorizes plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief
against places of public accommodation operated by private entities.”
Smith, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 321. To establish standing, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury
and conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be addressed by a
favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992). “A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, unlike a plaintiff seeking
damages, must establish more than the existence of a past wrong to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.” Singleton v. Cannizzaro, No. 17-
10721, 2020 WL 3047453, at *3 (E.D. La. June 8, 2020). Courts in the
Fifth Circuit rely on Frame v. City of Arlington to analyze whether a
Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA.
657 F.3d 215, 235–36 nn.100–03 (5th Cir. 2011); Smith, 371 F. Supp. 3d
at 321–22.
“In light of Frame, district courts in the Fifth Circuit have generally
adopted the ‘deterrent effect’ test in Title III cases under the ADA.”
Smith, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 323. “Under the ‘deterrent effect’ test,
plaintiffs need only show that they were deterred from accessing public
accommodation to show standing.” Badalementi v. La. Dep’t of Wildlife
and Fisheries, No. 19-10849, 2021 WL 4742930, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 12,
2021); see George, 769 F. Supp. 3d at 545–46 (finding that a plaintiff had
standing to state a Title III ADA claim when he had “alleged that he
would return to [Defendant’s] store if he could”); see also Smith v.
France, 850 F. App'x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2021) aff’g in part, vacating in
part, Smith v. Bd. of Comm’rs of La. Stadium and Exposition Dist., 371
F. Supp. 3d 313 (E.D. La. 2019) (holding that a plaintiff had standing to
pursue a Title III ADA claim when she visited a venue 10 to 15 times in
her lifetime and planned to return if able).
Here, Morgan alleged that he “has been a frequent patron and
member of Topgolf facilities across the United States” for more than ten
years, “frequently travels to Texas and other states where Topgolf
operates facilities, and [] intends to return to the Fort Worth location in
the future.” ECF No. 20 at 4, 7. He “genuinely desires and intends to
return to the Topgolf facility in Fort Worth,” but “the discriminatory
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treatment 	he 	experienced, 	combined 	with 	the 	facility’s 	failure 	to
reasonably accommodate his apparent disability, has deterred him from
returning.” ECF No. 20 at 7. Morgan also alleged that he “remains
deterred from patronizing the Fort Worth facility because Defendants
have not addressed or corrected the discriminatory practices, creating a
continuing and imminent threat of unequal treatment.” ECF No. 20 at
7. This is sufficient to show a “deterrent effect” and establish standing.
Having reviewed these authorities and the record in this case, the
Court agrees that Morgan has standing to bring a claim. Accordingly,
Topgolf’s objection as to standing is OVERRULED.
2. 	Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim under Title III of the ADA.
Topgolf objects to the finding that Morgan sufficiently alleged a claim
under Title III of the ADA. ECF No. 26 at 5. To state a claim under Title
III of the ADA, a plaintiff must plead: (1) that he has a disability; (2)
that the place the defendant owns, leases, or operates is a place of public
accommodation; and (3) that he was denied full and equal enjoyment
because of his disability. George, 769 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
Here, Morgan has alleged that he is a disabled veteran. ECF No. 20
at 4. His disability limits his ability to walk, stand, and bend. ECF No.
20 at 4. Morgan has also alleged that his disabilities are readily visible
to others, including Topgolf and its employees, because he demonstrates
restricted gait, limited range of motion, and visible mobility impairment.
ECF No. 20 at 4. Morgan has also pleaded that the Topgolf Fort Worth
facility is a place of public accommodation. ECF No. 20 at 4. Finally,
Morgan has alleged that he was asked to surrender his credit card. ECF
No. 20 at 5. There was no signage indicating that this was a policy, and
no policy was identified by Jane Doe. ECF No. 20 at 5. He alleged that
the discrimination was due to his disability because other non-disabled
patrons were not required to surrender their cards. ECF No. 20 at 5.
Morgan has thus alleged that (1) he has a qualifying disability; (2)
Topgolf 	is 	a 	place 	of 	public 	accommodation; 	and 	(3) 	he 	faced
discrimination because of his disability, as other non-disabled patrons
were treated differently.
The 	Court 	agrees 	that 	Morgan 	has 	sufficiently 	alleged 	facts
regarding his claims under Title III of the ADA to survive a 12(b)(6)
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motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Topgolf’s objection as to failure to state
a claim under Title III of the ADA is OVERRULED.
3. 	Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim under § 1981.
Topgolf objects to the finding that Morgan sufficiently alleged a claim
under § 1981. ECF No. 26 at 6. To establish a claim under § 1981, a
plaintiff must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) the
plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate
on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerns
one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute,” which, in this
case, is the making and enforcement of a contract. Green v. State Bar of
Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994); see Morris v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2001).
Morgan has alleged that (1) he is a “Black U.S. Army veteran”; (2) he
“was subjected to a discriminatory condition not imposed upon similarly
situated 	non-Black 	patrons 	in 	the 	same 	vicinity, 	namely, 	the
requirement that he surrender a credit card before being served” while
“[n]on-Black patrons were allowed to order and consume food without
providing a credit card in advance;” and (3) the discrimination interfered
with his intent to “form a contractual relationship by purchasing food
and beverages.” ECF No. 20 at 12.
The Court agrees that Morgan has alleged sufficient facts to survive
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Topgolf’s objection as to
Morgan’s failure to state a § 1981 claim is OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION
Having conducted a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s FCR,
Topgolf’s Objections, and Morgan’s Response, the Court ADOPTS the
reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR and OVERRULES Topgolf’s
Objections. Accordingly, Topgolf’s Motion is DENIED IN PART and
GRANTED IN PART.
SO ORDERED on this 4th day of February 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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