Tesfa v. Bondi et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NAHOM NAYZGI TESFA, 	§
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:26-cv-1012-K-BN
§
PAMELA JO BONDI, U.S. Attorney 	§
General, ET AL., 	§
§
Respondents. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Nahom Nayzgi Tesfa, with the assistance of counsel, filed a habeas
petition action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on March 30, 2026, challenging his continued
detention without a bond hearing as unlawful. See Dkt. No. 1.
Tesfa also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (the “TRO Motion”). See Dkt. No. 2.
United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred the petition and TRO
Motion to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. See Dkt. No. 3.
The undersigned recommends that the Court deny the TRO Motion [Dkt. No.
2].
The TRO Motion seeks the same relief as the habeas petition – Tesfa’s
immediate release from custody or a bond hearing. Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 5
(“Petitioner therefore seeks habeas relief ordering his immediate release from ICE
custody or, in the alternative, an order directing Respondents to provide him with a
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prompt, constitutionally adequate, and individualized custody determination before
a neutral decisionmaker with authority to order release.”) with Dkt. No. 2 at 7 (“[T]his
Court 	should 	issue 	a 	[TRO] 	at 	the 	earliest 	possible 	opportunity, 	requiring
Respondents to provide [Tesfa]an immediate bond hearing or release.”).
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable
injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the
merits.” Canal Auth. of State of Fl. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974)
(cleaned up).
So the decision on a motion seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction does “not
amount to a ruling on the merits” of a plaintiff’s claims, Jonibach Mgmt. Trust v.
Wartburg Enters., Inc., 750 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2014), considering that “the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary
injunction are not binding at trial on the merits” and “may be challenged at a later
stage of the proceedings,” id. (cleaned up).
In short, a TRO or preliminary injunction is not a device “to give a plaintiff
the ultimate relief he seeks” through his claims. Peters v. Davis, No. 6:17-cv-595,
2018 WL 11463602, at 2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2018); accord Lindell v. United States,
82 F.4th 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2023) (“This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo; it is not to give the movant
the ultimate relief he seeks.”); Kane v. De Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 163 (2d Cir. 2021)
(“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to award the movant the ultimate
relief sought in the suit but is only to preserve the status quo by preventing during
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the pendency of the suit the occurrence of that irreparable sort of harm which the
movant fears will occur.” (cleaned up)). And, so, a motion or application for a TRO or
preliminary injunction is properly denied when it is no more than a “motion to win.”
“Specifically, a court cannot render ultimate relief sought in a habeas petition
– releasing a detainee – in the form of a preliminary injunction or TRO.” Saechao v.
Noem, 2026 WL 602783, at *1 (citations omitted); accord Cano Alvarez v. S. La.
Processing Ctr., No. 26-696, 2026 WL 660752, at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 9, 2026) (“The
Petitioner’s request for immediate release is improper because one cannot skip the
line by dressing a habeas petition in TRO clothes.” (citations omitted)).
And, so, undersigned recommends that the TRO Motion [Dkt. No. 2] should be
denied.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
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adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 31, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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